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**THE TATAR MILITARY ART OF WAR
IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD: AN EXAMPLE
OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE***

Abstract

The present analysis of military operations carried out by Tatar Hordes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has shown that these operations were basically shaped by asymmetric actions. Their main characteristics were secrecy of action up to the moment of attack, use of information-and-intelligence warfare struggle instruments, a total character of operations taken against civilians, their material resources and economic infrastructure, with use of terrorist tactics and means of psychological impact that aimed at intimidating the community under attack. The actions of Tatar Hordes were primarily focused on non-military aspects and took advantage not only of classic military tools but also a combination of political measures and instruments as well as those typical of economy, these including a variety of economic and demographic pressures. Pursuing asymmetric action was in the hands of the Giray (Gerey) dynasty one of the most important tools enabling them to efficiently achieve their political goals in the international arena and to support the economic development of the Crimean Khanate through permanent transfers of slaves and tangible property of various sorts.

Keywords: asymmetric warfare, Tatar military art of war in the early modern period, organised violence, war amongst the people, south-eastern borderlands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

Beginning with the late 1990s, the problem of asymmetric threats and conflicts has been more and more often discussed in publications on political science and security studies. Not only has the term ‘asymmetric warfare’ itself become extremely popular among researchers

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and experts in polemology¹ but it is also omnipresent in the media discourse because of contemporary terrorism, especially after the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the beginning of the so-called War on Terror. The origin of the term ‘asymmetric conflict’ dates back to 1975 when an American scholar in international security studies, Andrew J.R. Mack, published his article in the journal *World Politics*.² He wrote about the asymmetric conflict understood as a significant disparity in resource power between belligerents in the context of U.S. military intervention in Vietnam (1965–73), and its various strategic interactions.³ This innovatory concept remained ignored in the research community of political science and international relations until the end of the Cold War when, in the opinion of some researchers, the character of war and form of armed conflicts began to change completely.⁴

In the history of warfare and military affairs, asymmetric conflicts have a very long tradition dating back to the beginning of human civilisation, and the term itself can be regarded as clichéd and not particularly revealing.⁵ Suffice it to mention the biblical battle of David, armed with a slingshot, against the powerful Goliath, or the military conflict in the Gaza Strip (*Operation Protective Edge*) between Palestinians of the Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Israeli Army, of summer 2014. The fierce fighting then conducted, also against civilian targets on both sides, was a military confrontation of mostly lightly armed Palestinian militants using rocket weapons clashed with an ultra-modern Israeli weaponry based on solutions using, predominantly, precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and stealth (low observable) technology related to network-centric warfare. In this

¹ Polemology is a rapidly developing field of knowledge relating to the multi-disciplinary study of war and military conflicts, their motivations and mechanisms considered in the political, social, economic and psychological dimensions.

² Andrew J.R. Mack, ‘Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict’, *World Politics*, xxvii, 2 (1975), 175–200.

³ *Ibidem*, 182–8.

⁴ See Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge, 1999), 1–12, 69–111; Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars* (Malden, 2005), 1. Cf. Stathis N. Kalyvas, ‘“New” and “Old” Civil Wars. A Valid Distinction?’, *World Politics*, liv (2001), 99–118; Edward Newman, ‘The New Wars Debate. A Historical Perspective is Needed’, *Security Dialogue*, xxxv, 2 (2004), 174–9.

⁵ Vincent J. Goulding, ‘Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare’, *Parameters*, xxx, 4 (2000), 21–30.

classical approach, based on a paradigm developed in the 1970s, one that remained dominant until the turn of the twenty-first century, and which is typical for studies in the history of wars and traditional armed conflicts (and discussed from a strictly military perspective of the sizes of involved military potentials), asymmetric warfare was understood as carrying out effective operations despite a substantial disproportion in military strengths as well as in the type and quality of weapons used by the opponents.⁶

I

THE CONCEPT OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE IN CONTEMPORARY SECURITY STUDIES AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Although modern security studies and, to a certain extent, the global debate on 'new wars' has not yet developed one common, coherent concept of the term 'asymmetric warfare', after the attacks of 11 September 2001 there has prevailed a considerably narrow perspective of asymmetry in military affairs. In this paradigm asymmetric warfare is perceived and analysed in the context of dissimilarity in targets, which entails the transition of the area of operations, by forces posing asymmetric threats, from the traditional battlefield to an alternative space dominated by civilians as the main target of operations.⁷ It is this type of asymmetry, defined in view of alternative military operations, different areas of military impact and relevant operational targets, that is the subject of this work. In great measure, such a perspective corresponds with the definition of asymmetric conflicts currently used worldwide in security studies and political science (or, politology),⁸ and also present in the normative acts of the North

⁶ Winn Schwartau, 'Asymmetrical Adversaries', *Orbis*, xlv, 2 (2000), 197–204.

⁷ Franklin B. Miles, *Asymmetric Warfare. An Historical Perspective* (Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1999), 2–4; Steven Metz, 'Strategic Asymmetry', *Military Review*, lxxxi, 4 (2000), 9–12; Roger W. Barnett, *Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power* (Washington, DC, 2003), 15–18; David L. Buffaloe, 'Defining asymmetric warfare', *The Land Warfare Papers*, lviii (2006), 17; Rod Thornton, 'Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Response in the 21st Century', *Polity Press* (2007), 1–5. See also Marek Madej, *Zagrożenia asymetryczne bezpieczeństwa państw obszaru transatlantyckiego* (Warszawa, 2007), 34.

⁸ Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, *Asymmetry and US Military Strategy: Definition, Background and Strategic Concepts* (Carlisle, 2001), 5; Steven Metz, 'La guerre asymétrique et l'avenir de l'Occident', *Politique Étrangère*, lxxviii, 1 (2003),

Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) that define the asymmetric threats and asymmetric warfare.⁹

However, the question is worth considering whether the building of a theoretical framework and concepts of asymmetric conflicts in complete disregard of the actual potentials of the belligerents is an apt and logical solution. In my opinion, one cannot deny the fact that in the historical perspective, the origins of the evolutionary process of development of asymmetry in military systems were stimulated by challenges related to considerable and hard-to-balance disproportions in the forces the opponents had at their disposal. This was combined with possessing by the militarily and economically stronger opponent of a more technologically advanced armament. Therefore, I personally believe that the concept of asymmetry in military science and practice (and in akin areas), with its key notions of asymmetric conflict/action, ought to combine, to an extent, elements of imbalance and disproportion in the military potentials characteristic of the belligerents, and the phenomenon consisting in the weaker opponent's strife to undermine the sources of the enemy's powerfulness through targeting its weak and/or vulnerable points.¹⁰ The latter is delivered with use of non-standard strategies and methods that are in most cases aimed at the civilians and, quite importantly, are significantly different from the *modi operandi* and procedures applied by the stronger party.

The Tatar art of war in the early modern period has been studied by historians since the early nineteenth century. It was discussed in the works of Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, British and American historians, among them Kazimierz Władysław Wójcicki,¹¹ Olgierd Górka,¹²

27; Colin S. Gray, 'Thinking Asymmetrically in the Times of Terror', *Parameters*, xxxii, 1 (2001), 6–7; Bruce W. Bennett, 'Responding to Asymmetric Threats', in Stuart E. Johnson, Martin Libicki, and Gregory F. Treverton (eds.), *New Challenges: New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking* (Santa Monica, 2003), 33–7; Toni Pfanner, 'Asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of humanitarian law and humanitarian action', *International Review of the Red Cross*, lxxxvii, 857 (2005), 151–2.

⁹ 'Joint Vision 2020', *Joint Force Quarterly*, 25 (2000), 60; *Joint Publications 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 8 November 2010 (As Amended Through 15 February 2016)* (Washington, 2016), 17.

¹⁰ Cf. Joseph S. Nye, *Konflikty międzynarodowe. Wprowadzenie do teorii i historii*, trans. M. Madej (Warszawa, 2009) 391.

¹¹ Kazimierz Władysław Wójcicki, 'Tatarzy', *Biblioteka Warszawska*, i (1842), 153–83.

¹² Olgierd Górka, 'Liczebność Tatarów krymskich i ich wojsk', *Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy*, viii, 2 (1936), 185–295.

Stefan Maria Kuczyński,¹³ Jerzy Ochmański,¹⁴ Ivan Krypyakevych and Bogdan Gnatevych,¹⁵ Ryszard Majewski,¹⁶ Leslie Collins,¹⁷ Alan W. Fisher,¹⁸ S.A. Ishchenko,¹⁹ Rhoads Murphey,²⁰ Marek Wagner,²¹ Michael Khodarkovsky,²² Oleksandr Galenko,²³ Viktor Zaruba,²⁴ Victor Ostapchuk,²⁵ Ivan Storozhenko,²⁶ Marcin Gawęda,²⁷ Vytałyi Penskoj,²⁸

¹³ Stefan Maria Kuczyński, 'Tatarzy pod Zbarażem', *Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy*, viii, 2 (1936), 121–44.

¹⁴ Jerzy Ochmański, 'Organizacja obrony w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim przed napadami Tatarów krymskich w XV–XVI wieku', *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości*, v (1960), 355–67.

¹⁵ Иван Крипякевич and Богдан Гнатович, *Історія українського війська*, i (Київ, 1994), 213–26.

¹⁶ Ryszard Majewski, 'Z problematyki walk z Tatarami w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku', *Sobótka*, xxx (1975), 231–41.

¹⁷ Leslie J.D. Collins, 'The Military Organization and Tactics of the Crimean Tatars, 16th–17th Centuries', in Vernon J. Parry and Malcolm E. Yapp (eds.), *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East* (London, New York, and Toronto, 1975), 258–76.

¹⁸ Alan W. Fisher, *Crimean Tatars* (Stanford, 1978), 27–32.

¹⁹ С.А. Ищенко, 'Война и военное дело у крымских татар XVI–XVIII вв.', in Г.А. Федоров (ed.), *Северное Причерноморье и Поволжье во взаимоотношениях Востока и Запада в XII–XVI веках* (Ростов-на-Дону, 1989), 136–45.

²⁰ Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare 1500–1700* (New Brunswick, 1999), 150–1.

²¹ Marek Wagner, 'Chronologia i zasięg najazdów tatarskich na ziemie polskie w latach 1684–1696', in *idem*, *W cieniu szukamy jasności i chwały. Studia z dziejów panowania Jana III Sobieskiego (1684–1696)* (Siedlce, 2002), 77–88; *idem*, *Wojna polsko-turecka w latach 1672–1676*, i (Zabrze, 2009), 144–56.

²² Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800* (Bloomington, 2002), 17–21.

²³ Олександр І. Галенко, 'Про татарські набіги на українські землі', *Український історичний журнал*, 6 (2003), 52–68.

²⁴ Віктор Заруба, *Українське козацьке військо в російсько-турецьких війнах останньої чверті XVII століття* (Київ, 2003), 199–212.

²⁵ Victor Ostapchuk, 'Crimean Tatar Long Range Campaigns. The View from Remmal Khoja's History of Sahib Gerey Khan', *Journal of Turkish Studies*, xxix (2005), 271–87.

²⁶ Иван С. Стороженко, *Богдан Хмельницький і Запорозька Січ кінця XVI-середины XVII століть*, ii (Дніпропетровск, 2007), 119–36.

²⁷ Marcin Gawęda, 'Wojskowość tatarska w XVII wieku', *Rocznik Przemyski*, xlv (2009), 121–44.

