

COASTAL BARRIERS OF THE BALTIC

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BALTIC COUNTRIES

A SURVEY OF THE PEOPLES AND STATES ON THE BALTIC WITH
SPECIAL REGARD TO THEIR HISTORY GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS

EDITORIAL POLICY

'Baltic Countries' will present information on the conditions of life and the development of the South Baltic and Scandinavian states and their peoples. It will be the editorial policy to pay special regard to cultural and scientific trends, to establish contacts, and to investigate the various causes of conflicts, past and present, estranging the nations within the Baltic Region. European states with extensive interests in the region, those on the route between the Baltic and the Black Sea most especially, will also receive attention.

In spite of many close connexions, the English-speaking world receives little first-hand information on the Baltic. Nevertheless about fifteen million persons in the United States and Canada, to say nothing of the other countries of the world, are emigrants, or immediate descendants of emigrants, from that region. Of those in the United States some four million are of Polish origin, and about the same number of Scandinavian, the remainder being fairly evenly distributed among the other Baltic peoples. The influence of these persons in the countries of their adoption cannot be disregarded. Many of them, it is known, maintain an interest in the countries of their birth, and it is hoped to supply these with information not hitherto available. As it is hoped also to appeal to the general public as well as to the spe-

cialist, the contents, while maintaining their scientific character, will be to an extent popular.

Main attention will be paid to the history, geography and economics of the Baltic Region, although its cultural and political, social, racial and religious structure will not be neglected. The range of subject moreover being so wide, it is realized that exhaustive treatment will be difficult. For this reason the editors will concern themselves chiefly with such matters as bring out the essential homogeneity, cultural, economic and geographical, of the Baltic Region. Within these limits contributors are at liberty to state their own views, for which the Editorial Committee does not hold itself responsible.

Baltic countries dealt with will comprise, not only Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — the 'Baltic States' — but also Poland, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. Norway also will be touched upon to some extent. It is believed that by fostering cultural and scientific cooperation among the peoples of the Baltic better relations will be brought about, together with a keener appreciation of the community of their interests, both in the past and today. At the same time the English-speaking world may learn something further of a region containing some sixty million persons, which has been for many centuries of great significance, both cultural and political.

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COASTAL BARRIERS OF THE BALTIC

by JERZY SMOLEŃSKI

(CRACOW, POLAND)

I.

GENERAL REMARKS

DEFINITION OF COASTAL BARRIERS

A geopolitical barrier is any political area separating a State from another area with which direct territorial contact would be advantageous to the vital interests of the given State.

We have to deal here with three distinct areas in every case: (a) the state which is partly or completely cut off from such propinquity; (b) the geopolitical barrier region; (c) the area which is rendered more or less inaccessible for the given State by the existence of the barrier.

Such inaccessible areas may or may not be possessions of the State from which they are cut off (Political Exclaves), they may be bound by no political ties whatsoever or they may be simply open sea. Always however the vital interests of the State cut off from access to such areas or waters are adversely affected, in the case of access to the sea considerable economic and political advantages being lost.

There is, therefore, a natural tendency for the cut-off State to break its way through by gaining control of the barrier-region. The area acting as a barrier may have no intrinsic value in itself, the gaining of control over it is but a means to a definite end — that of attaining direct access to the territory or waters beyond.

The various geopolitical coastal barriers surpass all other geopolitical barriers in importance, and it is with them that this paper will deal. A coastal barrier can be most simply and generally defined as a political area which entirely or partly cuts off a given State from the sea. As this definition can be applied to every maritime State situated between inland countries and the sea, it is not fully satisfactory. It is therefore necessary to take into consideration the respective sizes of the barrier and of the hinterland State. Another factor which must be always borne in mind is the dynamic: whether or no there is a distinct urge towards the sea on the part of the inland area decides whether the barrier is to be classified as an actual obstacle or as a purely formal one.

Such an urge towards the sea-coast is not always solely dependent upon the geographical situation of the hinterland State and upon the physiographical character of the barrier. There are other factors to be considered, namely the internal anthropogeographic relations in the inland area (density of population, type and level of civilization and culture, economic structure, etc.). The influence of such relations may in some cases only make itself felt with the passage of years, appearing as the successive stages of a process of political and economic evolution.

TYPES OF COASTAL BARRIERS

Several types of coastal barriers can be distinguished:

(1) The inland State may be completely or only partially cut off from the sea; or may be completely cut off from access to one sea but not to another, or may be a predominantly continental inland country. Complete barriers may therefore be *absolute* or *semi-absolute*.

(2) It is important in a schematic classification of coastal barriers to examine their politico-geographical relation to the States which have common frontiers with them. Here we distinguish between:

(a) Politically independent coastal barriers which constitute separate bodies politic (e.g., Latvia, Estonia and Uruguay).

