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DEPORTATIONS IN THE ZAMOŚĆ REGION IN 1942 AND 1943 IN THE LIGHT OF GERMAN DOKUMENTS

On November 28, 1942 at 3 o'clock in the morning the deportation started in the Zamość region¹. The first stage (November 1942 — March 1943) covered 116 villages, the second (June — August 1943) — 171 villages. The Nazi authorities had intended to deport 10 000 Poles from those villages. However, they actually managed to deport only about 50 000.

The Reich commenced the deportation campaign at the time of the greatest successes, when it seemed that Germany was on the eve of victory. The campaign started after the fantastic plans of the Nazi colonization of the conquered eastern territories had been completed. Through the colonization the Nazis intended to build there a wall of peasantry, composed chiefly of Germanic population, to consolidate their conquests in the East. Among other things they were planning to resettle the Palestine Germans in the Crimea. They were preparing, on a large scale, the resettlement of 3 million Dutch people and for that purpose they organized, in July 1942, the *Nederlandsche Oost Compagnie*.

Simultaneously, the Germanization of the annexed Polish territories was in progress. In the General Gouvernement² that was the period of intensified extermination of Jews. In the Lublin Distrikt, for instance, the extermination of Jews was nearly completed in November 1942. There were 250 000 of them in April 1941, 190 000 in mid-1942 and 20 000 towards the end of 1942³.

¹ The Zamość region, during the occupation, comprised the following kreise: Zamość, Biłgoraj, Tomaszów, Hrubieszów.

² Abbr. GG.

³ A. Eisenbach, *Hitlerowska polityka eksterminacyjna Żydów*, Warszawa 1953, p. 295.

PREPARATION OF THE DEPORTATION OPERATIONS

As early as in November 1941 the Nazi authorities in the Lublin Distrikt made their first attempt at deportations. The operation covered over 2000 people from 6 villages. Germans from Moldavia were resettled in their place.

It can be supposed that the absence of resistance was then taken by the occupants as an encouragement for the future.

During the 8th Nuremberg Trial, Walter Huppenkothen, chief of the Sicherheitspolizei at Lublin in 1940—1941, stated in his evidence that since the spring of 1941 the Staff of Globocnik, the SS and Police commander, plenipotentiary for consolidation of Germanism in the Lublin Distrikt, had been very busy working out a plan of an SS and Police network. They were to be the very first colonization centres located in landed estates and villages. Himmler, who was not only the SS and Police Commander-in-Chief but also Commissary for consolidation of Germanism, was already showing his interest in that work and would frequently visit Lublin⁴. The preparations were backed by the policy of the highest Nazi authorities. According to Frank's account contained in his diary, Hitler decided in 1941, before the war with the USRR, to transform the GG territory into a German country, within some 15 or 20 years. Frank's administration started the necessary preparations. Street-names were Germanized, special German districts established in various towns. A plan was drafted for a reform of the agrarian structure of the GG, so as to adapt it to the agrarian system of the Reich and to the colonization needs. The preparations made by Himmler's Staff were progressing independently.

During Hitler's visit to Cracow on March 13—14, 1942, the question of deportations was discussed at two conferences. The relevant information is contained in the confidential reports of the Internal Affairs Department of the GG 'government'⁵. According to the first of them, apart from demanding that the 'historically German' centre of Lublin and the market square at Zamość should be given, after reconstruction, to German officials, Himmler put forward another demand — that in the confiscated Polish estates in the Zamość district German peasant families from Moldavia should be resettled.

According to the second report Himmler had presented his plans for the Germanization and resettlement campaign for the coming years.

⁴ Nuremberg Trial no. 8, vol. 39. Verteidigung doc. Creutz, no. 22. Statement on oath.

⁵ *Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal Nuremberg*, vol. XXVI, PS — 910.

He intended to germanize the Highlanders, Lemks and Huculs⁶. Germans from Spisz, for instance, were to be later resettled in these territories. Himmler thought that during the first five-year plan after the war, the end of which he expected shortly, the new eastern territories should have been colonized. Later, the first wave of German settlers was to spread to the Crimea and the Baltic countries.

Jeden alls wollte man zunächst eine strake Ansiedlung längs des Sans und des Bugs vornehmen, sodass die fremdvölkischen Teile Polens eingekesselt werden. Es habe sich bisher immer erwiesen, dass diese Art der Umschliessung am raschesten zu der gewünschten Nationalisierung führe.

Frank speaking on March 18 to the NSDAP leaders in the GG, referred to the talks with Himmler⁷, suggesting that the realization of a large scale colonization could be started only after the war. When speaking to the Nazi Youth leader Axmann (on June 7) he used expressions such as that the GG was the German *Lebensraum*, just like Würtemberg, Eaden, Brandeburg or Bavaria. Frank claimed that Cracow, Warsaw, Lvov, Lublin or Radom should be integrated into German community just like are Vienna or Hamburg⁸.

A little later, on June 12, 1942 Himmler, when giving his opinion on the first version of the *Generalplan Ost*, ordered that the complete Germanization of Estonia, Latvia and the GG should be included in the twenty-year plan.

He most emphatically stated that the proposal contained in the first version that the action in the GG and the *Ostland* should be limited only to a network of the SS and Police posts, did not correspond to his ideas or wishes⁹. So, Himmler had gone farther than during his talks with Frank in March. He confirmed the above mentioned attitude of the complete Germanization of the GG in his speech to the SS and Police commanders in the occupied southern territories of the USSR, on September 15, 1942¹⁰.

At the same time he also ordered to prepare a resettlement area for 43 000 *Volksdeutsche* in the Zhitomir region¹¹.

⁶ Regional Polish and Ukrainian ethnic groups.

⁷ Frank's Diary, Tagebuch, 1942/I, p. 193.

⁸ Ibidem, p. 489.

⁹ Nuremberg Trial, no. 8, vol. 25, doc. 2255.

¹⁰ Archiwum Główniej Komisji Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich. (Archives of the Central Commission for Investigation of Nazi Crimes (abbr. AGLKBZ H) Files of the Regional Commission for Investigation of Nazi Crimes in Cracow relating to the case of Frank's deputy, chief of the GG government Joseph Bühler (abbr. Bühler's Files) vol. 7, p. 137.

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 127..

Greifelt, the chief of the *Stabshauptamt*, asked the *SS Reichsführer* on July 3, 1943 to declare the GG a resettlement area¹². To his letter he attached a report¹³ to the effect that in the GG the Poles whose farms were undercultivated or neglected were to be deported in autumn. He proposed to replace them, as well as the *Volksdeutsche* who had been transferred in 1940—1941 from the Lublin and Chełm regions to the Reich, with German colonists. They were to be resettled in the vicinity of the Police stations and in compact groups. The approval of the GG resettlement project was sent by telegram on Himmler's behalf, on July 8. Himmler was supported by Bormann, the *NSDAP* leader. In a letter to Rosenberg, on July 23, he gave him the guiding principles for ruling the conquered eastern territories. They refer to the Nazi policy as regards Slavs, which included Poles as well. In Bormann's opinion no care for protection of their health or for their education was necessary. *Die Slaven sollen für uns arbeiten. Soweit wir sie nicht brauchen mögen sie sterben... An Verpflegung bekommen sie nur das Notwendige. Wir sind die Herren, wir kommen zuerst*¹⁴.

The already mentioned planning bureau at Lublin had been built up. It was still headed by Globocnik, a favourite of Himmler's, chief of staff of the *Operation Reinhard* for extermination of Jews. Colonization plans not only for the GG but also for European Russia were worked out there. Himmler continued to show much interest in them and would now come to Lublin every four or six weeks¹⁵. He presented the general lines of the Germanization policy in the June—July, 1942 issue of the *Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*. *Unsere Aufgabe ist es, den Osten nicht im alten Sinne zu germanisieren; dass heisst den dort wohnenden Menschen deutsche Sprache und deutsche Gesetze beizubringen, sondern dafür zu sorgen, dass im Osten nur Menschen wirklich deutschen, germanisches Blutes wohnen*¹⁶.

On August 4, at a session of the GG government in Cracow¹⁷ called specially to discuss the Lublin Distrikt problem, Frank emphasized that the Distrikt had a very special part to play in Himmler's plans.

¹² *Nuremberg Trial* no. 8, doc. no. 4876 a ‚Schnellbrief‘ from Greifelt, dated July 3, 1942, to the Chief of Himmler's personal Staff Brandt.

¹³ *Ibidem*, doc. nr 4877..

¹⁴ AGŁKZBH, Bühler's Files, vol. 7, p. 75, fragment of a letter dated August 19, 1942 from Bormann quoted by dr Markulla, one of Himmler's collaborators. Dr Markulla's remarks reveal that the conflicts among the Nazi leaders were reaching farther. The circles close to Himmler intended to liquidate the Rosenberg's Ministry for annexed eastern territories as well.

¹⁵ *Nuremberg Trial* no 8, vol. 39, doc. Creutz, no 23, Statement on oath.

¹⁶ *Nuremberg Trial* no 8, vol. 25, p. 299, doc. 2915 - PS.

¹⁷ Frank's Diary, *Tagebuch, 1942/III*, p. 821-3.

Krüger, the SS and Police commander in the GG and acting commissary for consolidation of Germanism in the GG, reported that Himmler had already forwarded the general directives on the future colonization of the district. Himmler intended to resettle the Volksdeutsche from Bosnia, Moldavia, Serbia, Leningrad, the Baltic states, Volhynia and other European countries in the Lublin and Zamość Kreise. A total of 10 000 families composed of 60 000 persons was to be resettled. Frank agreed to that and demanded that the operation should cause no disturbances. He also demanded that the resettlement plan should be submitted to him by September, so as the deportation operations might start in mid-November, that is at the most convenient time, in his opinion. Frank suggested that Himmler's attention should be invited to the fact that in Galicia as well there was plenty of fertile lands and that colonists should urgently be settled there. The session was concluded with the adoption of the plan for construction of a German settlement at Lublin.

