

INSTITUTE OF GEOGRAPHY AND SPATIAL ORGANIZATION  
POLISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

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CONFERENCE PAPERS, 3

## **THE STATE, MODES OF PRODUCTION AND WORLD POLITICAL MAP**

Seminar of the IGU Study Group on World Political Map  
Warsaw, October 1987

## **L'ETAT, MODES DE PRODUCTION ET LA CARTE POLITIQUE DU MONDE**

Colloque du Groupe d'Etude de l'UGI Carte Politique du Monde  
Varsovie, Octobre 1987





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IGU STUDY GROUP ON WORLD POLITICAL MAP  
SEMINAR IN WARSAW

This volume contains papers presented at the seminar held in Warsaw, Poland, on 13-16 October 1987, organized by the Institute of Geography and Spatial Organization of the Polish Academy of Sciences, in cooperation and in accordance with the programme of activities of the IGU Study Group "World Political Map".

The chairman of the Study Group prof. David Knight has sent from Canada a cable-address to the participants of the seminar wishing them a fruitful results of the meeting. Full members of the Study Group, prof. M.Rosciszewski and prof. P.Claval (France) have participated in the Seminar.

The originally long list of participants from abroad has been eventually much reduced because the dramatic economic situation of the country made it impossible for the organizers to meet the costs of stay of the participants.

The seminar has begun with the opening address by prof. M. Rosciszewski, Polish member of the Study Group and Head of the Organizing Committee and by prof. P.Korcelli, the director of the Institute of Geography and Spatial Organization in Warsaw.

There were 5 half-day sessions on: Political Geography and contemporary problems, Boundaries problems and administrative divisions, State and modes of production. New tendencies in contemporary political and social relationships, Discussion and concluding session. The venue for the meetings were the premises of Warsaw University. One day bus excursion for the participants offered an occasion to see the different suburban areas around warsaw town, developing and much diversified productive landscapes within the district almost completely destroyed during world war second.

The Warsaw meeting of the political geographers was intended to contribute to their effort to establish the regular IGU Commission on World Political Map as well as to promote the better organizational foundations for international cooperation of the geographers concerned.

The meeting has identified the ever growing interest in extending and intensifying the geographical studies of the world issues demonstrated by many inter-disciplinary scholars offering thereby a common ground for research and promising the better understanding of the contemporary global processes.



PAUL CLAVAL

Université de Paris-Sorbonne

## LA MÉTROPOLISATION DE L'ÉCONOMIE MONDIALE ET LE RÔLE DES ÉTATS

La décolonisation a multiplié les États depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale: il n'y a pour ainsi plus de territoires dépendants dans le monde. On pourrait croire que le rôle des gouvernements nationaux n'a jamais été aussi fort. Ce n'est pas l'impression que donne l'analyse des évolutions en cours. Tout se passe comme si l'autorité de l'État était victime d'érosion. C'est cela dont nous voulons parler ici.

### I. Le modèle traditionnel d'organisation des nations et de l'espace mondial

#### A. Les conditions

Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la vie économique est marquée par quatre traits.

#### 1. Un marché du travail industriel spatialement limité

Il n'existe encore qu'un petit nombre de nations qui possèdent une main-d'oeuvre capable de travailler dans les usines. C'est vrai pour tous les emplois de techniciens. Ce l'est aussi pour l'immense majorité des postes peu qualifiés. On ne demande pas, c'est vrai, un niveau élevé à la main-d'oeuvre, mais on attend d'elle un certain nombre de disciplines - celles de l'horaire et celles de l'obéissance. Elle doit aussi se montrer assez intéressée par ce qu'elle fait pour entretenir scrupuleusement l'outil de travail. Dans beaucoup de domaines enfin, il

est utile de savoir lire, compter et écrire. Tout ceci n'existe que si certains types de formations sont assurés: dans beaucoup de domaines, l'école élémentaire est indispensable et constitue la meilleure préparation, à long terme, à la vie à l'usine.

Il y a bien sûr des activités dans lesquelles on n'exige guère que de la force musculaire: c'est vrai de l'extraction minière - longtemps - et des chantiers de travaux publics. L'outillage qu'on y utilise est si sommaire - des pioches, des pics et des pelles - que son entretien n'offre pas de difficulté. Dans ce cas, et dans ce cas seulement, il est possible de trouver partout la main-d'oeuvre dont on a besoin. Pour les autres tâches, seuls les pays de civilisation européenne ont su former une main-d'oeuvre industrielle de qualité. Le Japon, où les traditions de discipline et la large diffusion de l'instruction créent des conditions voisines, les a seul rattrapés.

## 2. Des transports efficaces, mais encore lents

Les révolutions des transports qui se sont succédé durant le XIXème siècle ont beaucoup réduit le coût des transferts de biens et des déplacements de personnes. Elles les ont aussi accélérés, mais les vitesses commerciales restent généralement inférieures à 100 km à l'heure, ce qui veut dire que les relations qui demandent contact ne sont faciles que dans des aires relativement limitées: ce que l'on peut parcourir, aller et retour, dans une journée, tout en ayant le temps de rencontrer des partenaires n'excède pas normalement 300 km, exceptionnellement 400. Cela rend difficile l'organisation des relations avec des correspondants trop lointains et limite la dispersion des établissements au sein des firmes: ceux qui sont trop loin du siège échappent presque constamment aux visites, aux contrôles et posent donc des problèmes délicats de gestion.

## 3. Des télécommunications peu développées

Les moyens de télécommunication ont fait des progrès depuis le XIXème siècle qui les a vu naître, mais ils souffrent encore de nombre de limitations. Ils ont pour eux d'être instantanés, mais le télégraphe a un débit trop lent pour acheminer

des messages longs et complexes. Le téléphone n'a pas cet inconvénient, mais il ne laisse pas de trace de ce qui a été dit. Une révolution commence à s'opérer avec les téléscripteurs: leur capacité est élevée, et ils acheminent des textes. Le telex existe déjà, mais, en dehors des Etats-Unis, les réseaux commencent à peine à se mettre en place. Longtemps, ils ne paraissent utiles que pour échanger des nouvelles de marché: c'est essentiel pour qui cherche à écouler sa production au loin, mais ce n'est pas suffisant pour qui veut mieux souder les établissements dispersés de sa firme.

#### 4. Des activités sensibles aux économies d'échelle et aux économies externes

Les activités économiques se fixent aux points où les frais de transport et les coûts de main-d'oeuvre sont minima. Mais les entreprises cherchent aussi à profiter de toutes les économies d'échelle que le progrès technique rend possibles, ce qui les attire vers les zones centrales des aires de demande puisque c'est là que l'on dispose du plus vaste marché. Elles sont également sensibles aux avantages que l'on n'a pas à payer lorsqu'on s'installe en un point où les informations transitent, où les modes se forment et où les professionnels d'une branche se rassemblent. Les entrepreneurs savent aussi que pour attirer la main-d'oeuvre qualifiée sans avoir à la payer plus, il faut compter sur le charme des lieux et la qualité des services qui y sont offerts et qui complètent en nature le salaire versé. Ce sont là les formes d'externalités qui jouent le plus.

#### B. Les conséquences: l'organisation des espaces nationaux

Quelles sont les conséquences de cet état des techniques et des savoir-faire? La première, et la plus importante, c'est d'opposer deux ensembles dans l'espace mondial: celui qui dispose du quasi-monopole du travail industriel, et celui qui l'ignore encore. Dans le premier ensemble, tout pousse à la structuration de fortes nations économiques, alors que rien n'y prédispose ailleurs.

Les conditions de transport et de communication sont telles que les industries peuvent écouler leurs produits sur de très vastes marchés - sur un marché de taille mondiale pour beaucoup de produits de valeur déjà. Mais elles ne peuvent installer leurs fabrications hors des pays ou se concentrer le pool des travailleurs industriels.

La lenteur relative des communications pousse, dans la plupart des cas, les entreprises à rassembler leurs établissements dans une aire assez restreinte: aux Etats Unis, où les ressources énergétiques et minérales auraient pu inciter à la dispersion précoce des foyers industriels, les accords tarifaires pratiqués par les chemins de fer sous l'influence des milieux d'affaires ont empêché l'étalement de l'Industrial belt. La stratégie normale, pour une firme, est de concentrer ses établissements productifs au sein d'une nation. Les seules activités qui échappent à cette règle sont les activités minières ou certaines industries de première transformation: elles emploient une main-d'oeuvre très peu qualifiée et ne demandent pas à être intégrées dans un plan complexe de fabrication, ce qui facilite la gestion au loin.

Les États industrialisés réagissent contre la tendance des producteurs à concentrer leurs usines dans un même pays: les tarifs douaniers ont souvent pour but d'inciter les fabricants à installer des usines dans un marché qui sans cela leur serait fermé.

A l'intérieur des nations, toutes les régions n'offrent pas les mêmes opportunités pour qui veut s'implanter. Toutes celles qui ne sont pas liées à la présence de matières premières ou de sources d'énergie sont surtout sensibles à l'accessibilité au marché et aux externalités. Elles préfèrent donc les zones où la population s'est accumulée et qui sont proches du centre de gravité économique de l'ensemble du pays: c'est en s'installant là que l'on dessert le marché national aux moindres frais. Les nations opposent donc des zones centrales (Fig. 1A) où l'on rencontre à la fois des activités spécialisées liées aux ressources du milieu et des activités de transformation et




Fig. 1. La géographie de l'État industrialisé hier.

A - La division en régions spécialisées; B - L'opposition entre aires centrales à économie complexe et périphéries spécialisées

de service fixées par l'accessibilité à l'ensemble, et des zones périphériques (Fig. 18) dont l'économie est beaucoup moins complexe: elles ne fixent que les activités liées aux ressources locales. Les périphéries ne sont pas sous-développées, et les niveaux de vie y sont voisins, dans chaque secteur, de ceux des zones centrales, mais il leur manque généralement les secteurs où les rémunérations sont les plus élevées: statistiquement, elles apparaissent moins riches que les secteurs centraux.

Les activités installées au centre ne travaillent pas seulement pour les marchés nationaux: une part essentielle de leurs débouchés se trouve à l'étranger. Les zones "centrales" ne sont donc pas généralement au coeur des nations: elles doivent permettre l'accès facile au marché international. Elles sont donc proches d'une des frontières ou d'une des côtes du pays. Il arrive même souvent qu'elles soient axées sur un littoral.

Ce modèle d'organisation de l'espace prédomine à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, mais il est relativement récent. A la fin du XVIIIème siècle, il n'y a encore pas de coïncidence systématique entre les espaces économiques et les territoires nationaux: les frais de transport continentaux sont trop élevés pour que la plupart des marchés couvrent plus qu'une province. Les seuls qui soient plus vastes sont liés au commerce maritime - et sont donc à cheval sur plusieurs pays.

Dans le courant du XIXème siècle, la Grande-Bretagne donne l'exemple d'une organisation sensiblement différente du modèle qui nous paraît normal: ses zones industrielles ont d'emblée un marché plus que national - celui de l'Empire britannique au moins, et bien souvent, au début du XIXème siècle, un marché quasi mondial. Les meilleures localisations sont littorales: la Grande-Bretagne n'offre pas, jusqu'au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale, de région centrale où la concentration industrielle serait particulièrement forte. Les choses commencent seulement à changer dans les années 1920 et 1930. C'est que le développement économique britannique a cessé alors d'être différent des autres. Ce qui triomphe partout, c'est le modèle améri-

cain ou allemand, à savoir celui de pays dont les industriels contrôlent la totalité du marché intérieur, ce qui leur confère une puissance indispensable à la conquête de débouchés extérieurs. Dans de telles conditions, le choix de localisations centrales par rapport à l'espace national est indispensable, mais elles doivent autoriser aussi l'exportation. C'est là le type d'espace dans lequel s'appliquent les recettes de l'économie keynésienne: les secteurs d'activité sont fortement liés, et le marché, pour chaque produit, dépend d'abord de la masse salariale distribuée au sein du pays. C'est dire que les effets multiplicateurs de l'investissement et du commerce extérieur sont forts. Une croissance soutenue résulte de l'ensemble de ces choix économiques.

#### C. La nation keynésienne et ses limites

La nation que l'on pourrait donc qualifier de keynésienne offre un champ propice à l'intervention publique: les industriels sont liés à un Etat particulier puisqu'ils ne sont pas encore capables de se créer des bases de production à l'échelle internationale. La relative fermeture de l'économie de chaque nation rend efficaces les politiques de protection et d'investissement imaginée par les pouvoirs publics. L'absence de concurrence trop vive dans le domaine industriel permet de protéger totalement certains secteurs de la concurrence mondiale - c'est le cas, par exemple, des agricultures d'Europe occidentale.

La direction des économies nationales de type keynésien se fait à partir de la capitale, où sont définies les grandes lignes du contrôle et des impulsions étatiques, et à partir des grandes places d'affaires portuaires par lesquelles s'effectue la liaison avec le marché mondial: Berlin et Hambourg ou Rotterdam, Paris et Le Havre, Washington et New York.

Dès que l'on sort des espaces qui disposent du monopole du travail industriel, les conditions changent. Faute de développement du secteur secondaire, les marchés ne coïncident jamais avec les espaces nationaux: les activités trouvent des débouchés

locaux - c'est vrai de l'agriculture vivrière presque partout - ou des marchés internationaux. Aucune force économique ne pousse donc à la structuration des États en ensembles économiques articulés. Les colonies créées par les puissances européennes ont d'ailleurs été conçues comme des prolongements du territoire de leurs métropoles plutôt que comme des espaces structurés sur eux-mêmes.

Dans les pays déjà indépendants, en Amérique latine par exemple, les superstructures étatiques ne peuvent tirer beaucoup d'argent des agricultures vivrières de subsistance. L'État ne vit que parce qu'il existe des plantations ou des exploitations minières dont la production est exportée; il s'agit de secteurs monétarisés qui dégagent des ressources imposables: on frappe soit les exportations elles-mêmes, soit les importations qu'elles suscitent. L'intérêt de l'État n'est pas de développer les complémentarités entre les diverses parties du territoire national, mais de favoriser son intégration dans le marché mondial.

Les recettes des politiques économiques keynésiennes ne s'appliquent pas à ces espaces économiques: ils sont beaucoup trop ouverts pour que l'État puisse y exercer un contrôle efficace de l'investissement. Les effets multiplicateurs sont toujours faibles. Dans les années qui suivent immédiatement la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les économistes apprennent à leurs dépens que les politiques qui sont efficaces au centre ne le sont pas à la périphérie - mais ils ne voient pas qu'elles ne sont efficaces au centre que par manque de concurrence industrielle à l'échelle mondiale.

## II. L'évolution contemporaine

Tout n'était pas parfait dans l'organisation politico-économique de l'espace au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale: le progrès technique multipliait les économies d'échelle, si bien que la plupart des territoires nationaux se révélaient trop exigus pour tirer pleinement avantage des nouveaux équipements. La constitution d'aires de libre échange, de marchés



communs ou de conseils d'assistance économique mutuelle montre que les responsables politiques avaient conscience de ces limitations et étaient prêts à s'entendre pour les faire disparaître. Le dynamisme économique des espaces élargis ainsi créés est éclatant durant les années 1960. Il cesse de l'être à partir des années 1970: la Grande-Bretagne, qui rejoint alors la Communauté Économique Européenne, ne bénéficie guère de son entrée. Comme ce ralentissement coïncide avec le premier choc pétrolier, il est tentant de rendre celui-ci responsable de la cassure dans le rythme de croissance enregistré jusque-là. Les indicateurs économiques sont formels: les difficultés avaient commencé dans les années antérieures. L'explication doit être cherchée ailleurs, dans les forces qui remodelent en profondeur l'espace économique mondial.

#### A. Les nouvelles conditions

Les traits qui caractérisaient le monde à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale disparaissent les uns après les autres.

##### 1. Un marché mondial du travail industriel

Le marché du travail industriel s'élargit rapidement et l'Europe, les États-Unis et le Japon n'ont plus le monopole dont ils avaient joui jusque-là. L'enseignement primaire s'est généralisé dans un nombre croissant de pays: voilà un peu partout des jeunes formés aux disciplines élémentaires du lieu de travail, de l'horaire, et capables de lire des instructions simples ou de suivre les indications données par les cadrans des machines ou par les appareils de mesure. Là où les traditions valorisent le travail et la qualité dans l'effort, la mutation est complète. Dans un grand nombre de domaines, c'est désormais en Asie méridionale ou orientale que l'on trouve la main-d'oeuvre qui revient le moins cher: elle n'exige pas encore des rémunérations très élevées et son efficacité est redoutable.

En Amérique du Sud et au Moyen-Orient, l'évolution est également commencée, mais est moins avancée: le goût du travail soigné y est moins prononcé et les conditions démographiques ne

sont pas partout aussi favorables à l'acceptation de strictes disciplines de travail. Il en va de même pour l'Afrique noire, où il est encore difficile de recruter une main-d'oeuvre stable.

Même incomplète, la transformation est déjà assez avancée pour que, dans un grand nombre de fabrications, le choix qui s'offre aux industriels s'étende à la planète entière (pour les industries textiles ou la confection, par exemple), au monde méditerranéen, à une partie de l'Amérique latine et à l'Extrême-Orient (pour les constructions mécaniques), où à l'Extrême-Orient (pour les industries électroniques).

## 2. Des télécommunications efficaces

Les télécommunications ont également fait des progrès considérables: la qualité des liaisons téléphoniques s'est accrue, leur coût, en particulier pour les liaisons à longue distance, a diminué, et les capacités des canaux qu'empruntent les flux ont été multipliées au point que les risques de saturation sont bien plus faibles qu'autrefois. On sait d'ailleurs acheminer les messages en les dérivant sur les mailles du réseau les moins chargées, ce qui conduit à une meilleure utilisation des infrastructures.

Les systèmes télex se sont généralisés: il est désormais possible de trouver dans tous les pays des points de raccordement, et de recevoir ainsi en continu des textes qui renseignent sur la conjoncture politique, l'état du marché ou tel ou tel autre domaine.

## 3. L'impact de l'ordinateur

La révolution des télécommunications n'aurait pas la même signification si elle n'allait de pair avec la révolution - ou les révolutions successives - de l'ordinateur. Les organisations sociales tirent leur importance de leur capacité de recueillir, traiter, mémoriser et mobiliser les informations significatives dans tel ou tel domaine. Avant la révolution de l'électronique, ces résultats n'étaient obtenus qu'à grand-peine (Fig. 2): l'acheminement des informations était lent et coûtait cher. Pour éviter l'engorgement du centre où les capacités de traite-



Fig. 1. Interdependence in international wheat trade, 1970-1972 (measured by the highest value of trade intensity indices in each importing country)

Countries favouring wheat imports from: US - United States of America, C - Canada, E - European Economic Community (10), AUS - Australia, ARG - Argentina, USSR - Soviet Union




Fig.2. Interdependence in international wheat trade, 1980-1982 (measured by the highest value of trade intensity indices in each importing country)

Countries favouring wheat imports from: US - United States of America, C - Canada, E - European Economic Community (10), AUS - Australia, ARG - Argentina, USSR -




Fig. 2. La firme comme système de communication avant l'ordinateur et les télécommunications rapides  
 1 - flux d'informations lents (courrier), 2 - flux d'informations rapides (télécommunications), 3 - flux d'informations non-standardisées (déplacements de personnes et contacts)




Fig. 3. Les problèmes spatiaux des firmes avant l'informatisation  
 CBD - quartier central des affaires; A - acquisition des données;  
 M - mémoire; T - traitement des données; D - décision; 1 - flux  
 d'informations standardisées reposant sur les télécommunications,  
 2 - flux d'informations non-standardisées impliquant des con-  
 tacts face à face

ment et de mémorisation étaient limitées, il n'était d'autre solution que de traiter et mémoriser localement une bonne partie des données recueillies (Fig. 3). Ce qui était acheminé vers les niveaux supérieurs de la hiérarchie était ainsi relativement limité, et le système évitait la congestion, mais il payait cela d'une difficulté réelle à contrôler les services périphériques: du moment qu'on leur abandonnait le traitement et la mémorisation des informations locales, on concédait à ceux qui en étaient responsables la possibilité de manipuler les données, de les trier et de ne pas les diffuser toutes: c'est ainsi qu'ils pouvaient se tailler un pouvoir local contre lequel la direction centrale devait agir en permanence: les organisations ne pouvaient éviter, si elles voulaient échapper à l'éclatement, un style autoritaire de relations.