²⁸ Виталий Пенской, 'Военный потенциал Крымского Ханства в конце XV – начале XVII в.', *Восток*, 2 (2010), 56–66.

and, lately, Andrzej Gliwa²⁹ and Leonid Bobrov.³⁰ Most of the researchers focused mainly on analysing problems related to the size, combat capability and weaponry of Tatar troops, and not so much on the organisation of intelligence and logistics. Significantly, to date, asymmetric operations present in Tatar warfare have not become a subject of interest and research among historians. Even if a certain uniqueness of the Tatar art of war was noticed by some researchers, they discussed it without realising its asymmetric character and with no attempt to explain the problem. Trying to understand the lack of reflection on this important aspect of Tatar warfare in historiography, it is possible to draw an analogy to the approach characteristic for colonialism or Orientalism. Such an approach consisted in, for instance, contrasting Eastern barbarism with the civilised European methods, and in a general belittling of the Tatar military system as an efficient war machine.³¹

II

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS AND PERCEPTION OF THE OBSERVERS

In this context, it seems incredible that the specificity and uniqueness of Tatar warfare was already noticed by people living in the late Middle Ages and the early modern era, who were eyewitnesses to Tatar military operations. It can be proved, e.g., by the following note written down in 1498 by an anonymous town councillor and included in the *Rocznik krośnieński* ('Krosno Year-Book'): *Scytharum seu Thartarorum gens furax potius quam militaris* [emphasis – AG], *totam Russiam ad Pylszno usque ferro ignique vastarunt*.³² Worth mentioning are

²⁹ Andrzej Gliwa, 'O wojskowości tatarskiej w epoce nowożytnej i oddziaływaniu koczowniców na osiadłe społeczności Rzeczypospolitej', in Iwona Dacka-Górzyńska, Andrzej Karpiński, and Mirosław Nagielski (eds.), *Spółczesność i wojna. Społeczeństwo a wojsko*, n.s., iv (Warszawa, 2015), 89–133.

³⁰ Леонид А. Бобров, *Тактическое искусство крымских татар и ногаев конца XV – середины XVII вв.*, in К.В. Нагорный, В. Пенской, and А.Н. Лобин (eds.), *История военного дела: исследования и источники*, v, 2 (Санкт-Петербург, 2016), 210–388.

³¹ See Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, 'Introduction', in *idem*, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania. International Diplomacy on the European Periphery Century (15th–18th Century)*. *A Study of Peace Treaties Followed by Annotated Documents* (Leiden and Boston, 2011), xiii–xiv.

³² 'Rocznik krośnieński', in *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*, iii (Lwów, 1878), 250.

also the observations on the specificity of Tatar warfare made by some experts in military issues related to the Polish-Tatar-Ottoman border zone and dating back to as far as the seventeenth century. When discussing the specifics of the Tatar military operations, they wrote about a specific ‘manner of Tatar war’ (*maniera wojny tatarskiej/manière de faire la guerre des Tatares*) which, in their opinion, considerably differed from military operations carried out by the armies of Christian states. Among them were the excellent French cartographer Guillaume de Beauplan,³³ military engineer Jean Dupont,³⁴ and Grand Crown Hetman Stanislaw Jan Jabłonowski.³⁵ The authority elite of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were obviously aware of the unconventional style of military actions pursued by Tatars against civilians. This is attested by an excerpt of a warning *uniwersał* (‘universal proclamation’) issued by King Sigismund III on 20 September 1618, which in the face of the impending Tatar invasion, summoned the nobility of the Ruthenian palatinate to take proactive action against the Tatars – for, the king emphasised, “this is about the wealths and treasuries of Youre Allegy[ance] and Loya[ltie], about the wives and the little-ones and even the selves”.³⁶ In my opinion, the nature of the Tatar way of waging war was shaped in large degree by the action nowadays referred to as asymmetric warfare.³⁷ This is mainly due to the fact that the nature of conflicts generally determines the kind of tactics used by military forces.

Among the indicators of such asymmetric military operations was a tendency to avoid close combat against regular enemy troops, be it the Crown army, county or private units (especially in urbanised

³³ Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan, *A Description of Ukraine*, introd., trans. and notes by Andrew B. Pernal and Dennis F. Essar (Cambridge, MA, 1993), 52.

³⁴ Philippe Dupont, *Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de la vie et des actions de Jean Sobieski III. du nom, Roi de Pologne, par ... attaché à ce prince en qualité d’ingénieur en chef de l’artillerie*, ed. by Ignacy Janicki (Varsovie, 1885), 237.

³⁵ Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych [Central Archives of Historical Records; hereinafter: AGAD], Archiwum Publiczne Potockich [Public Archive of the Potocki Family], ref. no. 163a, vol. 26, p. 236.

³⁶ Центральний державний історичний архів України [Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine; hereinafter: TsDIAL], fond 13, op. 1, vol. 335, p. 1649.

³⁷ For methodological legitimacy of use of the notion ‘asymmetric warfare’ with respect to conflicts occurring in earlier periods, see Rory Cox, ‘Asymmetric Warfare and Military Conduct in Middle Ages’, *Journal of Medieval History*, xxxviii, 1 (2012), 100–25.

areas, where the effectiveness of Tatar warriors was considerably lower), along with reluctance to attack reinforced targets, mostly in order to minimise one's own potential losses. In this context, it is worth to invoke a statement (called *confessata*) by a Polish nobleman named Kamieński, shedding some light on how Tatars themselves understood and perceived the operations defined today as asymmetric. Kamieński, not known by his first name, was taken prisoner by the Tatars in the Podlasie region in 1617, adopted Islam and worked in the Crimea as a stableman. In 1629, he participated in an autumn foray of the joint forces of the Crimean and Budjak Hordes into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. During the invasion he served the Tatars as their guide (*kylawuz* in Turkish and Tatar) but near the village of Uście (Ustya-Zelene) on the Dniester, when the Tatar troops were retreating, he was taken prisoner by the soldiers of the Palatine of Ruthenia Stanisław Lubomirski.³⁸ Interrogated by Polish officers about the operational plans of the Tatar command, Kamieński testified as follows: "We shall return backwards with the harvest ere Chmielecki learneth of uss".³⁹ It proves that the chief commander of the Crimean Horde, *qalga* Devlet Giray, planned to carry out a swift foray into the Crown territories, followed by a quick retreat to the territory of Moldavia, thus forestalling any reaction from Deputy Hetman Stefan Chmielecki.⁴⁰ It can be stated that this

³⁸ AGAD, Archiwum Zamoyskich [Zamoyski Family Archive; hereinafter: AZ], ref. no. 3036, p. 409. Stanisław Lubomirski (1583–1649) was Palatine of Ruthenia (1629–38) and (since 1638) Palatine of Cracow. In 1609 he took part in the siege of Smolensk and fought Tatars at the battles of Lwów in 1620, Chocim (Hotin), 1621, and Uście (presently, Ustya-Zelene) near Halicz (Halych) in 1629, by sponsoring several military units with private funds. During the war with Ottomans in 1621, after the death of Lithuanian Grand Hetman Jan-Karol Chodkiewicz, Lubomirski became chief commander of the Polish-Lithuanian army (cf. Władysław Czapliński, 'Stanisław Lubomirski', in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* [Polish Biographical Dictionary; hereinafter: PSB], xvi [Wrocław *et al.*, 1973], 42–5).

³⁹ AGAD, AZ, ref. no. 3036, p. 409.

⁴⁰ Stefan Chmielecki (ca 1580–1630) was since 1629 Palatine of Kiev and Deputy Hetman of the Crown army in Ukraine (1626–9). He was one of the best and most experienced commanders in the fights against Tatars in Poland-Lithuania in the first half of the seventeenth century. As a high-ranked officer or commander of the quarter army, he took part at the battles of Chocim (Hotin) in 1621, Martynów (Martyniv) in 1624, Biała Cerkiew (Bila Cerkva) in 1626 and Obelnica (Obel'nytsya) in 1629. He died in Międzybórz Nowy (Medzhybizh Novyi) in February 1630 (cf. Wanda Dobrowolska, 'Chmielecki Stefan', in PSB, iii [Warszawa *et al.*, 1937], 318–20).

kind of action can be compared to the currently existing methods of contemporary terrorist groups using 'hit and run' tactics, although the concept of such military activities comes from the steppe Tatar-Mongol art of war.⁴¹ A similar tactic was used by a Crimean-Budjak cavalry unit under the command of Kulim-bey, operating in the eastern and central part of the Ruthenia palatinate in the second decade of October 1620.⁴²

An unconventional relation of Tatar warriors to local civilians, and a specific character of their military actions during operations in enemy territories, can be seen in a painting from the refectory of the former Jesuit monastery in Jarosław, made in 1731 by Adam Swach.⁴³ The painting shows an attack of Tatar warriors on a church, and peasant huts already set on fire in the vicinity.⁴⁴ According to the local tradition, recorded in 1581, during one of such raids in the fifteenth century the church was stormed by Tatars who placed brush-wood along its walls and set the wooden building on fire in an attempt to seize it. However, they did not manage to do it and the sanctuary survived due to a heavenly intervention from the Virgin Mary of Jarosław.⁴⁵ Alongside the mass destruction of housing and vital infrastructure in targeted towns and villages, this type of asymmetric operations resulted also in capturing civilians into slavery. The phenomenon is brilliantly illustrated in a copperplate engraving by Dutch painter and engraver Romeyn de Hooghe, showing the Battle of Komarno that took place on 9 October 1672 between the Crown forces and retreating Tatar troops.⁴⁶ The piece captures a dramatic moment when a cavalry unit under the command of Grand Crown Hetman Jan Sobieski attacks Tatars trying with determination and

⁴¹ Timothy May, *The Mongol Art of War. Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military System* (Yardley, PA, 2007), 71.

⁴² Biblioteka Raczyńskich [Raczyński Family Library; hereinafter: BR], ref. no. 2, 'Powieść pewnego Tatarzyna, którego pojmano w Radziwiłłowicach 17 Octobris 1620', p. 588.

⁴³ Magdalena Witwińska, 'Osiemnastowieczna polichromia w jarosławskim kościele "na Pólku" i jej twórcy', in *Wizerunki maryjne w diecezjach przemyskiej i rzeszowskiej*, i (Rzeszów, 1992), 54.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵ Almut Bues (ed.), *Die Aufzeichnungen des Dominikaners Martin Gruneweg (1562 – ca. 1618). Über seine Familie in Danzig, seine Handelsreisen in Osteuropa und sein Klosterleben in Polen*, ii (Wiesbaden, 2008), 684.

⁴⁶ Muzeum Czartoryskich [Czartoryski Museum], ref. no. R. 7474.

sacrifice to defend transported civilian prisoners who tightly fill up and surround the battlefield.⁴⁷

Tatars attached primary importance to actions directed against civilians even during the biggest Polish-Ottoman military conflicts, when Crimean and Budjak forces were responsible for major tasks, supporting the Ottoman army not only in the military dimension but also in terms of logistics and intelligence.⁴⁸ It should be stressed that Tatars usually fulfilled these tasks most accurately due to the fact that actions of this type were highly compatible with the capabilities and specificity of Tatar light cavalry and, moreover, perfectly corresponded with the motivational aspects of military operations carried out by Crimean and Budjak Hordes.⁴⁹ A testimony of Hadji Mehmed Senai in his chronicle devoted to the deeds of Khan Islam III Giray sounds extremely interesting in this respect. Praising fame-worthy Tatar military campaigns against the Commonwealth in the first period of the Khmelnytsky uprising, the chronicler frequently describes Crimean warriors as ‘hunting the enemy’.⁵⁰ The same rhetorical figure can be found in the writings of Evliya Çelebi, who wrote: “The Tatars, who are wont to deal with hunting for their enemies, invaded the town at dawn and set fire on it, and when the people, shaken awake all-of-a-sudden, began jumping out of the bed-linen, they captured them into captivity.”⁵¹ It goes without saying that Tatar warriors did not hunt or chase enemy military forces but targeted their ‘hunt’ against settled and usually vulnerable civilian people. Referring to

⁴⁷ See Andrzej Gliwa, ‘Doświadczenie inwazji tatarskich w narracjach ludowych i pamięci zbiorowej jako niematerialne dziedzictwo Polski południowo-wschodniej’, *Ochrona Zabytków*, lxxvii, 1(264) (2014), 55, ill. 1.