(b) Colonial-type coastal barriers, belonging to States having no common boundaries with the inland area cut off from the sea (e.g., Spanish-Morocco and Guiana).

(c) Exclave-type coastal barriers, belonging to neighbouring States but in spatial separation from them (e.g., Alaska, East Prussia and Zara).

(d) Flank-type coastal barriers, where the barrier is an integral part of the adjacent country and is in spatial union with it (e.g., North Albania, Greek Macedonia, etc.).

Cases may occur of politically composite barriers, i.e., of one and the same geographical entity embracing two or more of the types classified above.



GEOGRAPHICAL BASIS OF COASTAL BARRIERS

An examination of coastal barriers indicates that for the most part they are regions of which the physiographical features differ from those of the inland territory behind them. It would even seem that such divergencies between the character of the barrier-regions and the hinterland areas tend to favour their rise. The relations between the barrier region and the adjoining maritime areas are also of importance, even if the neighbouring territory is not part of the barrier. If the two maritime areas comprise or belong to a geographical entity, their mutual relation will be closer than with any inland areas. Such conditions facilitate the political expansion of strong States with littoral adjoining other maritime areas belonging to the same geographical complex. The flank-type coastal barriers have mostly arisen from such natural conditions.

There is another factor which must not be overlooked in studying the geographical basis for the rise of geopolitical coastal barriers. This, of frequent occurrence, is the existence of natural obstacles holding up communications between the coastal region and its hinterland. Such obstacles can be termed natural frontiers or inhibitive zones, according to their type.

Here, orographical barriers are most common, mountain chains or ranges running parallel to the coast (e.g. the Rhodope Mountains between Bulgaria and Greek Macedonia, the Sihota-Alin range in Manchuria, the Andes of South America, etc.). A similar effect may result from the existence of arid, uneconomic areas stretching parallel to and at some distance from the coast (e.g. Puna de Atacama). Trackless, undeveloped borderlands, large lakes or a lake country, marshlands, etc. may play the same rôle, as may also great river valleys running parallel to the coast (e.g. the Ussuri river), or large areas of virgin forest or jungle. All these may check communication between inland areas and their natural seaboards.

The significance of such natural obstacles to communication is the same whether we are concerned with factors making for the rise of coastal barriers or with the obvious tendency for political frontiers to coincide with some effective natural boundary or protective zone. It should be borne in mind that such natural frontiers are not always lasting. The protective value of such borderland areas may with time be lost or impaired, so losing its geopolitical significance. Thus progress may be made in developing or improving communications, roads may be built and rails laid down, borderland jungles or virgin forests may be felled, marshlands may be drained, and so on.

Coastal barriers may have geographical traits which conduce to their separation and isolation from the hinterland. Other conditions however may supervene, and the original traits may in time prove insufficient to guarantee or justify the stability of the barriers.

Differences in anthropo-geographic relations have a much greater significance than the geographical factor. It is true that such differences may have arisen, and most often arise, as a result of communications being held up by natural obstacles at a time when these were still effective means of assuring isolation from the inland areas. But though an obstacle may itself have ceased to be effective, nevertheless the differentiation which it originally helped to bring about may continue to exist and even to develop. The same observation applies to the anthropo-geographic phenomena resulting from physiographical differences between the maritime and inland areas.

The rôle of mountain chains and ranges running parallel to the coast has already been touched upon. The foregoing remarks will explain why there are more cases of coastal barriers on elongated (Pacific-type) than on projecting (or Atlantic-type) coasts. On the whole, however, the possible dependence of coastal barriers upon the configuration of the coast itself is a rather more complicated matter. Examples can be cited of coastal barriers arising on some littorals having a low coast and on others having a high one. Again, the coast may be either poor or excellent for the use of shipping. There appears to be no absolute rule in such matters.

Coasts may of course be, to a greater or lesser extent, suitable for the purposes of marine communication. As the more suitable coasts are more desirable and valuable, it follows that an inland State will apply more pressure upon the barrier region having such a coast. On the other hand a sea-minded nation (inhabiting an adjacent area or a nearby coast), well versed in maritime matters and realizing the value of a suitable coast for navigation, will regard such favourable seaboards as tempting fields for territorial aggrandizement.

Less favoured coasts are naturally less attractive as acquisitions, but this is closely bound up with their relation to the inland area served by them. Very often, even when the coast is useless for shipping, neighbouring inland states may none the less feel a decided urge to the sea, not in order to attain an open door to the outside world but in order to secure an easily defended natural frontier by the simple process of extending the area of the State to the sea-coast itself. This tendency may in some cases be more or less nullified by setting the frontier



along the inhibitive natural zones running parallel to the coast. But the instability of coastal barriers in such a case indicates that this state of affairs is at the best but a transitory one, — a stage in the territorial development of a powerful inland state determined to strengthen its frontiers to the extreme. It is, too, another indication of the subordinate role played by natural frontiers in maintaining the separate identity of coastal barriers.