Quelle est la signification de l'ordinateur - et de l'ordinateur couplé avec les réseaux modernes de télécommunications? C'est de bouleverser la répartition des lieux où l'information se stocke et se traite (Fig. 4). La transmission instantanée de données nombreuses sur de longues distances permet de localiser les mémoires ailleurs qu'aux endroits où les informations sont acquises (Fig. 5). Les capacités de travail des ordinateurs rendent inutile l'organisation hiérarchique du traitement des données: tout peut-être concentré et traité en un seul point.

L'organisation n'est plus soumise aux mêmes tendances centrifuges que par le passé: ses niveaux inférieurs n'ont plus la tâche délicate de traiter les informations locales au profit de tout le système. Elle peuvent continuer à le faire - les progrès de la mini- et de la micro-informatiques y poussent depuis une quinzaine d'années mais d'autres échelons peuvent mener au même moment le même travail. Il n'est plus possible de bâtir des autonomies locales sur la rétention des nouvelles. La centralisation des informations et leur traitement devient possible même si l'entreprise a des établissements dispersés dans le monde entier. La préparation des décisions peut se faire dans de meilleures conditions - et le rôle du centre devient plus grand.




Fig. 4. La firme comme système de communication avec l'ordinateur et des télécommunications rapides (légende - voir fig. 2)






Fig. 5. Les problèmes spatiaux de la firme après l'informatisation (légende - voir fig. 3)

Dans le même temps, le style de direction change. La direction de la firme n'a plus à se montrer constamment soupçonneuse vis-à-vis de ce qui se fait ailleurs: elle peut à tout moment contrôler la marche de ses établissements. Il lui est donc possible de faire davantage appel aux initiatives locales puisqu'elle n'a plus à les redouter: elle ne risque pas d'éclater, comme par le passé. Elle a donc intérêt à inciter tous ses membres à participer de manière active à l'élaboration ou à la mise en oeuvre des projets globaux.

Les télécommunications diminuent la distance réelle entre établissements. Elles facilitent les échanges d'information standardisées. Elles ne font pas disparaître les besoins de contacts: contacts entre les firmes, bien sûr, pour prospecter les marchés et signer des contrats, mais contacts aussi avec les échelons inférieurs de la hiérarchie. Dans les rapports de type ancien, on s'arrangeait pour faire circuler surtout des informations très normalisées de haut en bas de la hiérarchie - des ordres en un sens, des rapports sur l'exécution des tâches dans l'autre. Les contacts n'avaient pour but que de vérifier, par des inspections, la véracité des rapports. Actuellement, on a toujours besoin d'acheminer une masse considérable d'informations standardisées - les télécommunications y pourvoient si bien qu'une partie des contrôles devient inutile. Mais il est de plus en plus indispensable de rencontrer les dirigeants locaux: on leur demande autre chose qu'être des exécutants fidèles. Leur participation à la vie de la firme s'accroît: on attend d'eux des suggestions, des plans partiels. L'élaboration des décisions ne se fait pas tout entière au sommet, même si c'est là que le choix est finalement arrêté. La vie des organisations implique donc des déplacements plus nombreux entre les divers échelons de la firme.

#### 4. Les transports rapides

La révolution des transports rapides facilite les contacts entre partenaires éloignés. L'aviation entre vraiment dans l'âge commercial après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les vitesses moyennes atteignent alors 4 ou 500 km à l'heure. Les moteurs à

réaction conduisent dès la fin des années 1950 à des vitesses comprises entre 800 et 900 km et qui n'ont guère évolué depuis, malgré les expériences de Concorde. Il est possible de faire dans la journée l'aller et retour vers une grande métropole dans un rayon de 2000 km tout en gardant assez de temps pour des contacts réels. A l'échelle des États-Unis, il est facile d'aller de la côte Atlantique à la côte Pacifique et d'y travailler dans la journée, le retour s'effectuant de nuit. Dans l'autre sens, c'est le voyage aller qui se fait de nuit. L'interaction directe demande donc de 25 à 30 heures: elle n'offre plus de difficulté insurmontable pour les techniciens ou les hommes d'affaires.

Les liaisons aériennes ne sont réellement rapides que si les arrêts intermédiaires sont rares. Le développement du transport aérien introduit donc un facteur nouveau de hiérarchisation dans les réseaux urbains: les centres les plus importants sont reliés directement, et de chacun on peut accéder sans peine à l'ensemble de l'espace international - ou à l'ensemble des grandes métropoles internationales. Les villes plus petites ne sont desservies qu'indirectement, si bien qu'elles ne bénéficient guère de l'accélération des relations. C'est cela qui renforce le poids des échelons supérieurs de la hiérarchie urbaine - ou de la hiérarchie des grands aéroports. La population totale compte moins en effet que le volume des flux qui se nouent en un point: certains grands centres touristiques ou certaines villes qui offrent des services de rayonnement mondial font partie du club peu nombreux des nouveaux centres sans être très peuplées - ainsi, Nice ou Genève.

C'est le coût et la lenteur des communications qui imposaient naguère aux organisations de ne pas disperser leurs établissements sur des espaces trop étendus. La situation est aujourd'hui différente: il est facile pour un siège social de rester en contact avec un établissement qui se trouve à l'autre bout du pays ou à l'autre bout du monde à condition que l'un et l'autre soient dans un rayon d'une heure ou d'une heure et demie autour d'un grand aéroport. Une localisation plus proche, mais sans liaison aérienne, est moins avantageuse: les déplace-

ments qu'imposent son contrôle ou sa participation à l'élaboration de projets communs prennent trop de temps.

Les trains à grande vitesse ont des effets un peu similaires: là aussi, il n'est pas possible de multiplier les arrêts sans perdre l'essentiel de l'avantage qu'offre le nouveau mode de transport. La hiérarchisation est donc accentuée - mais de manière moins brutale qu'avec l'avion: on peut desservir une ville moyenne tous les 100 km sans trop ralentir le service.

L'avion désavantage les localisations proches: il ne devient vraiment utilisable que pour des trajets de plus de 400 km. Le train à grande vitesse est surtout avantageux jusqu'à cette même distance - où il offre des temps réels analogues à ceux de l'avion. Il cesse d'être compétitif au delà de 600 km.

## B. Les conséquences: l'organisation de l'espace

### 1. L'équilibre spatial des organisations

Les mutations des trente dernières années modifient complètement l'équilibre spatial des organisations. Celle-ci peuvent multiplier les établissements en des lieux très éloignés: elles trouvent partout, ou presque, la main-d'œuvre qualifiée dont elles ont besoin et disposent, avec les moyens de télécommunication, les ordinateurs et les transports rapides de ce qu'il faut pour maintenir la cohésion de l'ensemble, pour être au courant des conditions extérieures et pour élaborer des décisions dans les meilleures conditions. Il suffit, pour que tout marche bien, que les directions soient implantées dans de grandes métropoles où elles bénéficient de fortes externalités tout en ayant accès dans de bonnes conditions aux autres métropoles. Les autres établissements n'ont pas besoin d'être situés au cœur d'un quartier d'affaires, mais ils doivent être assez proches d'un grand aéroport - d'une métropole donc - pour être accessibles depuis le siège social.

On peut, pour résumer, dire que jusqu'ici, il était impossible pour les firmes de disperser leurs établissements de fabrication au delà d'un rayon de quelques centaines de kilomètres autour de leur direction. Aujourd'hui, le monde entier

s'ouvre à elles, ou plus exactement, les zones rapidement accessibles à partir des grands centres bien desservis par les liaisons aériennes.

## 2. La nouvelle organisation des espaces nationaux

Comment ces transformations se répercutent-elles sur la géographie des nations? A l'intérieur des vieilles nations industrialisées, l'opposition de régions centrales à économies diversifiées et complexes et de régions périphériques à économies spécialisées et peu diversifiées s'atténue (Fig. 6). Les espaces économiques nationaux étaient hier structurés autour d'un gros moteur central; elles sont aujourd'hui animées par une pluralité de moteurs - chacune des grandes métropoles - et ces métropoles ne sont pas toujours concentrées dans la même région. C'est ce que l'on observe aux États-Unis, par exemple: on y décrit la migration des activités du Snowbelt vers le Sunbelt; une observation plus fine montre que ce qui se produit est en réalité plus complexe: le Snowbelt recule surtout par suite de la crise qui frappe ses industries anciennes: les villes moyennes et les régions d'urbanisation diffuse sont les plus touchées. Les métropoles perdent aussi des emplois et des habitants, mais elles réussissent en même temps à attirer des activités nouvelles et continuent à participer pleinement à la nouvelle économie américaine. Dans le Sunbelt, l'essentiel des créations d'emploi se fait au bénéfice des nouvelles métropoles et des régions voisines - c'est vrai de Seattle à Miami en passant par les métropoles californiennes, Denver, Dallas, Houston ou Atlanta.

La géographie des pays qui sont en train de s'industrialiser et de s'urbaniser n'est pas très différente: la croissance y bénéficie surtout à un petit nombre de pôles urbains et aux zones qui les entourent, cependant que le reste se vide, ou demeure en partie à l'écart des formes les plus nouvelles de l'activité: là aussi, l'image est plutôt, pour les grands pays, celle d'une pluralité de moteurs dispersés que celle d'un gros moteur central.




Fig. 6. La nouvelle organisation de l'espace: métropoles et aires suburbaines voisines - vieilles industries en déclin

L'opposition qui existait entre les États industrialisés et les autres s'estompe: tous ont des économies où la part des activités secondaires est importante - quoique l'emploi dans ce secteur n'atteigne pas le niveau qui caractérisait les pays développés aux alentours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les activités de service jouent également un grand rôle. Tous les États disposent donc d'une base dont l'économie est totalement monétarisée, ce qui leur permet de trouver plus facilement des ressources fiscales.

#### C. Les conséquences: le rôle décroissant des États

Le pouvoir que l'État peut exercer sur la vie économique est beaucoup plus faible qu'il y a une génération dans les pays qui étaient alors industrialisés. Les marchés étaient souvent internationaux, mais les firmes ne savaient développer leurs activités productives qu'au sein d'un même espace national. Le marché qu'elles y trouvaient jouait souvent un rôle essentiel dans leurs stratégies: relativement protégé, il leur permettait

d'échapper aux à-coups de la conjoncture et d'offrir des possibilités d'emploi relativement stables. Les salariés étaient donc les premiers bénéficiaires de cette situation: ils n'étaient pas encore en concurrence avec les masses des pays non-industrialisées. Les gouvernements nationaux pouvaient aider les syndicats à arracher des concessions importantes aux employeurs: ceux-ci n'avaient pas la possibilité de se réinstaller aisément ailleurs. Comme leurs concurrents éventuels se trouvaient dans des pays dont les situations sociales étaient équivalentes et où syndicats et gouvernements exerçaient des pressions analogues, le risque de voir leur compétitivité ruinée par des salaires trop élevés était réduit.

Les gouvernements pouvaient donc mener des politiques économiques globales dont les retombées sociales étaient importantes: en favorisant la hausse des salaires, ils créaient une demande qui stimulait la croissance nationale, permettait, grâce à l'exploitation plus systématique des économies d'échelle, de maintenir la compétitivité, et instaurait une situation de croissance entretenue dans laquelle les menaces de sous-emploi paraissaient définitivement éliminées.

Dans la conjoncture actuelle, la marge de manoeuvre des gouvernements est singulièrement réduite: les firmes sont désormais capables d'implanter leurs fabrications dans l'ensemble du monde. Il y a trente ans, la sphère dans laquelle se situait l'essentiel des activités productives des firmes était généralement plus petite que les nations. Elle est aujourd'hui beaucoup plus grande. Les gouvernements perdent donc l'essentiel du pouvoir de coercition dont ils disposaient. S'ils essaient d'imposer des mesures trop contraignantes, ils n'aboutissent qu'à un résultat: faire fuir les activités sur lesquelles reposent l'emploi national et les revenus de l'État.

La situation des firmes s'est considérablement améliorée: au lieu de dépendre d'un gouvernement capable de leur imposer des règles rigides, elles sont en position de mettre en concurrence les divers gouvernements: "Voulez-vous que je m'installe sur votre territoire? Qui, mais offrez-moi mieux que ce que me

proposent vos voisins - ou tel ou tel pays du Tiers Monde"!

Dans une conjoncture de crise, cette mise en concurrence mine la cohésion nationale: chaque instance politique participe à la compétition. Les villes et les régions sont des acteurs dynamiques, mais souffrent des limitations que la nation a tendance à leur imposer. Le gouvernement central se doit de veiller à l'équilibre des régions et au redéploiement industriel des zones les plus touchées par le déclin des vieilles industries. Les collectivités les plus dynamiques ne le voient pas du même oeil: si elles ont des atouts, elles entendent qu'on ne leur interdise pas de les utiliser. Les autonomismes et les régionalismes s'alimentent donc à cette situation. Au moment où la sphère où les firmes sont capables d'organiser leurs activités s'élargit, il conviendrait que les acteurs politiques se concertent pour échapper aux possibilités de chantage que cela donne aux hommes d'affaires. Jusqu'à présent, les réactions se font en ordre dispersé.

#### Conclusion

L'évolution que nous venons de retracer est bien connue, mais on ne met pas suffisamment l'accent sur les facteurs qui expliquent les mutations contemporaines. A trop parler de capitalisme global et de multinationales, on oublie de s'interroger sur les facteurs qui ont permis en une génération aux firmes d'élargir aussi prodigieusement leur champ d'action. Que l'apparition, dans les années 1960, d'un marché financier échappant aux régulations nationales - celui des euro-dollars - ait joué un rôle, c'est évident; que les actions de dérégulation qui se sont succédé depuis dans le domaine du transport aient facilité l'évolution, c'est également vrai. Mais le moteur des transformations est plus profond: il est lié aux mutations techniques et aux nouvelles conditions de diffusion des connaissances et des techniques. C'est à ce niveau que doit se situer la réflexion si l'on veut comprendre les problèmes économiques du monde contemporain, et la nouvelle consistance des nations dans le domaine de la pro-



duction et des échanges.

On raisonne trop comme si il devait y avoir coïncidence nécessaire des espaces économiques et de espaces politiques: les aires de marché sont demeurées plus petites ou plus grandes que les nations jusque fort avant dans la révolution industrielle. Les aires de service et les sphères productives se sont ensuite inscrites pendant à peu près trois quarts de siècle dans les territoires nationaux - non sans difficulté d'ailleurs, puisque beaucoup ne permettaient pas de tirer pleinement parti des économies d'échelle. Nous entrons dans une phase où les formations nationales sont plus petites que bon nombre des cercles où s'inscrit la vie économique. Il faut le reconnaître si l'on veut comprendre le monde contemporain, et éclairer les rapports nouveaux qui se tissent entre l'économique et le politique. La floraison actuelle des discours sur le libéralisme et sur la dérégulation traduit une prise de conscience certaine, mais qui reste idéologique. On manque encore d'une analyse scientifique des situations qui émergent.



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LA GÉOGRAPHIE POLITIQUE  
ET LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DE CARACTÈRE GLOBAL

1. Introduction

La renaissance de la géographie politique est aujourd'hui incontestable. Les problèmes sociaux et économiques de caractère plus ou moins politique ont une importance de plus en plus grande dans leur approche spatiale. De nombreux événements et processus que l'on voulait jusqu'à présent examiner uniquement dans le cadre de la géographie économique n'ont pas trouvé et ne trouvent pas d'explication suffisante. Avec l'introduction dans la recherche géographique du problème de la subjectivité de l'homme et des sociétés, les questions suscitées par la géographie politique deviennent de plus en plus importantes. Il semble que le développement économique actuel soumis à l'impact de la globalisation, y compris la révolution scientifique et technique, crée également des situations spatiales de caractère politique. La géographie doit à mon avis s'intéresser à ces phénomènes. Les situations ont un caractère global, continental, régional, national, local enfin. Cette hiérarchie suscite la question des échelles dans lesquelles les considérations peuvent et doivent être menées. En même temps nous avons affaire à un embrayage intéressant des problèmes économiques, sociaux et politiques ainsi qu'à leurs interdépendances réciproques.

Dans cette intervention, je me permets de toucher quelques thèmes seulement qui, à mon avis, peuvent faciliter d'établir certaines directions de recherches en contact avec la géographie politique et d'autres domaines de la géographie.

## 2. Les problèmes du milieu

Hors de la discussion semblent se trouver les problèmes qui sont liées aux questions de la protection du milieu. Sa dégradation, la pollution de l'air et des eaux dépassent les frontières politiques. Les différents phénomènes de cette dégradation revêtent aujourd'hui un caractère global. On peut observer la multiplication des territoires qui sont plus ou moins touchés par une véritable catastrophe écologique. Les actions qu'on tente dans ce domaine, les recherches multiples, les organismes qu'on crée, tout cela acquiert une échelle supranationale et même globale. Dans ce domaine, la collaboration internationale devient également la plus visible et peut-être la moins controversable, quoique les résultats réels des actions menées sont bien différenciés. Ici la pression sociale venant de la conscience de différents groupes ou des sociétés, combinée avec l'intérêt économique concret, ont la possibilité de s'articuler. Les résultats souvent spectaculaires sont quand même limités du point de vue spatial. D'autre part, et cela constitue peut-être un paradoxe, les émetteurs de la pollution sont en général bien localisés dans des lieux restreints, locaux ou régionaux et dans le cadre du pays donné, mais les conséquences de la pollution peuvent avoir et ont très souvent une dimension internationale à cause d'une cumulation des effets négatifs de l'activité des particuliers. Les régulations qu'on tente d'entreprendre et qu'on entreprend deviennent de plus en plus obligatoires, se transforment en différentes conventions internationales, qui commencent à constituer un véritable réseau dans lequel les Etats particuliers sont obligés de se soumettre à des impératifs plus généraux. Il me semble que le problème du milieu devient aujourd'hui un des thèmes les plus importants de la géographie politique avec des implications différentes. La "Carte

politique du monde" ne peut pas omettre les différentes questions liées à ce problème.

### 3. L'économie globale et ses conséquences pour l'organisation de l'espace

La formation contemporaine de l'économie globale et ses conséquences pour l'organisation de l'espace socio-économique constitue le problème suivant en ce qui concerne la recherche dans le domaine de la géographie politique. On sait bien que l'économie globale n'est pas une simple somme des données économiques des différents pays. C'est une économie créée par des flux différents des biens et des services à l'échelle globale, dans la situation nouvelle du système du partage international du travail bien approfondi, de l'internationalisation spécifique de la partie de la main-d'oeuvre "nationale", de la présence des firmes multinationales et de leur fonctionnement. Dans cette activité participe une partie, d'ailleurs d'une grandeur différente, des économies des différents pays. Ces activités forment dans le cadre de ces pays un "secteur" qui pourrait être nommé "secteur supranational". En même temps, dans les différents pays existe l'autre partie des activités économiques qui pour des causes différentes, ne peuvent pas se joindre ou ne se joignent que partiellement à ce secteur supranational. Ces activités qu'on pourrait appeler "secteur national", sont formées aujourd'hui, ceteris paribus, par des entreprises et des domaines d'activités qui fonctionnent plutôt dans le cadre des mécanismes de la première révolution industrielle. Sur la carte économique mais aussi sur la carte politique de beaucoup des pays développés, nous avons affaire avec des régions en dépression qui, il n'y a pas longtemps, constituaient les principaux centres de l'activité économique.