⁴⁸ Andrzej Gliwa, ‘Dwa najazdy tatarskie na Ruś Czerwoną podczas wojny Rzeczypospolitej z Imperium Osmańskim w 1621 r. Zniszczenia i straty demograficzne na obszarze ziemi przemyskiej’, *Rocznik Przemyski*, xlviii (2012), 1: *Historia wojskowości*, 12–13; cf. Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 150.

⁴⁹ Biblioteka Czarotoryskich [Czarotoryski Library; hereinafter: BCZ], Teki Naruszewicza [Naruszewicz’s Files; hereinafter: TN], ref. no. 143, ‘Confessata Kanmanmeta Tatarzyna, którego pojmano pod Birkowem cztery mile z tey strony Jarosławia’, p. 575.

⁵⁰ Hadży Mehmed Senai z Krymu [Hadji Mehmed Senai of Crimea], see Zygmunt Abrahamowicz (ed.), *Historia chana Islam Gereja III* (Warszawa, 1971), 102.

⁵¹ *Księga podróży Ewliji Czelebiego*, ed. by Zygmunt Abrahamowicz, trans. by Zygmunt Abrahamowicz, Aleksander Dubiński, and Stanisława Płaskowicka-Rymkiewicz (Warszawa, 1969), 194.

civilians as ‘the enemy’ proves that military actions undertaken by Tatars were of extremely asymmetric character, the proof being all the more meaningful as it comes from Tatars themselves and is frequently repeated in different contexts. An example of such evidence can be found in the following verse-written excerpt from Senai’s chronicle: “The daredevils and the lions that hunt the enemy fomented a conflagration. The sphere of the skies was filled with blood; overcome with fear, the lot has forfeited its strength. The mouths of humans have lost the speech, the members of the lot have weakened with the effort.”⁵²

The quote also shows that the category of enemy functioned in the Tatar consciousness in its much broader conceptual sense than in the Christian legal doctrine pertaining to the rules of carrying out combat operations that dominated European early modern military thinking.⁵³ It obviously translated into a range of potential targets of attacks. Besides, the motifs of ‘prey chasing’ and ‘hunting’, rich spoils and gains acquired from raiding unbelievers are common in Crimean-Tatar sources describing Tatar incursions into Christian countries and their communities.⁵⁴

III GEOPOLITICAL BACKGROUND OF TATAR PLUNDERING EXPEDITIONS AND THEIR ROLE AS A TOOL FOR EXERTING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURE

Carrying out asymmetric operations by Tatar hordes over the period of several centuries was possible also because of a specific geopolitical ‘ecosystem’ prevalent in the early modern period on the vast areas

⁵² Senai, *Historia chana*, 116.

⁵³ Fritz Redlich, ‘*De praeda militari: looting and booty, 1500–1815*’, *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, no. spec. 39 (1956), 19. See Marian Iwanejko, ‘Prawo zdobyczy wojennej w doktrynie XVI–XVII wieku’, *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Rozprawy i Studia*, xxxiv (1961), 60–2; Jerzy Maroń, ‘Militarne aspekty wojny trzydziestoletniej na Śląsku’, *Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis*, 2201, *Historia*, cxl (2000), 148.

⁵⁴ Özalp Gökbilgin (ed.), *Tarih-i Sahib Giray Han (Histoire de Sahib Giray, Khan de Crimée de 1532 à 1551)* (Ankara, 1973), 189; Осман Н. Акчокракли, ‘Татарська поема Джан-Мухамедова про похід Іслям-Гірея II спільно з Богданом Хмельницьким на Польщу 1648–49 гг.’, *Східний світ*, 12 (1930), 167–8; *Księga podróży Ewliji Czelebiego*, 194–9, 201–2, 205, 207–8, 282; Senai, *Historia chana*, 101.

of south-eastern Europe, with its complex historical and political, socioeconomic, and religious or ideological factors, as well as the open and insufficiently defended border between Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire until the beginning of the eighteenth century.⁵⁵ Apparently, the historical legacy of the Mongol-Tatar hegemony in the thirteenth century and the dependence of later Ruthenian duchies on the Golden Horde must have been of particular importance. From the late fifteenth century until the end of the seventeenth century, Crimean khans still regarded originally Ruthenian territories as their sphere of influence, even though the areas had already become an integral part of the Kingdom of Poland, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as well as the Grand Duchy of Moscow. For the Genghisids, plundering incursions of Tatar hordes turned out to serve as an excellent tool for fiscal management, aimed at controlling the Ruthenian lands which were already then part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and their inhabitants over a longer period of time. Closely related to this is the phenomenon of Tatar raids perceived as a form of alternative communication, as is exertion of political impact on the authorities of the Commonwealth and the Grand Duchy of Moscow by using not only military means but also instruments of economic pressure – a perspective so far overlooked by historians. The capability of Tatar troops to conduct military expeditions reaching far beyond their own territories constituted a perfect tool used by Crimean khans to enforce customary payments (*pişkeş ve hazine*), that is, tributes that Polish and Muscovite rulers were *de iure* obliged to send to the Giray dynasty.⁵⁶

It is worth stressing that part of the political practice of the Girays as Crimean khans, carrying out incursions into the territories of Poland-Lithuania and the Tsardom of Russia, was legal activity justified in cases when the rulers of these states failed to pay due tributes (*bölek, virgü, pişkeş*) guaranteed by peace treaties concluded with the Ottoman Porte and the Crimean Khanate.⁵⁷ Any failure

⁵⁵ See Rifaat A. Abou-el-Haj, 'The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe: 1699–1703', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, lxxxix (1969), 471–5.

⁵⁶ Ostapchuk, 'Crimean Tatar Long Range Campaigns', 283.

⁵⁷ Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate*, 586, no. 10; 616, no. 15; 631, no. 17; 699, no. 26; 734, no. 31; 784, no. 35; 858, no. 46; *idem*, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th–18th Century). An Annotated Edition of 'Ahdnames and other Documents* (Leiden, Boston, and Köln, 2000), 378, no. 35; 382, no. 3; 497, no. 51; 499, no. 51;

to pay the dues by Polish kings or Moscow tsars was interpreted by Crimean khans as a breach in the established relations between the Crimean Khanate and its northern neighbours, perceived as a legal sanction which justified carrying out forays into the territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, in accordance with the Islamic law.⁵⁸ At this point, an excerpt is worth quoting from a letter called *'ahdname*, sent by Khan Inayet Giray on 29 June 1635 to King Władysław IV Vasa of Poland, in which the khan explained that in case of the king's failure to pay the ordinary tributes guaranteed by treaties, Tatars would respond with military campaigns aimed at acquiring a large number of slaves and animals: "And, should it be the case that, according to the old practice and the resolution from thee, our Brother, donations and moneyes have been sent not ..., I, Inaiet Giray the khan, having transferred my army to thine state, would order to desolate [the land in] the summer and winter, and having entered with a hundred-thousand Tatars into thine entire intact state, with help of God, and this be witnessed by our Prophet, militating thine demesne with fire and sword, having taken the little and the grand into slavery, reckoning per each Tatar one captive and one calf: thou do adjudicate whether this might render not more than those donations which are meant to be given from thee."⁵⁹ It was thus a clear message that in the event that the Polish authorities fail to pay the dues, none of the inhabitants of the south-eastern lands of the Commonwealth will be safe and the consequences and material costs of the planned Tatar raids will be most severe.

Letters in a similar tone were written to King Władysław IV by Khan Islam III Giray⁶⁰ on 10 June 1648 near Ochmatów⁶¹ (Ohmativ) and in Żywotów (presently: Novozhivotiv). The khan explained that the Tatar spring raids had been caused by the Polish government's

502, no. 52. Cf. Halil Inalcık, 'Power Relationships between Russia, the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire as reflected in Titulature', in Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejey *et al.* (eds.), *Passé turco-tatar, présent soviétique. Études offertes à Alexandre Bennigsen* (Louvain and Paris, 1986), 209.

⁵⁸ See Inalcık, 'Power Relationships', 209.

⁵⁹ Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate*, 907, no. 51.

⁶⁰ AGAD, Archiwum Koronne Warszawskie [Warsaw Crown Archive; hereinafter: AKW], Turkish section, vol. 62, no. 110; Львівська національна наукова бібліотека ім.В.Стефаника [Lviv National Vasyl Stefanyk Scientific Library of Ukraine; hereinafter: LNVSSLU], fund 5, op. 1, ref. no. 225, fol. 71v–72.

⁶¹ BCz, ref. no. 2576, p. 123.

failure to offer gifts over the period of four years.⁶² There was also an ultimative demand that the overdues be paid by the Commonwealth authorities within forty days. Otherwise Islam III Giray threatened to carry out a big retaliation expedition into Crown territories, and over three months later such an incursion took place indeed.⁶³ A message that Kantemir Murza, the powerful Manghit leader and chieftain of the Budjak Horde, sent from the fortified camp situated in the area known as the Przemyśl Gate⁶⁴ near Medyka to King Sigismund III Vasa at the beginning of a Tatar invasion into Red Ruthenia in June 1624, sounds even more interesting. In his letter, the *beylerbeyi* of Ochakiv (Turkish: Özü; Polish: Oczaków) threatened that if the Polish authorities failed to comply with the conditions of the Treaty of Hotin (Polish: Chocim) of 1621 and the Cossacks continued to waste the Ottoman Black Sea coast, his forces would reach as far as the Baltic Sea in their destructive act of retaliation.⁶⁵

⁶² *Ibidem*.

⁶³ See Andrzej Gliwa, 'The Tatar-Cossack Invasion of 1648: Military actions, material destruction and demographic losses in the land of Przemyśl', *Acta Poloniae Historica*, cv (2012), 85–120.

⁶⁴ In early modern period, it was an area of strategic importance, located at the foot of the Carpathians, in the region called San-Dniester Plateau [Polish: *Płaskowyż Sańsko-Dniestrzański*].