It transpires from the later speeches of Frank, delivered on August 15, 1942 that he was back to his attitude of Germanization of Polish territories by stages¹⁸. While approving of the necessity to Germanize the GG and to make it a purely German *Siedlungsland* he was making a reservation that that could not be done at the moment because of the difficulties created by the war. Polish railwaymen, Polish workers in armfactories, Polish peasants — were at the moment irreplaceable. That had nothing to do with sparing the Poles and was rather a cold-blooded reckoning that the enormous contributions to the Reich were possible, provided there were no disturbances.

According to Frank, Cracow with 30 000 Germans living there already, was to become a German city. There were 100 000 Germans in Warsaw. At a sports festival Przemyśl and Radomsko were proclaimed places of residence for the *Hitlerjungend*: *Lassen Sie erst einmal den Krieg beendet sein*, Frank shouted, *dann werden die Millionen deutscher Menschen hier einströmen und eine neue Heimat finden*¹⁹. Himmler opposed in principle the idea of waiting for the end of the war. He thought the German administration both in the GG and in the occupied Soviet territories was not enough determined or ruthless in the implementation of the Reich policy and that the chief part should be given there to the SS and Police. His influence was incomparably greater and he was driving at an integration of the GG with the Reich for administration purposes, as a *Gau*²⁰. It transpires from a number of Frank's statements that Himmler's idea

¹⁸ Frank's Diary, Tagebuch, 1942/III, p. 860—867 and 895—897.

¹⁹ Frank's Diary, Tagebuch, 1942/III, p. 895-7.

²⁰ Ibidem, 1942/III, p. 163.

was, at the time, very nearly realized²¹. Frank, for his part, considered the independent GG a form more convenient, for the duration of the war, for exploitation of the territory and thought the integration plans were premature and less advantageous to Germany²².

Although both Frank and Himmler were in agreement as to the ultimate aim which was the colonization of the GG, the tactical differences, by no means restricted to the Polish affairs, resulted in sharp conflicts between them as well as between Frank and the newly appointed Minister of Justice Thierack and the Minister of Internal Affairs. In connexion with these conflicts Frank went to Berlin in August and presented his resignation. At that time he was released from his position of both leader of the Nazi Lawyers Union and president of the German Academy of Law. His position, as he stated himself, was weak²³. Hitler did not accept Frank's resignation. Frank agreed to carry on, realizing at the same time that Hitler had adopted a still more ruthless course of policy, based upon methods of violence, complete destruction of legality, concentration camps and free hand for the Police. To such an extent Hitler showed that he saw no need to keep up appearances that he aroused some objections of Frank. In view of the tendencies of the Berlin central authorities to take over the prerogatives of the GG government, losing his hope to maintain the status quo, Frank himself suggested integration of the GG with the Reich²⁴.

In the summer of 1942, unusually high quotas of agricultural products were, to be commandeered. The Reich was to receive over 750 000 tons of grain from that source. The enormous imposition had not only its economic aspect. It constituted a hint at starvation and Frank mentioned that line of the Reich policy in his December speech²⁵.

October was dominated by feverish preparations for the deportation operations in the Zamość region. On October 10, 1942 the Reich Security Central Office informed *Obersturmbannführer* Krumey, chief of the Lodz Resettlement Centre, by telegram, of the orders issued by Himmler during

²¹ *Ibidem*, 1942/IV, p. 1310. There were suggestions to create 3 Gaus: Cracow, Warsaw and Lvov.

²² In connexion with this probably, the Reich was not paying back its growing debts to the GG, estimated by Bühler at the beginning of 1943 at 3000 million zlotys.

²³ Frank's Diary, *Tagebuch*, 1942/III p. 961.

²⁴ Frank's Diary, *Tagebuch*, 1942/III, p. 981-2. *Abschliessende Betrachtungen zur Entwicklung des letzten Vierteljahres* of August 28, 1942.

²⁵ Starvation methods in a classic form were applied by the occupants in Greece.

his several hours' visit to Cracow²⁶. The resettlement of 17 000 Slovenes and Lorrainers in the Lublin Distrikt had to be speeded up, so as it might be completed before Christmas. Apart from them 10 000 *Volksdeutsche* were to be resettled. The following preliminary directives how to deal with the expatriated Poles were issued by Himmler. For children up to 10 'education camps' were to be organized. Those accepted as valuable from the racial point of view were to be directed to the Reich. For people over 60 the *Rentendörfer* were to be created. Those classified as group 4 were, on Himmler's orders, to be sent to a concentration camp and group 3 was to go to forced labour in the Reich or in the East²⁷, while group 2, was to be sent to Lodz for examination. On Himmler's directives the total number of Poles to be expatriated was increased by the Reich Security Central Office from 73 000 to 140 000. Besides, Himmler demanded an estimate of the number of Poles to go to the Reich and of those to be sent to concentration camps.

As early as on October 11, Krumey sent a telegram answering the question²⁸. Working on the experience of the deportations in the Poznań region, he expected that 29 per cent. of the deportees would go to children camps, 12 per cent. to the *Rentendörfer*, 21 per cent. to concentration camps, 15 per cent. to forced labour (without families), 22 per cent. for transfer to the East (group 3 with families) and 5 per cent. for Germanization.

On October 23, Krüger received from Globocnik a report on the state of preparations for colonization of the Lublin region and forwarded it by a messenger to Himmler²⁹. The report described the state of preparations for the period from the July Himmler's decisions to September 15. Globocnik complained that, so far, he had not been provided with the necessary forces to execute the resettlement and that he had not received a decision as to where the Poles were to be deported. Germans from Croatia and Bosnia would not be ready for resettlement before December. The arrival date of the Lorrainers and Luxemburgers had not yet been fixed. In connexion with that Globocnik suggested, as a solution, to begin in the Zamość Kreis the so called 'little resettlement', covering 2500 families (the *Deutschstämmige* from the Lublin Distrikt, Germans from Russia, Moldavia and Rumania). He was however, remarking that the resettlement, for the time being, of the colonists from the East alone, would be undesirable.

²⁶ Z. Klukowski: *Zbrodnie niemieckie w Zamojszczyźnie [The Nazi Crimes in the Zamość region]*, Warszawa 1947, p. 61-2 (appendices).

²⁷ In a speech on June 20, 1940 Rosenberg proposed to resettle Poles in Byelorussia while the Generalplan Ost envisaged resettlement of about 20 million Poles in western Siberia.

²⁸ Z. Klukowski, op. cit., p. 63.

²⁹ Bühler's Files, vol. 8, p. 218—224. The report was delivered to the SS Reichsführer on November 1.

In the circumstances Globocnik suggested to supplement, in future, the colonized villages with colonists from the West. He also planned to thin out the Polish population in the towns constituting the central resettlement points (Lublin, Zamość, Krasnystaw) with the dead-line date fixed for spring 1943. It can be seen from the progress of the deportations that that demands had not been approved.

We do not know Himmler's reply to this report. Nevertheless, that was some sort of 'little resettlement' which was eventually put into effect, owing to the delay in preparations which, in turn was to a great extent a result of the intensified fighting on the eastern front.

The continuing German offensive at Stalingrad posed before the Nazi authorities a serious problem of railway rolling stock. On October 26 the tasks for the Ministry of Transport were specified in a telegram from the Reich Security Central Office to Krumei, on the subject of evacuation of Poles from the Lublin, Lvov and Radom Distrikts. Starting from November 2, 1942, two trains a week were to depart from Zamość each taking 1000 people to Berlin, and three trains to Oświęcim (Auschwitz)³⁰. It transpires from the telegram that it was originally intended to send to a concentration camp $\frac{3}{5}$ of those deported beyond the GG territory.

In the course of further preparations, as it can be seen from a secret telephone message of October 31 from *SS-Gruppenführer* Müller to the *SS-Reichsführer*, the principles of segregation of the Polish population to be 'evacuated' were definitely specified³¹. Polish families classified as group 1 and 2 were to be directed, in principle, to a camp at Lodz to be Germanized. Only a few of them were to take over the farms left empty because of the lack of colonists. Out of groups 3 and 4, children up to 14. old and sick people were to be accommodated in certain Polish villages called the *Rentendörfer*³². They were to be some sort of reservations for Poles. Müller referring to Krüger's attitude warned against sending children of the deported Poles to the German educational institutions, as it had been advocated by Himmler, as that might result in a considerable intensification of the resistance movement. Only a small number of Polish children whose parents would be classified as group 3 or 4 was to be accepted as suitable for Germanization. The deported people, able

³⁰ AGLKBZH, Bühler's Files, vol. 9, p. 7. Copy of the telegram.

³¹ Ibidem, p. 8—9, Copy of the letter.

³² T. Brustin - Berenstein in the article *Zagadnienia gospodarcze GG [The GG economic problems]* rightly invites attention to the fact that the accommodated old people and children, deprived of a proper care or protection were dying out very quickly. That was, after all, a certain form of extermination; *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego* ['Jewish Historical Institute Bulletin']. No. 9—10, 1954.

to work, and those classified as group 3 were to be directed to factories of military importance in the Reich to replace the exterminated Jews. Finally, Müller suggested to abandon the idea of directing a part of Poles for resettlement in the Ukraine, in view of the intense activity of partisan 'bands' in that territory and to the danger of their being reinforced by the deportees joining unp.