Le développement de l'économie globale est occasionné surtout par le fait de la nouvelle révolution scientifique et technique, dans les domaines de l'informatique, de la biotechnologie, des nouveaux matériaux etc. Ce type de développement excite d'une façon à peu près absolue la soumission des diffé-

rents pays à ces régularités plus générales de l'évolution économique et politique. L'étape actuelle de la civilisation technique subordonne le développement des différents pays à des tendances plus générales. A ces régularités doivent se soumettre aussi les pays à l'économie centralement dirigée. Dans ce cas là, les prémisses idéologiques permettaient de développer un certain progrès économique quantitatif de caractère extensif. Mais à un moment donné, la rencontre avec la nouvelle étape du développement et avec les exigences de l'économie globale a acquis un caractère de choc. Le fossé du développement qui se creuse entre le système du marché et le système dit "planifié" occasionne dans le cadre de ce dernier la nécessité des réformes sociales et économiques parallèles en vue d'adaptation aux processus globaux.

Ces processus économiques de caractère global excitent donc les changements sociaux et politiques sur une bonne partie de l'espace mondial. Cela va occasionner dans l'avenir proche des transformations profondes dans l'organisation de l'espace de ces pays ainsi que dans la "carte politique du monde".

#### 4. Les problèmes de la dépendance

Les remarques précédentes nous amènent à attirer l'attention sur les problèmes de la dépendance - au sens large - et du développement au caractère dépendant ou interdépendant. Je ne veux pas me pencher ici sur la discussion terminologique et les différences qui existent p.ex. entre "l'école de dependencia" latino-américaine et l'approche à la notion du développement dépendant représentée aux Etats Unis. Je me propose seulement de souligner l'importance de plus en plus croissante de ce type de développement dans le monde contemporain. "Dis moi de quelle façon tu deviens dépendant et je te dirai qui tu seras". Cette parabole démontre bien la situation actuelle dans laquelle la dépendance réciproque, l'interdépendance, et enfin la dépendance proprement dite deviennent des catégories concrètes en ce qui concerne la recherche dans le domaine de la géographie socio-économique et politique.

L'un des problèmes également politiques c'est p.ex. la diffusion des innovations (y compris le problème du cycle du produit qui constitue un des domaines importants de la recherche géographique), la localisation des principaux centres de la création des innovations, la dépendance technologique et beaucoup d'autres. Le fonctionnement de la production industrielle à l'échelle internationale devient aujourd'hui un problème semblable car l'interdépendance fonctionnelle du processus de production est de plus en plus disloqué dans l'espace. On pourrait dire que cela constitue le problème de la géographie économique mais c'est aussi un problème politique, car le fonctionnement des systèmes économiques qui deviennent de plus en plus complexes et qui se trouvent repartis à travers plusieurs Etats, demande des liens et des concordance politiques.

Les problèmes suscités indiquent de façon très partielle seulement certains des domaines de la recherche possible dans le cadre de la géographie politique. Il me semble toutefois que la question de la dépendance est bien insuffisamment étudiée. Un seul élément de ce problème était et est aujourd'hui l'objet d'une attention plus large. Il s'agit des liens entre les pays développés et sous-développés, donc de la dépendance à sens unique. La littérature géographique sur ce thème est abondante. Par contre, nous avons bien moins d'études géographiques concernant les problèmes d'interdépendance entre les pays développés ainsi que son impact sur les différentes économies. Si dans nos études nous nous penchons sur le thème "Espace-Monde", nous ne pouvons pas omettre entre autres les questions liées à "l'Economie-Monde".

##### 5. La souveraineté des Etats

Le dernier problème que j'aimerais signaler ici et qui, à mon avis, devrait devenir le thème de recherches intensives, c'est la question de la souveraineté actuelle des Etats. Dans les recherches concernant la géographie politique, nous utilisons toujours la notion "Etat-nation". Surtout dans l'enseignement géographique ce schéma est bien enraciné. Cependant ces Etats-nations deviennent de plus en plus interdépendants et

cette interdépendance se développe d'une façon de plus en plus accélérée et intensive. Les exemples nous sont fournis par la Communauté Economique Européenne, y compris toutes ses institutions, qui regroupe aujourd'hui 12 Etats, par le groupe des pays les plus développés - OECDE, par le pays de l'ASEAN. Les liaisons économiques compliquées qui se créent, concernent les activités multinationales, les flux des capitaux, de la main-d'oeuvre. Les accords militaires ont aussi de l'importance. Dans ces conditions, la conservation de la souveraineté nationale traditionnelle, y compris la disposition unique de l'espace propre des Etats particuliers, devient impossible. L'exemple de la CEE est ici bien caractéristique.

Il me semble qu'on doit traiter à part la dépendance spécifique qui s'est formée dans le groupe des pays appartenant au CAEM. Les prémisses idéologiques et militaires imposées, qui étaient à la base de la formation de ce groupe, ont introduit en même temps un modèle quasi autarchique du développement économique en ce qui concerne les pays particuliers ainsi que tout le groupe. Dans les prémisses, il s'agissait d'éviter les dépendances quelconques vis à vis du monde capitaliste ainsi que de créer un nouveau modèle du développement. Les processus actuels des transformations, la pierestroïka, signifient l'insuccès de cet essai et, en même temps, la nécessité de se ranger du point de vue non seulement économique mais aussi social dans le courant plus général du développement global. Dans cette partie de l'Europe - l'Europe Centrale et l'URSS - on reste encore dans la conception de l'Etat du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, qui absolutise la notion de la souveraineté. Cependant dans les pays les plus développés à l'économie du marché, cette conception, comme formation historique, n'existe déjà plus ou est soumise à une érosion intense.

La quantité de plus en plus grande des décisions concernant les différents pays se concentre dans les sièges sociaux des firmes multinationales, dans les états-majors des armées (dans ce point, la même chose existe dans le CAEM), dans les états-majors des organisations économiques - comme la CEE. On ne doit pas oublier non plus p.ex. les fonctions des conven-



tions internationales qui limitent même la souveraineté des législations nationales.

Nous avons donc affaire à une conception de l'Etat tout à fait nouvelle. C'est pour cela qu'on peut se poser la question si dans le monde à venir, le monde intégré, l'Etat ne va pas ressembler dans ses structures à un Etat du Moyen-Age? Je ne sais pas. Tout de même si l'évolution va dans ce sens ou dans un sens semblable, dans le cadre de l'espace des différents pays, un rôle tout à fait nouveau va être acquis par les sociétés locales ou régionales, les groupes d'intérêts sociaux différents etc. On aura donc la croissance de l'activité sociale des groupes de catégorie et de caractère différents. La géographie politique ne pourra pas négliger ce fait. Mais c'est l'avenir.

## 6. Conclusions

La recherche dans le domaine de la géographie politique ne peut donc pas se limiter seulement aux études de l'Espace-Monde ou de l'Economie-Monde, quoique ces problèmes ont une importance fondamentale. Sous l'impact des processus globaux s'accomplissent des transformations profondes dans l'organisation de l'espace, jusqu'aux niveaux locaux, y compris toutes les nuances et les situations de transition.

Il me semble que l'étude des différents aspects de l'économie globale et de son développement actuel peut apporter aux recherches dans le domaine de la géographie politique non seulement des éléments nouveaux de réflexion, mais aussi une explication meilleure et approfondie des processus qui influent sur les transformations contemporaines dans l'organisation de l'espace.



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## UNE GÉOPOLITIQUE DES RÉGIONS FRONTALIÈRES

### 1. Echelles territoriales, nationales et internationales

Thème actuel, la géopolitique des régions frontalières suscite ces dernières années, malgré une littérature abondante, de multiples questions. Comment intégrer les logiques d'un fonctionnement régional transfrontalier aux logiques institutionnelles des états nationaux? Comment tenir compte des attachements territoriaux, des bassins d'emplois transfrontaliers et des objectifs de firmes multinationales cherchant à bénéficier des avantages comparatifs de la division spatiale du travail?

Autant d'interrogations délicates à aborder à une époque où surgit un double mouvement contradictoire: celui de la réémergence des régions et celui de l'internationalisation des marchés économiques. Aux stratégies endogènes des régions s'opposent celles centralisatrices des états; aux solidarités de connexité locales s'opposent les décisions internationales des grandes firmes attachées à la notion de profit.

Nous nous trouvons confrontés à la fois à un problème d'échelles géographiques différentes et à une diversité d'objectifs, de ceux du développement local à ceux du contrôle centralisé des activités et des ressources. Faut-il alors privilégier l'une des échelles géographiques? C'est ce que proposent les théoriciens du développement endogène, ou à l'opposé les tenants de la centralisation politique, administrative et économique. Faut-il aussi transférer une partie des pouvoirs de la nation aux régions ou au contraire aux institutions supra-nationales, et dans ce cas quels pouvoirs? Si la division spatiale du travail est utile à la rentabilité de la firme, l'est-elle pour les régions et les soli-

darités territoriales? Bien des doutes existent à l'issue des expériences récentes en particulier pour les régions périphériques. Deserrer l'emprise de l'état central sur l'état local correspond à changer de logique administrative tout comme donner des compétences aux institutions transnationales, en dépouillant l'état national de certaines prérogatives. Dans tous ces cas, trois niveaux géographiques sont en cause: le local, le national et le transnational.

Au moment où se multiplient les institutions internationales, ou se développent les régionalisations, l'état national issu des découpages du XIXème siècle est mis en cause. Et les problèmes se posent de manière cruciale dans les régions frontalières là où des pratiques locales quotidiennes se heurtent aux murs institutionnels des frontières et là où les firmes multinationales profitent des avantages comparatifs des marchés de l'emploi. A force d'avoir oeuvré à l'échelle nationale, les géographes ont omis ces autres échelles d'intervention. La géographie de l'espace vécu et la géographie politique ont remis ces questions sur la sellette. L'exemple de la Regio Genevensis en constitue un exemple frappant.

## 2. Une géo-politique de la Regio-genevensis

Dans une région frontalière enserrée entre France et Suisse, la République et Canton de Genève vit depuis plusieurs siècles ces contradictions entre les logiques de l'état local, des états nationaux voisins et des firmes multinationales. A la différence des régions françaises créées récemment pour favoriser la reproduction sociale de l'état national, le Canton de Genève a su progressivement s'intégrer dans l'espace helvétique tout en maintenant de subtils liens avec la France voisine. Les interrelations territoriales horizontales des habitants se sont imbriquées dans les réseaux des relations des états nationaux et des firmes multinationales. En résulte un jeu institutionnel qu'il nous faut maintenant brièvement analyser à l'aube du troisième millénaire où vont se poser les questions d'intégration des cantons, de la Confédération Helvétique dans la vaste Communauté Economique Européenne. Faut-il jouer le jeu du hérisson, fermé sur lui-même, ou

de la pieuvre tentaculaire? Faut-il suivre le lièvre européen ou la tortue helvétique? Autant de questions qui se posent d'autant plus qu'il est courant de parler dans la presse de "dérive genevoise" par rapport à la Suisse. L'image mentale des genevois (Fig. 1) en constitue l'illustration.

Nous partons donc des pratiques des Genevois pour comprendre ensuite comment se tissent des solidarités de connexité, malgré les blocages des institutions nationales et la compétition des firmes multinationales. La région franco-genevoise constitue un exemple dans ce domaine: non seulement elle a été pionnière en Europe pour établir une Commission Consultative transfrontalière bipartite acceptée par les gouvernements (1973), mais de plus, elle est la première à "passer outre à l'un des tabous de la souveraineté nationale absolue. C'est en effet à l'initiative du Gouvernement de la République et Canton de Genève qu'une part importante des impôts payés à Genève par les travailleurs frontaliers se trouve reversée aux communes françaises de résidence par l'Etat de Genève" (De Rougemont). En renonçant à conserver une partie de l'impôt régulier, l'Etat de Genève ouvre une porte majeure à la coopération transfrontalière; la réalité physique favorisait ce mouvement que la tradition étatique freinait.

Bien souvent la Regio Genevensis sert d'exemple dans les relations transfrontalières; position enviable, mais aussi difficile, car l'engagement international d'un canton non souverain face à un Etat centralisé résulte de compromis bien fragiles et délicats à élaborer. En effet les mesures internationales franco-genevoises dépendent de relations triangulaires entre trois acteurs (Fig. 2): un canton non souverain, la République et Canton de Genève, le gouvernement fédéral suisse et l'Etat français. Depuis peu un quatrième partenaire, non souverain, la région Rhône-Alpes, apparaît dans ce jeu transnational. Guidé par des intérêts spécifiques chaque acteur propose des séries d'actions pour faciliter (ou entraver) le fonctionnement régional. Ces intérêts sont souvent de nature pragmatique, liés aux pratiques de populations qui vivent dans cette région frontalière.




Fig. 1. Carte mentale des étudiants genevois (Enquête A. Bailly 1982)




Fig. 2. le rôle des acteurs politiques de la région franco-genevoise

Migrations transfrontalières, flux économiques transfrontaliers, tous ces éléments contribuent à la mise en place de structures destinées à réduire les contraintes des Etats nationaux. Depuis l'accord franco-suisse (29 janvier 1973) de péréquation fiscale transfrontalière, petit à petit, des institutions ont été créées. L'espace économique ne coïncidant plus avec l'espace national, il est devenu impératif, malgré les réticences des institutions centralisées françaises, de limiter les perturbations dans le flux de personnes, de biens et de services liées à l'effet frontière. La notion de Regio Genevensis repose à la fois sur un mode de fonctionnement et une image ancrée dans l'esprit de la population. Reste donc à en tirer des leçons sur le plan légal, ce qui est toujours long. Rappelons donc les grandes étapes de la mise en place des institutions transfrontalières:

- 1881 Décision de raccordement du chemin de fer de Haute-Savoie à Genève-Eaux-Vives
- 1935 Convention sur le régime fiscal des frontaliers.
- 1946 Convention sur la circulation frontalière.
- 1956 Accord pour la création de l'aéroport international de Genève-Cointrin.
- 1973 Accord de compensation fiscale transfrontalier et approbation de la constitution d'une Commission consultative mixte transfrontalière traitant des questions franco-genevoises.
- 1974 Création du Comité Régional Franco-Genevois.
- 1982 Création de la Communauté de Travail des Alpes Occidentales (Genève - Vaud - Valais - Rhône-Alpes, Provence - Côte d'Azur - Piémont - Lombardie).
- 1986 Création du Conseil du Léman (Geneve - Vaud - Valais - Rhone-Alpes).

Devant l'ampleur des problèmes à résoudre, nombre d'institutions voient donc le jour. Mais les obstacles restent nombreux: centralisation des décisions à Paris et à Berne, règlements du Marché Commun et de l'Association Européenne de libre échange dont la Suisse fait partie.

### 3. Les difficultés

Le Regio Genevensis existe; une ville d'importance internationale, véritable pôle de croissance économique, dynamise sa région proche et lointaine; et en utilisant les avantages comparatifs de deux pays différents, les entreprises de services, industrielles et agricoles bénéficient des attraits complémentaires de cette région transfrontalière.

Mais dans cet espace vécu se superposent deux espaces nationaux, qui tendent à freiner les mouvements économiques et des individus. Malgré des progrès, surtout depuis 1973, la dynamique institutionnelle reste en retard sur les faits et parfois on assiste à un véritable enlisement administratif défavorable au développement de l'entité régionale. Les interventions administratives, à des échelles géographiques différentes, celles de la nation et de la région, répondent à des logiques différentes; et souvent les régions en subissent les conséquences puisque les décisions n'ont pas été imaginées pour ces cas marginaux. L'intérêt national ne correspond pas toujours à celui des régions.

De nouveaux modes d'intervention territoriaux se mettent pourtant en place dans les régions transfrontalières; progressivement les gouvernements locaux développent des politiques transnationales pour régler les problèmes concrets liés aux pratiques quotidiennes. On peut parler de véritable politique étrangère cantonale et régionale, alors que les compétences légales n'existent pas.

L'évolution de la Regio Genevensis suppose qu'aux problèmes communs qui se posent soient trouvées des solutions communes, dans le respect des caractères de chaque entité. C'est par la mise en valeur des avantages complémentaires, centralité de Genève, disponibilité foncière de la France, que peut se produire un rééquilibrage économique au profit de l'ensemble de la région.

Ce mouvement ne sera possible que si les collectivités locales bénéficient de pouvoirs décisionnels plus larges et de responsabilités plus financières pour pouvoir gérer la région transfrontalière; car comment une région déchirée administrativement



peut-elle, sans ces moyens, lutter face à des entreprises et des problèmes qui se posent de plus en plus à l'échelle internationale?

D'un autre côté, à trop développer les pouvoirs locaux, va-t-on retomber dans un régime des seigneureries locales? Le risque existe. Mais nul ne peut nier l'existence de bassins d'emplois frontaliers et de leurs besoins spécifiques. Seule une véritable géo-politique régionale permet d'analyser toutes les implications des glissements de pouvoirs et une meilleure régulation du fonctionnement institutionnel au profit de l'homme, trop souvent oublié dans le dédale des règlements administratifs.

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THE POLITICAL OPENNESS OF THE STATES  
(SAMPLE RESEARCH)

The aim of the present article is to analyse the degree of openness of the states on the basis of calculated index values as well as to examine whether there is some regional or typological differentiation of states according to the degree of their openness, within continents.

Contemporary political geography - just as other domains of geography - ever more frequently applies a systemic approach, referring directly to cybernetics and systemic analysis, as well as to the concept of a political region long since created on the ground of geography. The new tendencies initially became apparent in the manifestly functional approach of political geography (Hartshorne 1950), and since the turn of the 1960s, following the political science works of C. Deutsch (1953, 1961), they have assumed the form of studies based on the treatment of state and political region (different hierarchical levels) in a systemic approach (Claval 1984, Muir 1975, Taylor 1985).

In the 1970s Cohen proposed a geopolitical concept based on the analysis of the evolution of the world system. Just like living bodies, the world system also evolves from a simple to more complex forms. The world system should be understood as a set of single elements such as particular states, interrelated by multifarious interdependencies. The theory of hierarchical integration assumes political transformations among the states as a result of which particular states enter a complex system of states. The position of a state in a hierarchy is estimated on the

basis of the measures of its internal and external situation which are inseparably connected with one another. One of the measures of the external group is the openness of a state which affects the position it occupies in the hierarchy of states. The present article is devoted precisely to this problem.

The precise definition of what constitutes the "openness of the state" is not easy, hence there are few concrete formulations of this definition. The type and density of the interrelations network are most often mentioned - and these interrelations should be understood as virtually all the mutual influences of the states and other participants of international life. The openness of a political system is defined along this line by Cohen and Rosenthal (1971, 30):

"Open political system has a maximum degree of external connectivity to other parallel systems in the hierarchy. Connectivity is measured through the politically regulated movement of men, goods, and ideas and is reflected in specialized, intensive, and cosmopolitan use of geographical spaces. Closed political system seeks to cut itself off from other, parallel systems. Its political and economic isolation is reflected in generalized extensive use of geographical space."

The Polish publications concerned with those problems (Kukułka 1984, Ryszka 1978, Rychłowski 1967) draw attention to the dependence between the international relations of a state and its internal structure. An open political region - in this case a state - performs a dual function: external and internal. In the first can be ranked the activity of a state for the sake of the external world, in the second the activity aimed at the satisfaction of its own needs through contact with other countries. This dependence is not, however, the essence of openness but can be either its cause or effect and only as such can it be taken into account in the analyses of openness.

The scheme of the openness of states is presented in graph. 1. However, it is generally accepted that external functions are of decisive importance to an open state.

The political openness of the states




Fig. 1. Scheme of the political openness of the states

The degree of openness is a product of the relations between states which should be viewed in three aspects: political, economic and social.