⁶⁵ According to a synopsis of the letter from the leader of the Budjak Horde (as compiled by Zygmunt Abrahamowicz): "On entering into the peace treaty with Sultan Osman, near Hotin, the King pledged that he shall offer contributions to the Porte and shall prevent the Cossacks from any outrages. None-the-less, the King has not kept the promise, it being not known what his desire is, or why he is acting thus inappropriately. In the event that the King would explain his reasons by saying that Cossacks are reavers who are not willing to listen to him, whilst they would keep setting sail on the Black Sea and devastating the Sultan's dominion, then hundreds of thousands of brave servants of the Sultan shall be ready, even without consent from the Sultan, or the Great Vizier, to go in defence of the faith and the state to where the horses may carry them. Should he fulfil his promises, then Kantemir Pasha shall not allow the Tatars to invade Poland, and then both of the parties shall leave peacefully and in friendship; should he, however, refuse, then the Pasha shall also demonstrate what he is capable of, and then his incursions will go as far as the White Sea." Kantemir Murza to Sigismund III, camp near Medyka, 10 June 1624, cf. Zygmunt Abrahamowicz and Ananiasz Zajączkowski (eds.), *Katalog dokumentów tureckich. Dokumenty do dziejów Polski i krajów ościennych w latach 1455–1672* (Warszawa, 1959), 255–6, no. 263; AGAD, AKW, Turkish section, box 72, file 309, no. 568; Stanisław Przyłęcki (ed.), *Pamiętnik o Konięcpolskich. Przyczynek do dziejów XVII w.* (Lwów, 1842), 252–3.

A mere casual analysis of selected sources shows that these forays were also used by Tatars instrumentally as an alternative way to get their political message across and as a means to exert their influence on the authorities of the Commonwealth and its noblemen through widespread destruction in the vital infrastructural targets and significant demographic losses.⁶⁶ From this point of view, the asymmetric operations conducted by the Tatar forces can be interpreted as a form of indirect terrorist approach based on exerting politico-economic pressure on various decisive groups in order to force them to make certain decisions, weaken their political will, and achieve strategic objectives. *Ergo*, Tatar terrorist plundering operations were extremely important with regard to communication, and their consequences in the material and demographic domains served as specific generators of messages to selected recipient groups. As such, the incursions of Crimean and Budjak Hordes contributed to the development of multi-faceted socio-political relations inside the community of the Commonwealth's noblemen, which often confirmed the effectiveness of the Tatar military missions as a tool of political pressure.⁶⁷ Last but not least, asymmetric warfare was for Genghisids an ideal instrument for demonstrating their capability of aggressive military power projection and their political power.

⁶⁶ Gliwa, 'O wojskowości', 93–4. See also Jürgen Paul, 'The State and the Military – a Nomadic Perspective', in Irene Schneider (ed.), *Militär und Staatlichkeit. Beiträge des Kollegiums am 29. und 30.04.2002* (Orientwissenschaftliche Hefte, 12, Mitteilungen des SFB 'Differenz und Integration', 5, Halle an der Saale, 2003), 56.

⁶⁷ As one of many examples, I will mention a decision of the noblemen of the Rus' and Belz Palatinates in Red Ruthenia, included in the instruction of the Dietine (*Sejmik*) in Wisznia for deputies to the Diet (*Sejm*), compiled in late December 1622. In fear of possible Tatar raids, the citizens of the palatinates wrote as follows (item 8): "wee the Ruthenian citizens *horum pars magna sumus*, certain of uss are today calling the name of God in the darkeness and in pagan fetters, others remain barely aliue with their wounds and lashes, others still haue come forth with their ashes and their wealths ... Yet, so that wee may haue borne any hopes for a better tyme, our L[ords] the deputyes shall request H[is] Roy[al] M[ajesty], in *quantum humanae patiuntur rationes*, that hee preuent, together with his L[ords] the counsels, *hisc extraneis bellis*, and conciliate the Tatares with giftes ordinary." [emphasis – AG] (Lucyan Tatomir, Ksawery Liske, and Antoni Prochaska [eds.], *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolitej z archiwum tak zwanego bernardyńskiego we Lwowie*, xx [Lwów, 1909], 203, no. 142).

IV
SOCIOECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
AND RELIGIOUS FACTORS IN THE BORDER ZONE
OF POLAND-LITHUANIA AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The reasons for conducting by the Tatars of asymmetric operations also included fundamental disproportions in social and economic development between fairly well-off sedentary Christian communities, living mostly of farming, and poor, yet in great measure militarised, societies in arms, nomads and half-nomads with kinship-based social organisations, who made their living of grazing and breeding animals and who rarely worked the land or grew fruit.⁶⁸ However, it is worth remembering that, as pointed out by Anatoly M. Khazanov, the economic and social ‘backwardness’ of the nomads forced and created the conditions for a sort of military superiority over sedentary population.⁶⁹ These striking differences in the standards of living and styles of life present in the borderland area of the so called Great Cordon⁷⁰ constituted factors that facilitated the conflict between these two groups of people and were among the causes behind the specific system of ‘war economy’, based on violence and slave trade as an important source of income for the Crimean Khanate’s economy in the early modern era.⁷¹ The above-mentioned plundering operations based on asymmetry were a powerful means in the exploitation and in

⁶⁸ Alan W. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford, 1978), 26–8; Khodarkovsky, *Russia’s Steppe Frontier*, 12.

⁶⁹ Anatoly M. Khazanov, ‘Nomads of the Eurasian Steppes in Historical Retrospective’, in Nikolay N. Kradin, Dmitri M. Bondarenko, and Thomas J. Barfield (ed.), *Nomadic Pathways in Social Evolution* (Civilizational Dimension, ed. by Igor V. Sledzevski et al., 5, Lac-Beauport, 2015²; 1st edn – Moscow, 2003), 25–49, here 32.

⁷⁰ Иван Лисяк-Рудницкий, ‘Україна між Сходом і Заходом’, in *Історичні есе*, і (Київ, 1994), 4–5; Я. Р. Дашкевич, ‘Большая граница Украины: этнический барьер или этноконтактная зона’, in *Этноконтактные зоны в Европейской части СССР: История, динамика, методы изучения* (Москва, 1989), 7–21. See also Віктор Брехуненко, *Козаки на степовому кордоні Європи. Типологія козацких спільнот XVI – першої половини XVII ст.* (Київ, 2011), 19–24.

⁷¹ Алексей А. Новосельский, *Борьба московского государства с Татарами в первой половине XVII века* (Москва and Ленинград, 1948), 418; Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 26–7; Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, ‘Slave Hunting and Slave Redemption as a Business Enterprise: The Northern Black Sea Region in the Sixteenth to Seventeenth Centuries’, *Oriente Moderno*, xxv (2006), 149–59.

the military and economic activities carried out by the Tatars in the south-eastern palatinates of the Commonwealth. The importance of predatory long-range expeditions conducted by the Tatar hordes into the territories of neighbouring countries – as an important branch of the Crimean economy providing permanent influx of the skilled workforce, which generated considerable transfers of cash – was attentively observed not only by the tribal aristocracy (the *karaçi* beys and noble clans) but by the local population in its entirety.⁷² The differences appearing between the people of nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle and sedentary communities deepened as the borderline of two geo-botanical zones went through the borderland.⁷³ Afforested areas and lands of agricultural use, pretty well populated, were predominant in the north; more southwards, an area stretched that was mostly covered by an extremely low-populated steppe. An interesting border zone functioning in early modern period can be regarded today not only as one of Europe's most important discontinuity spaces – not only in a geopolitical or geo-botanic sense but also as a zone of civilisational fracture.⁷⁴

The above-mentioned disproportions in socio-political development grew in the broad borderland zone between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate due to fundamental intercultural differences creating the dramatic ground of 'clash of civilisations'. It has to be borne in mind that from the Tatar perspective, their violent behaviour and involvement in plundering operations in the territories of Christian states was motivated not only by a great opportunity to quickly and considerably raise their material status but it also had a religious meaning carrying with it important ideological values. During preparations to their expeditions

⁷² AGAD, Archiwum Radziwiłłów [Radziwiłł Archive], section II, vol. 842, p. 2; Halil Inalcık, 'The Khan and the Tribal Aristocracy: The Crimean Khanate under Sahib Giray I', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, iii–iv (1979–80), 452; Mikhail Kizilov, 'The Slave Trade in the Early Modern Crimea from the Perspective of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Sources', *Journal of Early Modern History*, xi (2007), 23–4.

⁷³ Б. Е. Патон (ed.), *Національний атлас України* (Київ, 2009), 198–9.

⁷⁴ See Wolfgang Reinhard, *Zones of Fracture in Modern Europe: A Summary*, in Almut Bues (ed.), *Zones of Fracture in Modern Europe: The Baltic Countries, the Balkans, and Northern Italy. / Zone di frattura in epoca moderna. Il Baltico, i Balcani e l'Italia settentrionale* (Wiesbaden, 2005), 271–5.

against the Kingdom of Poland, Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Muscovy and the mobilisation of forces, the Crimean authorities often used for propaganda the concept of *jihad* (Holy War) against infidels at the peripheries of and beyond the Islamic World (*Darü'l-Islam*).⁷⁵ In this way was promoted successfully the idea of warriors fighting against unbelievers in their own land defined in the Islamic religious law as the House of War (*Darü'l-harb*).⁷⁶

A more or less deliberate reception of the Holy War ideology by the *ghazi* warriors [i.e. fighters of the Islamic faith] who participated in religiously legitimated military expeditions against the territories of northern neighbours combined with the above-mentioned financial, material and spiritual motivations, led to concrete actions and violent behaviours towards local non-Muslim (mainly Christian) non-combatants. All these factors resulted in the asymmetric character of Tatar operations, marked by high coherence and efficiency. The intensifying asymmetrisation processes observable in Tatar warfare in the seventeenth century were in fact an outcome of various disproportions and the lack of balance with regard to all civilisational and socio-cultural phenomena typical for sedentary communities and Tatars who lived, to a greater or lesser extent, a nomadic life; it also resulted from the proceeding decline of the Tatar art of war (as compared to the first half of the sixteenth century), which, among other things, manifested itself in an almost entire disappearance of firearms from usage.⁷⁷ This was particularly evident in the military operations conducted by the Tatar troops of the Budjak Horde.

⁷⁵ For example, before the beginning of a winter incursion into Red Ruthenia at the turn of 1540, Khan Sahib Giray called on Crimean beys to take part in the foray as a commendable act of Holy War (Ostapchuk, 'Crimean Tatar Long Range-Campaigns', 277; see *Tarih-i Sahib Giray Han*, 46).

⁷⁶ Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, 'Between the universalistic claims and reality. Ottoman frontiers in the early modern period', in Christine Woodhead (ed.), *The Ottoman World* (London and New York, 2012), 206; Victor Ostapchuk, 'The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids', *Oriente Moderno*, xxxi (2001), 88.

⁷⁷ See Marcin Broniewski [Broniowski], *Tatariae Descriptio. Opis Tatarii*, trans. by Ewa Śnieżewska, ed. by Magdalena Mączyńska (Łódź, 2011), 83; Stanisław Sarnicki, *Księgi hetmańskie*, ed. by Marek Ferenc (Kraków, 2015), 430; Mirosław Nagielski (ed.), *Relacje wojenne z pierwszych lat walk polsko-kozackich powstania Bohdana Chmielnickiego okresu "Ogniem i mieczem" (1648–1651)* (Warszawa, 1999), 103.

V

DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF TATAR ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Among the most important characteristics of asymmetric operations carried out by Tatar hordes were high unpredictability and secrecy till the moment of attack, as well as the high mobility of Tatar cavalry combined with their operational speed, a wide range of impacts in terms of area, the total character of actions, and the excellent synchronisation of units operating in a nonlinear way and mostly in rural areas, using the means of psychological influence. In general, it can be stated that operations of this sort encompassed and were concentrated in a civilian environment – and thus, in the non-military sphere – directly hitting the vulnerable economic infrastructure and demographic resources of the targeted area in a given country.