The further definition of the segregation principles is contained in secret order no 1, issued by Krüger, dated November 10³³. A part of small farmers classified as group 3 was to be left as labour force. Those classified as group 3 were to be sent to the Brzezinka camp. His next order, of the same date related to the deportations of Ukrainians from the Zamość region³⁴. The Ukrainians were not to be deported but transferred to Polish villages in the so called Ukrainian Resettlement Area and resettled there on farms equivalent in size to those previously owned.

The third order issued by Krüger contained the principles of expropriation of landed estates which were to be converted into the SS and Police posts³⁵. The owners were to receive from the trustees the customary rations and accommodation. The agricultural workers were to be left in the estates.

On November 12 Himmler issued order no 17H setting up the first resettlement area in the General Gouvernement³⁶. The order ran: *Die Kreishauptmannschaft Zamość wird zum ersten deutschen Siedlungsbereich im Generalgouvernement erklärt*. It was to be a new 'safe motherland' for the resettlers from Bosnia, for the endangered *Volksdeutsche* from the occupied Soviet territories, for the other groups of resettlers to be specified by Himmler and for the *Volksdeutsche* and *Deutschstämmigen* from the GG. Himmler ordered, first of all that the town and the Zamość kreis should be colonized by Germans before summer 1943. Finally, the order named those responsible for the execution of the resettlements and requested the plan of the area affected by the deportations to be submitted for Himmler's approval.

Among the last documents known to us, dating from the period preceding the deportations, are the secret 'Directives for the Assembly Camp for Poles in connexion, with the deportation operations in the Za-

³³ AGŁKBZH, Bühler's Files, vol. 9, p. 11, Copy of the order.

³⁴ Ibidem, p. 14. Copy of the order.

³⁵ Ibidem, p. 15. Copy of the order.

³⁶ The German text of the secret order runs: Allgemeine Anordnung No. 17C des Reichsführer — SS, Chef der deutschen Polizei und Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums über die Bestimmung eines ersten Siedlungsbereiches im Generalgouvernement. Vide Bühlers Files, vol. 8, doc. no 2562.

mość district' forwarded by Krumej on November 21³⁷. They contain a number of technical details of the deportation operations. To pacify the Polish population an official announcement³⁸ was to be distributed, presenting the deportation operations as a mobilization of forces 'against Jewry and Communism'. Only children up to 6 months old were to be left with their mothers. The other children, according to Krumej, were to be put under the care of relatives. People earmarked for the Reich were allowed to take with them a maximum of 20 zlotys per person.

Very important are the confidential 'Directives concerning the deportation of Polish landowners' issued by the Zamość branch of the Resettlementz Centrale at Lodz and dated November 21, like the previously mentioned Krumej's directives³⁹. The deportees were to be treated decently but rigorously. 'In cases of active resistance fire arms should be used'. A deportation operation was to last up to an hour. It was recommended to reinforce the 'evacuation detachments' so as to make them capable of preventing the attempts at destroying or setting fire to the abandoned property. The directives also stipulated that the weight of luggage must not exceed 30 kilograms for an adult person.

During the period from November 25 to December 1, 1942 Frank was in the Reich. It is impossible to establish whether he left after having been informed about the deportations due to begin in a few days, or was it rather that Himmler and his men took advantage of Frank's absence to face the administration with a fait accompli. In this way the deportation operations were commenced, without consulting the GG administration but taking for granted its previous sanction, given in August.

DEPORTATIONS

On the night of November 28 the deportations of Poles from the Zamość region started. By March 1943 — 116 villages were depopulated⁴⁰. The intensity of the operations as regards the individual villages is illustrated by the following table:

³⁷ AGŁKBZH, Bühler's Files, vol. 9.

³⁸ Z. Klukowski, *op. cit.*, p. 69. The idea was probably abandoned because, as it is noted by Polish sources, the Polish Committee at Zamość, 'by an official order' sent a telephone message to all its branches on November 28, to pacify the population.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 71.

⁴⁰ Z. Klukowski, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

Former	Nov. 42	Dec. 42	Jan. 43	Feb. 43	March. 43
Zamość district	12	35	—	—	—
Tomaszów district	15	—	+	—	—
Hrubieszów district	—	—	26	26	2

According to the data from the German sources, by the end of 1942 the deportations affected 33832 persons out of which only 9771 were actually captured. Two thirds had managed to escape. From the German sources it can be seen that as early as on November 30 Globocnik called attention to the fact that one third of the deported population was escaping and ordered to prevent it in the future⁴¹. People were escaping not only during the deportations. A report dated December 16, 1942 submitted by H. Kinn and relating to a party of deportees escorted to Oświęcim, reveals that out of 644 escorted — 14 had escaped. Besides, he reported that the Oświęcim camp command had demanded that only Poles fit to work should be sent.

Frank expressed official attitude to the deportation operations in a speech delivered on December 14, 1942 at the working session of the NSDAP political leaders. He began with a warning as to the confidential character of the discussed matters. Here are some excerpts from the speech:

Sie wissen Frank said dass innerhalb der Partei im allgemeinen absolut die Meinung vertreten wird, dass die Aussiedlung der Polen, ihre Vernichtung oder ihre Behandlung lediglich als Arbeitswesen Ausdruck unserer Polenpolitik ist. Sie wissen auch, dass in weitem Umfange in die Tat umgesetzt wurde. Nun zeigt sich aber in zunehmenden Masse auf diesem Gebiet eine ungeheure Erschwerung.

Es wäre vielmehr wünschenswert, dass sich die Reichsinstanzen, die Parteinstanzen und die territorialen Instanzen endlich einmal über einen Weg klar werden. Es geht nämlich nicht an, dass die einen sagen: alle Polen, ganz gleich welcher Art, wenn sie arbeitsfähig sind, müssen in den Arbeitsprozess eingeschaltet werden. Hier klappt ein diametraler Gegensatz. Man könnte sagen: alle Polen, die hier im Arbeits einsatz stehen, können wir behalten, alle Polen, bei denen das nicht der Fall ist, können wir ausrotten. Darin liegt nur die eine grosse Schwierigkeit, dass eine Ausrottung von Millionen menschlicher Wesen am Voraussetzungen geknüpft ist, die wir zur Zeit nicht erfüllen können.

⁴¹ Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych [Ministry of Internal Affairs Archives] (AMSW), Lublin Gendarmerie Files, File 114, copy of the letter.

Da gilt es nun, im einzelnen zu verhandeln, aufzuklären zu erfahren, welche Richtung das Reich verfolgt. Sollen wir ausrotten oder aufbauen, soll die Arbeit hier oder im Reich geschafren werden, sollen wir Arbeiter abgeben oder sie hier behalten. Sollen wir die Polen verhungern lassen oder sie ernähren?

In the conclusion of the speech Frank said that some moments, very difficult for the Reich, might still come in the course of the war and that his aim was to maintain order in the GG up to the victory day. In connexion with that he expressed his doubts whether it had been advisable to have started the deportations at that time and demanded for the NSDAP the right to co- decide in these matters ⁴².

Fifteen days after Frank's speech, on December 29, Krumej, acting on information supplied by Globocnik, submitted by wire to the Reich Security Central Office his further intentions as regards deportations ⁴³. Towards the end of February 1943 more deportation operations were to start. 'Evacuation' of 9000 people from Zamość was to take place in mid-January but it did not materialize. To make possible the transfer of the Ukrainians deported from the former Zamość Kreis to the former Hrubieszów Kreis it had been planned to move in January 3000—4000 Poles from there, which was actually done, although number of the detained was considerably smaller. On December 29, the Reich Security Central Office ordered Krumej by wire to send Polish priests captured during the deportations, to a concentration camp and not to the *Reintendorfer* ⁴⁴.

The documents dating from January 1943 already admit the facts of Polish resistance against deportations ⁴⁵. One of the documents is a special order of the Police commander in the Lublin Distrikt, dated January 6, 1943 ⁴⁶. One hundred Polish police constables were detailed to protect the border of the Zamość region. They were to prevent Polish and Ukrainian deportees from returning, to fight the 'bands' on the border of the deportations area and to prevent robbery and sabotage.

There are some clearer indications of the partisan activity in an order of the officer commanding the 1st Motorized Gendarmerie Battalion, dated January 27 ⁴⁷. It stated in part:

⁴² Frank's Diary Tagebuch, 1942/IV, p. 1328—1340.

⁴³ Z. Klukowski, op. cit., p. 72.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, p. 73.

⁴⁵ The very first act of resistance was an operation, on December 9, against the German colonized village Nawóz, where 13 farmssteads were burnt out and several Germans killed. As a reprisal, the Germans murdered about 170 people of Kitów.

⁴⁶ AMSW. Lublin Gendarmerie Files, vol. 66, p. 40.

⁴⁷ Ibidem p. 35. Only a fragment of the order is preserved.

Die im Einsatzraum befindlichen deutschen Umsiedlungsdörfer sind in letzter Zeit durch starke Banden der WB⁴⁸ überfallen, Einwohner getötet und Dorfteile abgebrannt sowie die Landwacht z. T. ermordet worden. Diese Mordbremer setzen sich aus den ungesiedelten Bevölkerungskreisen, die bei der Umsiedlung nicht erfasst werden konnten und sich hauptsächlich an der Ostgrenze des Kreises Z. aufhalten, zusammen. Sie und ihre Helfershelfer sind im Einsatzgebiet der Kreise Zamość und Hrubieszów nach den Richtlinien der Kampfweise für die Bandenbekämpfung im Osten — besonders Abschn. E — zu bekämpfen⁴⁹.

The progress of the resettlement campaign in the Zamość Kreis was reported by Krüger at a session of the GG government on January 25, 1943. He emphatically assured that there were no doubts as to that the GG area should and would be colonized by Germans, without postponing the operations till after the war⁵⁰.