A local interruption to free access to the sea (one, however, which cannot be described as a coastal barrier) is often encountered in larger states where the coast runs out as a peninsula. Such peninsular areas bear all the features of well-defined individual geographical entities, and this favours politico-territorial differentiation and separatism. The Jutland Peninsula and Korea are cases in point. Similar features may often be possessed by large continental 'corners' stretching far out to sea, as in the case of Portugal, Thrace and Yemen.

Rivers flowing from the hinterland to the seaboard area act as lines of communication and as connections. It is true we have several examples of rivers flowing through coastal barriers, but it is significant that the gaps in very many *semi-absolute* coastal barriers are in the vicinity of the lower courses of great rivers — the Congo is an example.

Small politico-territorial units of which the area is limited to the regions around the mouth of large rivers belong to the category of local coastal barriers; history teaches us that their existence is at best but precarious and short-lived. They block up the natural outlet of a waterway (and valley-route) and, in spite of their small size, are most troublesome to the neighbouring State occupying the drainage-area of the river thus bottled up. Such barriers are always subject to the powerful political pressure of the inland State, however they can show greater stability if they act as buffer states. Such areas can be termed *river-mouth plugs*.

HISTORICAL BASIS OF COASTAL BARRIERS

An independent coastal barrier may be either a native state organized by the indigenous population or an allochthonic one founded by an alien element which, after subjecting, driving out or exterminating the native population, maintains contact with its mother-country. The Kingdom of Jerusalem, and the Dominion of the Teutonic Order in what is today known as East Prussia are examples.

If an autochthonic coastal barrier state has a population of the same nationality as the inland state directly neighbouring with it, there may be ties of such close kinship that the barrier cannot exist for long. But if it is peopled by inhabitants of another nationality or race, such a coastal barrier may have

a much longer life as a separate unit. If such an area is incorporated within a larger State, it can gain political independence when the latter is enfeebled, as is shown in the case of the Baltic States and Russia.

Allochthonic barrier-states base their existence upon an immigrant state-creative element. If the new-comer drive out, extirpate or assimilate the indigenous population, the state assumes the features of an autochthonic entity, the only difference being in the genesis of the body politic set up. Such virtually autochthonic States then have the advantage of being nationally or racially differentiated from their hinterlands.

If on the other hand the hegemony of the immigrant element is based on administrative, economic, and cultural superiority, and not on the numerical preponderance of the settlers, and if the process of assimilation or of expelling the native group proceeds more slowly than the cultural and economic emancipation of the indigenous population, then with time the native inhabitants will take advantage of their greater numbers and seize power. The allochthonic coastal barrier then becomes an autochthonic one.

In politically dependent coastal barriers which are held by larger States, the ethnic composition of the population is of great importance. Ties of ethnic kinship or of common blood (both as regards the indigenous and the immigrant element) may bind the coastal barrier area to the State under whose political sway it remains. Other factors being equal, such ties enhance the power of resistance and extend the duration of life of such barriers. On the other hand, close ethnic ties with the hinterland are always dangerous in the long run to the continued existence of coastal barriers as such.

In accordance with the definition we have accepted for a coastal barrier, the region must be of relatively small area. As an independent State, it is usually a weaker country than the inland entity which it cuts off from the sea; in such case it may easily succumb to the superior power of the hinterland State and cease to exist as a body politic. If, however, it is stronger, and extends its area at the cost of the inland State, it ceases ultimately to be a barrier and becomes a normal maritime State. The process of territorial expansion, whether sea-wards or towards the interior, must finally cause the coastal barrier to lose its specific character.

The same process of evolution likewise affects colonial-type coastal barriers. A dependent coastal barrier bases its existence upon the power of the State to which it belongs. The continued existence of the barrier is then decided by the relation of the

power and vitality of the inland State to that of the mother-country of the barrier region.

The pressure of the inland State towards the sea may be either strong or weak. This is a prime contributory factor always to be kept in mind. The total lack of such pressure will afford the barrier region comparatively good chances of further existence. This may arise when the inland State has few if any maritime interests, owing to its specific economic structure or to the type and level of its civilization.

An extreme example of this attitude is furnished by the nomad-pastoral peoples. With such, as also with purely agricultural peoples, the urge for access to the sea may be exceedingly weak. But in course of time, with the advance of culture and civilization, this frame of mind can undergo change; economic evolution may influence or even compel such peoples to enter into direct commercial contact with the outside world.

During recent times the determination to acquire (or maintain) direct access to the sea has been common to most large and virile States and is clearly evident in their territorial policies.