The unpredictability and, combined with it, secrecy of Tatar operations was a serious hindrance in undertaking effective defensive measures against such an unconventional danger. Actions of this type aimed at deliberately misleading adversary decision-makers and command staffs are defined in contemporary military doctrine as military deception. Such activities were observed, for example, during the Crimean Horde's march across north-western Moldavia in late June 1594⁷⁸ and in the Budjak cavalry' march across north-western Moldavia towards the borders of Poland-Lithuania at the turn of May and June 1624.⁷⁹ Messages informing of a forthcoming Tatar attack that were received continuously, from April 1624 onwards, at the Crown army's headquarters caused some exhaustion of the Polish army's command and rendered the Red Ruthenian populace indifferent and put them off guard because the people repeatedly heard numerous warning proclamations issued at that time by Field Crown Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski and King Sigismund III.⁸⁰ In his last warning *uniwersał*, issued on 6 June 1624, Koniecpolski remarked that the Tatar troops intended to “invade upon the locall assured cityzens, entailing the trouble of trepidations.”⁸¹ How unpredictable Tatar warriors were

⁷⁸ *De Transitu Tatarorum Per Pocuciam Anno M.D.XCIII Epistola. Ad ... Cynthium ... Aldobrandinum. Ab ... Ioan[ne] De Zamoscio ... missa* (Cracoviae, 1594), B ij.

⁷⁹ Andrzej Gliwa, *Kraina upartych niepogód. Zniszczenia wojenne na obszarze ziemi przemyskiej w XVII wieku* (Przemyśl, 2013), 287–90.

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, 288–9.

⁸¹ TsDIAL, fund 1, op. 1, vol. 209, p. 533.

can be observed on the example of the manoeuvres of the Crimean-Budjak cavalry forces, prior to a raid in the autumn of 1629. In order to mislead Stefan Chmielecki and Stanisław Lubomirski, the commanders of the frontier defence forces, on approaching the borders of the Commonwealth the Tatar troops changed their route three times, first using the Kutchman Trail (Polish: *Szlak Kuczmański*), then – on 23 September, after crossing the Dniester – entering the Walachian (i.e., Moldavian) Trail, also known as the Golden Trail (Polish: *Szlak Wołoski / Szlak Złoty*),⁸² to finally get back onto the Kutchman Trail in the night of 27 and 28 September.⁸³

The aforesaid Polish commanders highly valued the operational aspect of the manoeuvres executed by the Tatar troops. In a warning declaration issued at the field camp near Żabińce (Zhabyntsi) on 26 September 1629, Stanisław Lubomirski, Palatine of Ruthenia, wrote: “the adversarie is allways perpetrating a delaye so great, against their tyme, and so doe they weave their waye, for, once engaged onto the Kutchman route, I have bene informed that they had crossed-over unto the Wallachian land, below Raszków,⁸⁴ acrossse the Dnyester, in the past weeke.”⁸⁵ The movements of Tatar troops in the last phase before a plundering raid resulted from the fact that in the centre of attention of Crimean and Budjak commanders and tribal chieftains, who followed the best traditions of the Mongol-Tatar art of war, was information and intelligence warfare based not only on obtaining information about the deployment, dislocation and plans of the enemy’s units but also on producing information noise and ‘fog of war’ and thus deliberately misleading the opponent’s intelligence with regard to the actual aim of the operation.⁸⁶

⁸² For a detailed description of Tatar military routes, see Ярослав Кісь, ‘Татарські шляхи на Україні в XVI–XVII ст.’, *Жовтень*, iv (1986), 134–6.

⁸³ *TsDIAL*, fund 5, op. 1, vol. 119, p. 1605; Biblioteka Kórnicka Polskiej Akademii Nauk [Kórnik Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences], ref. no. 201, ‘Diariusz expeditiety z pogaństwem’, p. 364; BCz, TN, ref. no. 121, ‘Relacya Expedycyi przeciwko Dewlet Gierejemu Sołtanowi Gałdze’, p. 459.

⁸⁴ Raszków (presently, Rașcov in Republic of Moldova) was a small town situated on the left bank of the Dniester, in the Bratslav Palatinate. In the first half of the seventeenth century, the town was owned by members of the Zamoyski aristocratic family.

⁸⁵ *TsDIAL*, fund 5, op. 1, vol. 119, p. 1605.

⁸⁶ See Ищенко, ‘Война и военное дело’, 140; Maria Ivanics, ‘Krimtatarische Spionage im osmanisch-habsburgischen Grenzgebiet während des Feldzuges im Jahre 1663’, *Acta Orientalia Academia Scientiarum Hungaricae*, lxi (2008), 120–1.

In this context it is worth mentioning that in February 1697 contradictory news about the danger of a Tatar assault arrived at the Crown army headquarters in Lwów at intervals of a few hours.⁸⁷

On the other hand, it is worth noting that Tatar commanders were able to support their military activities by obtaining important messages through the use of open-source intelligence information such as public available data. A good example of this phenomenon is a warning *uniwersał* published by Grand Crown Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski on 9 August 1615.⁸⁸ In the face of impending threat of a Tatar assault, Żółkiewski appealed to the Red Ruthenian nobility to be careful “whilst not depending that far upon the army, for the soldiers have roamed all over following those barrateries and there is presently no army [in] the C[om]m[on]w[ealth] whatsoever”.⁸⁹ Having received the message, the Tatars were able to fully utilise its value, plundering and looting with impunity vast areas of the Palatinate of Ruthenia, which Żółkiewski admitted in his declaration dated 14 September 1615.⁹⁰

A very interesting *modus operandi* applied by the Crimean and Budjak taskforces in most of the Tatar raids into the south-eastern parts of Poland-Lithuania in the early modern period is worth noticing: the Tatars approached the Commonwealth’s borders in moonless nights and then effected their raids under full moon. The phenomenon is based on the pursuit of the Tatar commanders to stealthy approach the Tatar cavalry units at the border zone and to begin the first stage of military actions outside Poland-Lithuania under the cover of moonless nights (during new moon periods, in complete darkness).⁹¹ This type of proceeding refers to a broad set of tactics aimed at hindering the Tatar units by the enemy forces, once their location was detected, thus causing an element of surprise prior to the attack, reducing the intensity of the resistance offered by the local population and facilitating the acquisition of captives. The procedure that sought to ensure secrecy and concealment undoubtedly can be described as a kind of stealth tactics. Evidence demonstrating how frequently this solution was

⁸⁷ BCz, TN, ref. no. 189, p. 153.

⁸⁸ TsDIAL, fund 9, op. 1, vol. 369, p. 853.

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁹⁰ *Ibidem*, fond 1, op. 1, vol. 200, p. 1171.

⁹¹ AGAD, AZ, ref. no. 341, p. 7; TsDIAL, fund 9, op. 1, vol. 369, p. 884.

applied by the commanders of Tatar hordes is attested, for instance, in *Księgi hetmańskie*, a work by a Polish nobleman Stanisław Sarnicki (ca. 1532–97). In the section (chapter 8) on Tatar military operations, we read: “And when the people be of the conception that they [i.e. the Tatars] have already returned, or trailed to Moscow, onely then would they move the army from those fieldes in the night, for they willingly walk under the full-moone, after the month [emphasis – AG].”⁹² Also worth mentioning is a letter of King John III Sobieski to Grand Crown Hetman Stanisław Jan Jabłonowski, written in Żółkiew (Zhovkva) on 20 January 1694. The king ordered the hetman to issue warning proclamations to the threatened population of the south-eastern parts of the Commonwealth, “so that the week ere the full-Moon and the second afterwards [emphasis – AG] in this month the peopel wait in their cottages not, but rather, gather together at the fortresses, as many as could bee, together with everything”.⁹³ Five days later, on 25 January 1694, in the wake of this letter, Jabłonowski issued a *uniwersał* warning that “at the very full-Moon of this same month, severe incursyons may be expected”.⁹⁴

The high mobility of Tatar light cavalry was a basic tool in the military power projection used by the Crimean and Budjak Hordes in a selected theatre of war.⁹⁵ It is worth noticing that the capability of quick relocation and ability to hit multiple strikes, as characteristic of Tatar cavalry units, was also successfully used in carrying out nonlinear military operations, non-standard in terms of the traditional art of war, often throughout the width and depth of the operational area, and under conditions of considerable dispersion.⁹⁶ It was enabled by fortified field camps (Tatar: *koş*), from where the military forces were directly distributed. These bases played a key role of specific logistic and supply platforms where stolen goods, livestock (cattle, horses, sheep) and the most valuable slaves (Turkish: *esir*) were kept; Tatar troops would return there for safe retreat and

⁹² Sarnicki, *Księgi hetmańskie*, 431.

⁹³ BCz, TN, ref. no. 184, p. 69.

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*, ref. no. 2699 IV, fol. 193v.

⁹⁵ In contemporary political sciences and security studies, the term ‘military power projection’ refers to the abilities of a state to carry out effective ‘expeditionary warfare’ beyond its own territory as one of the means of influencing decision-making processes in international relations.

⁹⁶ See Gliwa, *Kraina upartych niepogód*, 199.

relaxation after a plundering operation; the units would get regrouped and rotated.⁹⁷ The functioning of these camps increased the mobility and flexibility of Tatar cavalry units, considerably expanding the range of their actual impact, and not only elevating their physical security in a hostile environment but also shaping the ability for Tatar warriors to keep the required psychological readiness for combat operation. An equivalent of these Tatar base camps as safe havens in contemporary military operations is the Forward Operating Bases (FOB), which were successfully used by U.S. troops during the two wars in Iraq, in 1991 (Operation Desert Storm) and in 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom).⁹⁸

Carrying out operations under the conditions of considerable dispersion paradoxically ensured increased security for Tatar cavalry troops, since destroying one or two *torhaks* (i.e., small cavalry detachments consisting of a few to a dozen riders) had no noticeable effect on the operational capability of the whole army, and additionally maximised the efficiency of plundering actions. The strategy of conducting swift operations drew on the operational and tactical principles rooted in traditional Mongol-Tatar warfare, according to which the fundamental condition of military success is gaining advantage over enemy forces on the basis of mobility and operational tempo. There is no doubt that the thinking and acting of Tatar commanders resembled the principles propagated by the Chinese theoretician of war Sun Tzu, who wrote: “Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of the forest. In raiding and plundering be like fire, is immovability like a mountain. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.”⁹⁹ The tempo of Tatar cavalry’s actions was so high that their units were often unreachable for Crown, county and private formations responsible for defence against Tatar incursions. Such a situation took place not only in the initial phase of plundering operations, after entering Polish-Lithuanian territories, when the speed of Tatar troops was the highest, but also during their retreat, even though they were loaded with rich spoils such as cattle, horses, sheep and usually

⁹⁷ Le Vasseur de Beauplan, *A Description of Ukraine*, 49–50; BR, ref. no. 2, ‘Diariusz wtargnienia tatarskiego po wołoskiey potrzebie w kraie podolskie in Anno 1620’, p. 587.

⁹⁸ See Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, *CU @ The FOB: How the Forward Operating Base is changing the life of combat soldiers* (Carlisle, 2006), 1–8.