The Lublin Distrikt deportations were to be, in the initiators opinion, the first stage of the colonization. They were to serve as the first experiment to find out the difficulties, the size of Polish resistance, the economic and political consequences etc. From the propaganda point of view the operations were not successful. *Denn der Pole hat gesagt: nach dem der Jude vernichtet worden ist, versucht man mit den gleichen Methoden, den Polen aus diesem Raume herauszubringen und ihn ebenso zu liquidieren wie den Juden.* As a un unfavourable factor Krüger considered the impossibility to give the Poles a pacifying explanation. He announced that if a Pole proved *minderwertig* he would disappear in a concentration camp and if he proved *wertvoll* he would get, allegedly, the same as a German colonist. According to Krüger's information it was Himmler's wish that the Galicia Distrikt should also be colonized in the near future. He had even fixed groups of colonists for that area. If they had not been resettled so far, it was but for the conviction that resettlement could not have been undertaken simultaneously in two distant parts of the General Gouvernement.

At the above mentioned session the Distrikt Governors reported the quiet and orderly progress of the 'internal resettlement' of the Germans from poorer to more fertile ex-Polish lands and in compact settlements. Zörnner, the Lublin Governor, opposed the deportations because of the

⁴⁸ Abbr. for Widerstandsbewegung.

⁴⁹ Directives were entitled Kampfweise für die Bandenbekämpfung im Osten, dated November 11, 1942. In chapter „E” concerning the fight with partisans and their helpers, Himmler ordered the most rigorous treatment of those groups, recommending, among other measures, collective punishment.

⁵⁰ Frank's Diary, Arbeitssitzungen 1943, Polizeisitzung January 25, 1943.

unrest and the resettlement of Slovenes because he considered them the most hostile to Germany. A fear could be felt that the resettlers would make the administration tasks more difficult as they would first of all care for their farms and would be attacked by partisans. Governor Fischer revealed the fact of unrest among the Warsaw Distrikt Poles, particularly because of deportations of the Zamość children, brutally separated from their parents⁵¹.

In a secret letter of February 16, referring to the objections within the GG 'government' and among the Governors, Krüger submitted to the SS *Reichsführer* a suggestion of a temporary suspension of the deportations⁵².

Of a great importance is a 'Report' on the Polish rising in the Zamość region, dated February 16, 1943, worked out by a Gendarmerie major from Zamość⁵³. It was stated there that the resistance leaders recruited from intelligentsia and from ex-servicemen. The landed estate owners were usually to be found in their estates, but nearly all Polish teachers had disappeared. The majority of the insurgents were peasants. They were armed with 1939 arms. The report estimated that in the woods, accessible only with difficulty, the movability and better knowledge of the locality favoured the 'bandits' while those encountered in built-up areas were killed to the last.

At a conference of the Governors on February 22 Bühler announced that the resettlement operations continued. Frank demanded then that the Lublin Distrikt authorities should submit to him a report on the operations and their economic effects. He cautiously added that although it was the *Führer's* wish that the German colonization of the GG should gradually begin, 'the present hard times' did not favour that. Consequently, in his conclusions from the conference he put forward a demand for suspension of the resettlement⁵⁴.

An extensive study written for Frank by Zörner, the chief of the Lublin Distrikt, entitled *Auswirkungen der Umsiedlung im Kreise Zamość*⁵⁵ and dated February 24, 1943, was a reply to the Governor General's demand. Zörner, admitting that he had no accurate figures

⁵¹ Frank's Diary, Arbeitssitzungen 1943, p. 13—19, 32, 38-9.

⁵² AGŁKBZH, Bühler's Files, vol. 9, p. 222, Photocopy.

⁵³ AMSW, Lublin Gendarmerie Files, vol. 76 Erfahrungsbericht über den Aufstand der Polen im Kreise Zamość, Anfang, Februar 1943, Roneoed text. The report was worked out after a large scale 'round-up' of a group of escapees near Krasnobrod. Due to the help of partisans the defence had been broken through and the deportees had escaped. The operation took place between February 4 and 12.

⁵⁴ Frank's Diary. Tagebuch, 1943/I, p. 129.

⁵⁵ AGŁKBZH, Bühler's Files, vol. 9, p. 236—264. A copy.

available, reported that 9000 Germans from Moldavia had been resettled up to November 26, 1942⁵⁶. According to the report the majority of Poles had been directed to the Oświęcim concentration camp, the minority — to work in the Reich. That was, however, incorrect in the light of other documents. The Ukrainians were being temporarily resettled in 35 or 40 villages of the Hrubieszów Kreis, from where the Poles had been deported to the Reich.

The deportations, in the opinion of the occupation authorities of the Distrikt, caused among Poles and Ukrainians:

- a feeling of insecurity and a fear of being treated like Jews,
- economic insecurity, as the greater part of the Polish deportees was being sent to forced labour at Oświęcim,
- a fear of separation of families⁵⁷.

That resulted in a mass exodus of farmers who, taking with them their livestock and implements, departed along the side lanes, under the cover of darkness or fog, to join their relatives or the 'bands' in the woods. Only 25000 of them were captured, although double that number had been expected. All over the district tens of thousands were waiting, ready to escape.

Es ist selbstverständlich, states the report in question, *dass ein wesentlicher Teil der Flüchtlinge, die nichts mehr zu verlieren haben, zu einer Verstärkung der Banditen im Süden des Distrikts beigetragen hat. Man kann schon von einer militärähnlich organisierten Volksbewegung sprechen, die geschlossene Abteilungen der Polizei verlustreiche Kämpfe verwickelte, ja sogar zurückschlag.*

Zörner also emphasized the German casualties due to the 'bandits' operations, namely 37 new settlers killed and 16 wounded⁵⁸. In the

⁵⁶ Figures are inaccurate. The *Volksdeutschen* from Russia, Serbia, 300 families from Luxemburg (to 133 out of which Globocnik was refusing the resettlement in the Lublin region, as they were hostile to Germany) had also been brought there. (*Nuremberg Trial*, no 8, vol. 29, dec. no 2400).

⁵⁷ It is emphasized in the Polish protocols of questioning the witnesses of the Zamość region deportations that heartrending scenes took place in the camps when children were separated from their parents. Very often the *Gestapo* men could separate children only after beating the parents unconscious.

⁵⁸ On January 28 Krüger informed Himmler about an attack on the village of Cieszyn. Apart from the above mentioned number of killed he reported 15 *Landwacht* also killed. He reported at the same time that he was preparing a revenge (*Grossrazzia*), probably even with the use of aircraft to break the resistance. In his reply Himmler advised that the proposed reprisals should be executed with full severity, so as to make sure that the attack would be the last one. He permitted extermination of whole Polish villages, if necessary (*Nuremberg*

opinion of the Distrikt authorities that was 'a significant act of revenge' of the expelled peasants. The number of arson cases in the newly resettled villages was increasing considerably. Between 9 and 28 December 1942, in the Zamość Kreis the 'bandits' set fire to 125 buildings, using among other means, incendiary ammunition.

According to Zörner the economic effects of the deportations in the Hrubieszów Kreis were: slaughter of the livestock, falling milk deliveries, stoppage of transport of timber for military purposes. There was a shortage of seed corn in the Zamość and Hrubieszów Kreise. In the opinion of the Lublin Governor it was not worth-while for the Poles to work as they thought they would eventually be deported after all.

In Zörner's opinion the slogans of the resistance movement and of the Bolsheviks who maintained that the Polish property was insecure, have now been confirmed. The 'bands' activities have been considerably intensified in the Biłgoraj, Kraśnik, Puławy and Zamość Kreise⁵⁹. According to the report, uneasiness persisted among the Poles because the German colonists from the Zamość Kreis were coming to the Krasny-staw Kreis forcibly to exchange their band horses and carts received in their farms taken over from the Poles, for better ones. That originated from a clear suggestion that the Poles would need no horses or carts as they would be deported next year in any case. The Distrikt authorities admitted that the Poles would not believe in the deportations remaining limited to the so far affected areas. Moreover, there was even some uneasiness among the Ukrainians, although they were, temporarily, a little better treated for tactical reasons. According to Zörner's report, that threatened with the disappearance of the Polish-Ukrainian antagonisms, so cleverly fomented by the occupants.

While there was no noticeable increase in the number of candidates for the Volksliste⁶⁰, either before or after the deportations, a considerable number of Poles were joining the Orthodox Church to secure for themselves a more tolerant treatment.

The report ends with a demand for an immediate suspension of the deportations, although it admits that they are advisable in principle.

At the beginning of March Globocnik worked out his reply in which he refuted Zörner's opinion on the situation and all his reproaches.

Trial, no 8, vol. 30 — Documents, doc. no 2780). Himmler's wish that the attack should be the last one had not come true. The German colonists' villages continued to burn.

⁵⁹ Except for the Zamość Kreis, that was the area of the particularly intense activity of the communist People's Guard.

⁶⁰ At the beginning of 1944 5300 *Volksdeutschen* and 10 500 *Deutschstämmigen* were to be in the Lublin region (*Nuremberg Trial* no 8, vol. 28, doc. 4005).

On March 17 Krüger forwarded Globocnik's reply to Himmler⁶¹. It seems that there was not much truth in it. Globocnik stated that till March only 40 criminals had been sent to Oświęcim from among the deportees and that 6000 had been directed to the Reich, whereas the previously mentioned report from H. Kinn concerning the first transport to Oświęcim gave a number of those sent there as 650⁶². Globocnik denied that the deportees had been joining the partisans, although that had already been confirmed in a number of previously quoted reports

Very significant is Globocnik's explanation why some people 'of alien origin' had been left in the deportation areas. Those left were either farming very poor lands intended for afforestation, or a small part of a little better lands intended for the Germans from the Reich, merited during the war, in order to mix the *Volksdeutschen* with the *Reichsdeutschen*, or finally because of the lack of manpower in the amalgamated villages. Globocnik suggests in conclusion that cooperation with Governor Zörner is impossible.