Although no social, economic or political system has reached complete openness or complete closure, political systems (states) can be classified according to the degree of openness. The study here presented applied 6 statistical measures of the degree of openness for 1984:

1. membership of international organizations,
2. number of ratified international conventions,
3. number of diplomatic agencies,
4. number of diplomatic visits,
5. share of foreign trade in national income,
6. number of foreign tourists in relation to the number of inhabitants.

The analysis of the above measures was carried out for 168 political units in 1984. It was also acknowledged that the application of a greater number of measures produces little new information and does not change the distribution of states according to the degree of the openness synthetic index value.

In order to establish the degree of the political, economic and social openness of states a synthetic index worked out on the general statistical principles applied for such type of indices was used, whereas to justify the hypothesis of the synthetic index (SI) the method of finding spatial autocorrelation was employed. The maximum and minimum values of particular measures of the states openness, derived from calculations, are presented in table 1.

On the basis of the values of the synthetic index obtained, in order to isolate the group of states with similar "SI" a histogram was drawn up. The distribution of SI in the histogram permitted the isolation of four divisions: 1)  $SI \geq 0.5$   
2)  $0.5 > SI \geq 0$  3)  $0 > SI \geq -0.5$  4)  $-0.5 > SI$ , embracing states with a similar degree of openness.

Table 1. Extremal values of individual factors of the openness of the states (1984)

Measures of openness	max.	min.
1. Membership of international organizations	1212 France	19 Nauru
2. Number of ratified international conventions	239 France	0
3. Number of diplomatic agencies	142 USA	0
4. Number of diplomatic visits	27 China	0
5. Share of foreign trade in the formation of national income	90% Ivory Coast	0 Vatican
6. Number of foreign tourists in relation to the number of inhabitants	10.2 Bahama Islands	0.01

In the first division  $SI \geq 0.5$  were found 27 states, out of which 1 was in Africa, 4 in America, 2 in Asia and 20 in Europe. The second division ( $0.5 > SI \geq 0$ ) embraces 51 states with the following continental distribution: 15 in Africa, 13 in America, 13 in Asia, 10 in Europe. The third division ( $0 > SI \geq -0.5$ ) embraces 62 states: 25 in Africa, 14 in America, 20 in Asia, 2 in Europe. In the fourth division ( $-0.5 > SI$ ) with the lowest values of synthetic index were found 28 states: 9 in Africa, 3 in America, 13 in Asia, 3 in Europe. The precise distribution of states in particular class divisions of index value (SI) is shown in map 1. The analysis of the group of states with an index of openness higher than 0.5 - that is, the most open states - indicates a preponderance of European states (table 2). This makes possible the statement that in respect of the openness of states we are absolutely justified to speak of Europocentrism. In the group of states with the greatest openness are also found all the European socialist states except for Czechoslovakia. However, none of them

is found among the 10 most open states of the world. In the group of the least open states are found above all, the poor countries, with a very low national income, as well as states that have recently come into being. Among them there are also states with a deliberately isolationist policy (Albania, e.g.). Africa is a continent with the highest number of the least open states.

Table 2. States with the highest synthetic index of openness in the world

States	SI	States	SI
1. France	1.88	6. Italy	1.30
2. Great Britain	1.59	7. China	1.28
3. Belgium	1.55	8. Holland	1.19
4. USA	1.48	9. Switzerland	1.01
5. FRG	1.33	10. Denmark	0.92

The diffusion of characteristics, symbols, patterns of political behaviour in the international area is one of the many environmental features resulting from the openness of states. However the very openness itself, as a characteristic of a state's policy, may be an object of diffusion. One of the issues closely connected with the phenomenon of spatial diffusion is the so called neighbourhood effect. Its interpretation may run like this: the probability of becoming an adopter of innovation is greater in the case of remaining in direct vicinity of the hitherto carrier of innovation, than in the case of potential users who are farther away. In this connection the question arises whether within the framework of continents there is a regional differentiation of states according to the degree of their openness, or is this a typological differentiation?

The above presented problem of the classification of states according to the synthetic index of openness (SI) may suggest a dichotomical division of the world into open and closed states. This division does not take into account the geographical aspects of the problem - i.e., the situation of the states with regard to



one another - neighbourhood in space and their mutual spatial relations. Therefore it was decided to examine whether within the framework of particular continents openness is a phenomenon exhibiting spatial autocorrelation.

In spatial analyses autocorrelation is understood as the influence of a definite phenomenon occurring in one spatial unit on the augmentation or reduction of the probability of the emergence of the same phenomenon in neighbouring units. According to autocorrelation a thus understood degree of openness of a given state influences through spatial neighbourhood the augmentation or reduction of the degree of openness in another state. The final effect of this autocorrelation in respect of openness would thus be a uniformization of the level of openness of states on particular continents. The analysis of synthetic indices (SI) shows that in 1984 such a situation did not fully take place. On the basis of equations serving to establish the presence of spatial autocorrelation, the "Z" distribution of statistics was established with the assumption of normalcy and randomization of particular continents of the world. The results are given in table 3.

Table 3. Spatial autocorrelation of the degree of openness of states according to continents

Continent	Number of states	Moran's "I" statistics	Ej	"Z" normality test	"Z" randomization test
Africa	51	0.48	0.02	5.51	0.47
South America	12	-0.20	-0.09	-0.64	-0.67
North America	15	0.23	-0.07	1.50	1.73
Asia and Oceania	51	0.02	-0.02	0.46	0.05
Europe	35	0.16	0.03	1.68	0.60

The  $E_j$  values (common border sections of neighbouring states with identical SI value) only insignificantly diverge from zero. So that no conclusions can be drawn about the concentration or dispersal of units on particular continents. In the case of non-arbitrary restricted distribution (we took into consideration

all the states of the world with a continuity of territory) with the use of unilateral levels of confidence the "Z" distributions are significant only for (essential) North and Central America. A significant value was also obtained for Africa, only with the assumption of normality. The results obtained for other continents do not allow the drawing up of a conclusion about the presence of a spatial autocorrelation on their territories. The values presented in Table 3 make us discard the zero hypothesis for each of the continents under analysis. The presence of a state with a high degree of openness on a given continent does not cause an augmentation of the degree of openness in neighbouring states. The openness of states in the contemporary world is not subject to diffusion. The diffusion of this phenomenon is connected with the economic, social and political situation of states on a given continent. Independent states increase the degree of their openness, however not by taking over or imitating the actions of neighbouring states. Beyond any doubt, the reason underlying this picture as well as the rejection of the zero hypothesis, was the too extensive territory embraced by our studies. The ideological, economic, and physico-geographical differentiation of states on particular continents is too extensive for the process of expansion of political openness to embrace their entire areas.

And finally one more question, namely that of relations between the degree of openness of states and their position in world politics. The results of our study as well as the literature concerning the subject show that there is a close dependence between the degree of openness of a state and its position in international politics. The political position of a state in the world depends on such factors as population size, economic and military potential, geographical situation as well as its internal situation. The same factors bear on the degree of the openness of states. On the basis of the synthetic index (SI) values, characterizing the degree of the openness of states, it can be said that the following countries are among the 27 countries of the world with  $SI \geq 0.5$ .

- 1) all the countries of power status (USA, USSR, China, France, Great Britain) which due to this are permanent members of the UN Security Council,
- 2) seven of the most developed states of the capitalist world (France, Japan, Canada, FRG, USA, Great Britain, Italy),
- 3) ten out of the twelve member countries of ECM,
- 4) six out of the ten member countries of CMEA,
- 5) twelve out of the sixteen member states of NATO,
- 6) six out of the seven countries of WTO,
- 7) five out of six nuclear powers.

Thus the degree of openness of states can be regarded as adequate to the position occupied by them in the world.


Whereas countries that for many years adhered to the policy of autoisolation, as e.g., Burma and Albania, do not play any major role in international relations.

In analysing the group of 41 states with the synthetic index of openness value below  $-0.5$ , attention should be drawn to the fact that only 3 of them (Albania, Andorra and San Marino) lie in Europe and only one (Mongolia) is a member of CMEA, while the rest are former colonies. They are considered to be of minor importance in the sense of their political rank and possibilities of exerting an actual influence on international relations of global scope.

The above formulations concerning the assessment of the openness of states should however be accepted with caution, as these studies are the first attempt at this method, and the measures used in them concern only one moment of 1984, whereas international relations and the political activeness of states are continual actions, i.e. ones with both earlier conditionings and effects in the more distant future. Nevertheless, on the basis of those studies one can ascertain a bilateral logical interdependence between the degree of the political openness of states and their role in international politics.

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### TRAVAILLEURS ÉTRANGERS DANS LES PAYS SOCIALISTES

Ce communiqué concerne le phénomène des migrations saisonnières au travail à l'étranger, de courte et de longue durée, dont le commencement ou la fin se trouvent sur le territoire des pays socialistes, notamment sur celui des pays du CAEM. Il traite donc en principe de la collectivité définie par le terme de *gastarbeiters*. D. Bartels a introduit ce terme pratique en un seul mot dans la littérature géographique il y a déjà vingt ans. Si j'y insiste, c'est parce qu'outre le territoire de la langue allemande (et même pas en sa totalité), il a joui d'un succès très rapide en Pologne. Le mot de *gastarbeiter* est généralement compris dans notre pays. Dans les publications polonaises, ce terme s'écrit déjà le plus souvent sans guillemets. Comme toutefois il n'apparaît pas (encore) largement dans la littérature spécialisée, je continuerai à utiliser les termes de "travailleur étranger" ou de "travailleur de l'étranger".

Le phénomène des migrations au travail a en général une tendance croissante bien que son évaluation quantitative soit extrêmement difficile et cela pour plusieurs raisons. Je me limiterai à n'en citer que quelques unes: manque d'une statistique convenable, distinction formelle difficile entre les migrations au travail et les autres types de migrations (p.ex. des voyages touristiques ou l'émigration politique), incertitudes concernant la définition du migrant au travail ou du *gastarbeiter* en général



(p.ex. un "Gastprofessor" est-il aussi gastarbeiter?), divers moyens de considérer le facteur humain dans le cas de voyages organisés par des institutions officielles ou par leur intermédiaire (p.ex. dans le cas de voyages organisés, liés à l'exportation de biens matériels ou de services concrets, la mise en valeur de l'aspect matériel de cette exportation) etc. Une toute autre question, ce sont des raisons de nature doctrinale et idéologique.

Pratiquement tous les pays socialistes sont aujourd'hui donateurs ou preneurs de travailleurs étrangers (ou les uns et les autres). Les chiffres disponibles sont fragmentaires et incertains. Des données estimatives citées par N.I.Sidorov et A. Khorvat (1985) informent sur l'emploi d'env. 200 mille personnes provenant d'autres pays (il ne s'agit là que de l'emploi des ressortissants des pays du CAEM dans d'autres pays du CAEM). Ces données semblent être nettement trop basses, ce que l'on remarque déjà si l'on essaie de faire le total des chiffres pour les différents pays ou bien dans les données provenant d'autres sources. L'on estime par exemple que seul le nombre des Vietnamiens travaillant dans les pays du CAEM s'élève à env. 200 mille (Bartoszewicz 1987). Celui des Polonais travaillant dans d'autres pays du CAEM était de 80 mille en 1986 (Krzyżanowska 1987). Dans chacun des trois pays du CAEM employant le plus de travailleurs étrangers, à savoir en Tchécoslovaquie, RDA et URSS, il se trouve 50-80 mille travailleurs, venus d'autres pays du CAEM.

Conjointement à la hausse de l'échelle des migrations au travail, les explications et évaluations de ce phénomène deviennent de plus en plus complexes et controversées. N.I.Sidorov et A.Khorvat (1985), auteurs déjà mentionnés de l'une des publications (peu nombreuses d'ailleurs) à ce sujet, concentrent leur attention sur les différences radicales entre la migration de la main d'oeuvre dans les conditions du capitalisme et du socialisme. À une migration capitaliste impétueuse (dépendant des besoins du capital, d'un niveau différent du développement économique, de la situation démographique des pays, des crises, du chômage), le plus souvent unidirectionnelle, c'est à dire à par-

tir des pays en voie de développement vers les pays développés, ils opposent un transfert multidirectionnel des réserves de travail entre les pays socialistes en tant que "processus réglé de manière planifiée reflétant les rapports d'une coopération internationale de camaraderie et d'entre-aide de pays frères". "Sa base objective consiste en un partage du travail international et socialiste, l'accroissement de la socialisation de la production moderne, la hausse du degré de son internationalisation dans les conditions contemporaines de révolution scientifique et technique" (p. 150-151). Cette estimation générale qui semble être plus une image de l'état voulu qu'un reflet de l'actualité existante, demande au moins à être nuancée. Outre des différences indubitables dans le déroulement du phénomène en question dans divers régimes, il existe également des ressemblances; il est nécessaire de tenir compte des conditions spécifiques des différents pays et même des intérêts contradictoires apparaissant aussi bien dans ces pays qu'entre eux.

En effectuant une analyse des causes des migrations de la main d'oeuvre, il est bon de commencer par de simples rapports d'offre et de demande qui existent sur le marché du travail. Depuis le début des années 70, dans maints pays socialistes l'offre de la main d'oeuvre ne satisfait pas la demande. On lie ce fait à l'épuisement des simples réserves du travail dans ces pays. Le degré de cet épuisement est différent et d'après K. Żukrowska (1987), par rapport aux autres pays, il est le plus élevé en RDA, moyen en Tchécoslovaquie et en Hongrie et relativement faible dans les pays tels que l'URSS, la Bulgarie, la Pologne ou la Roumanie. D'autre part, il est des pays où l'offre est supérieure à la demande actuelle. D'après les données officielles, en 1986 le chômage en Yougoslavie a dépassé un million de personnes (Rocznik Statystyczny 1987). Pour ce qui est des pays du CAEM, au Vietnam il y a env. 2 millions de chômeurs (les estimations non-officielles sont 3 fois plus grandes). Il y a des surplus considérables de main d'oeuvre à Cuba. Bien entendu, aussi bien dans le cas de pénurie que de surplus, l'on peut considérer leurs valeurs absolues et relatives. Vu une exploitation extensive de la main d'oeuvre (efficacité du travail relativement basse), les

pays socialistes disposent en fait de réserves potentielles considérables de main d'oeuvre (efficacité du travail relativement basse), les pays socialistes disposent en fait de réserves potentielles considérables de main d'oeuvre, utilisables lors de processus de rationalisation appropriés (Gospodarka światowa... 1986, p. 117-119). Dans le contexte du présent communiqué, nous nous intéressons avant tout aux possibilités de rationaliser l'utilisation de la main d'oeuvre au moyen d'un transfert international de celle-ci. Bien entendu, il serait beaucoup trop simple d'interpréter la migration de la main d'oeuvre sous l'aspect de transferts unilatéraux à partir des pays de surplus vers les pays déficitaires dans ce domaine. Les conditions des transferts réels qui s'opèrent sont complexes et peu connues encore. L'exemple de la Pologne sert ici de preuve.

En Pologne, la demande déclarée des travailleurs dans divers domaines se chiffre aujourd'hui à 500 mille personnes au moins. En même temps, il travaille officiellement à l'étranger 107 mille personnes (Krzyżanowska 1987). Par contre, il n'y a pratiquement pas en Pologne de travailleurs étrangers. Il est des opinions envisageant la possibilité de faire venir en Pologne un nombre plus grand de Vietnamiens, voire éventuellement de Cubains (Bartoszewicz 1987).

Les 107 mille Polonais mentionnés travaillant à l'étranger, ce sont des personnes employées soit dans des unités d'organisation polonaises, soit également dans des unités étrangères mais par l'intermédiaire ou avec l'accord des autorités polonaises. Elles sont incluses dans la statistique officielle. Cette statistique n'englobe pas les personnes partant pour leur propre compte et entreprenant un travail à l'étranger. Le nombre des personnes séjournant temporairement à l'étranger est actuellement estimé à plusieurs centaines de milliers. Compte tenu du fait que les départs à l'étranger ont pour motif principal le gain de l'argent, l'on peut donc considérer que le nombre des travailleurs temporaires à l'étranger est de plusieurs fois supérieur à celui figurant dans les statistiques officielles. Le problème des départs temporaires ne peut être envisagé de manière tout a

à fait séparée des départs définitifs; une partie de ces départs temporaires se transforme en migration définitive. Autrement dit: les départs temporaires contribuent à rendre plus aigu le problème des départs définitifs. Les départs définitifs, ayant d'ailleurs dans une grande mesure aussi l'aspect de l'émigration économique, sont considérés comme un grave problème social, démographique, économique et politique qui affecte particulièrement des régions telles que la Silésie (notamment celle d'Opole), la Warmia et la Mazurie. Au cours des derniers temps, l'émigration définitive moyenne annuelle se présentait comme suit: dans les années 1971-1975 - 16,7 mille personnes, dans les années 1976-1980 - 28,4 mille et dans les années 1981-1985 - 24,0 mille personnes. En 1986 il en a émigré 29,0 mille et en 1987 - 36,4 mille personnes.

Les résultats de diverses analyses représentatives ainsi que l'examen de la statistique existante permettent de se faire une image seulement très générique de la collectivité se rendant au travail à l'étranger. La statistique de l'Office Central de Statistique concernant les Polonais travaillant à l'étranger constate qu'il y a plus de travailleurs à des postes d'ouvriers (76% de l'ensemble des travailleurs) et ayant une formation inférieure à la moyenne (60% de la totalité). Le groupe dominant, ce sont les ouvriers de l'industrie du bâtiment et des industries connexes (près de 20% de la totalité), plus loin nous trouvons ceux du traitement des métaux ainsi que les ouvriers s'occupant de l'exploitation et de la réparation du matériel lourd pour les terrassements (Krzyżanowska 1987).

Les analyses réalisées à l'École supérieure de planification et de statistique (SGPiS) et concernant la migration temporaire la plus récente vers les pays capitalistes (notamment la RFA, les Etats Unis et l'Autriche) témoignent que près de la moitié des migrants c'étaient des personnes que leur âge situait dans la période de la plus forte activité, de 25 à 39 ans. Les plus nombreuses étaient les personnes d'origine ouvrière ou paysanne, caractérisées par un niveau d'éducation supérieur à la moyenne nationale, de même que leur niveau de richesse (Kujawska-Misiąg,

Latuch 1988). Il prévalait les personnes provenant du sud-est de la Pologne ce qui démontre des liens de parenté avec l'ancienne émigration au travail (Badowski, Latuch 1986).

L'identification et l'analyse des causes de la migration temporaire au travail (conformément à la nature de cette migration) sont complexes et ont plusieurs aspects. Les motifs et les objectifs de ceux qui entreprennent une migration (les individus) et de ceux qui l'encouragent ou bien s'y opposent (organismes économiques, État) peuvent être différents et même contradictoires. Le bilan des profits et de pertes dus aux migrations, étroitement lié aux systèmes de valeurs adoptés n'est pas facile à dresser, lui non plus. Il est même discutable et controversable, dans quelle partie de ce bilan il faut situer tel ou autre effet des migrations. On pourrait aussi réfléchir sur le problème de la liberté ou de la contrainte dans la prise de décisions sur la migration mais cela pourrait nous mener trop loin.

A court et à moyen terme au moins, les décisions de migrer temporairement peuvent être considérées dans les catégories de stratégies de réaction (souvent immédiate) aux situations dues à la crise socio-économique. En général, ces décisions sont liées à l'espoir d'améliorer la situation matérielle individuelle, dont celle du logement (Bakalarski et al. 1987; Kujawska-Misiąg, Latuch 1988). Pour ce qui est des profits et des pertes des migrations, outre des différences certaines, l'on y remarque de fortes ressemblances entre les migrations temporaires (et en certaine mesure aussi entre les migrations définitives) dans les pays aux systèmes sociaux, économiques et politiques différents.