It has been demonstrated that coastal barriers are subject to a steady and growing pressure from the interior; at the same time the defensive poten-

tialities of their natural physiographical features are steadily losing in force and significance. For these reasons such barrier regions or States are uniformly transitory in nature. The only exception which may enjoy a longer life are coastal barriers which act as buffer-states (such as Holland) or those which are possessions of powerful States jealous of their prestige and interests. In all other cases, the barriers must sooner or later fall victims to external pressure and suffer annexation by a larger and stronger State which needs the littoral to round off its territory, to establish a natural frontier upon the line of the coast, or to further its economic and political interests through access to the sea. If the coastal barrier be inhabited by people of a stock different to that of the inland population, if the barrier folk's consciousness of national or racial differentiation be sufficiently strong, and if it consistently strive to regain its political independence, it may in times of political crisis reappear as an autochthonic coastal barrier State. But in view of their usually small area, and the inconvenience which they cause to their stronger neighbours of the hinterland, barriers continue to be subjected to pressure from the interior, and their further independent existence is constantly threatened.

II.

COASTAL BARRIERS OF THE BALTIC REGION

The history of the territories upon the Baltic furnishes us with many examples of the evolution of coastal barriers of various types.

The shores of the Baltic Sea were settled by four powers of long standing: Germany, Poland, Russia and Sweden. Each of these countries constantly strove for full and free access to the sea, and each at some period in its history had to deal with politico-territorial obstacles bearing the character of coastal barriers.

With the exception of Sweden, the countries mentioned are all typically inland States. Their first centres of political and administrative life were all far removed from the sea-board. The maritime regions separating them from the open sea all possessed physiographical features which differentiated them from the inland areas, and which favoured the formation of separate political entities. Apart from ethnic considerations, the physical traits of the Baltic sea-board lands were such that isolation was favoured and national or linguistic differentiation enhanced. The protective belt of the Baltic littoral range, the Mazurian lake-country, the impassible forests of Lithuania, the lakes and marshlands to the north, all played their part in bringing this about.

ABSOLUTE COASTAL BARRIERS ON THE BALTIC

Germany, Poland and Russia all passed through a period of complete severance from the sea at some time or other of their history.

Germany was cut off for a short time from the Baltic during the 13th century by the Danish conquest of 1223-27 under Waldemar II, who seized the South Baltic littoral from Holstein to Pomerania. Poland was barred from the sea by the dominion of the Teutonic Order during the 13th and 14th centuries until access to the Baltic was regained by the Peace of Torun (1466) which restored the East Pomeranian seaboard and Danzig to the Polish State. When the Dukes of Prussia became vassals of the Polish Crown (1525) and Courland was added to the Polish Commonwealth (1561), the breadth of Poland's access to the sea was quite considerable. Up to the dismemberment of the Polish Commonwealth at the end of the 18th century, the country enjoyed this access uninterrupted. Russia, owing to the territorial aggrandizement of the dominions of the Teutonic Order and its affiliated bodies, had in the 16th century only a very narrow and useless outlet to the sea, on the Gulf of Finland. In the 17th century she was cut off altogether by the belt of Swedish possessions embracing Livonia (from

1629), Estonia (1561), Ingria (1617), Carelia (1617) and Finland. It was only in the time of Peter the Great that Russia broke through this barrier and gained her 'window onto Europe'. In more modern times, that short-lived creation of Napoleon's, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, was in 1807-13 completely cut off from the sea by the territorial acquisitions of Prussia.

All these South Baltic *absolute barriers* proved to be transient in nature. They either disappeared altogether or were broken through by pressure from behind. Their appearance and rise had been favoured by physiographical traits which fostered Baltic littoral differentiation. Although vulnerable to attack and invasion from the sea, they were protected against the pressure of the inland States by such obstacles, hampering alike peaceful and warlike contacts, as impassible virgin forests and extensive lake and swamp districts. These favourable natural conditions did not, however, assure their safety and integrity when their inland neighbours grew in power and pressed forward to the sea with greater impetus.

The history of Brandenburg and Poland will furnish examples which will be instructive. The former country, the nucleus of the later power of Prussia, was up to the Peace of Westphalia (1648) a purely inland State. The principalities of Mecklenburg and of Pomerania formed a barrier separating it from the sea. The territories of these two maritime areas were in the South Baltic lake-district belt, while their morphology and hypsometry caused them to differ widely from the German lowlands in the interior. The relation of these sea-board States to the Brandenburgian State can be compared to that of the Cassubian and Mazurian lake-countries (Polish Pomerania, Danzig and East Prussia) towards the lowland areas of Great-Poland and Mazovia to the south. Physiographical conditions were in both cases favourable to the rise of coastal barriers but were insufficient to safeguard the integrity of the sea-board States against stronger and more energetic pressure from the interior. Brandenburg during the time of the Great Elector annexed the Principality of Pomerania, while Poland, reinforced in the 15th century by the union with Lithuania, regained Danzig Pomerania and later extended her sovereign authority over the Duchy of Prussia. In similar fashion the East Baltic provinces of Sweden were seized by Russia in the 18th century.