A report submitted to the SS and Police commander in the Warsaw Distrikt, dated February 26, 1943 gives some more details of the deportations methods. The report was written by an SS inspector, a *Sturm-bahnführer* who had visited the parts of the Warsaw Distrikt situated on the eastern bank of the Vistula in order to prepare accommodation for the Polish deportees qualified for the *Rentendörfer*. He reported inter alia, that in January 1019 deportees had been brought to Siedlce. Out of them 15 people had died and 2 had been shot during the journey. At Siedlce, 23 more died. From another train 'a large number of corpses' had been unloaded. The report admitted that families had been separated at Zamość. Similar information is contained in a report entitled *Auswirkungen der Umsiedlungsaktion Zamość in Distrikt Warschau*. The author of the report points out the large number of dead children found in the train-loads of the deportees directed to the *Rentendörfer* from where the Jewish population had been removed. The deaths were caused mostly by cold and starvation.

It is generally known that the Nazi policy very often ignored pacts, declarations or conventions. So, it is not surprising that the deportations were being executed at the time when Goebbels sent a circular letter (of

⁶¹ AGŁKBZH, vol. 962, z. exhibits in the case of Nazi crimes in the Lublin region (criminal case of J. Sporrenberg), Exhibit No 36.

⁶² J. Szczepanowski, ex-prisoner of Oświęcim, stated that the second train from the Zamość region (draft No 102 000) arrived at Birkenau shortly after Christmas (Bühler's Files vol. 9, p. 33/34, Court evidence). The number of trains to Oświęcim lower than that planned is explained by the state of chaos in the supplies for the eastern front in December (Frank's Diary, Regierungssitzungen 1943, p. 26).

February 15, 1943) in which he announced the new German attitude to the treatment of the European peoples residing beyond the Reich. The extermination, plunder and discrimination policy was to be abandoned.

SUSPENSION OF THE DEPORTATION OPERATIONS

Himmler informed Krüger on March 3 that *SS Brigadeführer* Wächter, the Governor of Galicia, had called on him, on Frank's orders, with a suggestion that the resettlements operations should be suspended. Himmler put forward a number of suggestions as regards the Lublin Distrikt. Probably in connexion with Zörner's accusations that the deportations had confirmed the resistance movement and the Communist contention that the Polish property was unsafe, he suggested that the deported Poles should be resettled in the State farms. They would get, if possible, slightly better properties than those they owned, but not in the Zamość or Krasnystaw Kreise. At the same time he decided to suspend, for the duration of the war, classification of the deportees into four groups, as it had resulted in some dangerous mental associations and the deportees thought they would be treated like Jews. According to Himmler the resettlement could continued in this manner, without expropriation but with transfer of people. Finally, the resettlement in Galicia was to be undertaken should the presence of Volksdeutschen there prove necessary ⁶³.

Probably in connexion with various opinions on the results of the resettlement campaign, Himmler requested some data from Globocnik. These were supplied mostly as appendices to a letter dated March 3 ⁶⁴. They are of various importance. In the appendix *Feststellungen die sich aus der Umsiedlung ergeben* ⁶⁵ Globocnik made excuses that the new settlers were farming better.

Another appendix was headed *Germanen—Umsiedlung* ⁶⁶. Globocnik suggested there that the Germanic population should voluntarily settle down in the Lublin region. In connexion with that he asked Himmler for appropriate orders.

The appendix headed *Zahlen über angesetzte Deutsche und Umsiedler* ⁶⁷ gives some statistical data. 14 300 Germans had been resettled.

⁶³ AGŁKBZH, vol. 962 z. Secret letter.

⁶⁴ The appendices bear a rubber stamp of the *Persönlicher Stab of the SS — Reichsführer*.

⁶⁵ AGŁKBZH, Bühler's Files, vol. 9, p. 195, Photocopy.

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, vol. 9 p. 197, Photocopy.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 207—8, Photocopy.

6509 expropriated Poles had been resettled in 40 amalgamated villages as labour force in 1413 farmsteads. They were, according to Globocnik's suggestions, to be removed in the future. According to his estimate the Zamość Kreis could take 10 000 more colonists, the Lublin Kreis 10 000 more as well, and the Krasnystaw Kreis 19 000 more. The suggestion put forward in connexion with the robberies committed by the new settlers in the Krasnystaw Kreis, that that Kreis as well should be covered by the deportation operations, was confirmed once more.

In another appendix — *Massnahmen für die weitere Umsiedlung*⁶⁸ Globocnik suggests some tactical measures to give an answer to the opinions that the deportations are causing unrest and destroying the agricultural production. One of the measures was to be the circulation of the news that the deportations had been suspended, while the time fixed for the next wave of deportations — after the sowing campaign — was to be kept strictly secret. Globocnik writes that the Poles would cultivate and sow up the lands and the new settlers, who might have not enough time for the spring farm work, would gather the crops. He also proposes to conduct the resettlement under the slogan *Herstellung der Sicherheit in den Bandengebieten* and with the view to enable 'good elements' from among the Poles to resettle voluntarily. The slogan will come to the fore in the June—July *Wehrwolf* campaign, described later. Globocnik finally proposes that the deported Poles be given certificates as to the property left behind. He explains the reason for this: *Es soll den Ausgesiedelten nur das Gefühl gegeben werden, dass später einmal eine Vergütung ihres zurückgelassenen Eigentum erfolgt.*

In the *Massnahmen zur Beruhigung der Fremdvölkischer beider Umsiedlung*⁶⁹ worked out by Globocnik as well, it is suggested that a promise of compensation be made. As regards the deportation methods it is suggested to 'weed out' the villages earmarked for resettlement of Germans and to leave only 'trustworthy' people there. Similar action was recommended by Globocnik in the villages outside the resettlement area, but endangered by 'banditism'. In this manner free farms were to be created and trustworthy Poles from the resettlement area were to be offered 'voluntary' transfers there. So, the methods were becoming more subtle. For the second time, the previously rejected proposal is repeated that the deported Poles, and particularly Ukrainians, should be resettled in the Ukraine, as that form of resettlement connected with the allocation of new land would considerably facilitate the deportations.

⁶⁸ Ibidem, p. 186—7, Photocopy.

⁶⁹ AGŁKBZH, dec. 211 from Document Centre, Photocopy.

Finally, the last note of Globocnik — *Behandlung Fremdvölkischer*⁷⁰, dated March 15, 1943. It refers, deliberately or not, to the talks between Himmler and Wächter. Globocnik strongly opposes the suggestion to switch to a more compromising policy to which the occupation administration was supposed to be inclined. At the same time he declares himself categorically opposed to the return of land to the Ukrainians in the Galicia Distrikt, which was favoured by Himmler, as resettled to day they would have to be expropriated to morrow, to make room for the Germans.

There is no material available which would allow to establish whether the above described Globocnik's remarks were in any way connected with Himmler's reply given to Krüger on March 12, 1943⁷¹. To the suggestion of a temporary suspension of the operations the SS — *Reichsführer* replied that the difficulties should not worry them as the operations would bring about an improvement of the situation in consequence of the elimination of the so called 'anti-social elements'. However, he recommended for the future that further resettlement operations should be undertaken in consultation with the heads of the districts. The fact that the operations were not resumed before the harvest-time seems to prove that he either had accepted Globocnik's suggestion as to the economic advantages connected with that postponement, or had been influenced in his decision by some other elements, out of which one seems particularly likely: the Nazi intentions connected with the Katyń affair and its political consequences⁷².

From mid-April to the end of May 1943 the Warsaw Governor Fischer was Acting Lublin Governor as well⁷³. From that time dates

⁷⁰ AGŁKBZH, Bühlers Files, vol. 9, p. 210—212. Secret letter, Photocopy.

⁷¹ Ibidem, p. 223—224, Photocopy.

⁷² Schöngart, the *Sicherheitspolizei* commander in the GG, stated at a session of the GG government on April 20, 1943, that the Germans, owing to the Katyń graves, had gained a chance to win the Polish population for the German aims. Schöngart's expectations proved unjustified. Nevertheless they showed, together with numerous other statements by the Nazis, that it was intended to use the Katyń affair and the breaking - off of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Polish government in London to the benefit of the Reich. It was, at least, to divert the attention of Poles from other matters such as e.g. the resistance movement.

⁷³ The change seems to be an expression of Frank's dissatisfaction at the loss of Zörner's prestige. It is impossible to establish whether it was connected with the decision taken on March 5 1942 at Hitler's Headquarters that Zörner should be relieved of his post. Globocnik, the SS and Police commander was to become Governor and retain his other functions. How strong was his position is showed by the fact that while in the other districts the Governors were plenipotentiaries for the NSDAP affairs, in the Lublin Distrikt Globocnik was a plenipotentiary (AGŁKBZH, doc. 662).

Krüger's information⁷⁴ reported at a working session that it was Himmler's intention completely to colonize the Zamość Kreis and the city of Lublin with the *Volksdeutschen*. 12 000 people from the Dniepr—Bogen were to be transferred to Galicia to the farms abandoned in 1939 by the repatriated *Volksdeutschen*. About the same time Frank sent a letter to the Chief of the Chancery, reporting on the situation in the GG (the Ghetto rising, the increasing number of attacks on Germans etc.) and on the session of the GG government devoted to the attitude to the Poles. He declared himself in favour of a more tolerant course, which was categorically opposed by Himmler and Bormann⁷⁵. Thus, he admitted the failure of the strong-hand policy in Poland initiated by him in 1939. In view of the deteriorating position of the Reich, that attempt at a change in tactics was aimed at restitution of order in the GG.