Du point de vue de l'individu, la perspective d'un départ temporaire au travail à l'étranger est de nos jours très tentante. Il s'agit avant tout des profits résultant d'un travail aussi bien mieux qu'autrement rémunéré. Autrement, c'est à dire en une autre monnaie, permettant d'acheter plus facilement nombreux biens, tant de consommation que d'investissement. D'après les analyses mentionnées ci-dessus, effectuées à l'École supérieure de planification et de statistique, un émigré polonais temporaire sur 4 à 5 est revenu de l'étranger en voiture ou bien

en a acheté une à son retour et un sur 20 a acheté un appartement ou des machines pour la production artisanale ou agricole. Plus de 80% des personnes revenant de l'étranger ont constaté que leur séjour a contribué à améliorer leur niveau de vie.

Bien entendu, la question est nettement plus complexe. Dans la situation d'une pénurie relative et absolue des biens et services sur le marché polonais, il est également question d'autres profits résultant de la possibilité de franchir plus librement les frontières d'État. Cela concerne même des migrations dans le cadre des pays du CAEM dont les frontières sont devenues récemment plus étanches. Par exemple, le gasterbeiter polonais dispose plus facilement de maints produits avec dotations en RDA, dont les prix demeurent inchangés depuis une quinzaine d'années ou plus etc. Les possibilités d'acquérir à l'étranger un savoir-faire nouveau, de connaître de nouvelles formes et moyens de travail, de son organisation etc. semblent être un profit moins aperçu. Un domaine très vaste, mal connu, c'est celui des désavantages liés à la condition individuelle de santé, prise largement (y compris la condition psychique et morale), à la vie personnelle et familiale des personnes partant au travail. A titre d'exemple, je mentionnerai là les conflits avec la loi se manifestant déjà au moment des tentatives de partir au travail, les conflits liés au travail "au noir" et en général aux contacts avec ce qu'on appelle sphère de l'économie non-formelle.

L'estimation des conséquences du mouvement de la main d'oeuvre, vues du point de vue de l'État, de l'économie ou de la société en tant qu'entité, n'est pas univoque. Pour ce qui est des transferts des travailleurs dans le cadre du CAEM, au plus haut niveau des arguments, on se limite plutôt à souligner les profits sociaux généraux résultant de la participation au partage du travail international et socialiste, participation rationnelle et réciproquement profitable. En une certaine mesure, il s'agit là des profits résultant de la participation aux réalisations économiques communes, soit à la construction d'installations dont l'existence et le fonctionnement sont essentiels non seulement pour le pays sur le territoire duquel elles sont réali-

sées (oléoducs et gazoducs, centrales nucléaires en URSS) mais aussi à une exploitation commune des richesses naturelles (coupe du bois par les Bulgares en république de Comi). Particulièrement pour ce qui est des pays plus faiblement développés (Vietnam, Mongolie, Cuba), l'on cite en premier lieu les profits résultant de l'acquisition par les travailleurs de ces pays de la formation professionnelle dans les pays mieux développés. Comme on le prouve parfois, les profits de ceux-ci peuvent se situer à la limite de la rentabilité économique.

Environ 75% des voyages au travail organisés de Pologne s'opèrent dans le cadre de l'exportation des services du bâtiment, tenus pour justifiés et rentables (du moins dans les calculs sectoriels) d'autant plus que l'efficacité de notre travail à l'étranger est nettement plus élevé qu'en Pologne. On souligne le rôle de l'exportation de ces services pour le maintien de l'équilibre du bilan des paiements etc. Cependant, les plans de construction en Pologne ne sont pas réalisés, entre autres à cause du déficit de la main d'œuvre dans cette branche de l'économie. Il est toutefois une opinion, surprenante au début, que le manque de travailleurs est ressenti tout d'abord par les entreprises du bâtiment en Pologne qui ne mènent pas l'activité d'exportation. La perspective d'un départ au travail à l'étranger joue ici le rôle d'un facteur freinant la fluctuation des travailleurs.

Quoi qu'il en soit, les désavantages sociaux liés aux départs temporaires au travail sont une question réelle. Compte tenu du nombre de ces départs de la Pologne, l'étendue de ces désavantages n'est pas comparable à l'étendue et au type de ceux liés par exemple aux départs en masse au travail de la Yougoslavie: déformations des structures démographiques, perturbations du marché, notamment de celui du travail (Ikanowicz 1985). Toutefois, à l'échelle régionale ou locale, ces désavantages peuvent se manifester sensiblement, par exemple dans les zones d'une concentration particulière du phénomène en question ou dans les régions où les désavantages dus aux départs temporaires "s'ajoutent" aux désavantages des migrations définitives (Rauziński 1982; Korbel 1986).

Il faut s'attendre à ce que les transferts de la main d'oeuvre s'opérant dans les pays socialistes ne vont cesser d'augmenter alors que la pratique et la science auront à affronter maints problèmes nouveaux à résoudre, liés à ce phénomène. Ce n'est qu'un truisme que de constater d'avoir la des problèmes dont l'analyse et la solution demandent une coopération interdisciplinaire. Par contre, il n'est pas décidé quel peut être le rôle de la géographie dans cette action. Les analyses qui nous intéressent ne sont pas chez nous des plus avancées du point de vue méthodique ni théorique. Il semble donc qu'à l'heure actuelle, il est primordial de participer à la construction d'outils pour les analyses et particulièrement à la formulation et à la vérification des hypothèses de recherche. Je suis d'avis que pour commencer il serait intéressant de tester certaines hypothèses créées dans d'autres conditions et adaptées tout d'abord à celles-ci.

A titre d'exemple, je voudrais indiquer certaines hypothèses liées à la théorie de segmentation du marché du travail (Opawski 1985). Il s'agirait notamment de vérifier si dans nos conditions, on peut parler d'un caractère permanent de la présence de travailleurs étrangers sur les marchés du travail et à quels genres de travail (qualifié - non qualifié) ou domaines d'activité cette présence est-elle liée. En général, les travailleurs étrangers dans les pays socialistes sont employés surtout à des postes d'ouvriers, dans des domaines tels que le bâtiment, certaines industries lourdes ou exigeant un apport de travail important, la sylviculture et aussi l'agriculture. En URSS par exemple, ils travaillent à la construction de diverses installations industrielles (centrales nucléaires) et urbaines (habitat), à la pose d'oléoducs et de gazoducs, à la coupe des forêts. Les Hongrois, outre le bâtiment, emploient des travailleurs étrangers dans la métallurgie, l'industrie mécanique et textile, dans les mines de charbon et les raffineries de pétrole. Dans les considérations sur un emploi éventuel de Vietnamiens en Pologne, il est question de travailler dans les domaines qui ne demandent pas une haute qualification et où le manque de personnel est le plus sensible: services communaux, bâtiment, industrie textile mais aussi industrie



lourde et minière (Bartoszewicz 1987).

Comme second exemple, étroitement lié à celui mentionné ci-dessus, ce pourrait-être la vérification de la validité du groupe d'hypothèses liées à la conception de "stratification bilatérale" venant à la place des théories précédentes d'une marginalité univoque des travailleurs étrangers (marginalité du point de vue du pays - preneur). Il s'agirait là d'analyser la position qu'occupent les collectivités des travailleurs étrangers, c'est à dire des travailleurs et de leurs familles au pays d'où ils proviennent et à celui où ils travaillent. Il semble absolument possible d'entreprendre de telles analyses, tout au moins à cause du nombre des travailleurs étrangers dans certains groupes et de la durée du travail à l'étranger (p.ex. les Vietnamiens et les Cubains sont envoyés au travail à l'étranger pour une période de 4 ans; le séjour des Polonais à l'étranger dans le cadre de contrats officiels peut aussi en principe durer 4 ans et être éventuellement prolongé pour 2 nouvelles années).

Le troisième exemple concerne une conception complexe, formulée par E.Lichtenberger (1984). Cette conception concerne les éléments de théories spatiales et non spatiales très diverses (théorie de l'écologie sociale, théorie démographique du comportement des générations, conception du cycle de la vie et même la théorie des périphéries de A.Lösch) et se rapporte à la désagrégation spatiale de diverses fonctions vitales (appartement, études, travail et également les loisirs) et de leur décalage dans le cycle de la vie. La conception en question se sert des analogies qui existent entre les "localisations" des sociétés de migrants au travail et les sociétés urbaines modernes disposant de deux appartements (on pourrait faire là une comparaison supplémentaire avec la population à double activité). En particulier, il serait souhaitable d'analyser la mesure dans laquelle on peut observer dans nos conditions et par rapport aux sociétés mentionnées: 1 - changement des fonctions assumées par divers espaces dans diverses périodes du cycle de vie des différents individus et de leurs groupes; 2 - accroissement de la désintégration spatiale (ou dans certains cas - de la réintégration) des familles

à plusieurs générations; 3 - développement des formes complémentaires d'habitation et des transferts des capitaux qui y sont liés ainsi que de "transferts" de facteurs non-matériels entre différents espaces, et enfin, 4 - phénomènes de stratification spatiale, et notamment de "surstratification" au lieu (pays) de résidence et de "sous-stratification" au lieu (pays) de travail.

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## MACRO-REGIONAL STABILITY AND THE EMERGENCE OF A PACIFIC NETWORK

### 1. Introduction

During the sixties and early seventies many studies were devoted to questions concerning regionalism and the role of regions (regional subsystems) in the global system. Regional economic and political cooperation was regarded a prerequisite for achieving the so desperately needed economic development in the third world, and at the same time as a way to achieve stability in these often conflictuous corners of the globe. The subject was not only the focus of many scholars but had for several years been a major issue in American foreign policy, especially during the Johnson administration (Nye 1969, Nye 1971 pp. 188-189). During recent years there has again been an upsurge in studies and writings emphasizing the importance of regional systems to maintain world order (e.g. Feld and Boyd 1980, Boyd 1984, Cohen 1982, 1984, 1986. See also Hoffman 1985). Some of these writers, notably Boyd (1984), stress the need to increase regional coherence in several parts of the world for reasons of global security. He even offers concrete suggestions to United States policy-makers to foster such developments. Others, in particular the geographer Cohen, picture the present world as already consisting of several coherent geopolitical regions, each of them with increasing internal pacification.

In this paper I will try to identify major developments in the postwar spatial pattern of interstate relations and delineate regions or groups of countries that are relatively closely knit

together. To this end I will first concentrate on one sector of international contact, i.e. the institutional network as shaped by shared memberships of Intergovernmental Organizations. The division of the world resulting from the analysis of this network will be the point of departure for the rest of the paper. In the second section I will investigate if developments and patterns in the institutional field stand on their own or are accompanied by similar developments in the economic sector (international trade). In the last section I will look in some more detail at the regional group that appears to mark the only substantial shift in the institutional as well as the economic international network and will probably represent the most important change in the world political map of the near future, the Pacific Rim countries.

## 2. The development of institutional groupings since 1950<sup>1</sup>

Interaction between state-administrations is effected through different channels and instruments. Intergovernmental organizations, diplomatic missions and official visits are among the most important of these. The importance of IGO's as vehicles for interstate contact especially increased after the Second World War. The number of IGO's increased from 94 in 1950 to 265 in 1980 (in 1960 and 1970 these figures were 132 and 207 respectively). The average number of memberships for all states in this period increased from 25 to 45. So the present 164-state world is tied together by institutional bonds more strongly than the smaller 81-state world of the early fifties. Almost without exception states in the present world are now to a considerable degree involved in the international institutional network.

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<sup>1</sup> Raw data for this section were derived from several editions of the Yearbook of International Organizations, published in Brussels by the Union of International Associations. A full report of the analysis of postwar developments in the global institutional network that is described in this section, is given in Nierop (1988).

To identify groups of states that are tied together relatively strongly by institutional bonds, a hierarchical clustering analysis was carried out for four points in time (1950, 1960, 1970, 1980) on a matrix containing for every dyad the number of shared IGO-membership, thus indicating "organizational proximity" between two countries. In this procedure the criterion for clustering was the maximum distance (minimum number of shared memberships) to be found between a country and the members of the different clusters. A country is added to the cluster to which this maximum distance is minimal. In this way an absolute minimum level of institutional contact between any pair of countries within a cluster is assured.

The volume of organizational links between countries is used simply as an indicator of the volume of mutual interaction at this level. Although it is clear that the impact of the various organizations is hardly equal, no weights are attached to each of them. The character and importance of the institutional links between countries will be evaluated afterwards and they will of course be incorporated in the final interpretation. Attaching quantitative weights beforehand to all IGO's is doomed to remain arbitrary. Valid objective criteria are lacking, and even helpful (though disputable) indicators like size of the bureaucratic staff or budget are available for only a limited number of organizations. It is however important to realize that the number of clearly top-rank IGO's is relatively small. In addition, such organizations are often multiple (e.g. European Communities, OAS) and often go together with other organizational activities between the countries in question. Consequently their undervaluation is in some degree compensated, or in any case has a less distorting effect on the final results.

Some variations may occur depending on the criterion used in the hierarchical analysis. For this reason comparisons were made with the results of a similar procedure, this time using the average number of shared memberships as the decisive criterion for grouping countries together. The institutional sub-

divisions of the world resulting from the two different criteria and even the internal structure of the different clusters turned out to be roughly the same. Where major differences did occur however, they will be discussed.

Maps 1-4 show the results of the analysis for the various years. To be identified as a coherent group or geopolitical region, a proximity of 10 shared memberships on top of shared memberships in worldwide organizations (defined as those with at least 75 percent of the states as members) was considered the minimal institutional framework required. Of course this limit is rather arbitrary. Clusters consisting of three countries or less were not taken into consideration.


From 1950 to 1980 the number of clusters has increased from 4 to 8. Growth occurred especially during the 1960s and 1970s. Western Europe and Latin America appear to be the oldest and tightest clusters. The volume of their internal ties exceeds that of the other clusters by far in all years. Looking at the maps it is clear that there is a strong geographical component in the formation of organizational networks. The groups identified are to an increasing extent exclusively regional in character. The non-regional Commonwealth has faded. The Arab countries now constitute a highly connected subgroup of their own. Within the Latin American cluster the delineation of a Central American and South American subgroup (though highly interconnected) is now almost perfect. In 1980 we witness the emergence of a separate British Caribbean cluster, consisting of countries formerly weakly attached to the Latin American group. The number of organizational ties within already long established regional clusters has sharply increased over time, an ever growing number of the included countries meeting well above the minimum coefficient required by our definition. This trend is especially strong in Western Europe, Latin America and the Arab group.

Most "white spots" on the map have gradually disappeared. One reason for this of course is the larger number of independent states, some of which immediately constituted new clusters

1. 1950



2. 1960




Maps 1-4. Clusters based on IGO-memberships



3. 1970



4. 1980



<sup>1)</sup> British Caribbean: Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Barbados, Guyana, Bahamas

(e.g. British and French Africa). But apart from this there has been an autonomous trend towards the development of institutionally connected subgroups. New clusters appeared and already existing but weak and incomplete networks were completed. Many Arab countries were already independent in 1960, but it was not until 1980 that one cluster containing most Arab nations can be observed. The Eastern European group can not be considered complete until 1970, although even then the German Democratic Republic (in 1980 very marginally attached to the cluster) was excluded from it. Even Western Europe contained several important "white spots" in 1950, and in 1960 Iceland, Finland and Yugoslavia (all three obviously peripheral cases in a geographical and/or political sense) are still missing from its ranks. Argentina and Uruguay are major blank spots in Latin America in 1950, though this is partly the result of our criterion. In the alternative procedure (using the average number of shared memberships as criterion for clustering) the position of these countries appears to be far less peripheral. Most countries formerly not included in any organizational framework at a substantial level now are, the countries outside clusters in 1980 with a few exceptions being micro-states. China's nonclassification must be attributed to the very dispersed membership pattern of this major power, without clear regional or other attachments. The same holds for South Africa and Israel, that finds itself at the outer margins of the Western European group.

There are a few exceptions to the overall prevalence of regionalism in the observed pattern. In sub-saharan Africa former colonial ties clearly outweigh pure geographical proximity in shaping the organizational networks. On the other hand, even here the beginning of a differentiation along geographical lines is visible, although the gap between former British and former French Africa is persisting.

The most notable non-regional cluster is that of the very dispersed Asia and Pacific group, in which countries like New Zealand, USA and Iran find themselves brotherly together. On closer inspection this cluster appears to be partly the result of the method and criterion used. The gradual formation of the cluster through the years is of course definitely the result of growing institutional links between constituting members, but the inclusion of all these countries in one cluster slightly overestimates the actual internal coherence of the group. All dyads within the cluster do meet regularly in an institutional setting, for this is the criterion used in our procedure, but at closer inspection the number of IGO's really consisting (approximately) of the countries of this cluster appears to be very limited, i.e. only one (for example, in the Arab group this number is 8). The cluster apparently is the result of a cobweblike structure of a variety of interlinked and overlapping networks of diverging composition. When the analysis is carried out with the average (instead of minimum) number of shared memberships as criterion for clustering, the same countries come out in two separate groups. One is made up of Japan, India and the western countries (New Zealand, Australia, USA and Canada), the other is composed of a clear ASEAN bloc later joined by the other Asian states. Both groups did form the main building blocs of the big Asia and Pacific cluster in the first analysis too. We may conclude that an Asian and Pacific cluster, including the USA and Canada is definitely in the making, but its exact composition and structure for the moment is still rather diffuse.

Apart from the gradual filling in of white spots, the delineation of the identified clusters and the position of the several states appear to be remarkably stable through the years. The only notable shift is that of the USA, connected with the emergence of a kind of Pacific network, and in correspondence with the current emphasis on the Pacific Region for its future relations.

Assessing the strength and coherence of the various organizational clusters on the basis of objective criteria is very difficult. The organizations vary according to scope, field of action, frequency and intensity of contact, capacity, competence etc. We may however assume that the more a group of states is united through cluster-wide activities, the more it will tend to operate as a functional entity in some respects and the more it will indeed be regarded as such by states within as well as outside the group. Therefore, leaving the character of the organizations for the moment out of consideration, the number of IGO's in which a large part of a cluster is represented can be understood as an indication of the coherence of that group of states. When the number of such cluster-wide IGO's within a cluster is low, it means that much of the institutional contact within the group takes place in organizations of which only a small part of the constituting states are members. These may well be important and tight organizations, but the composition of the group of represented states differs in most cases. In such a case the cluster is composed of different overlapping and interlinked networks, assuring frequent contact between all cluster-members but each time in a different setting. The internal coherence and "group-feeling" within the cluster as a whole will be less pronounced than in a cluster that is tied together mainly through group-wide organizations. In addition, we assume that the more non-group members are represented on top of the group members in an organization, the lower the intensity of the mutual interaction will be, and the less an institution will contribute to the cohesiveness and group-feeling (and acting) within a cluster. For this reason a distinction is made between big and small cluster-wide organizations (see Table 1), the latter in many cases being really "cluster-wide" and indeed almost exclusively confined to the members of the cluster.

From the information in Table 1 it is clear that Western Europe and Latin America are the most tightly knit IGO-clusters. The difference between the two in the fifth column reflects the fact that many important European IGO's, for example those within the framework of the European Community, do not meet the 75 per-

Table 1. Number and size of cluster-wide organizations, 1980

	at least 50% membership			at least 75% membership		
	total	1-40	1-20	total	1-40	1-20
Western Europe	61	37	17	40	18	5
Latin America	41	27	5	33	23	2
Eastern Europe	33	17	11	23	11	6
Arabs	29	15	12	17	9	8
Asian and Pacific	43	17	4	17	7	1
British Africa	29	12	3	18	5	0
French Africa	29	11	7	16	5	2
British Caribbean	35	22	5	25	15	5

Table 2. Kind of IGO's in the different clusters, 1980\*

	WE	LA	EE	Ar	AP	BA	FA	BC
Military	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	1
Political	1	2	-	1	-	-	-	2
Trade	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	1
Product organ.	4	2	2	1	1	2	1	1
Ec.Dev. and Coop.	5	3	4	8	4	-	1	6
Culture	2	2	1	1	-	1	1	1
Science	6	10	2	-	3	4	3	3
Transport	7	3	3	1	4	1	1	2
Admin. and Juridical	4	3	-	2	1	1	2	3
Food and Agriculture	6	-	4	1	2	3	2	2
Ad hoc Organ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	37	27	17	15	17	12	11	22

\* Only IGO's with 40 members or less, covering at least 50 percent of the cluster-members are included.

cent criterion. The low Latin American entry in the sixth column is caused by the size of the various OAS organizations (27 memberstates) that also include the United States and the Caribbean.