⁹⁹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. by Lionel Giles (London, 2009), 26.

a great number of transported slaves.¹⁰⁰ A surprising speed of military operations conducted by Tatar troops was perceived in the headquarters of the Crown army. Jan Daniłowicz, Palatine of Ruthenia, Grand Crown Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski, and Grand Crown Hetman Stanisław Jan Jabłonowski all wrote about the nature of ‘quick war’, rapid pace and unpredictability of Tatar military actions. Daniłowicz warned the inhabitants of Red Ruthenia in his proclamation dated 24 October 1620, during one of the most terrible Tatar raids: “it was already at the night-fall that merciless fires occurred in the vicinage of Lwów: this enemy rushed onto us so expeditiously that earlier had we seen the fires than could hear about the assaulters.”¹⁰¹ Żółkiewski, in turn, wrote to Grand Crown Secretary Jakub Zadzik, in a letter from Bar dated 4 November 1618: “To vanquish the Tatars is almost similar as when some one should wish to beat the byrds flying on the air.”¹⁰² Finally, Jabłonowski, in a letter of 26 September 1697 to King Augustus II, stated with a sense of helplessness: “wherefrom and whereto they come over, one can not know; and before the troopes move on towards them, they have already fled with the trophy.”¹⁰³ These messages demonstrate how severe the challenge posed by the struggle with Tatar troops was for Polish commanders.

A creative extension of the conception of swift military operations in Tatar warfare was the operational use of speed in order to arouse fear and panic among attacked communities.¹⁰⁴ High speed and covering long distances during daily marches was possible thanks to the traditional Mongol system of using several horses

¹⁰⁰ Such a situation took place, for instance, on 20 to 22 February 1626 near Uście, when the major forces of the Crimean Horde under the command of Khan Mehmed III Giray fled from an ambush prepared by the quarter army led by Field Crown Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski (Gliwa, *Kraina upartych niepogód*, 335–6); or, in the winter of 1699, during an incursion of the Budjak Horde, when Tatars headed by *nureddin* Ghazi Giray Sultan managed not only to fend off several attacks of the quarter army but even to defeat some of them in the second battle of Martynów fought on 22 February 1699 (*idem*, ‘Ostatni napad tatarski na ziemię przemyską w 1699 r.’, *Studia Historyczne*, xliii, 4 [2000], 579–80).

¹⁰¹ *TsDIAL*, fund 5, op. 1, vol. 119, p. 1637.

¹⁰² Biblioteka Jagiellońska [Jagiellonian Library; hereinafter: BJ], ref. no. 166, p. 52.

¹⁰³ D.C.F. Jonsac, *Życie Stanisława Jabłonowskiego, kasztelana krakowskiego, hetmana wielkiego koronnego*, iii (Poznań, 1868), 134.

¹⁰⁴ Broniewski, *Tatariae Descriptio*, 79.

in shifts.¹⁰⁵ During plundering operations the system made it possible for Tatar quick-moving troops, operating in considerable dispersion in the vast area of the enemy's territory, to appear suddenly and almost at the same time. Such simultaneous attacks affecting large territories took place during several raids, such as the two Tatar raids in 1621¹⁰⁶ and the Tatar-Cossack incursion of 1648¹⁰⁷ (these, and more, have been researched in depth by the author). Carrying out simultaneous actions at operational scale worked as a force multiplier in the perception of the people who eye-witnessed those operations, which produced a synergetic effect enhancing the efficiency and relative military capabilities of Tatar forces. Therefore, in the witnesses' minds these circumstances were interpreted as a convincing proof of a considerable size of enemy forces.¹⁰⁸ In my opinion, these circumstances were one of the reasons why the historical sources from the early modern period tended to exaggerate numerical data concerning the size of the Tatar troops involved in military operations in the south-eastern territories of Poland-Lithuania.¹⁰⁹

The preference of Tatar commanders for intensive military operations directed at civilian targets, and carried out simultaneously, in a considerable dispersion, on an area of several to several dozen thousand square kilometres per each Tatar cavalry build-up, resulted in a total character of the danger. It could be seen during the biggest plundering expeditions, such as the Tatar raids of 1621, 1624, 1648 and 1672. An outcome of these unconventional solutions was the nonlinear character of military missions at the operational and tactical levels, which considerably blurred the dividing lines between the modes of war (not only between the exact war zones), supply bases

¹⁰⁵ Collins, 'The Military Organization', 267–8; Ostapchuk, *Crimean Tatar Long-Range Campaigns*, 165.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. map depicting the movements and range of Tatar forces in *powiat* (district) of Przemyśl during the two Tatar invasions of 1621, published in Gliwa, *Kraina upartych niepogód*, 120. The map has been drawn on the basis of quantitative sources, especially the sworn declarations (Lat. *iuramenta*) by the inhabitants and owners of affected settlements, as recorded in court registers.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. map depicting the movements and range of Tatar-Cossack forces in Przemyśl district in 1648, published *ibidem*, 162.

¹⁰⁸ Broniewski, *Tatariae Descriptio*, 83.

¹⁰⁹ Olgierd Górka was the first Polish historiographer to have revised the exaggerated estimates proposed by historians with regard to the number of Tatar troops (Górka, 'Liczebność Tatarów', 257–63).

and territories remaining under the opponent's control, as well as between the environment of non-combatants, i.e. civilian people, and the classical area of military operations, dominated by armed soldiers. This is also a characteristic trait of asymmetric conflicts taking place in the last decades starting from the 1990s – for example, in the Gaza Strip and Palestine, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Darfur in western Sudan and, nowadays, in Syria.¹¹⁰ The total character of the danger posed by Tatar raids was noticeable already at the stage of operational planning. What I mean here is the policy of Tatar commanders that was based on a detailed planning: after the main forces leave their camp bases, simultaneous attacks reaching as deep as 120–140 km in three or four directions would be carried out, to engage and often paralyse the whole defence system of the assaulted territory. One example is the first Tatar raid in the first decade of September 1621, during which the Tatar cavalry units, split into three basic operational groups, left the main *koş* located between Kozłów (Kozliv), Zborów (Zboriv) and Jaryczów (presently: Yarchivtsi), with a mission to fulfil their tasks in their respective zones of responsibility, which included the palatinates of Volhynia, Ruthenia, and Bełz.¹¹¹ Another case in point was Tatar troops' departure from the *koş* in Skniłów (Sknyliv) near Lwów on 7 October 1648 in view of conducting military operations reaching almost throughout the whole Red Ruthenian lands, as well as the palatinates of Lublin and Volhynia.¹¹²

During forays, Tatar troops used various destabilisation methods and techniques affecting the psychology of the attacked groups of people, thus directly enhancing the efficiency of operations. The operational use of fear as an effective tool impact on population targeted areas plays a key role in Tatar art of war and also had a great symbolic significance which influences the perception of the Crimean khans as powerful rulers in the religious and ideological dimensions. This is confirmed by a fragment of a congratulatory poem found in the chariots of Khan Djanibeg II Giray abandoned in the Dniester River during the winter incursion of 1626, reading as follows: "Once

¹¹⁰ See Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 92.

¹¹¹ Maurycy Horn, *Skutki ekonomiczne najazdów tatarskich z lat 1605–1633 na Ruś Czerwoną* (Wrocław, Warszawa, and Kraków, 1964), 32–3.

¹¹² А.З. Барабой, И.Л. Бутич (eds.), *Документы об освободительной войне украинского народа 1648–1654 гг.* (Киев, 1965), 68, no. 61; Senai, *Historia chana*, 116.

they heard that the great khan was going to war, they were frightened immediately in their soule, the Christianity [i.e. Christians]. The enemies' hearts, how may they have no fear of the emperor, with thine sabre, whilst dread and shiver has overwhelmed so many!"¹¹³

Among the crucial and spectacular elements of asymmetric warfare carried out by Tatar troops was the military tactic based on aggressive visualization of their presence in a given area through deliberate fires, which is known as mass arson.¹¹⁴ It is worth noting that between the years 1620–9 alone, in the Land of Przemyśl, Tatars burnt down a total of at least 11,908 peasant cottages, 304 mills, 331 inns, and fifty manor houses. As a result, over 50,000 people (approx. 16 per cent of the region's population) lost their homes, which was in fact a serious humanitarian crisis.¹¹⁵ These brutal actions had a double function, in the operational and tactical dimension. In the former case, they were used as a kind of recognition and quick communication signal, to inform about the presence of Tatar units and about the operations carried out in a given area, enhancing the economy and efficiency of the engaged forces.¹¹⁶ In the latter case, they constituted an extremely effective tool for exerting psychological pressure on civilians, intended to arouse chaos, panic and fear across the community. In parallel, these 'Tatar frights' (Polish: *trwogi tatarskie*), so called by contemporary observers, facilitated the procedure of capturing people into slavery.¹¹⁷ This was possible because the

¹¹³ BK, ref. no. 341, fol. 192v–193.

¹¹⁴ Національна бібліотека України ім. В.І. Вернадського [The Volodymyr Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine], fund 1, ref. no. 6283, 'Diariusz pogromu tatarskiego in A[nno] 1672', p. 42; Нацыянальны гістарычны архіў Беларусі [National Historical Archives of Belarus; hereinafter: NHABM], fund 695, op. 1, vol. 99, p. 55; *ibidem*, vol. 200, p. 84; *ibidem*, vol. 69, f. 8v; BJ, ref. no. 92, fol. 4v; AGAD, APŁ, ref. no. 55, vol. 1, p. 263; *ibidem*, Zbiór dokumentów papierowych [A collection of paper documents], ref. no. 2618, pp. 1–2; Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie [National Library, Warsaw], ref. no. 9085 III, pp. 138–9.

¹¹⁵ Gliwa, *Kraina upartych niepogód*, 629–40.

¹¹⁶ BR, ref. no. 2, 'Powieść pewnego Tatarzyna, którego pojmano w Radziwiłowicach 17 Octobris' 1620, p. 585; Ярослав Дашкевич, 'Ясир з України (XV-першاپоловина XVII ст.) як історико-демографічна проблема', *Український Археологічний Щорічник*, s.n., 2 (1993), 42.

¹¹⁷ *De Transitu Tatarorum Per Pocusiam*, p. after B iij; TsDIAL, fund 9, op. 1, vol. 369, p. 1032; *ibidem*, fund 1, op. 1, vol. 209, p. 533; *ibidem*, fund 52, op. 1, vol. 396, p. 560; BR, ref. no. 2, p. 587; NHABM, fund 695, op. 1, vol. 224, fol. 104.

peasants escaping from the burning houses became an easy catch for the Tatars who hunted them.¹¹⁸ This tactic can be perceived as an instance of violence used as a tool to enhance the functionality and effectiveness of Tatar cavalry units under their charge. Such operations can be compared to the present U.S. ‘shock and awe’ military doctrine that consists in a spectacular manifestation of power paralysing the enemy’s will to fight.¹¹⁹ In this context, an excerpt from an account by a young girl from the village of Morawsko near Jarosław, who was an eyewitness to the Tatar strike into her home village in October 1672, is worth quoting: “I could see the villages and our village of Morawsko burning; the forests burning also; the people escaping, screaming and crying, with their children and cattle, to the Chłopice forest where there was a Chapel of Our Lady the Miraculous, in the Chłopice wood.”¹²⁰ This testimony is an important source telling us about the way civilian people perceived Tatar attacks, and what effect these attacks had on the psychology of the assaulted population in the rural areas. This effect tended at times to be pretty severe, causing panic amongst the populace that dwelled during the incursion in large urban areas equipped with efficient defence systems. The events occurring in Lwów in the course of the Tatar invasion in October 1620, as reported by the local archbishop Jan Andrzej Próchnicki,¹²¹ offer a good example of such situation. As a result of Tatar operations, both seasoned fighting soldiers and ordinary civilians frequently experienced during the Tatar raids a dramatic display of afterglow shimmering across the night skyline.¹²² In autumn 1617, during

¹¹⁸ *Księga podróży Ewliji Czelebiego*, 194.