An appendix to the programme of the planned Frank's visit to the Zamość Kreis in May, 1943, on the occasion of the installation of German bailiffs, tells what the Zamość region was supposed to look like under the Nazi 'New Order'⁷⁶.

Villages were to be organized on a military pattern. The *SS-men* vested with unrestricted power were to be placed at the head of nearly all larger villages. The *Deutschstämmige* group was to be mixed up with the groups of the *Volksdeutschen*, to be eventually absorbed.

Of certain importance for the further deliberations is the fact that after a talk between Frank and Hitler (May 6—7, 1943) in Berlin Frank's position was visibly strengthened⁷⁷.

A number of decisions of great importance were taken on May 12 during a talk between the chief of the *Statshauptamt* and Himmler⁷⁸. Himmler insisted on the continuation of the resettlement operations

⁷⁴ Frank's Diary, Arbeitssitzungen 1943, April 15, 1943, p. 258.

⁷⁵ AGLKBZH, Büblers Files, vol. 11, p. 33—35, Photocopy of a Frank's letter to Lammers, dated April 20, 1943.

⁷⁶ AMSW Gendarmerie Files, vol. 69. A letter from the plenipotentiary of the Reich Commissary for consolidation of Germanism in the Lublin Distrikt to the Distrikt. Police commander, dated May 7 1943.

⁷⁷ Frank's Diary, Tagebuch, 1943/II, p. 286.

In Goebbel's diary entries can be found, dated March 3, May 7 and May 10, mentioning his talks with Hitler. On those occasions Hitler revealed his intention to dismiss Frank and to replace him with Greiser. Goebbels noted on May 22 that the Führer had changed his mind and decided to keep Frank for some time, to try him out.

⁷⁸ *Nuremberg Trial*, No 8, vol. 29 Documents doc. 3181. Greifelt's note of his report to the *SS-Reichsführer* on May 12, 1943.

'within the existing possibilities'⁷⁹. The expropriated Poles were to be given other accommodation in exchange. Globocnik's suggestion that the Poles should be given a sort of promise of compensation was rejected by Himmler a limine, as regards the annexed territories. With regard to the GG, while he did not oppose the suggestion in principle, he said the question should be submitted to Hitler, as it related to the general policy in Poland. During the described talk Himmler accepted⁸⁰ the suggestion that the people from Lorraine should be resettled in the Lublin Distrikt 'on a voluntary basis'. He advised to try and persuade as many of them as possible to agree to the resettlement. Men who were not inclined to move to the Lublin Distrikt, were threatened with a forced labour camp. Himmler and Greifelt also debated the question of deportation of Alsations who, in their opinion, were strongly resisting their move to the East. The Lublin Distrikt was probably contemplated as the resettlement area for that case as well.

On May 25 Frank sent a letter to Hitler, concerning the scope of the GG administration competency and that of the commissaries for consolidation of Germanism. The chief theme of the letter is the question of deportations of Poles, presented in the light of the reports of the Police commander and of Zörner's report dating from February⁸¹. Frank emphasized that to provide accommodation for the *Volksdeutschen* in the conquered eastern territories was a noble and urgent task for the German authorities. He also agreed that humanitarian reasons should play no part in the deportation question. He said, however, that it should be decided whether the deportation operations would have not been more advisable after the war, when the war difficulties or the economic consequences would no longer constitute an obstacle. On the other hand, he repeated the suggestion that the cooperation between the GG administration and the Commissary for consolidation of Germanism would facilitate many matters and that the effects in the sphere of 'security' and food supplies would be not so far-reaching. He saw the reason for 'breach of peace' in the methods used during the deportations.

Männer, Frauen, Kinder und Greise wurden vielfach ohne die geringsten Kleidungs — und Ausrüstungsstücke, in Massenlager abgeführt und dort ohne Rücksicht auf Familienzusammenhänge in Gruppen

⁷⁹ The previously mentioned Müller's statements also confirm that Himmler had revoked his decision concerning the suspension of deportations. He adds that that happened during his visit to Lublin.

⁸⁰ The relevant note is of an earlier date — April 12, 1945 (*Nuremberg Trial*, no 8, vol. 30, doc. 5307).

⁸¹ AGŁKBZH, Bühler's Files, vol. 11, doc. 2202, Letter 13/43 gRs — 22, p. 40—41.

von Arbeitsfähigen, Minderarbeitsfähigen und Arbeitsunfähigen insbesondere Kinder und Greise) ausbeschieden. Hierbei wurde jede Verbindung zwischen Familienzusammengehörigen durchschnitten, so dass Schicksal der einen Gruppe der anderen jeweils unbekannt blieb. Diese Massnahmen riefen erklärlicherweise bei der von Aussiedlung betroffenen Bevölkerung eine unbeschreibliche Panik hervor und führten dazu, dass schätzungsweise die Hälfte der auszusiedelnden Bevölkerung sich den planmässigen Aussiedlung entzog. Sie ist in ihrer Verzweiflung aus dem Aussiedlungsbereich geflüchtet und hat in erheblichen Umfange zur Verstärkung der im gesamten Distrikt Lublin seit geraumes Zeit vorhandenen und mit fortschreitend grösserer Frechheit und Stärke auftretenden Banditengruppen beigetragen.

Frank goes on to say that the resistance movement has spread to the areas unaffected by the resettlement, particularly because the colonists had robbed the 'alien' population of implements necessary in farming. *Diese chaotische Lage — Frank writes — wurde noch verschärft durch die von der Ordnungspolizei im Distrikt Lublin in die Wege geleiteten Sühnenmassnahmen zur Abwehr weiterer Angriffe auf die volksdeutschen Dörfer. Diese Sühnenmassnahmen bestanden unter anderem aus Massenerschiessungen Unschuldiger, insbesondere von Frauen und Kindern sowie Greisen im Alter von 2 bis 80 Jahren. Diese Massnahmen besitzen nach der Erfahrungen für die vilefach unter bolschewistischer Leitung stehenden Banditenkreise⁸² nur geringe, abschreckende Wirkung. Sie steigern aber die Erbitterung und den Hass der unschuldig davon Betroffenen...*

In the sphere of the economic problems connected with the deportations Frank stressed his anxiety about the future harvest and his fear of falling supplies of agricultural products for the Reich as well as of hunger in the GG. He writes that the continuation of the resettlement operations, as envisaged by the Commissary for consolidation of Germanism, threatens with more disturbances in production. Basing his opinion on the presented material he asked Hitler to define the scope of his competency.

Lammers, the chief of Hitler's Office forwarded the letter to Himmler on June 4, asking for his views⁸³.

Meanwhile, a working session was held at Lublin on May 28, attended by Frank⁸⁴. Fischer, the acting Lublin Governor, stated when opening the debates that the unrest among the Polish population, particularly

⁸² He was wrong, as they did not prevent the activity of the Peasant Battalions and Home Army units also operating against the German settlements.

⁸³ AGŁKBZH, File 962 z, No 2202, Secret letter.

⁸⁴ Frank's Diary, Tagebuch 1943/I, 28—29 May 1943.

in the rural parts of the Warsaw Distrikt, had visibly grown. Similar statements were heard, a few days earlier, at a session in the Radom Distrikt. During the session extensive materials were quoted relating to the resistance movement in the Lublin Distrikt. Fischer declared himself in favour of suspension of the previously prepared deportations, for security reasons. Globocnik cleverly referred to those demanding 'the security' and announced not deportation but 'mopping up' operations against 'bandit' villages. He intended to conceal the further deportation operations behind that technical definition.

During the *Parteikundgebung* at Lublin on May 28, Frank said about that town that it was one of the more beautiful German towns and assured that the Germans would never withdraw from there. During that visit to Lublin Frank installed Wandler, the former Cracow Governor and a distant relative of Himmler, in the office of the Lublin Governor.

At a session of the GG government in Cracow on May 31, attended by Kaltenbrunner, Krüger informed that Himmler had agreed to the deportation being continued after the security in the GG had been assured. 12 000 Germans from Russia were to be resettled in Galicia in June ⁸⁵.

CONTINUATION OF DEPORTATION OPERATIONS

In spite of the reservations from various quarters the deportation and pacification operations were resumed in June 1943 under the pretext of combating the 'bands'. As early as on June 3 Globocnik issued an order concerning the *Banditenbekämpfung* ⁸⁶. Localities situated within an area referred to as 'permanently bandit-infested' or devastated by the Police operations were to be mopped up. Men from 15 to 45 years old were to be handed over to the *Sicherheitspolizei*. It was intended to use women and children as a labour force on the spot or after deportation.

The *Vermerk* sent by Globocnik to Himmler's personal Staff defines the principles of the *Wehrwolf I* operation ⁸⁷. The agricultural population of the zone Biłgoraj—Tarnogród, Bełżec, Tomaszów, up to Zamość and the town population of Zamość and Tomaszów was to be evacuated. The area to the south and north of the Biłgoraj woods was to be given

⁸⁵ The final decision was taken by Himmler on May 12 during his previously mentioned talk with Greifelt. The Germans were to be resettled in the formerly German villages and in the area to the west of Lvov.

⁸⁶ AMSW. Lublin Gendarmerie Archives, vol. 115, letter I, No 1513/9/208/43.