The Arab group and Eastern Europe do have a relatively strong internal institutional structure as well, many of the concerned organizations being strictly limited to the members of these clusters. The small British Caribbean cluster appears to be quite tightly knit too, but this is slightly overstated due to the smallness of this micro-grouping. Most of the binding organizations (column 6) cover the whole of the British Caribbean (11 members). This small group could turn out to be the core of an emerging wider Caribbean cluster, separated from Latin America.

The figures in Table 1 clearly reveal the loose and fragmented structure of the Asia and Pacific and of both African clusters. Of the 17 IGO's that cover at least 75 percent of the countries in the Asia and Pacific group only the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council can be regarded as truly group-wide. Within the British African group no organization falls into this category, and in the French African case only two organizations (African and Malagasy Industrial Property Office, African and Malagasy Postal and Telecommunications Union), both covering most but not even all of the cluster-members, meet this criterion. None of these organizations can be considered as "heavy weight".

The loose structure of both African clusters is also reflected in the kind of organizations linking these countries together (see Table 2; only organizations with 40 members or less and covering at least 50 percent of the cluster-members were considered for this purpose). Institutions in the field of scientific and technical cooperation dominate the picture. IGO's in the most sensitive and binding categories (military and political) are lacking altogether, and more binding attempts towards institutionalized cooperation in the economic field are either very small (e.g. the failed East African Community) or regionally defined and encompassing members of both clusters (e.g. ECOWAS), again underlining the predominance of regionalism in the international institutional network. In the Asia and Pacific group too, politi-

cal and military IGO's are absent or covering only a small part of the cluster (ANZUS). The same holds for major economic organizations (ASEAN). This again underlines the fragmented structure of this cluster.

On the other hand, the stronger groupings of Western and Eastern Europe, Arabs and Latin America, in which (except for Latin America) economic organizations are the major binding element, do incorporate some IGO's in the heavy categories as well, thus adding an extra dimension to their already assessed coherence. The WTO, NATO, Arab League and OAS are the main ones, not implying that an equal weight can be attached to all four of these.

### 3. Economic bonds

To see if the postwar development of economic interaction is running along the same path as the patterns and developments in the institutional field, the share of intra-group trade in the total exports of each cluster is assessed (see Table 3). Clusters including large countries (in terms of their position in world trade) almost automatically have a larger share of intra-group trade, because a larger proportion of the flows of states in these clusters will be other states in their group. To control for this size effect and to be able to assess the importance of preferences within the groups, Relative Acceptance scores were computed in addition to the straight percentages (Table 4). This measure relates the actual volume of trade (here exports) between partners (groups of partners) to the volume of trade that could be expected on the basis of this partner's share in world trade (here imports). In contrast with the first measure, RA scores tend to overstate the importance of intragroup trade within small clusters (for example: 2% intragroup exports in a cluster that is responsible for 1% of the world's imports, results in a far higher RA-score than 50% intragroup exports in a cluster responsible for 40% of global imports)<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Calculation of Relative Acceptance scores:  $RA = A-E/E$  in which A = actual share of intra-cluster exports in the total exports of cluster i. E = expected value: cluster i's share in world imports.

The institutional clusters identified in section 2 (composition 1980) are the point of departure. When international trade flows would be analysed in a similar way, the resulting division of the world would in some cases probably be different. Therefore, the figures in Table 3 and 4 do reflect economic trends in different regions, but it can no be taken for granted that these regions are optimally delineated from an economic point of view.

Western Europe, Asia and Pacific and Eastern Europe have by far the highest shares of intragroup trade. This is not caused by the importance of the concerned countries in the world economy alone, as is shown by the RA scores of these clusters. Especially Eastern Europe's economic coherence is to a large degree caused by strong preferences of these countries for each other, as their role in world trade is very modest. The share of Latin American internal trade, though on a much lower level than that in the aforementioned clusters, rose steadily until 1980 but came abruptly to a halt and even declined during the first half of the present decennium. The global economic recession, and in particular the debt-crisis that unfolded in 1981 and concerned virtually every Latin American country and that caused sharp import-cuts, account for much of this remarkable downfall. Asia and Pacific, the only region in the world that was for the most part not affected by the economic recession, still continued to expand its share of internal trade during this period, whereas the Western and Eastern European figures too dropped slightly.

Apart from these four clusters, none of the regional institutional groupings experienced a similar level and development of economic coherence, with the exception of the small and (in this context) unimportant British Caribbean. British and French Africa, that are both very weak in institutional terms, exhibit very low levels of economic coherence too. These figures even exaggerate the actual volume of trade, because a large part of the economic traffic included in them concerns transit trade between a few landlocked and coastal states. The Arab group, characterized by strong institutional growth during the sixties and seventies, did not show a comparable development in trade relations. In part



this reflects the one-product (oil) trade of the largest exporters in the region (Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq). But even the non-oil exporters direct only a few percent of their trade to other groupmembers, with the exception of the three smallest economies in the cluster (Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan), that are quite "Arab-oriented" (around 35% of their total exports in 1985).

Overlooking the institutional division of the world, the trade-orientations of the different groupings, and the correspondencies between the two, two factors seem to be of some importance (see figure 1).

Fig. 1. Institutional coherence and trade in different macro-regions

		TRADE	
		-	+
IGO's	-	British Africa French Africa	Asia and Pacific
	+	Arabs	Western Europe Eastern Europe (Latin America)

First, the age of the states in a region appears to be a major background factor. Institutional as well as economic bonds have clearly developed most in the "old worlds" of Western and Eastern Europe and (to a far lesser degree) Latin America. Within the (partly younger) Asia and Pacific and the Arab group, the developing cohesion in one sector of interstate contact is not matched by a similar level of interaction in the other sector. Within the clusters containing the youngest states of all, French and British Africa, cohesion in neither of the two sectors of interstate contact has developed up to a reasonable level. A major reason probably is that young states are often still too much engaged in national problems of nation-building and developing internal cohesion, to take steps towards far-reaching cooperation

Table 3. Share of intra-bloc exports for each cluster (percentages), 1960-1985\*

	1960	1970	1980	1985
Western Europe	56.9	67.1	67.5	65.8
Latin America	8.0	12.1	14.9	10.0
Eastern Europe	59.2	59.3	49.1	na
Arabs	6.3	4.2	2.7	4.6
Asia and Pacific	42.6	50.8	47.5	57.2
British Africa	-	5.1	1.5	1.7
French Africa	-	3.9	5.3	3.8
Brit. Caribbean	-	4.3	4.9	6.8

\* With the exception of Singapore in the A and P cluster, only countries independent in each year are included.

Source: Raw data from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics and (for Eastern Europe) UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, several editions.

Table 4. Intra-bloc exports for each cluster (Relative Acceptance scores), 1960-1985\*

	1960	1970	1980	1985
Western Europe	0.45	0.30	0.42	0.56
Latin America	0.25	1.52	2.04	1.78
Eastern Europe	5.04	5.98	5.55	na
Arabs	1.52	1.47	-0.34	0.24
Asia and Pacific	0.37	0.52	0.51	0.47
British Africa	-	3.64	0.15	1.43
French africa	-	4.57	6.57	6.60
Brit. Caribbean	-	6.17	8.80	21.67

\* With the exception of Singapore in the A and P cluster, only countries independent in each year are included.

Source: See Table 3.

with other states. Internal legitimation and stabilization of national political structures may be considered a pre-condition for taking successful steps towards international integration of institutions and policies.

The level of economic development of the potential partners seems to be the second explaining factor of some importance, and is of course partly connected with the first one. Regions containing developed economies with many-sided industrial bases generate more opportunities for internal trade than regions consisting of economies that are dependent upon a few, sometimes common, primary products (compare the economic cohesion in Asia and Pacific with the state of affairs in the African and Arab clusters). As many of the intergovernmental organizations in the world are concerned with economic matters, economic development is probably not only a favourable condition for increasing regional trade, but will favour institutional growth too. Well-developed countries are more likely to engage in a process of give and take with other countries, which is an inevitable element of serious steps toward economic cooperation and integration.

#### 4. The Pacific Rim: Present networks and future prospects

The only real shift in the remarkably stable international IGO-network is the cautious emergence of the Asia and Pacific group. In terms of trade orientations the cohesion of this group has increased too. The group encloses the most dynamic area in the world economy of the eighties, including not only Japan but also the Asian NIC's Singapore and South Korea. When we look at the trade orientation of each the countries separately, it appears that there is a clear division between the Pacific and non-Pacific states (see Table 5). The non-Pacific countries' exports to the Asia and Pacific group are hardly higher than could be expected on the basis of this group's position in world trade. These figures indicate that, though the Asia and Pacific share in the non-Pacific exports is rising, the core of the cluster is composed of Pacific states. The institutional pattern, though more difficult to interpret, points in the same direction,

with the exception of India that is firmly rooted in the "western" subgroup of the cluster. Schubert (1978), who analysed the organizational growth in Asia between 1950 and 1975, also found an increasing division between different regional subgroups (South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia), of which the Southeast Asian one appeared to be by far the most cohesive. The number of organizational links within this subregion increased especially rapidly during the late sixties and seventies. Probably the future will bring an ongoing delineation of a separate Pacific network, including Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States, but excluding South Asia.

Until now, the so-called Pacific Region is primarily an economic affair, characterized by core positions of the United States and Japan in trade as well as foreign investment. Developments in the political, military and security fields are clearly running behind. In 1980, truly group-wide IGO's, covering all Pacific states, were virtually absent. The formation of a Pacific Community, proposed by private groups in many Pacific countries and receiving official support mainly in Japan, has never come off the ground. One of the reasons for this is the reluctance to form a wider regional grouping by the most important subregional organization in the Pacific, ASEAN, comprising Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and recently Brunei. Despite high running expectations at the time of its founding in 1967 as to economic integration and presumed future political and defence cooperation as important side-effects (see for example Gordon, 1969), progress in this organization is running slowly. The ASEAN memberstates feel that their grouping will be weakened if they join a larger organization. Nevertheless, annual ministerial meetings of this association are followed by consultations with government leaders from Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Boyd 1984, p. 84; Sneider and Borthwick 1983, p. 1252).

There is no multilateral Pacific cooperation in military and security matters. Security relations are maintained by a web of bilateral links between the United States and individual partners. Important defence treaties exist with Japan, South Korea

and the Philippines. Large military bases are established in these countries. Indonesia, Thailand and Australia only receive military assistance in the form of training (Kidron and Smith 1983, Young 1983). Since New Zealand's refusal in 1985 to allow US vessels carrying nuclear weapons or driven by nuclear energy into its harbours, the tripartite ANZUS treaty virtually degraded to a bilateral agreement between the United States and Australia.

Despite American pressure on Japan to take on an autonomous regional security role in accordance with its economic weight, and thus no longer be a "free rider" on United States' expenses, such a shift in Japanese policy has not taken place yet. Japan's military build-up is restricted by the constitution that was imposed by the United States after the Second World War. Opinion polls still show a negative attitude of a large majority of the Japanese public (over 70% in 1985) towards an increase of the defence budget (Kurokawa 1986). In addition to the strong antimilitary sentiments at home, possible expansion of Japanese military capabilities is viewed with suspicion by the Southeast Asian countries, that keep vivid memories of the Japanese attempts to establish a Greater Asia Co-prosperity Sphere during the forties. However, some changes are occurring during the last years that could be the starting point of a shift in the Japanese position and of a gradual change in the regional military and political configuration. In 1983, the Japanese government expressed its commitment in protecting the sea-lanes, and stated that the scope of the Japanese Self Defence Force is not necessarily limited to Japanese territory but could under circumstances be extended to open sea and airspace (Lai Fung-wai 1984, pp. 57-58). In 1986 the ten-year-old defence expenditure ceiling of 1% of GNP was broken for the first time, and although Nakasone's governing LDP party stated that it would continue to respect the "spirit of the ceiling of about 1%", this trend will probably continue in view of the goals set in the 1986-1990 defence programme (IISS, 1987). But so far, Japan's involvement in the region is of a purely economic nature, Southeast Asia serving as an important supplier of raw materials and a growing market for the Japanese industrial products.

One can think of several possible factors that inhibited a rapid process of institutional, political, and military cooperation alongside the developments in the economic sphere in the Pacific. Physical distance within this region may have been a barrier towards swift integration, as may have the cultural diversity and the wide gaps in levels of economic development between the various states involved. Subregional associations (ASEAN) were established that now are an impediment to integration at a larger geographic scale. Unlike the situation in Western Europe, where German re-armament and integration in the Western European (Atlantic) framework went hand in hand, early integration of Japan in a regional political and military framework has not been undertaken. The higher levels of economic and political development in Europe (some of the Pacific states still being colonies at the time or newly independent and involved in large national political and economic problems), as well as the presence of a push factor in Europe in the form of the physical proximity of a commonly perceived external threat, may have played a part in the diverging trajectories these regions have followed.

The prospects for the development of a politically more cohesive Pacific region depend to a large extent on the political and military role Japan is going to play in the Asian part of the region. There are signs that Japan's ubiquitous economic presence in the area will in the future indeed be matched by stronger political and security ties. Prime Minister Nakasone was known to pursue a more active political role for Japan in world affairs. The United States have actively supported a possible shift of this kind in Japanese policy for many years. But even in Southeast Asia official opinions concerning a more prominent Japanese regional security role seem to be shifting a little during the last years (Lai Fung-wai 1984, pp. 61-63).

Future integration within the Pacific macro-region is also strongly connected with the developments in ASEAN. A strong ASEAN bloc, providing these developing countries with a more solid po-

Table 5. Share of intra-group exports in total exports of each Asia and Pacific country (percentages), 1970 and 1985

	1970	1985
Indonesia	66.7	84.8
Canada	70.1	82.5
Malaysia	64.2	75.4
Philippines	86.8	72.2
South Korea	81.1	63.8
Singapore	51.6	63.4
Australia	56.0	57.8
New Zealand	40.9	56.9
Japan	52.0	56.6
Thailand	56.4	54.5
India	35.7	43.9
United States	41.2	43.6
Sri Lanka	22.4	39.6
Iran	53.5	39.0
Pakistan	28.5	33.8

Note: Asia and Pacific accounted for 38.9% of the world's imports in 1985 (expected value).

Source: See Table 3.

sition vis-a-vis their developed partners and a better chance to defend their own unique interests, can be regarded a precondition for succesful region building at a larger scale.

Though some changes in the regional political configuration may be expected in the long run, developments up till now are proceeding very slowly. In the near future the so-called Pacific Rim will probably remain primarily an economic affair, with political and institutional relations being very dispersed. The last decennia witnessed a change of the world's economic map in the sense of a move of the economic gravity centre towards the Pacific. When the present mosaic of bilateral political and military ties and subregional overlapping narrow-focus institutions will be replaced by more extensive intra-regional networks, the Pacific will be the subject of another change in international patterns, this time especially affecting the political map of the world. The clustering of shared IGO-memberships already foreshadows this evolving pattern to some extent.

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#### SOCIAL CHANGE BEHIND MILITARY COUPS IN WEST AFRICA

Social advance may be considered as a criterion of development and a measure of stabilization attained by the particular nation. The process of social advance is conditioned by the economy which is interrelated with the organization of the territory delimited by political boundaries (Chisholm 1982).

West African countries have formed the ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States, well defined territorial unit, though full of socio-economic problems and as a whole lacking political stability after the independence (Lagos Plan ..., 1980). If compared with the relatively quiet period of the colonial administration - independent states since their origin have experienced considerable internal troubles often reflected even by the abrupt military coups and shed of blood (Corre de St. John 1980). The question therefore arises why the authorities of the newly created states so readily push forward the firing arms. Especially if we consider the cases when the sole opponent is represented by the crowds of oppressed and miserable civilians having as a matter of fact no political aspirations (Okafor 1983).

The very notion of social progress, according to the resolution of the UN Social Development Committee, October 1987, is a move towards the advance of the less developed countries, taken into account as a global process.

Generalized typical social division in West Africa develops along the following lines:

1. Tribes and traditional tribal elites
2. Urban elites
3. Farmers - small holders
4. Employed town dwellers
5. Unemployed in rural areas
6. Unemployed in towns.

Two main characteristic features of the current situation are: number one, mass migration from the rural areas toward urban areas and number two, decision making power concentration within the urban elites (Legum 1979). Urban seat of power cooperates with the business sector and with the subjugated statesmanship and administration staff stepping down to local governments in the villates. Not much required evolution proceeds around point number 5 - growing unemployment in rural areas creating the frightening potential for disastrous upheaval, as no single country within the region under review has managed to arrest productively the evergrowing unemployed labour force, predominantly agricultural (Berry 1984). The political leaders competing for power in the towns have found themselves in a more or less antagonistic position in respect to rural majority (Dando 1980). They discovered ethnicity as a powerful political weapon and resorted to a strategy of ethnic mobilization for inter-party rivalry (Mommsen 1986). Social mobility increased after independence does not promote social career for all and since long time now deliberations continue on the definition of social career in developing countries accordingly (Czyż 1986). Ethnic and communal mobilization stirred up by political leaders helped to conceal very real cleavages between different social groups and between town and country. Social differentiation along ethnic lines was further enhanced by the new invention of the popular suffrages.

Colonial ethnicity was primarily an urban phenomenon. It was in the centres of colonial penetration that members of different ethnic groups came into contact with each other. To better enable them both to weather the hardships of life in the competitive

economies of the colonial cities and to keep in contact with home, some of the migrants gathered along communal lines. This coming together assumed greater importance because most of migrants hoped to return home eventually. They were villagers in towns rather than real townspeople, hence the lasting importance of communal values and communal ties. The above statement by Wirz (Wirz 1986, s. 131) offers quite coherent presentation of the turbulent flows of migrants still in action, trying to settle themselves in the new social environments.

The repeatedly publicized sources of the occurring internal troubles include the neglect of the interest of the people by the former inefficient regime, corruption, nepotism foreign dependency, mismanagement of the public funds etc. - though all of that kind of accusations may explain much - obviously they do not explain thoroughly the complete intertwined forces at play (Amin 1986). A careful inquiry into the problem brings to the scene the major social change as a meaningful but weakly recognised (Czyż 1986) factor responsible for many regional and national upheavals. Such a suspicion turns up because as a matter of fact social change in many regions proceeds adversely to economic growth (Boateng 1978). It is well known fact that the class structure in West Africa is not to be compared with that of Asia or Latin America (Flanagan 1978). Social stratification until the recent past was predominantly the product of actual power structure and not the result of productive relations being formed or economic forces competing on the market (Bretton 1973). Until the end of XIX century some stateless societies continued their existence in several parts of West Africa (Horton 1976). Colonial economy of the past was not directly interested in any major social transformations, on the contrary, it was interested rather in maintaining the traditional political structures as illustrated by the case of the North Sudanic belt (Ikporukpo.1986). Occasional shifts or changes on the limited scale as for example re-occupation of the depopulated areas or concentration of the migratory labour force connected with plantation farming - have not caused the overall modernization (Church 1980). It is worthwhile to note that as a rule the-

re was no landed aristocracy in Africa, owners of significant property and long established hereditary privileged classes on the European mode (Calvocaress 1985). The ruling king very often was a son of a slave-woman and under African conditions for sure his line could not last long (Morris 1980). Perhaps due to this old pattern, social origin also nowadays in Africa is not a matter of special significance in a public life of the country. The individuals are evaluated in accordance to actually occupied positions and connections with decisive personalities (Radtchenko 1983). This applies however predominantly to individuals seeking upward lift in the capital towns. The whole social groups attempting to change their situation and possibly social position at the same time may be looked upon as posing a threat to the established order (Jorre de St. John 1980). If we omit here the question of what does it mean "established" in any particular case - the main problem comes to the fore: social unrest provokes unjustified rude actions on the side of law enforcing authorities and military units and not so rarely open the way for a military coup.