Semi-absolute barriers were of much more frequent occurrence in the Baltic region. Today, in fact, these are the only type of barriers to be found there, and appear for the most part as independent autochthonic States, such as Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania. Excluding from consideration the tiny area of the Free City of Danzig, administered by the League

of Nations, it will be found that East Prussia is the only coastal barrier which is of the allochthonic type, politically dependent and an exclave of Germany.

COLONIAL-TYPE ALLOCHTHONIC BARRIERS

The past was more fruitful in allochthonic barriers on the shores of the Baltic, although the only ones to bear the character of independent States were the dominions of the Teutonic Order and of its allied organizations. The others were dependent barrier-regions mostly of the colonial type, that is to say possessions of larger State entities and in no spatial contact with their mother-lands. In the majority of cases the home-countries were overseas — on the opposite shores of the Baltic. Denmark held the southern tip of Sweden from the 12th to the 18th century, part of the Pomeranian seaboard in the vicinity of the Isle of Rügen in the 12th and 13th centuries, and Estonia from the 13th to the 14th century. In the 17th century the East Baltic possessions of Sweden stretched from Livonia to Finland; the latter country was a Swedish possession from the 14th century up to 1809. Sweden also held a part of Pomerania during the 17th and 18th centuries and up to 1815.

It is most noteworthy that Sweden and Denmark were the only Baltic countries to form such overseas colonial-type barriers. The peninsular peoples of Scandinavia, with their aptitude for marine affairs, are not comparable with the inland states of Germany, Poland and Russia, which were continental in character although they enjoyed free access to the sea. The flank type of dependent coastal barrier was much more rare. Examples of this are furnished by the Danish possessions in Pomerania, which acted as a flank barrier towards Germany in the 13th century, and East Prussia with Polish Pomerania, which flanked the Russian Empire from 1772 (first partition of Poland) throughout the 19th century and up to the Great War.

Overseas dependent coastal barriers no longer figure upon the map of the Baltic regions. Their connections with their respective mother-countries turned out to be weaker than the tendency of neighbouring inland States to gain control of the coastal area whenever they were more powerful. The Danes were driven out of Sweden in the 17th century. Russia liquidated Sweden's possessions on the East Baltic in the 18th century. Germany finally occupied Swedish Pomerania in 1815. Such was the fate of all allochthonic barriers, even when they were independent States, such as the dominion of the Teutonic Order, whose power was crushed in the 15th century by the irresistible pressure of the Poles towards the sea.

MODERN AUTOCHTHONIC COASTAL BARRIERS

The liquidation of the South and East Baltic coastal barriers and their annexation by the neigh-

bouring inland states was not, however, final. Further events caused these barriers to arise again, although in different form. Later, upon those same littorals of the Baltic coast where had been allochthonic barriers (mostly of an oversea, colonial type), new autochthonic coastal barriers appeared at times when the inland powers were enfeebled politically. It was not geographical individuality which decided their re-appearance, for this had in the meantime lost its significance, but ethnic differentiation from the inland areas. Wherever the seaboard was inhabited by a population of the same ethnic composition as the hinterland nation, no new barriers arose or old ones re-appeared. Once the seaboard, Slavonic peoples of Mecklenburg and West Pomerania had become completely assimilated by the German element, these lands became stable constituent parts of the adjoining Germany. The eastern part of the Pomeranian lake-country, inhabited by the Cassubian-Poles, very soon became an integral part of Poland, the consciousness of this population that it is of Polish nationality and tongue furnishing every reason for its accession to the modern Polish State. In these cases the coastal barriers disappeared under the decisive influence of the close ethnic ties binding the littoral to the hinterland.

But where the seaboard areas were inhabited by a population having no ethnic ties with the neighbouring inland State, political separatism caused new States to arise, forming coastal barriers of the autochthonic type. The East Baltic littoral countries inhabited by the Finns, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, which had been annexed by Russia in the 18th century, achieved political independence after the Great War, and as independent states constituted autochthonic coastal barriers between the sea and the U.S.S.R. The political, economic and cultural influence of the Germans in the former dominions of the Teutonic Order (north of Prussia), of the Swedes in Finland, and the Poles in Lithuania were undoubtedly considerable in the past, and traces still remain today. But these influences seldom led to any great denationalization of the indigenous populations — in this respect later Russian influences were just as unsuccessful. The native population remained in the majority, maintained its own language intact amongst the peasant classes, and upon the revival and development of nationalism during the 19th century was decisive in keeping up the political individualities of the areas it occupied, in tearing them away from Russia and in forming sovereign States.