⁸⁷ AGŁKBZH, Bühler's Files, vol. 9, p. 188—189; Photocopy.

to Ukrainians. Should the number of them in the deportation zone be insufficient, they were to be transferred from the Hrubieszów Kreis which would thus become an area free for German resettlement. The area to the south of the deportation zone was free as well and the *Volksdeutschen* and *Deutschstämmigen* could be resettled there. 30 000 people were to be directed to the Reich.

In this manner a German resettlement area would be made ready for further colonization, an area surrounded by Ukrainians who were to constitute a bridgehead. This arrangement was intended to intensify and spread the antagonisms between Polish and Ukrainian population and to use the Ukrainians, very often nationalists, as the first line of defence against the Polish partisans. Globocnik hoped that in the new situation a Polish attack would only be possible from the north where the defence of the resettlement area would be easier. His hopes proved unjustified. The resettled Ukrainians, about whom the Polish sources say that they very often behaved quite decently or even friendly, threatened by the Polish resistance movement were not at all inclined to play the assigned role. After a short stay they were fleeing back to their former farmsteads⁸⁸.

The pacification and deportation operations affected various parts of the Zamość region to a varying degree. 171 villages were affected, with the population of 60 000. The progress of the operations which, within the *Grossaktion*, commenced on June 24 and lasted till mid-July (later only isolated cases) is illustrated by the following table⁸⁹:

Districts	Biłgoraj	Tomaszów	Zamość	Hrubieszów
June	24	1	1	—
July	65	43	28	8
August	—	—	1	—

A German Police report estimated that 50 per cent of the population had been captured⁹⁰. The deportations were not less brutal than before. A part of the deportees was sent to the camp of Majdanek.

⁸⁸ This transpires from the report *Sicherheitsverhältnisse im Kreise Biłgoraj*.

⁸⁹ Z. Klukowski, op. cit., p. 10. The number of villages is not strictly accurate as it was difficult to establish the dividing line between the deportation operations and those of an exclusively pacification character.

⁹⁰ AMSW, Lublin Gendarmerie Archives, vol. GG. Report *Sicherheitsverhältnisse im Kreise Biłgoraj* worked out by the Gendarmerie Zug Biłgoraj, dated December 8, 1943.

The majority of the German sources omitted the facts transpiring from the Polish sources⁹¹ that is the brutal character of the deportations. As regards this matter a report addressed to the SS and Police chief of the Warsaw Distrikt, dating from February 1943, had been quoted from the German sources. Besides, during the 8th Nuremberg Trial J. Müller, who from December 1941 to the end of 1943 was acting Sipo commander at Lublin stated in his evidence that during the deportation *wurden so unmenschliche Vorgänge festgestellt* that the Sipo and the Kripo organs had allegedly felt compelled to report that to their central authorities in Berlin.

During the deportation and pacification operations Frank sent, on June 19, 1943, an extensive memorandum to Hitler explaining his attitude to the proposal put forward by the 'Sword and Plough' (Miecz i Pług) organisation, concerning the common fight against the USSR. The memorandum analysed the Nazi policy in the GG and its damaging results, and suggested that, in the interest of the Reich, there should be a tactical change to a more tolerant course, which was to be made easier by the Katyn affair. Frank referred to the deportations, declaring himself in favour of calling an end to them. He quoted the previously reported information on the winter deportations. He admitted that during the deportations some *erhebliche Verluste* had happened, particularly as regards old people and children and that the operations had been received by the Polish people as the beginning of deportations of Poles from the GG. The Poles expected to share the fate of the Jews.

In mid-June, however, probably during a visit of Frank at Himmler's Headquarters in East Prussia on June 23⁹² an agreement or compromise on the deportations question was reached. A secret letter from the SS—*Reichsführer* Himmler to Frank, dated July 3, referred to that. It reads (in extenso):

*Sehr geehrter Parteigenosse Dr Frank*⁹³

Ich darf in diesem Brief, so wie wir es mündlich vereinbart haben, zum ganzen Siedlungsproblem im Generalgouvernement Stellung nehmen:

1. Es muss unser Bestreben sein, die östlichen Grenzgebiete des Generalgouvernements als ersten mit einer deutschen Bevölkerung zu ver-

⁹¹ Vide Z. Klukowski, op. cit.

⁹² Frank's Diary, Tagebuch, 1943/III, p. 639—640.

⁹³ AGLKBZH, Bühler's Files, vol. 11, p. 75—77. letter R/Bn 47/117/43g dated July 3, 1943, Photocopy made by the Office of Chief Counsel for War Crimes from document No 2444. The list of those receiving the copies of the letter is omitted. It contained, among others, Greifelt, Krüger, Wendler, Globocnik and Lammers.

sehen. Dafür kommen der Distrikt Lublin und die früheren deutschen Dörfer des Distriktes Galizien in Betracht.

2. Wir sind uns einig, dass diese Ansiedlung während des Krieges nur in einer Form stattfinden darf, die in keiner Weise die Ruhe des Landes und die wirtschaftliche Leistung des Generalgouvernements ernsthaft beeinträchtigt. Selbstverständlich dürfen wir bei diesem Vorhaben auch nicht überängstlich sein und müssen bei grosstmöglichsten Bedacht und grösster Überlegung die eine oder andere kurzfristige Schwierigkeit in Kauf nehmen.

3. Im Distrikt Lublin nehmen wir uns bis Anfang des Jahres 1944 die Besiedlung des Kreises Zamość und die Deutschwerdung der alten Hansastadt Lublin als Aufgabe vor.

4. Durch die Grossaktion „Wehrwolf“ ist eine erhebliche Anzahl von Hofstellen südlich des Bilgorajer—Waldes von Bevölkerung frei geworden. In diese Höfe werden in den nächsten Wochen die Bauern und kleinen Landwirte der Kreises Zamość unter Vergrösserung ihres bisherigen Besitzes (z. B. von 3 bis 4 Hektar auf 6 Hektar) eingewiesen und umgesiedelt. Die Umsiedlung geschieht in der Art der freundschaftlichen Umsiedlung; zum Teil geradezu in der Form der Belohnung für bisheriges Wohlverhalten. Wir erreichen ausserdem damit, dass der zweifellos vorhandene Haas der Ausgesiedelten bezw. der Nachbardörfer der Ausgesiedelten sich auf polnische und ukrainische Nachfolger richtet und nicht auf Deutsche.

Es ist anzustreben, dass diese durch Polen und Ukrainer aus dem Kreise Zamość neu zu besiedelnden Dörfer völkisch gemischt besiedelt werden, sodass wir in dem Gebiet ein Gleichgewicht zwischen Ukrainern und Polen bekommen und damit dieses Gebiet leichter beherrschen können.

5. In den durch den Abzug der ukrainischen und polnischen Bevölkerung des Kreises Zamość leergewordenen Hofstellen werden nunmehr laufend Deutsche angesiedelt. Unter diesen Deutschen befinden sich Volksdeutsche, zum Teil bereits der eine oder andere germanische Bauer, Handwörter oder Unternehmer, ferner die gemäss Führerbefehl im Osten einzusetzenden Elsässer und Lothringer und in ihrer Substanz sehr gute slovenische Siedler aus Oberkrain und Untersteiermark.

Gleichzeitig mit der Besiedlung des flachen Landes muss die restlose Deutschwerdung der Stadt Zamość vor sich gehen. Hierbei ist der Weg, die Stadt selbst in der Bevölkerungszahl allmählich herabzudrücken und die kleiner gewordene Stadt mit Deutschen anzureichern, als der brauchbarste zu begehnen.

6. Die andere Aufgabe, die Deutschwerdung der Stadt Lublin stelle ich mir folgendermassen vor:

Lublin hatte im Jahre 1939 rund 140 000 Einwohner und hat heute an ziviler Bevölkerung 89 000. An deutscher ziviler Bevölkerung rund 5000 Einwohner. Ausserdem eine deutsche Garnison von ebenfalls rund 4 bis 5000. Das Bestreben muss nun sein die polnische Bevölkerung der Stadt Lublin dauern zu verringern. Als Nachziel möchte ich die Herabminderung der Einwohnerzahl auf rund 60 000 stecken. Diese Zahl wird am besten erreicht durch friedliche Umsetzung von Pensionisten und sonstigen Familien auf das polnische flache Land oder in kleine rein polnische Landstädte und durch Vermittlung von Arbeit in anderen Gebieten des Generalgouvernements oder auch ins Reich. Schon damit würde die deutsche Kopfzahl von Lublin mit heute rund 9000 deutschen Menschen von rund 10% auf 15% ansteigen. Gleichzeitig hat das Hereinströmen einer deutschen Bevölkerung zu erfolgen. Ich glaube, dass wir bis Anfang des Jahres 1944 als erreichbares Nahziel auf 20 bis 25% deutscher Bevölkerung in der Stadt Lublin kommen können. Anfang des nächsten Jahres wäre dann die Überlegung zu treffen, wobei ich vorschlage, dass wir uns dann in der Zwischenzeit besprechen, Lublin im Frühjahr 1944 nach Abschluss einer weiteren Etappe, in der ein deutscher Bevölkerungsanteil von 30 bis 40% erreicht werden müsste, zur deutschen Stadt zu erklären mit einem deutschen Oberbürgermeister unter gleichzeitiger Errichtung einer ordentlichen Polizeidirektion. Ich glaube, dass die dringende Einrichtung und Errichtung der sanitären Anlagen der Stadt Lublin unter Verwendung des reichlich vorhandenen Materials des Warschauer Ghettoa möglich ist.

7. Voraussetzung für alle diese Massnahmen ist die von uns besprechen totale Zusammenarbeit zwischen Verfahren einerseits und SS und Polizei andererseits und ein absolut unbürokratisches Verfahren bei der Durchführung aller unserer gemeinsamen absichten.