Power structure within the region under review is not adequate for the proper management of the arising social conflicts among the society.

There is a general lack of social and political institutions capable of negotiating and solving the arising conflicts. The nature of many of them may be determined as normal within a developing society undergoing social and economic transformations.

It is worthwhile to underline that under the circumstances of economic backwardness and traditional African society the massive social protest of the lower strata against the existing system have not been registered and is not likely to occur. The violent riots in urban quarters usually are the final consequence of the previous unrests not necessarily in the same area caused by direct assault on the established status, rights or traditional values of the particular larger group (Sampson 1982). As examples may serve the violent attempts of the municipal authorities to level spontaneously erected by the immigrants slum quarters on the

city outskirts. Another case of revolt may be the mass protest of population endangered by the approaching major change felt as unfavorable for them. There were noted several cases of the general unrest provoked by the government plans to expropriate the village land for the purpose of irrigation project, river basin improvement, highway construction or similar public investment (Okafor 1983). The groups protesting in a massive though poorly organized way were readily confronted by the armed forces pressing to restore law and order, that is to say the complete surrender to the current instructions. There are numerous cases of the blood shed on such occasions, suspicions wide-spread by rumors pointing out at who was the supposed main enemy of the local ethnic group. In result ethnic conflicts may be involved along with the personal rivalries among the chieftains and district leaders. The applied lethal measures diffuse fear among the populace ready to migrate immediately in order to protect themselves and general unrest, with already obscured original reasons of it, is on increase. When the new political plot is well under way, after firing arms were in action and victims fallen - there is open ground for the successive military coup under the cover of dismissing the former inefficient and corrupt regime which is to be replaced by a new progressive and responsible military command ready to act in the general interest and favour of the people. Such a sequence of developments have formed a blue print scheme for the consequent takes-over.

After independence the new African states have experienced 74 military coups, over 100 attempted plots and 115 officially registered mutinies. In West Africa the leaders on the list are: Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Mali, Upper Volta/Burkina Faso, Benin, Nigeria. The only country which so far has not experienced the coup is the recently proclaimed independent state of Cape Verde Islands.

We have to admit that social unrest in distant rural provinces must not be a sufficient ground for a military drive to power. But given an existence of much more broader built-up of institutional mechanism offering a peaceful settlement of sur-



facing conflicts - the incidents of the reshuffle in the capitals by the use of force could be significantly reduced along with the consequent losses incurred to the nations. Any pretext for spectacular pacification seems good for the expanding military to grasp at power. Contemporary the basic line of social differentiation places at the top those who have access to power. In developing countries power leads to wealth contrary to the situation in western democracies. Despite the fact that power, wealth and influences are already well inter-related in African countries (UN Report, 1987), military coups secure the best short-cut access to power. No other way is so readily open due to the enormous advantage offered by technical and organizational effectiveness of the military. Until the end of 1947 only one black indigenous was commissioned army officer in the whole British West Africa and no more than 20 in the French African colonies. Since the independence day the process of multiplication started on accelerated rate. Military budget in all countries tend to expand on unprecedented scale in result of imitation of the European models without any rational justification or need but seemingly to satisfy the new rules of political competition along with the material desires and glamour of the growing new military caste. The armies grow without fighting wars and demand ever higher financial supplementations. In view of ethnic mosaic instead of homogenous nation practically all countries draft only volunteers for service. Professional officers seeking social promotion, quickly accommodated themselves to the new opportunities of drawing additional income out of the contract investments, construction operations, purchases of special equipments, transportation, spare parts storages, traveling abroad etc. In Nigeria during the first five years after independence number of armed forces officers increased seven times and after twenty years - several hundred times.

Disparities between the growing wants and real social and economic capacities are illustrated by the financial abilities to support national army in a less developed country, for example in Mali or Niger the cost of maintaining one soldier is estimated to be higher than total annual income of 100 labourers (Meredith 1985).

Army officers have entered into and mixed with civilian decision making urban elites (Morris 1980). Military groups due to their higher operational effectiveness possess the initiative for sudden change and ability to form brand new coalitions.

Legitimate goals set out for the military in the new nation-states involved uniting the society, fighting natural calamities, assisting in infrastructural investments (Wirz 1982). In spite of the above the ambitious and versatile officers posed a threat to domestic institutions, to social integration and rational use of national income. Since the officers caste gained the decisive or influential position in the internal life of many West African countries they become to compete with the civilians not only in politics but also in business through inventing their own confidential profits as e.g. border customs manipulations, importation of attractive commodities, illegal distribution of fuels, etc. Initially army officers tried their best to present to the public the viable explanation and excuse for their move to power. Recently according to the new code they restrain themselves from giving any extra-ordinary justifications.

Whatever orientations and political goals proclaimed - most important result for the nation of the military rule is negative. Military regimes proved to be unable to deal with the basic problems of the backward economies (Wallerstein 1976). The routine actions of a newly established military commands comprise firstly, accusations against the former regime of misconduct and secondly, obtaining new foreign loans for "stabilization and development projects". Decisive role is left for the foreign capital and that particular orientation oppose the ideas of decolonization (Accelerated ..., 1982). Credits are negotiable but extreme caution characterizes the talks on productive investments when a country is frequently rendered to be shaken by the internal social disorder. Military coup as a remedy for change and economic take-off actually does not lead to that end. Future selfdetermination of the unemployed in the rural areas may create a factor of new quality which may force a major turn-over in the dynamics of social change.

Backward economy can not sustain investments and is featured by the lack of innovative centres, then manufacturing industry is not developing and such a situation is characterized by increasing unemployment. Low standard of living and prolonged unemployment facilitate social unrest or even violent riots. Missing mechanism of social counsel and moderation calls for military dictatorship substitution. Military regime elevating its own supporters sow from the beginning the seeds of dissatisfaction and opposition. The economy remains in crisis as it was, new credits add to foreign indebtedness of a country and narrow that way its sovereignty. And that is exactly what is going on in the region: social perturbations, frequent military coups and permanent economic crisis (Green 1986). Rapid transformations always produce a sort of instability in public life. West African problem consist of discontinuities in social change and restructuralization and worsening of economic situation over too long period. Administrative and public institutional network is by far not adequately developed to cope with and to resolve the arising social conflicts.

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## A GEOGRAPHY OF REVOLUTION

We are concerned in this paper with marxist revolutions and shall not attend to rebellions, revolutions, or coups d'état that do not bear a marxist label. We are aware that marxist revolutions are supposed to be social revolutions, that is, to be societally transformational and not merely changes among factions within a ruling class, or violent changes of governance which leave the mode of production untouched. We are led by our professional "bias" as geographers to seek a locational logic in such occurrences. This paper is the presentation of an argument, rather than a detailed proof which would require an entire book.

### 1. The original thesis

The marxist model of revolution as originally stated was one in which the proletariat would rise, end the regime of the bourgeoisie, and institute a socialist order. I am not concerned at this point with all the arguments that ensued concerning the nature of the class struggle, between determinist and voluntarist interpretations, or between reformist and revolutionary viewpoints. The point I am concerned with is that the industrially-employed workingclass would become class conscious one way or another, as a result of its experience of capitalist labor relations, and, in so doing, would wage the class struggle and appropriate the expropriators.

Like all ideas, this one had a place of origin, which, rather significantly, was London, the very heart of the capitalist system of the mid-eighteen-hundreds. Like all ideas which diffuse, it has changed, not only because conditions change as time passes, but because the diffusion carries the idea into social environments different from those in which it originated. It is thus inevitable that it should be revised repeatedly. We cannot, in this paper, explore the question of how this idea, along with the rest of marxism, was spread, but we do want to note where it has resulted in the establishment of regimes which call themselves marxist.

## 2. From the Finland Station to Esteli

As is by now well-known, the Bolshevik Revolution was the first successful revolution considered marxist by both its proponents and its opponents. It is also well known that this event was a drastic departure from the expectations of classical marxist theory. One needs only recall that

a) it did not occur in a Core country, but in an empire that was semi-peripheral in some respects and peripheral in others;

b) although it had the potential for the establishment of a proletarian-cum-peasant regime, this potential was choked off deliberately and replaced by the dictatorship of a "vanguard" party which did not hesitate to suppress independent workingclass political expression, as well as dissent from other classes, thus creating a "new class" of rulers and a new social formation, the proper label for which has confounded the savants;

c) the Mensheviks, in accordance with classical marxist theory, argued (in vain, as we know) that the necessary infrastructure upon which to build a socialist society was not present, and therefore the results could not be socialist. Many of the difficulties now faced by the Soviet regime are attributed by many analysts to the consequences of precisely this state of affairs;

d) Rosa Luxemburg objected that its lack of democracy would endanger the whole enterprise, and the rise of Stalinism seems to

have confirmed her analysis;

e) furthermore, all subsequent analyses of this event, whether marxist or not, give evidence in support of the Great Man Theory of history, which is certainly contrary to marxism, for all point to the political genius of Lenin as the key ingredient in the success of the revolution. It is no wonder that some considered Lenin as much a blanquist in 1918 as a marxist.

In order to avoid imposing our conception of what "really" constitutes marxism and marxist revolutions, we accept, pragmatically, the idea that all revolutionary movements and all regimes which claim the label are marxist, regardless of their relationship, however, tenuous, to the ideas of classical marxism or any of its subsequent major versions.

We find that such revolutions manifest the following geography:

1. They occur in peripheral countries:
  - a) in countries with predominantly agrarian economies, with small, if any, industrial proletariat;
  - b) in countries in which the introduction of capitalist labor relations is recent;
2. They occur where imperial power has collapsed;
3. Their manifestations diverge increasingly from the original marxist conceptualization and a tendency toward "the degeneration of the revolution" exists.

The first revolution occurred in Russia toward the end of World War I. It was due, not to a mass proletarian uprising, but to the rare situation in which an imperial government had actually collapsed under the strain of a major war. Into the ensuing power vacuum came a Provisional Government. While it was floundering about in an effort to establish its authority and set policy, sufficient popular support from workers, peasants, and soldiers was gained by the Bolsheviks for them to seize power, first in only a few cities, and then more widely. They did not hesitate to



arrogate to themselves the right to speak on behalf of the proletariat, even in the face of working-class dissent. This they successfully struggled with over a period of years, along with foreign intervention and counterrevolutionary forces, and established the rule of a vanguard party over the economy and the polity of what came to be called the U.S.S.R.

This did not spark a proletarian revolution in the Core, as was hoped, but, instead, spread only to Mongolia and Tanna Tuva, which were even more economically underdeveloped than was Russia. This turned out to be a harbinger of future developments, both geographically and politically, for future successes have been in peripheral countries, and therefore in countries rather lacking the sort of workingclass about which Marx had theorized (see map).

Because the Chinese workingclass was concentrated in the large cities, especially on or near the coast, and these cities were controlled by the Nationalist forces (and, later, by the Japanese), the revolutionary forces were peasant forces, led by a marxist intelligentsia. Yugoslavia and Albania, in contrast to the rest of eastern Europe, established marxist regimes based on purely indigenous resistance forces which had opposed the Axis armies, but neither of these countries had a sizable industrial workingclass. Even Cuba could hardly be designated as semiperipheral, and the other countries which have "gone marxist" are even less developed. That means that marxist revolutions there cannot be called workingclass revolutions.

One can expect marxism to have its attractions for workers and peasants in peripheral countries because it offers hope of success in a struggle against economic and political hardships. Capitalist relations of production and capitalist ideologies have been rather recently introduced into such countries, and, consequently, capitalist conditions are a rather new experience. As capitalism advances (succeeds), it produces a sizable "middle" class, it improves the levels of living of some workers, and the "ideological hegemony of the bourgeoisie" prevails. In the early stages of the introduction of capitalism into a country (regard-

less of the stage of capitalist production that is brought in) one should therefore expect that employee militancy and anti-capitalist ideologies will co-occur. This was the experience of the Core countries when industrial capitalism emerged there. They now have only relict features of that phenomenon. Thus one can expect that whether there is resentment against foreign economic and political power, or against the disruption of traditional ways of living, or against capitalist labor relations, it may well find expression in marxist terms.

Marxist revolutions have also occurred where an imperium has collapsed. We have already noted this in regard to Russia. Portugal provides another case, but here, in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde, power passed to marxiste resisters to the imperial power because that power's army itself revolted against a failing war in the colonies and against the dictatorship in the home country. Old-style imperiums of that sort are now a thing of the past.

It is not our contention that all peripheral countries or all countries in which the government collapses will experience a marxist revolution, merely that it is such locations in the world system that provide the opportunity for such revolutions. These are the types of locales in which they have occurred. Research into the detailed history of each country is required to discover why some countries and not others have experienced a marxist revolution.

The third point to be noted is that there has been a tendency for marxist revolution to depart ever further from its original conceptualization. One such manifestation, it seems to me, can be called "the degeneration of the revolution". We noted that the first revolution, in Russia, departed from the theoretical formulation in that it relied heavily upon peasants as well as workers. The Chinese revolution marked an even further departure, as it was, for all intents and purposes, entirely peasant. The proletariat was not only a small portion of the "toiling masses" but could not participate until the revolution was in its final stage. In the case of Cuba we note that one does not need workers

or peasants, well organized on a class basis, one needs a populist revolution which shows signs of success and is then taken over. Finally we have the examples of Kampuchea under Pol Pot and Ethiopia under Mengistu, in which no workers, no peasants, no mass support at all is required, only a military cadre armed not only with guns but with marxist rhetoric. One has here a progression, or retrogression, from the postulation of a class-conscious industrial proletariat rising against capitalism to create a democratic socialist society to the actuality, after many changes in time and place, of a marxist dictatorship established by a putsch. These two last examples illustrate how far from the original idea a marxist revolution has strayed.

However, this tendency is not universal. Perhaps it will turn out to be an unfortunate aberration. The clearest example of a quite different development is to be found in Nicaragua. Here, again, we have a peripheral state, and, therefore, a small proletariat. Again, we have a proletariat which certainly was not organized behind marxiste banners before the revolution. But there was a dictator who dictated so ineptly that he managed to alienate the peasants, the workers, the students, the Church, and even the local bourgeoisie. No wonder the place exploded! However, the marxists had several years of guerilla experience behind them, and in program and modus operandi were closer to the workers and peasants than were the other participants in the revolution. Both the Church and the bourgeoisie were accustomed to operating "from the top down", and therefore lost out in the revolutionary situation. The Nicaraguan revolution differs from all the others we have referred to, so much so that it has been sharply criticized by some marxists. There is multiple leadership, so that the "cult of personality", which has afflicted so many marxist regimes, is avoided. There is ideological heterogeneity, as some Sandinist leaders are out-and-out leninists, and others take their marxism in the context of liberation theology. There has been an ecological awareness right from the beginning, and a definite effort to blunt traditional male chauvinism. There has been an economic policy of mixed privatism and statism, and an election in which proportional representation provided places for seven political

parties in the National Assembly, although it is not yet clear if a multi-party system will survive the strain under which the regime has had to struggle. All this suggests that we have not yet seen all the variations-on-a-theme that the marxist revolutionary potential in peripheral countries possesses.

### 3. Is a proletarian revolution possible?

Given the conditions under which revolutionary marxist regimes have emerged, and the changes that have occurred in marxism as it has diffused from its place of origin, can it be said that no socialist revolutionary movements based on a class-conscious proletariat desiring a democratic social order have emerged? Has nothing happened which at all closely approximates the original marxist conceptualization? The answer is that there have been two such instances, and almost a third.

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 is the best example. Here was a revolution that was clearly proletarian in nature: the most militant core of the revolutionary forces was the portion of the workingclass employed in heavy industry. The leadership and the followers were overwhelmingly workingclass and pro-socialism, some even considering themselves loyal members of the Communist Party. No revolution is "pure" and monolithic, and even Cardinal Mindszenty had hopes of restoring some sort of status quo ante, but such hopes remained ephemeral.

It is ironic that the sort of revolution Marx envisioned occurred under a regime which claimed allegiance to his ideas. However, a leninist government creates a situation which is far simpler than that of a capitalist one. There is essentially only one employer, not the multiplicity of capitalism. There is only one organization of political power, monopolizing the government and para-governmental agencies, not the variety of conflicting parties and jurisdictions which characterize bourgeois democracies. If there is severe cognitive dissonance between the ideological claims of the regime and the daily experiences of the workingclass, it is clear to the workers where the blame lies, and the Magyar

workingclass acted accordingly.

The second example was that of Solidarity in Poland. Again, this was essentially a workingclass phenomenon, with intellectual allies as usual, strong especially in the major centers of industry, in the coal and steel cities and the shipyards of Gdansk. The ideological composition of this movement was not as homogeneously marxist as that of Hungary, but it could hardly be correctly characterised as non- or anti-socialist. It came close to being a violent outburst, as had happened in Hungary.

Considered structurally, the Czech situation was quite similar, but the dissident or humanistic communists under Dubcek's leadership lacked the mass support which developed Poland, and therefore a revolutionary stage of development of the crisis did not occur. Suppression was greeted with very passive resistance, whereas in Poland it appears that there was a truly revolutionary situation, but "cooler heads prevailed".

My conclusion from this is that what is necessary for a marxist revolution of the sort Marx predicted is a leninist regime in a semi-peripheral country. The number of such countries as qualify is very small, and given the denouement of such movements, the probability is also very small.

#### 4. Contingency and indeterminate conjunctures

Marxists, despite their claims and hopes have not given us a body of knowledge than can be applied with anything approaching precision. At best, it provides useful approaches, concepts and insights, and clues as to some of the necessary questions that need to be asked, rather than answers one can trust one's fate to, as well as many dangerously erroneous interpretations of the classical texts. Despite all, including as well bourgeois political "science", the practice of politics remains an art. Some individuals and collectivities are more skillful at it than others. This is not to hold that scientific techniques are not valuable, but they apply only within a context that is as yet quite beyond the mastery of any social science.

Human history is open-ended (non-teleological). At any given moment there is such a multitude of changing variables that conjunctures are in part fortuitous, accidental, precarious balances of opposing forces in which slight changes can produce great consequences. Tell me history would have been the same had Lenin not reached the Finland Station, or if the population of towns such as Esteli had not swung their active support to the Sandinists! Had the attitudes and abilities of a few individuals in the Hungarian and Polish situations alluded to above been different, the conjuncture of forces would have produced quite different results. This does not mean that all is random, in which case no sense can be made of history. There are environmental and social-structural constraints upon the activities of change-agents and these are decisive. However, societal forces are manifested in the attitudes and behaviors of individuals in institutional settings, and these, too, are decisive. A human society is not a precise machine. Neither is a political movement. There is always leeway or "play" in the system, and it confounds prediction.

##### 5. In conclusion

If one accepts the tripartite Wallersteinian regionalization of the world system as a working hypothesis, the "Third World" or peripheral countries can be viewed as caught in a trap in which they are doomed to remain partly developed. Such economic development as occurs does so because of the advantages this brings to organizations external to those countries, ones located in the Core. Development can fade away or be subject to drastic changes, again having little or no connection to the domestic economic needs or political desires of a hapless peripheral country. Although bourgeois theory assumed that just as the Core developed, so also would the rest of the world, this does not seem to be happening. A few countries may change their position (for better or worse) but a major structural change of some sort apparently is needed if most of the underdeveloped countries are to improve their lot.