The causes which made for East Prussia retaining its political and ethnic differentiation as regards the hinterland country (Poland) were of quite different

origin and character. Ethnic dissimilarity here was likewise a decisive factor — the majority of the population was German. But this national majority was not an indigenous one: it had arisen after the extirpation of the Ancient Prussians (a Balt-Lithuanian, non-Germanic people), through consistent colonization of the country by German immigrants. The large minority of Polish immigrants was insufficient to turn the scales and to alter the preponderatingly German composition of the new population. Evidence of the 'colonial' beginnings of the East Prussian coastal barrier is afforded by its politically dependent character, quite exceptional and even anachronistic amid the other present-day coastal barriers upon the Baltic. As a colonial settlement of the Germans, founded in the midst of foreign peoples, and having no spatial connection with the Fatherland, East Prussia has remained an exclave of Germany surrounded by Polish and Lithuanian peoples, just as it was from its very inception. Polish Pomerania continues to separate East Prussia from Germany as it has always done with but comparatively brief intervals.

The role of the Free City of Danzig as a *river mouth plug* is from the point of view of geographical and political science very exceptional, even unique. This small independent area cuts off the Vistula mouth from the rest of Poland, in spite of the fact that the whole river, from its source to the boundaries of the Free State, flows through Polish territory. The sole reason for the setting up of the Free City after the Great War was the non-Polish ethnic composition of its population. A glance at the map will show that it must have always been in the closest economic connection with the hinterland.

EVOLUTION OF COASTAL BARRIERS

Several stages in the evolution of coastal barriers can be observed in a study of the history of the Baltic area during the past thousand years.

1. Originally the inland regions of the Continent were cut off from the South Baltic coast by the independent, indigenous tribal confederations occupying the whole littoral. The German inland areas were cut off by the states of Western Slavonic peoples (the Obodrites, the Luticians and the Pomeranians) extending from Holstein to the mouth of the Oder. The Pomeranians and the Ancient Prussians barred inland Polish territories from the sea. The Samogitians, the Couronians, the Letts and the Ests barred off the White Ruthenian and Russian peoples from the South-east Baltic coast. The basic factor making for their independent status was the difficulty of communication from inland owing to natural obstacles of various kinds. The coast States were further aided in maintaining their separate

existence by the small interest shown by the inland folk in securing access to the sea. Charlemagne indeed subdued the Obodrites and Luticians, and Boleslas the Brave of Poland became overlord of Pomerania, nevertheless the coastal states remained autochthonic principalities which were not easily kept in full and permanent dependence. This period can be termed one of primitive autochthonic coastal barriers.

2. The next stage marked the subjection of the coastal barriers by invasions from the sea of West Baltic peoples, well versed in navigation and marine matters (Denmark and Sweden), also the economic and politico-territorial expansion of the German element eastwards along the South Baltic coast (the Hanseatic League and the Teutonic Order). This period can be termed one of colonial-type coastal barriers.

3. The further process of development was marked by the activities of the inland Baltic States, which aimed at extending their frontiers to the coast and securing direct access to the sea. The colonial-type coastal barriers were annexed by the neighbouring inland States. This period is one of the liquidation of coastal barriers by and in favour of the countries cut off from the Baltic Sea.

4. In turn, with the loss in strength of the various inland Baltic countries, the littoral areas appeared in the form of independent, sovereign barrier-States mostly of small area (with the exception of Finland). The explanation of their appearance and existence is their ethnic differentiation from the inland States, and the revival of national consciousness which arose among the barrier peoples (Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and Finns). Where this differentiation is absent, as upon the present littorals of Sweden, Germany and Poland, the barriers have not reappeared. The only dependent coastal barrier existing today upon the Baltic is East Prussia. This area owes its continued existence as a barrier to its common ethnic character with Germany (acquired during Period 2), and as such it is still an exclave isolated from its home-country. This period is therefore one for the most part of sovereign, autochthonic barrier-States.

The evolutionary stages enumerated above were not of course coeval over the whole area of the Baltic coast. Where, too, the same ethnic element inhabited the littoral and the hinterland area, the process of evolution was completed during the course of the third period (liquidation of the coastal barrier).

An examination of the course of politico-territorial changes upon the Baltic littoral reveals in many cases a tendency for the evolution of coastal barriers to become cyclic. The fourth stage is similar to the first in that in both cases the coastal barriers

are sovereign, autochthonic States. This does not mean, however, that the course of evolution necessarily stops, or that the present status is final.