Heil Hitler
Ihr
gez. H. Himmler

It seems that the expression *gemeinsamen Absichten* was not grossly misused by Himmler. In spite of the lack of consistency in the attitude of the Governor General on July 8 Frank was informed by Krüger about the progress of the pacification operations. On July 22 Frank said at a session of the GG 'gouvernement' that in the territories declared 'the bands haunts' the deportations had been necessary and that the 'evacuation' orders had been issued after a consultation between him and the SS-Reichsführer⁹⁴. At the same time, although he announced at the above mentioned session that the deportations had been generally suspended

⁹⁴ Frank's Diary, Regierungssitzungen, 1943, p. 74.

for the duration of the war, he asked Himmler to forbid further deportations⁹⁵.

On August 5, 1943 Governor Wendler in Cracow categorically requested from Globocnik that the deportation operation for which railway wagons had already been ordered, should be stopped⁹⁶.

Wendler's telegram to Globocnik, of August 5, and a number of other, earlier facts were closely connected. Among these facts I count a visit of von dem Bach who had earlier, on August 2, tried to mediate with Frank between Wendler and Globocnik. During the talks Bach approved the view that the security measures taken in the Zamość region had brought no results, and promised to stop deportations⁹⁷. Frank demanded that all Police operations should be stopped *weder unter dem Thema Bandenbekämpfung noch unter dem Thema Umsiedlung stattfinden* and that Globocnik should immediately be released from his post⁹⁸.

On August 4 and 5 talks were held with dr Kubiyovitch, leader of the Ukrainian nationalists in the GG⁹⁹. In view of the reprisals of the Polish resistance movement he demanded that the Ukrainians should be transferred to compact settlements and that the recently started deportations of the Ukrainian peasants from the Hrubieszów Kreis should be stopped. Frank assured him that large scale Police operations had been suspended and that he would discuss with him the matters in detail in the presence of the Lublin Governor Wendler. The discussion took place the next day. It had been decided that the Ukrainian settlers would be withdrawn from the endangered areas. Kubiyevitch's suggestion concerning the exchange of the Polish and Ukrainian population to create ethnically uniform regions, had been rejected.

It is likely that the August decision concerning the suspension of further deportations was also influenced by Kovpak's raid which had reached Galicia in July. In the opinion of Becker, the Police commander in the GG, the raid required a transfer to Galicia of the Police forces concentrated in the Lublin region.

The documents of the Resettlement Centre use the expression that the action *wurde vorzeitig abgestoppt*. The August preparations for the further deportations allow a hypothesis that Globocnik did not think the *Wehrwolf* campaign completed and intended to resume it, expecting a quick defeat of Kovpak's group which, however, proved illusionary¹⁰⁰.

⁹⁵ Ibidem, Tagebuch, 1943/IV, p. 774.

⁹⁶ AGLKBZH, Bühler's Files, vol. 9, p. 190, Telegram.

⁹⁷ Frank's Diary, Tagebuch, 1943/IV, p. 801.

⁹⁸ Ibidem, Tagebuch, 1943/IV, p. 778—9.

⁹⁹ Ibidem, p. 809—810.

¹⁰⁰ Ibidem, p. 835—839.

It is significant that during the *Wehrwolf* campaign Himmler did probably take some steps to prepare reserves for the colonization area. That was mentioned in a letter from *Stabshauptamt* addressed to the personal Staff of the *SS-Reichsführer*, dated July 7, 1943, suggesting the resettlement in the Ciechanów region of the colonists prepared for the Zamość region ¹⁰¹. The Ciechanów region where the proposed resettlement of the *Volksdeutschen* from Lithuania did not materialize, was originally intended for colonization by German peasants from East Prussia ¹⁰².

The temporary intention of Himmler to shift the colonization to the other Polish territories but not to stop it suggests that it was not only a result of the military situation, particularly on the eastern front. The Nazis began to lose their cock-sureness only when, after the defeat in Africa and the unsuccessful offensive of July 5—11 the retreat on the eastern front had started. The retreat lasted till September and took the German armies back to the Dniepr.

The shift to the other Polish territories was probably caused by the economic and political consequences of the deportation campaign, particularly painful at the time of military setbacks, and by the blows delivered by the resistance movement. Resettlement of the *Volksdeutschen* ¹⁰³, not too closely bound to Germanism, could prove a failure. That Himmler was doing that under the pressure of the situation could be clearly seen from his talk with Sperrenberg posted to the Lublin region during the Nazi 1943 offensive on the eastern front. In the course of the talk Himmler recommended a good care for the settlers and expressed the hope by the end of 1944 the distrikt would have been entirely Germanized ¹⁰⁴.

On July 10 Himmler, as it transpires from his note, had a talk with Hitler on the possibility to make use of the captured general Rowecki. On that occasion Hitler made a statement on the Polish question, generally in line with Himmler's attitude. In his speech delivered on November 18, 1943, to the GG Police, Himmler was still mentioning the GG as an area to be colonized by German peasants — promoters of the Ger-

¹⁰¹ AGŁKBZH Doc. 511, PS—9 entitled *Ansiedlung von Umsiedler im Regierungsbezirk Zichenau*.

¹⁰² Ibidem, A letter from Himmler to the Gauleiter and a letter from the Reich Commissary General for consolidation of Germanism to the *Gauleiter* of East Prussia Koch, dated July 7, 1943.

¹⁰³ It clearly transpires from the *Sicherheitspolizei* reports from September 1943 (Bühlers Files, vol. 11, p. 101).

¹⁰⁴ AGŁKBZH — 'Files concerning' Nazi crimes in the Lublin region, vol. 4, Report on questioning of *Gruppenführer* J. Sperrenberg (December 13—16 and 19, 1949).

man race¹⁰⁵, although Frank confirmed at the September conference of the War Economy Staff and the GG Defence Council that the compulsory resettlement and deportation campaign had been abandoned¹⁰⁶.

FINAL REMARKS

In the light of the Nazi documents a number of conclusions of a more general character can be formulated. There are two aspects of the Zamość region problem. It can be, on the one hand, treated as a problem of local importance and as such comprises the deportation campaign, its methods and consequences. On the other hand it is a problem going far beyond that and concerning the fate of the Polish population in the GG, of the Polish nation. The research results permit to define the Nazi plans as regards Poles and the degree of their relation to the *Generalplan Ost*. Out of all eastern territories conquered by the Reich the General Gouvernement was occupied for the longest time. Therefore, the plans regarding the Polish territories are characterised by an advanced degree of readiness. The plans were affecting more than the fate of the Polish population, as apart from the *Volksdeutschen* also some people from Lorraine, Luxemburg and the Netherlands were to be resettled in the Lublin Distrikt. The Nazi intentions to colonize the GG with German and Germanic population within 15 to 20 years are of not less importance than the Zamość region deportations themselves. In the Polish territories the Lublin region was a further stage of the deportation operations commenced in 1939—1940 in the part of Polish territories annexed by the Reich.

The criminal aspect of the deportation plans is particularly expressed in the two accompanying features. Firstly in the intention to send a very large number of deportees to concentration camps and numerous casualties among the deportees caused by the brutality of those executing the evacuation. The second feature deserving attention was the policy of antagonizing the Poles and Ukrainians applied during the deportations. Globocnik's plans were based upon fundamental assumptions of the policy of Himmler and Frank and were aimed at surrounding the newly established German colonies with a protective wall composed of Ukrainian settlements. It transpires from the German documents that the Ukrainians were only temporarily left there as they were to be deported as well in not a distant future. During the last stage of the deportation operations Himmler suggested that various groups of the Polish deportees should be made opposed each other as well.

¹⁰⁵ AGLKBZH, Bühler's Files, vol. 7, p. 251.

¹⁰⁶ Frank's Diary, Arbeitssitzungen 1943 September 22. 1943.

There were differences of opinion between the Reich authorities and the occupation authorities in the GG. They did not, however, concern the principle itself of colonization of the GG but the question of tactics. Where to colonize so as to avoid economic disturbances and intensification of the resistance movement. Besides, when personal conflicts, and ambition clashes disappear, some agreement is reached as regards the action. (Frank's consent to the deportations in August 1942, agreement between Frank and Himmler regarding some operations in June—July 1943).

The German documents reveal the Polish resistance against the deportations, 'the significant act of revenge' of the deported Polish peasants, fearing the fate of the exterminated Jewish population.

The resistance has grown to become a mass movement and found its expression in avoiding the deportations through escapes from the deportation Police detachments. During the first stage of the operations (up to December, 31, 1942) it was intended to detain and deport 33,832 people. Actually, only 9771 people, i. e. 19 per cent. were detained. During the second stage (till March 1943) it was planned to detain and deport 14,738 people, while 5,578 were actually detained. In the course of the operations Wehrwolf I and II (June—July 1943) the pacification and deportation operations covered an area inhabited by 60,000 people. Only 33,000—36,000 (56—60 per cent.) were actually detained. The resistance, intensification of the Polish underground activities leading in consequence to the chaos which made the economic exploitation of the GG difficult to the Reich, and the revenge operations against the German colonists were very important factors in preventing the realization of the deportation plans in the Zamość region.

Finally, decisive were the developments on the eastern front (offensive at Stalingrad and Kursk), which is, however, never directly mentioned in the German documents. The activities of the Soviet partisans to the east of the Bug was the fundamental reason for abandoning deportations of Poles to the east, as envisaged in the *Generalplan Ost*.

There are serious reasons to think that Kovpak's raid into the Lvov region in July 1943 prevented completion of the deportations planned within the *Wehrwolf* operation, as the pacification troops from the Lublin region had to be used there.