Książka = Book ; KS/2/1992/R04
Instytut Badań Systemowych. Polska Akademia Nauk ; Systems Research Institute. Polish Academy of Sciences
23-34 pages ; 21 cm ; Bibliography p. 33-34
In a two-person game with bargaining, C-optimal threat decision pairs are defined. The definition is compared with that of optima! threat decision pairs in the sense of Nash. In the case of differentia! games, a sufficiency condition for C-optimality of a threat strategy pair is given and illustrated by an example of collective bargaining.
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Systems Research Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences
Library of Systems Research Institute PAS
15 paź 2021
15 lip 2021
38
https://rcin.org.pl./publication/234109
Vilums, Evalds Gorbatyuk, Vyacheslav Borisov, Arkady