¹¹⁹ Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, *Shock and Awe. Achieving Rapid Dominance* (Washington, 1996), 19–36.

¹²⁰ Janusz Bazak, ‘Wspomnienia Kasi Kolasy jako przyczynek do opisu najazdu tatarskiego podczas wojny polsko-tureckiej w 1672 roku’, *Rocznik Stowarzyszenia Miłośników Jarosławia*, xvi (2006), 44.

¹²¹ His account goes as follows: “Plebs vero inopinato casu percussa turmatim coibat et consilii inops ubique tumultuabatur. Feminae denique metu examinatae gemitibus et ingenti ploratu omnia urbis loca implentes charaque in minibus pignora sua portantes plus nimio trepidationem augebant.” (after Teofil Długosz [ed.], *Relacje arcybiskupów lwowskich 1595–1794* [Lwów, 1937], 83).

¹²² Biblioteka Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności i Polskiej Akademii Nauk w Krakowie [Polish Academy of Learning and Polish Academy of Sciences Library, Cracow; hereinafter: BPAU-PAN], ref. no. 1051, f. 228; ‘Dziennik wyjazdu naszego na pospolite ruszenie r. 1621. Anonimowy szlachcic z woj. krakowskiego powiatu

a Tatar plundering operation in the border zone between Moldavia and Red Ruthenia, Grand Crown Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski wrote: "And the Tatars indeed have done this, equally as it occurs owing to them in our lande as well, that we have seen perpetuall glows which were burning the Wallachyan land, and the Wallachyan land shall long not forget this expedityon."¹²³ Similar references preserved in archival sources leave no doubt as to the nature of this mechanism.

Another element of Tatar asymmetric operations, extremely traumatising for the assaulted rural population, was deliberate terrorising and threatening of people through demonstrative murders. It is worth taking a look at the effects of such actions in a micro-historical perspective. During an incursion of the Budjak Horde in June 1623 into the Land of Przemyśl, in fourteen villages of the Zamch estate belonging to the family Zamoyski, the Tatar nomads killed a total of 71 peasants, including seven women who were beheaded; and during the subsequent raid, less than a year later, nineteen peasants were murdered and 636 people taken into captivity, in the same area.¹²⁴ The fact that during the second raid three children were drowned in the San River by their parents, in the villages of Krzeszów and Kamionka, indicates how extremely effective these operations aimed at terrorising local communities were.¹²⁵ These tragic decisions were motivated by the peasants' panic and overwhelming fright of the Tatars and a paralysing fear of getting into slavery, which was commonly perceived as worse than death.¹²⁶ Incidents of attacks on towns combined with mass killing of their residents appeared, though rarely – just to mention the strike on a small urban hub of Bóbrka (Bibrka) in the Land of Lwów in 1618, where Tatar warriors killed 403 local residents and abducted another fifty.¹²⁷

czchowskiego', in Hanna Malewska (ed.), *Listy staropolskie z epoki Wazów* (Warszawa, 1977), 219; Archiwum Państwowe w Przemyślu [State Archives in Przemyśl], Akta miasta Przemyśla [Records of the Town of Przemyśl], ref. no. 540, p. 123.

¹²³ BPAU-PAN, ref. no. 1051, fol. 228.

¹²⁴ Archiwum Państwowe w Lublinie [State Archive in Lublin], Archiwum Ordynacji Zamoyskich, ref. no. 91, 'Inquisitia o spustoszonych trzech włościach: ludzi y koni przez Tatary zabranych uczyniona a die 19 ad diem 28 July' [1624], pp. 3–21.

¹²⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁶ Bohdan Baranowski, *Chłop polski w walce z Tatarami* (Warszawa, 1952), 48.

¹²⁷ BCz, ref. no. 350, p. 1009; Maurycy Horn, 'Najazd tatarski 1620 roku i jego skutki ekonomiczne', *Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu. Historia*, iii–iv (1963), 186.

A similar tactic intended to intimidate local peasantry was used by the troops of the Crimean Horde in the autumn of 1648, during their raid into the Land of Lwów. According to Andrzej Stano's testimony given on 28 May 1649 before the castle court (Polish: *sąd grodzki*) in Lwów, during the invasion Tatar raiders murdered twenty-five people in Pohorce (Pokhortsi), thirteen in Podolce (Podoltsi), sixteen in Tuligłowy (Tuliglove), and killed as many as eighty-three peasants in Koniuszki (Konyushchky).¹²⁸ It should be emphasised that during the Khmelnytsky rebellion the Tatars often conducted violent actions of this type even against the Ruthenian townspeople and Ruthenian clergy of the Orthodox Church. A good example was a terrible event that happened in Żywotów (Zhivotiv) in the first half of June 1648. When the Tatars began approaching the city, the Orthodox priests came out to meet them in a solemn procession as allies, holding banners and incensories. Ignoring the alliance fixed with the Zaporozhian Cossacks, the Tatar horsemen took the astonished popes in captivity and killed the others.¹²⁹ In my opinion, this incident clearly shows the pragmatism of the proceedings applied by Tatar hordes in the asymmetric warfare and, generally, in military affairs. Worth quoting is also an excerpt from an official report concerning Tatar operations during the winter incursion of the Budjak Horde into the area of Stryj *starosty* in February 1699. As Jan Malewicz, the mayor of Stryj, and a city councilor Mikołaj Dąbek, testified before the Przemyśl castle court: "The estates of the entire starosty of Stryj, and the villages nominated above and belonging to the starosty, through the invasion of the Tatar army that, with all of their might, in the month of February, on the day 17th, having invaded upon those estates and installed them selves into a *koş* [i.e. enclosed and guarded camp], and for the whole of the three days [of] Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday wracking those estates with fire and sword, they could come upon subjects of both genders [including] people [i.e. adults], children, retinue, and whom ever else, by their sudden and unexpected burst into there, taking into captivity, killing cruelly, wounding, crippling, binding, and lashing the others."¹³⁰ The testimony of Katarzyna Kolasa from the village

¹²⁸ TsDIAL, fund 9, op. 1, vol. 399, p. 359.

¹²⁹ BCz, ref. no. 2576, p. 123.

¹³⁰ TsDIAL, fund 13, op. 1, vol. 287, pp. 2038–9.

of Morawsko near Jarosław, who was abducted by the Tatars into slavery as a young girl, sounds even more terrifying: “My father was killed by a black Tatar with an axe, and he took me and my mother away, in the pasture they divided us into several huddles. Me and my mother were separated amidst our weeping and yelling. And I saw my mother no more ever since. Mother had both of her hands bound with perches on her back and I was bound into one huddle with the other such little girls like I was then.”¹³¹

Another practice that was on the military agenda of Tatar commanders, and was frequently resorted to, was attacking the same villages, already robbed and wasted, repeatedly. Not only did such actions increase the opportunity to capture more people when they were returning home from peasant strongholds, local fortresses and different sheltering posts after the first raid, but they also, seemingly, resulted in the attacked group’s feeling of losing control over their fate, which intensified the psychological effect. As an example, in an autumn Tatar foray of 1620, the Tatars successfully attacked the central part of the Ruthenian Palatinate, raiding into it twice in a row at an interval of a few days.¹³² As Palatine of Sandomierz Zbigniew Ossoliński wrote: “... the Tatar murzas instantaneously fell into our Pokuttya, ’cross the Dniester, unawares, unto the incautious cityzens, encountering them with the wives, with the children at their houses, destroying every thing with sword and by plundering, and since the great terror in our people prevented the bare sword from exhibiting, they unrestrainedly walked deeply into the land, loading innumerable harvest upon them selves, which they deposited in Wallachya, and several tymes returned.”¹³³ A similar tactic was used during a raid in June 1624 into the western part of Red Ruthenia, where two waves of Tatar cavalry attacks were consecutively launched.¹³⁴ A scribe responsible for the records kept by the Priestly Archconfraternity in Krosno interpreted it as two separate Tatar raids: “*Sabbato aut post Octavam Corporis Christi altera incursio Tatarorum*

¹³¹ Bazak, ‘Wspomnienia Kasi Kolasy’, 44.

¹³² BR, ref. no. 2, ‘Diariusz wtargnienia tatarskiego po wołoskiej potrzebie w kraie podolskie in Anno 1620’, p. 586; Gliwa, *Kraina upartych niepogód*, 210–21.

¹³³ Zbigniew Ossoliński, *Pamiętnik*, ed. by Józef Długosz (Warszawa, 1983), 127–8.

¹³⁴ Gliwa, *Kraina upartych niepogód*, 302.

fruit.”¹³⁵ The described pattern of Tatar operations was a common practice and, as such, it was reflected in the folk tradition and collective memory of people living in the south-eastern territories of the Crown, for centuries at the risk of attack by riders from the steppes of Kipchak.¹³⁶

Let us emphasise that characteristic of the described unconventional Tatar warfare was double asymmetry, referring not only to fundamental disproportions in the military potential (*power asymmetry*), i.e., classical military asymmetry, but also to the nature and choice of the primary targets of military operations – that is, concentrating the operational effort in the civilian space (*asymmetry in space*). In operations of this kind, civilian population of the rural area, their material assets, as well as poorly fortified objects that traditionally had little or no protection – the so called soft targets, such as villages and suburban settlements, or, occasionally, unfortified towns – were of primary importance for Tatars.¹³⁷ It can be stated that these actions were in fact population-centric warfare.¹³⁸ During such operations, Tatars commonly used a wide range of destabilisation techniques, such as targeted killing and looting, raping, torturing and abducting civilian people, deliberate and indiscriminate damaging of houses and economic infrastructure, and burning down sacral buildings, all aimed at intimidating local communities and increasing anxiety under attack. This type of military operations, even though with no direct reference to Tatar warfare, has recently been defined by Rupert Smith as “a war amongst the people”: this, in my opinion, reflects to a considerable extent the nature and specificity of Tatar actions during their raids into the territory of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and other neighbouring countries.¹³⁹

¹³⁵ LNVSSLU, fond 4, op. 1, ref. no. 1378/II, ‘Liber primus actorum Archiconfraternitatis Sacerdotalis in districtu sanocensi fundata’, fol. 71.

¹³⁶ See Gliwa, ‘Doświadczenie inwazji tatarskich’, 12.

¹³⁷ See Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 150.

¹³⁸ Buffaloe, ‘Defining asymmetric warfare’, 16.

¹³⁹ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York, 2007), 6.