It is necessary to bear the following points in mind:

1. The present coastal barriers are sovereign States and arose as a result of the enfeeblement of the hinterland State, that is to say, they became free at a time of specially favourable conditions. Thus the East Prussian coastal barrier, which was a fief of the Polish crown during the 16th and 17th centuries, gained its independence after the Swedish invasion had left Poland prostrate and exhausted (Peace of Oliva, 1660), and consolidated its separation from Poland during the years that Poland was partitioned. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland broke away from Russia and set up sovereign barrier-States after the Great War and the Russian Revolution, both of which greatly weakened Russia.

2. The chief basis for the existence of the present coastal barriers is their ethnic differentiation from the hinterland areas. How far the principle of nationality will remain in the future a decisive factor in the shaping of politico-territorial relations it is of course impossible to state.

3. The pressure of the inland States upon the coastal barriers is permanent, and in the light of history appears if anything to be gaining in force. It is today stronger than ever, owing to the present-day importance of navigation and maritime trade to the economic life of countries.

4. The position of a sovereign coastal barrier-State may be rendered stronger against the pressure of the larger and more powerful inland State by support and protection from outside powers. Thus the defence of Belgian integrity is a cardinal feature of British foreign policy. Poland contributed to set up the independent states of Latvia and Estonia, and these in some degree play the role of buffer-states between Russia and Poland — this is a factor favouring their continued existence.

All the above considerations must be taken into account when examining the permanence of the Baltic coastal barriers. The chief fact to be borne in mind is that coastal barriers are always subject to the pressure of inland states wishing to extend their territory to the sea-coast. Such pressure or the tendency to such pressure may be latent and inactive, but the possibility, even probability, of friction arising through the existence of coastal barriers is always present, and must be considered. For this reason the present status of the Baltic coastal barriers cannot be accepted as final. That friction exists is already indicated by many signs today, Klaipeda (Memel) being a case in point.



The Polish Republic was established in 1918, following the end of World War I. It was the first time in over a century that Poland regained its independence. The new constitution, adopted in 1921, established a semi-presidential system with a president and a parliament. The president was elected by the people for a five-year term and held significant powers, including the right to appoint and dismiss ministers and judges. The parliament, known as the Sejm, consisted of two chambers: the Sejm and the Senate. The Sejm was elected by universal suffrage, while the Senate was elected by local and provincial assemblies. The constitution also provided for a system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Over the years, the Polish Republic has experienced various challenges, including political instability and economic difficulties. However, it has remained a democratic state and a member of major international organizations, including the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the European Union.

The Polish Republic's political system is based on the principle of the separation of powers. The executive branch is headed by the President, who is elected by the people for a five-year term. The President has the authority to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and other ministers. The legislative branch consists of the Sejm and the Senate. The Sejm is elected by universal suffrage, while the Senate is elected by local and provincial assemblies. The judicial branch is independent and consists of the Supreme Court and lower courts. The Polish Republic has a long history of political development. It was the first time in over a century that Poland regained its independence. The new constitution, adopted in 1921, established a semi-presidential system with a president and a parliament. The president was elected by the people for a five-year term and held significant powers, including the right to appoint and dismiss ministers and judges. The parliament, known as the Sejm, consisted of two chambers: the Sejm and the Senate. The Sejm was elected by universal suffrage, while the Senate was elected by local and provincial assemblies. The constitution also provided for a system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Over the years, the Polish Republic has experienced various challenges, including political instability and economic difficulties. However, it has remained a democratic state and a member of major international organizations, including the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the European Union.



THE BALTIC INSTITUTE

The Baltic Institute was created in Torun in 1926 for the investigation of Pomeranian and Baltic matters'. At first it directed its attention mainly to Polish Pomerania and her neighbour countries, but it now aims at including the whole Baltic Region within the scope of its activities. It endeavours also to organize scientific co-operation among all those studying in Baltic countries.

The Institute does not possess its own research staff, but invites specialists from Polish and foreign universities

and other centres of research as corresponding-members and collaborators. Over 150 Professors and Assistant-Professors have given active assistance or have contributed to the publications of the Institute, and the number of these helpers is constantly growing. The main line of research is economic, and is chiefly connected with maritime trade, navigation and harbour matters. Much attention, moreover, is paid to the cultural relations between the peoples of the Baltic region, as also to problems of history and geography.

PUBLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTE

The publications of the Institute, which present the results of its activities, can be divided into three main groups, the 'Records of the Baltic Institute', monographs and treatises in scientific form, the 'Baltic Pocket Library',

semi-popular booklets which appear also in English, and periodicals, such as the 'Bulletins of the Baltic Institute' and 'Baltic Countries'. A complete list of the publications of the Institute comprises more than 300 items.

RECORDS OF THE BALTIC INSTITUTE

The 'Records', chief among the publications of the Institute, appear in five distinct series, arranged according to subject. All these works are in Polish.