VI
EFFECTS OF ASYMMETRIC OPERATIONS CONDUCTED
BY THE TATAR HORDES

One of the outcomes of accepting and implementing the conception of asymmetric military operations by Tatar commanders was usually an extremely large scale of war damage concentrated mainly in rural areas. A particularly interesting example in this context is from the Land of Przemyśl, located in the western part of Ruthenian palatinate. Covering an area of 12,070 square km, the said Land was among the richest and most densely populated regions of the Commonwealth at the beginning of the seventeenth century.¹⁴⁰ Studies on war damage in the area of the Land of Przemyśl in the perspective of the whole seventeenth century showed that, as a result of a dozen Tatar raids carried out between 1618 and 1699, the economic potential of the region decreased by approx. 80 per cent as compared to its condition at the beginning of the century. This situation was brought about by at least 2,480 indiscriminate attacks of Tatar troops on rural settlements and sixty-six strikes on urban areas, all of which were recorded in fiscal or tax-related documents.¹⁴¹ The attacks represented as many as 85.4 per cent and 71.7 per cent, respectively, of all the raids on rural and urban areas launched by enemy troops in the seventeenth century in the Land of Przemyśl. The most severe losses were inflicted in the 1620s, as a result of a spate of extremely destructive Tatar forays which led to the devastation of over 40 per cent of the region's economy.¹⁴² In the said decade alone, a total of 1,095 raids on villages were recorded, which represented over 44 per cent of all the attacks reported for the seventeenth century, along with eighteen raids on urban areas, which represented 27 per cent of all the attacks reported.¹⁴³ Resulting from the systematic Tatar expeditions in this period, the area of arable land decreased by 4,241 *łans*, i.e., ca. 68,000 ha, which represented ca. 47 per cent of the total area of cultivated arable

¹⁴⁰ Aleksander Jabłonowski (ed.), *Polska XVI wieku pod względem geograficzno-statystycznym*, vii: *Ziemie ruskie. Ruś Czerwona*, pt. 2 (Źródła dziejowe, 18, 2, Warszawa, 1903), 42; Kazimierz Przyboś, 'Granice ziemi przemyskiej w czasach nowożytnych XVI–XVIII wiek', *Rocznik Przemyski*, xxix–xxx (1994), 189.

¹⁴¹ Gliwa, *Kraina upartych niepogód*, 630.

¹⁴² Cf. map depicting the range of Tatar raids into the Land of Przemyśl in 1620–9, publ. *ibidem*, 150.

¹⁴³ *Ibidem*, 630.

land (excluding the arable land in manorial farms) in the territory of the Land of Przemyśl in the pre-war period.¹⁴⁴ Considerable damage was inflicted to the Land as a result of Tatar-Cossack attacks on the territories of Red Ruthenia in the autumn 1648, which affected 426 villages and 15 urban centres in the area.¹⁴⁵ A Tatar operation in October 1672, carried out during the Polish-Ottoman war, caused even larger damage, inflicting 867 villages and 32 towns, i.e. 93 per cent of all the rural settlements and 97 per cent of all the urban centres in the territory.¹⁴⁶ Less damage was inflicted by the last large Tatar intrusion of the seventeenth century, in winter 1699, which affected mainly the south-eastern part of the region.¹⁴⁷

An extremely important outcome of asymmetric operations carried out by Tatars – this aspect being poorly recognised, if not neglected, by historians – was the phenomenon of delocalisation of war damage, consisting in the moves of the largest damage zones.¹⁴⁸ Among the causes potentially analysable in rational categories was the character and specificity of Tatar operations, which in certain periods included precisely planned, sequential, and systematic wasting and plundering of individual areas in the south-eastern territories of Poland-Lithuania in the course of subsequent military operations. For example, in the 1620s the Land of Przemyśl was a target of eight Tatar invasions, six of which reached as far as the central part of the region, while the other predatory missions gradually swallowed up almost its entire area. As a result of this well-thought-out and refined strategy, the zones of the severest damage permanently shifted from southeast to northwest as the attacks culminated in 1624; afterwards, by the mid-1620s, they got resettled in their original locations. A detailed spatial analysis of the damage has shown that the attacks of Tatar hordes

¹⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, 631.

¹⁴⁵ *Idem*, 'The Tatar-Cossack Invasion', 112–13, 117.

¹⁴⁶ *Idem*, *Kraina upartych niepogód*, 630.

¹⁴⁷ The spatial range of the Tatar-Cossack expedition of 1648, the 1672 operation, and the incursion of the Budjak Horde in 1699 can be seen in detail in the maps published as attachments *ibidem*, Maps nos. 7, 11, 12.

¹⁴⁸ *Idem*, 'Krise durch Plünderung. Die zivilisatorische und ökonomische Entwicklung im Grenzgebiet des Osmanischen Reiches und der polnisch-litauischen Adelsrepublik', in Dariusz Adamczyk and Stephen Lehnstaedt (eds.), *Wirtschaftskrisen als Wendepunkte. Ursachen, Folgen und historische Einordnungen vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart* (Osnabrück, 2015), 301–3.

concentrated in the area stretching from Jarosław, *via* Przemyśl, up to Sambor, which was a territory characterised by the highest population density (of, roughly, 40 people per 1 sq. km) and the greatest economic potential. Ergo, the command of the Crimean and Budjak Hordes paid particular attention to the penetration of, specifically, the Land of Przemyśl as the demographic and economic backbone of the country, already in the planning phase of the plundering operation.

To sum up this thread, the severest damage to the economic potential of the Land of Przemyśl was inflicted by the Tatar raids of 1624, 1648 and 1672, all of which were highly asymmetric operations whose effect on the economy can be described as transformative. Interestingly, the destructive character of Tatar operations in those expeditions so strongly affected the community's perception that peasant communities began telling time by referring to these Tatar forays. A record from 1680, found in the registry book (*księga gromadzka*) of the village of Czarna near Rzeszów, can be provided here as an example, with the property rights of peasants described as follows: "and so, after the first [1624], the second [1648], and also the third Tatars [1672], and after the various *incursia* untill this time, have they settled them selves, crofts, cottages."¹⁴⁹ Similar mentions were found also in the records of the vogt-and-council court (*sąd wójtowski-ławniczy*) of the village of Markowa near Łańcut, where as of 18 April 1714 the right of a certain Marcin Jarosz to possess a piece of empty land was thus confirmed: "... into which emptyness no-body has built things by closeness, since it has remained emptyness since the first Tatars".¹⁵⁰ The village registry book of Łukawiec near Rzeszów mentions as follows (1697): "The penn of Maciej Grunie, which was acquired by his parent Krzysztof on the second year after the first Tatars, those that had preceded Khmelnytsky."¹⁵¹

The use of asymmetric strategies by Tatar hordes, so far overlooked by historians, constitutes an important part of research and analyses devoted to the old Tatar art of war. A closer look at the problem is crucial not only from a historical-military point of view but it

¹⁴⁹ TsDIAL, fund 136, op. 1, vol. 2, 'Księga gromadzka wsi Czarna', 1626–1808, p. 126.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, fund 85, op. 1, vol. 1, 'Księga sądu wójtowski-ławniczego wsi Markowej', 1591–1777, p. 690.

¹⁵¹ Franciszek Kotula, *Chłopi bronili się sami* (Rzeszów, 1982), 52.

is, seemingly, a question of much greater importance and gravity. The use of asymmetric warfare by Tatar hordes enables one, in my opinion, to explain why Tatar raids had such a devastating impact on the economies of the countries that were attacked. Our present knowledge of the consequences of these operations justifies their perception as the major structural causes of the economic crises occurring across vast areas of East Central Europe in the early modern period, and the later backwardness of this part of Europe as compared to the West.¹⁵² After all, the operations of Tatar units were a multi-dimensional and extremely wide-ranging phenomenon, not limited to the military space but affecting in great measure the economic environment, thus leading to significant social and cultural changes in the targeted territories.

Asymmetric operations carried out by Tatars with the use of specific methods of psychological influence and targeted against civilian population resulted in specific religious and cultural discourses as a defence reaction to the traumatic experiences connected with Tatar strikes.¹⁵³ These discourses, with a social dimension to them, constituted a communication practice with a distinct and explicitly negative reference to the religiously and culturally alien Tatars, and played an important part in the processes of adaptation to existential risks that Tatar invasions in reality posed.¹⁵⁴ As it seems, a major factor contributing to such a perception of the risks was the asymmetric character of operations targeted against civilians, leaving an indelible mark also in the collective memory, and changing the cultural landscape of the vast areas of East Central Europe which were at that time within the striking range of Tatar cavalry raids.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York, San Francisco, and London, 1974), 97.

¹⁵³ See Gliwa, 'Doświadczenie inwazji tatarskich', 53–73; *idem*, 'Powstawanie lokalnych kultów maryjnych i świętych patronów na Rusi Czerwonej po najazdach tatarskich jako dyskurs religijny w Rzeczypospolitej epoki nowożytnej', *Tematy i Konteksty*, 4 (9) (2014), 380–400.

¹⁵⁴ *Idem*, *Відображення у сакральному мистецтві католицької і православної церков (XVI–XVIII ст.) процесу виходу християнських спільнот південного сходу Речі Посполитої із травми, спричиненої татарськими набігами*, in Сергій Серяков (ed.), *Феномен мультикультурності в історії України і Польщі* (Харків, 2016), 161–79.

¹⁵⁵ Адріан Ф. Каїценко, *Оповідання про славне Військо Запорозьке низове: коротка історія Війська Запорозького* (Катеринослав and Ляйпцір, 1917), 3–41; Sarolta Tatár,

A number of elements of the Tatar art of war, such as stealth tactics, reconnaissance and intelligence activities on an operational scale, manoeuvring, a nonlinear and simultaneous character of operations throughout the area of operation, high mobility of cavalry units and their capability to relocate quickly, refraining from accumulation of forces in a given place to reinforce the effort and the effects of action, special attention paid to the maximum security of Tatar forces whilst economising on human resources, as well as the policy of organising field camps – the so-called *koşes*, with their role as specific logistics and supply bases, all offer grounds for comparing the Tatar warfare – despite all the differences based on disproportions in technological capabilities – with the military operations of the turn of the twenty-first century, carried out by what is now the greatest military powers and the world's highest developed countries. On the other hand, the style and character of combat missions conducted by Tatar hordes in the early modern period are comparable to the operations of today's terrorist groups. The characteristics and methods typical of asymmetric warfare that are shared by the historic Tatar forces and the present-day terroristic militant organisations or groups include the unpredictability of attack, the secrecy of military actions until the beginning of the attack or plundering operation, prioritising the strikes against soft targets, i.e. civilian populations and their resources, pursuing operations in non-military environment, using psychological instruments on a tactical and operational scale, and intensifying actions in areas where different civilisational circles meet. The course of the predatory invasions conducted by Crimean and Budjak Hordes in the early modern period proves that asymmetric warfare was entirely incorporated at the operational and tactical levels into Tatar military art of war.

As a conclusion of the discussion on asymmetric operations in Tatar warfare in the early modern period, one finds that the operations of Tatar forces can be compared to the recently increasingly popular concept of 'hybrid' warfare defined as military operations without a declaration of war, characterised by a simultaneously and adaptively employed combination of regular and irregular warfare, as well as terrorist tactics and criminal behaviour aimed at achieving political

A Transylvanian Folk Legend about the Tatars, <http://www.academia.edu/8345838/A_Legend_about_the_Tatars_in_Transylvania> [Accessed: 12 Dec. 2016], 1–7.

goals based on disruptive operations in the same time and battle space.¹⁵⁶ The asymmetric operations practiced by Tatar forces – consisting in the use of not only classical military tools but also a combination of political means and instruments as well as infrastructural objects and civil population-directed military actions, in the form of various macroeconomic consequences and pressures suggests that the system of Tatar warfare of the early modern period – formed a surprisingly modern mechanism that enabled Tatars to successfully achieve their political goals in international relations, and to continuously enhance the development, efficiency and prosperity of the Crimean Khanate' economy. As has been demonstrated, the operations of Tatar forces during their raids against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were a fairly unusual and uniquely modern phenomenon, in military and political terms; in fact, one that has eluded traditional evaluation by many generations of historians.

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¹⁵⁶ See Frank G. Hoffman, *The Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Arlington, 2007), 29; *idem*, 'Hybrid Warfare and Challenges', *Joint Force Quarterly*, 52 (2009), 36–7.

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