1. '*Dominium Maris*', comprising works on maritime trade, navigation and ports.

2. '*Balticum*', comprising geographical and cultural studies of various territories of the Baltic.

3. '*Research Workers on Pomerania*', comprising lectures and papers read at meetings, together with their minutes.

4. '*Pomeranian Bibliography*',

5. '*Monographs on Pomeranian Towns and Villages*', a series, in which only one work has appeared.

Below is a list of the 'Records of the Baltic Institute'.

DOMINIUM MARIS

International Trade on the Baltic': by W. Stopczyk. Toruń 1928, pp. 192 + VIII, 71 stat. tables and 6 graphs. Price: 6 zł.

Defence of Pomerania': collective work edited by J. Borowik. Toruń 1930, pp. 237 + XV, 42 stat. tables, 14 maps, charts and graphs. Price: 10 zł.

The Case of Gdynia': by A. Siebeneichen and H. Strasburger. Toruń 1931, pp. 180 + VIII, 43 stat. tables. Price: 7.50 zł.

The Development of the Port of Danzig': by K. Świątecki. Toruń 1932, pp. 309 + XIV, 148 stat. tables, 5 maps and 8 graphs. Price: 10 zł.

'German Transit through Poland': by J. Piasecki. Toruń 1935, pp. 187 + VII, 2 stat. tables and 4 charts. Price: 5 zł.

'Sea Consciousness': collective work edited by J. Bo-

rowik. Toruń 1934, pp. 390 + XVI, 35 stat. tables, 13 maps, 11 graphs, 6 ills. Price: 10 zł.

The Technical and Commercial Equipment of a Sea-Port': collective work in four volumes edited by J. Borowik, B. Nagórski and T. Seifert. Vol. I. Organization of Ports with Special Regard to Gdynia and Danzig'. Toruń 1934, pp. 150 + VI, 2 maps. Price: 7.50 zł.

'Polish-British Coal Export Competition on Scandinavian Markets': by A. Jałowicki. Toruń 1935, pp. 191 + X, 50 stat. tables. Price: 6 zł.

Sea Transport and International Agreements in Navigation': by F. Hilchen. Toruń 1934, pp. 104 + X, 11 stat. tables. Price: 5 zł.

The Port of Copenhagen': by B. Leitgeber. Toruń 1935, pp. 256 + X, 7 maps, 28 stat. tables. Price: 10 zł.

BALTICUM

Polish Pomerania'. Vol. I. 'Land and People': collective work edited by J. Borowik. Toruń 1929, pp. 326 + X, 118 ills., 17 maps and graphs. Price: 12.50 zł.

Polish Pomerania'. Vol. II. 'History and Culture': collective work edited by J. Borowik. Toruń 1931, pp. 224 + X, 55 ills. Price: 7.50 zł.

Reply to German Corridor Propaganda': collective work edited by J. Borowik. Toruń 1930, pp. 163 + VII. Price: 5 zł.

Pomeranian Art': by B. Makowski. Toruń 1932, pp. 250 + XIV, 78 ills., 20 plates. Price: 10 zł., bound 12 zł.

The Struggle for the Baltic': by W. Sobieski (in German). Markert & Petters, Leipzig 1933, pp. 269 + VI. Price: 10 zł.

The District of Malborg': by W. Łęga. Toruń

1933, pp. 256 + XVIII, 180 ills., 10 maps. Price: 12 zł.

'Farmers' Year-book': by B. Stelmachowska. Toruń 1933, pp. 271 + XI. Price: 10 zł.

'An Outline of Cassubian Civilization': by F. Lorentz, A. Fischer and T. Lehr-Spławiński. Toruń 1934, pp. 306 + XVIII, 38 ills., 1 map. Price: 12 zł. (Also published in English by Faber & Faber, London 1935).

'Cassubian Songs': by Ł. Kamiński. Toruń 1935, pp. 340 + XXIV. Price: 15 zł.

'Polish Pomerania'. Vol. III. 'Economic Life': collective work edited by J. Borowik (in print).

'Economic Conditions in East Prussia': by A. Münich and J. Wilder (in preparation).

'History of East Prussia': collective work in three volumes (in preparation).

RESEARCH WORKERS ON POMERANIA

'National Problems in Pomerania'. Toruń 1931, pp. 130, 1 map, 1 graph. Price: 5 zł.

Landownership in Pomerania. Historical and Juridical Problems'. Toruń 1933, pp. 244. Price: 10 zł.

Polish Land Settlement in Pomerania'. Toruń 1935,

pp. 216, 7 maps, 7 graphs and 19 stat. tables. Price: 10 zł.

Landownership in Pomerania. Economic and Geographical Problems'. Toruń 1935, pp. 254, 12 maps, 1 coloured map, 10 stat. tables. Price: 10 zł.

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