The political significance of this is that social unrest in peripheral countries will not cease. The whole world is now sufficiently integrated that a) capitalist relations of production intrude disruptively and increasingly upon traditional ways of living in even the remotest areas, and b) the "revolution of rising expectations" affects the educated portions of the population of all peripheral countries and the uneducated portions to varying degrees as well. Marxist ideas or ideas which pass as marxism are present in every country. Because such benefits of capitalism as the creation of an affluent and sizable bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie and obvious improvements in the level of living of at least a portion of the workingclass are difficult to achieve in peripheral countries, it is not unreasonable to expect that significant portions of the intelligentsia will seek an alternative ideology and will find a ready audience among part of the alienated of several classes. One should expect that the last of the marxist revolutions in peripheral countries is yet to come. The evidence before us indicates that the consequences thereof will be diverse. The Soviet dream that their modus operandi and their control of marxist-leninist movements could prevail was destroyed by the hard facts and precarious conjunctures of the real world. The dream of ruling circles in the U.S. that marxist revolutions could be prevented by military force has not been a success story, either, vide Vietnam. Indeed, reliance on military solutions can be taken as a sign of political and economic weakness (vide the S.U. in Afghanistan and the U.S. in Nicaragua).

Indeed, so great is the gap between theory and practice, so varied both the interpretation of theory and the formulation of national policy, and so insistent the nationalism which the veneer of radical rhetoric barely disguises, that it might well be more prudent for the superpowers to accept whatever rhetoric peripheral country regimes find congenial, and whatever organization of their political economy they choose, and concentrate on the development of such peaceful trade as is possible, avoiding ideological crusades which lead so easily to armed conflict without solving any real fundamental problems.

For the U.S. there is no guaranty that the creation of marxist revolutions can be prevented, or that they will be obedient client-states of the S.U. if they are successful. For the S.U. there is no guaranty that all peripheral countries will "go marxist" or that those that do will harken to Soviet desires eagerly or at all.

What does seem likely is that there will be no proletarian revolution in Core countries, and that whatever structural changes occur (since no structure is eternal) will be the result of conflicts related to, but far more complex than, class struggle.

That leaves us with the semi-peripheral countries. They tend to remain so, but it is not impossible for specific countries to change their status. If a country succeeds in joining the Core, the likelihood of a marxist revolution fades. If a country declines toward peripheral status, the political process may be violently disrupted, but there is no guaranty that that disruption will produce a marxist regime. We have also probably not seen the end of politics that does not easily fit the capitalist/communist dichotomy, Islamic fundamentalism being one such.

The relation of modes of production (as conceived by marxists) to politics is still not a clearly understood relationship. Certainly the capitalist mode of production co-exists with several differing political systems. Nor is it clear at this point how the capitalist or socialist (or state-party centrally-planned) modes of production are changing. The mode of production apparently must be understood, not as determining the polity, but as the central part of a societal structure to which politics must relate in some effective way, and which usually sets most of the problems the polity must attempt to solve or at least ameliorate. How this is best accomplished in detail in specific instances remains a set of contingencies wrapped in ipsecure conjunctures. The age of grand theory has passed and left us adrift.



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#### LEVEL OF LIVING, STATE AND THE GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDIES

In the course of a few last years the interest in the problems connected with level of living has been growing, mainly due to four crucial reasons: (1) drastic growth of differences in the level of living between the "North" and the "South"; (2) negative phenomena connected with the present phase of economic growth. This refers, first of all, to the rising unemployment, the rapid deterioration of the natural environment and increasing symptoms of social pathology such as criminality, alcoholism or drug addiction; (3) the feeling of alienation connected with the above mentioned phenomena; (4) the widening gap between the rate of economic growth and the rate of the level of living improvement.

These phenomena have led not only to the growth of interest in the problems connected with the standard of living, but also to an essential change in the way they are treated. These problems have been recognized as a wide phenomenon of not merely economic but also of social character. This fact means that the concept of the national income as a sufficient condition of a certain level of living and the satisfactory method of its measurement has been abandoned.

The fact of GNP not being an adequate measure of progress and the level of living combined with it, is due to a few reasons. First of all, the identifying of the notion of progress with economic growth is, unjustified. Economic growth is,

although an important one, only an element of progress in its broad sense. The notion of progress is nowadays viewed as a very broad category, mainly because of the changes in the model of life and the abandoning of the concept of homo oeconomicus in favour of satisfaction-seeking man.

This means that GNP does not reflect a number of elements strongly influencing the level of living like the sense of security, participation in the social life of a community, identification with the existing socio-economic system, family happiness etc. As M. Rakowski has rightly pointed out "... results of substituting the proper objective of economy - maximizing the nation's level of living in general with another objective - maximizing only this part of it which is included in the national product are socio-economically pernicious. With the ever existing and, in the period of economic difficulties, increasing scarcity of human and material resources for socio-economic growth, it is easiest to attain the maximizing of that element of the nation's level of living which is included in the national income (...), if expenditure on those level of living elements which are not incorporated into the national income are correspondingly minimized. Thus, an improperly defined or accomplished objective has to be accompanied by an improper structure of expenditure and be a constant integral cause of structural disproportions in the nation's level of living improvement in favour of those elements of it which are not incorporated into the national income"<sup>1</sup>.

There is one more reason for the national income not being a satisfactory measure of the level of living - GNP is an index of production and not of consumption, while the notion of level of living is connected with consumption above all.

Because of the above enumerated reasons the national income is a rather faulty measure of a country's achievements. Its use in comparative studies is very risky and usually leads to a far reaching adulteration. The crucial problem here is the method of converting various countries' national income into one currency, usually the US dollar. The most popular method is the one also employed by the World Bank, according to the official exchange

rates. This method, however, encounters a number of obstacles, the biggest of which is the fluctuation of exchange rates. That is why, making international comparisons, on the basis of the above mentioned method is very risky. Apart from the official exchange rate method, there are three other methods of calculating the GNP of various countries in US dollars<sup>2</sup>.

Table 1 compares GNP per capita of the United States and 33 selected countries of the world with the help of two methods - the purchasing power parity method (PPP) and the official exchange rate method (OER). The results obtained with these two methods differed not only in respect of the GNP level, but also in respect of the differences between various countries. Thus, for example, GNP per capita of the United States in 1975 equalled 7.120 dollars; India's GNP per capita calculated with the OER method was 140 dollars, and with the PPP method was 3,5 times greater and equalled 490 dollars. Therefore, the ratio of the US's and India's GNP per capita drops from 1:50 to 1:14. Thus, as can be seen, the OER method leads to exaggerating differences between countries. This refers mainly to developing countries, where the underestimation of GNP with the use of the OER method varied in 1975 from 49% (Zambia) to 265% (Sri Lanka). Also underestimated, although not to that degree, was the GNP of Italy (12%), Ireland (14%), Spain (36%), Great Britain (11%) and of the four east European countries presented in table 1. On the other hand, however, in the case of a few west European countries, the GNP calculated with the OER method was overestimated in comparison with the results obtained with the PPP method.

In spite of the evident faults of the OER method, this is still employed by the United Nations, the World Bank and various other organizations and private persons. This fact is due mainly to the input of work and costs involved in creating the data base necessary for employing the PPP method for calculating GNP.

Therefore it has to be stressed once again that GNP is only a measure of production. It is not, however, a satisfactory measure of welfare or level of living. This is not due to any "faults in the instrument" which can be eliminated, but to the fact that

Table 1. Two estimates of GNP per capita in 33 countries.  
1975 (United States = 100)

Countries	Official Exchange Rate Method (OER)	Purchasing Power Parity Method (PPP)	GNP calculated with the PPP method as per cent of GNP calculated with OER method
1	2	3	4
Kenya	3,4	6,6	195
Malawi	1,9	4,9	255
Zambia	6,9	10,3	149
India	2,0	6,6	322
Iran	22,1	37,7	171
Japan	62,3	68,4	110
Korea	8,1	20,7	254
Malaysia	10,9	21,5	198
Pakistan	2,6	8,2	312
Philippines	5,2	13,2	251
Sri Lanka	2,6	9,3	365
Syria	10,0	25,0	250
Thailand	5,0	13,0	261
Austria	69,8	69,6	100
Belgium	87,8	77,7	88
Danmark	104,5	82,4	79
France	89,6	81,9	91
GFR	94,7	83,0	88
Hungary	29,6	49,6	168
Ireland	37,2	42,5	114
Italy	47,9	53,8	112
Luxemburg	90,2	82,0	91
Holland	84,5	75,2	89
Poland	36,0	50,1	139
Roumania	24,3	33,3	137
Spain	41,0	55,9	136
Great Britain	57,6	63,9	111
Yugoslavia	23,2	36,1	156
Brazil	16,0	25,2	158
Colombia	7,9	22,4	283
Jamaica	19,6	24,0	123
Mexico	20,4	34,7	170
Uruguay	18,2	39,6	217

Source: Kravis I., et al., 1982, World Product and Income: International Comparisons of Real Gross Product, Baltimore.

communities function not only in the economic, but also in the social and cultural sphere.

Calling in question the concept of GNP as a satisfactory level of living measure has led to either the partial or complete abandonment of it in the studies of level of living problems. These studies developed in three main directions.

The first one consists of attempts to transform GNP into a welfare measure. Among others, William Nordhaus and James Tobin tried to do this in 1973. According to them, "An obvious shortcoming of GNP is that it is an index of production, not consumption. The goal of economic activity after all, is consumption. Although this is the central premise of economics, the profession has been slow to develop, either conceptually or statistically, a measure of economic performance oriented to consumption, broadly defined and carefully calculated. We have constructed a primitive and experimental "measure of economic welfare (MEW), in which we attempt to allow for the more obvious discrepancies between GNP and economic welfare"<sup>3</sup>.

In constructing the MEW, Nordhaus and Tobin modified the existing system of national accounts in three major ways: (1) they reclassified expenditures; (2) they imputed values for the services of consumer capital, household activities, and leisure; and (3) they allowed for some of the disamenities of industrialization and urbanization.

The proposal has produced considerable controversy. Some of its major critics fear that such modifications will dilute the usefulness of GNP as a measure of production while misleading the public into supposing that GNP measures social welfare or the level of living<sup>4</sup>. Irrespective of those objections, however, it has to be stated that even a thus modified GNP is not a satisfactory measure of the level of living, and mainly because this does not account for many elements influencing the level of living in its broad sense.

Recognizing the level of living to be not only an economic but also a social phenomenon has led many researchers to completely abandon the concept of GNP and substitute this with a sepa-



rate system of information to measure and characterize the level and changes in the level of living.

In this stream of level of living studies there can be distinguished two main trends.

The first of them, widely discussed in L. Zienkowski's paper, consists in taking into account new elements when calculating GNP, real community income and total consumption of goods and services by the people<sup>5</sup>. The effect of such a procedure is a quantitative measure which Zienkowski calls an Economic Welfare Measure (EWM). The notion is defined as "a sum of the consumption and accumulation of material goods and services, and non-material values in all sectors; it can also be narrowed to the household sector only..."<sup>6</sup>.

Without going into details of the EWM construction and the discussions accompanying it, it should be stated that: (1) EWM is a value expressed characteristic and therefore is only an element of the category of level of living; (2) a growth of consumption and accumulation does not necessarily have to generate an improvement in the level of living. In many cases this causes negative phenomena to appear. In other words, economic growth and the accompanying it growth of consumption and accumulation in the process of civilization evolution can, and often does, lead to the dehumanization of living and the occurrence of phenomena of a pathological character. And this fact greatly depreciates economic achievements; (3) when constructing the economic welfare measure it is assumed that the bulk of goods and services at disposal is equivalent to welfare, which is doubtful in a situation when access to them is unequal; (4) in accepting money pricing, with the economic welfare measure we actually measure the stream of goods and services at the disposal of a given community and not the effects of their use. In other words, with the help of EWM we measure what a given socio-economic system can offer, and not the final effects of its functioning; (5) grave doubts are evoked by the fact of counting in plus, while computing EWM, health service expenses without stating in what part they are

allocated to recreating health lost through the faulty functioning of a socio-economic structure (accidents, alcoholism, drug addition etc.), and in what part to the purpose of improving health lost through biological phenomena, and at last, in what part for the prevention of health decline i.e., profilactics. The high health costs tell us nothing about the level of health because they do not measure it. The situation is the same in the case of expenditure on administration, the industrial-military complex, police etc., taken into account while calculating the EWM.

Hence it is clear that the accepting of money pricing when constructing the EWM leads not only to narrowing the subject area of the concept to those phenomena which can be priced, but also to a far reaching adulteration. Moreover, as was the case with GNP, doing comparative studies with the use of EWM is extremely risky. Defining, however, whether the level of economic welfare measured with the use of EWM is high or low is not possible without referring to comparative studies.

The other trend in studies on the level of living, know as the "social indicators movement" and represented by such authors and institutions as J.Drewnowski, Knox, Smith, UNRISD or the Institute of Social Economy of the Main School of Planning and Statistics (Warsaw), consists in calculating various non-value objective measures characterising a level of living.

Despite some differences and diversities in the opinions of various authors, they agree on the level of living definition. Thus, for example Jan Drewnowski in his paper of 1974 gave the following definition: "The level of living is the level of satisfaction of the needs of the population assured by the flow of goods and services enjoyed in a unit of time"<sup>7</sup>. Apart from the fact that this formulation is of a tautological character, it is not actually a definition but only a description of the frame and concept of a level of living measurement.

As can thus be seen, the nucleus of this trend of studies is the concept of need. Therefore the authors, more or less arbitrarily, discriminate - in their opinion - basic spheres of life,

which together form - the usually instinctively understood - level of living. Next, for every sphere of life a complex of measures-representatives is chosen (usually 3-4 measures) which serve as the basis for calculating the indices qualifying the level of living in a given sphere (partial indices). In many cases they are aggregated, which results in a synthetic level of living index.

The most widely known attempt at calculating level of living with the use of the above method was undertaken in the mid 60s by UNRISD and is known as the Geneva Method<sup>8</sup>. Its authors discriminated seven basic groups of needs (see table 2). Then, in order to calculate the level of the need provision in each of the groups, with the purpose selection method, they chose appropriate measures - representatives.

The most important feature of the Geneva Method is the introduction of threshold indices. The method differentiates the minimum threshold indices corresponding to biological survival and cultural ignorance, and maximum threshold indexes corresponding to the full satisfaction of material and cultural needs. The measurement method consists in placing each of the selected measures - representatives on a scale the limits of which are defined by the threshold indices fixed for every measure. For those measures for which it is possible to do so, the level of each need satisfaction is corrected with diffusion randomness indices. The more random its diffusion, the lower the level of the need satisfaction. Then, using special weighting methods, a satisfaction level index is calculated for every group of needs (expressed in percentage of provision), and the next synthetic level of the living index is computed.

UNRISD proposals, which after, a number of modifications, were employed in Poland also by A. Luszczewicz and the Group for Population level of Living Measurement in the Institute of Social Economy of the Main School of Planning and Statistics, provoked a lively discussion<sup>9</sup>. The discussion concentrated on five basic problems: (1) method of need groups discrimination and choosing measures-representatives; (2) method of giving weight to measures

and need groups; (3) rules and possibilities of fixing minimum and maximum threshold values of material and cultural needs satisfaction; (4) connection between the level of living defined in the Geneva Method and its followers as a level of need satisfaction and level of living sensu largo; (5) applicability limits of the proposed by UNRISD method of level of living measurement.

Table 2. Alternative criteria of level of living

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1. <u>United Nations</u>	2. <u>UNRISD</u>
a. Health	a. Nutrition
b. Food and Nutrition	b. Housing
c. Education	c. Health
d. Condition of work	d. Education
e. Employment	e. Recreation
f. Aggregate consumption and savings	f. Social security
g. Transportation	g. Material stock
h. Housing condition	
i. Clothing	
j. Recreation and entertainment	
k. Social security	
l. Human freedom	
3. <u>Drewnowski</u>	4. <u>OECD</u>
a. Nutrition	a. Health
b. Clothing	b. Education
c. Shelter	c. Employment and the quality of working life
d. Health	d. Time and leisure
e. Education	e. Personal economic situation
f. Leisure	f. Physical environment
g. Security	
h. Social environment	
i. Physical environment	

- g. Social environment
- h. Personal safety
- i. Social opportunity and participation
- j. Accessibility

5. United States

- a. Income, wealth and employment
- b. The living environment
- c. Health
- d. Education
- e. Social order
- f. Social belonging
- g. Recreation and leisure

6. Zienkowski (Poland)

- a. Nutrition
- b. Health
- c. Education
- d. Housing and environment
- e. Leisure
- f. Culture
- g. Employment and condition of work
- h. Social security
- i. Public order and personal safety
- j. Distribution of income, consumption and wealth
- k. Social stratification and mobility
- l. Family and sex

7. Knox

- a. Housing
- b. Health
- c. Education
- d. Social status
- e. Employment
- f. Wealth
- g. Leisure
- h. Social security
- i. Social stability

In L. Zienkowski's opinion, the proposed by UNRISD and Institute of Social Economy groups of needs overlook a number of vital aspects which, he thinks, greatly influence the level of living formation. They are problems connected with: (1) work and its conditions; (2) environment and its pollution; (3) family; (4) security; (5) social mobility<sup>10</sup>.

Similar postulates were formulated by J. Drewnowski. But, contrary to Zienkowski, he does not consider work to be one of the needs, assuming that it only allows for acquiring a certain income<sup>11</sup>. It would seem that such an approach is unacceptable. Work is not only a source of income, but also of satisfaction; it gives the feeling of self-realization and of being a member of local and professional community. Unemployment, however, may, and actually does, lead to a feeling of alienation and frustration which in turn, lead to the phenomenon of social pathology.

Serious doubts are evoked by the choice of many measures - representatives. According to a number of authors quite a few of those measures say nothing about the actual aspects of level of living and many simply adulterate the reality.

Most often criticized is the widely used measure of a number of physicians per number of inhabitants, which is assumed to reflect the level of health. In the opinion of M. Carley, such a measure reflects the expense on improving a population's health service and not the health level<sup>12</sup>. Population health depends on

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Source: UN, 1954, Report on International Definition and Measurement of Standards of Living: Report by Committee of Experts, New York; Drewnowski J., 1974, On Measuring and Planning the Quality of Life, Hague; Drewnowski J., Scott W., 1966, The Level of Living Index, UNRISD Research Notes 4, Geneva; DECD, 1986, Measuring Social Well-being; A progress Report on the Development of Social Indicators, Paris; Smith D.M., 1973, The Geography of Social Well-being in the United States: An Introduction to Territorial Social Indicators, New York; Zienkowski L., 1979, Poziom zycia. Metody mierzenia i oceny, Warszawa; Knox P.L., 1975, Social Well-being: A Spatial Perspective, Oxford.

a whole complex of factors such as, for example, income level, environmental pollution, diet, working conditions etc. According to I. Illich a greater number of physicians is a sign of a lower health level<sup>13</sup>. Another, equally controversial example is, almost universally employed, usually when referring to less developed regions, measure of accessibility to such communal amenities as clear water, sanitation, bathroom, WC etc. As was the case with the measure of a number of physicians, such measures do not provide any information about the sanitary consequences of the lack of access to those amenities.

These examples illustrate, the so often stressed in literature, problem of choosing measures - representatives so that they reflected effects, not expenditures.

Particularly widely disputed is the normative character of UNRISD's approach to fixing minimum and maximum thresholds of need satisfaction. Objections to normativeness can be roughly divided into two groups. The first is connected with the subjectivity of fixing a threshold which, as O.E. Niitamo has rightly pointed out, may be a tool of manipulation<sup>14</sup>. Therefore, as can be seen, this objection refers not only to the method of establishing minimum and maximum thresholds of need satisfaction, but also to the method of need groups discrimination and the choice of measures - representatives. Defining a certain level of living is therefore connected with the very serious risk of adulteration which can be particularly obvious when making dynamic analyses.

The other group of objections to the normative character of UNRISD's proposal can be formulated as follows: is it necessary or even possible and right to fix any norms when analysing a level of living? Does this not confine our research area both in its time and space aspects?

The dynamic development of research on social indicators and level of living has been due to the fact that a number of sociologists and economists as well as governments of many countries have realised that level of living in its broad sense is, slowly but inevitably, becoming the only sensible measure of a socio-economic system's functioning effectivity. It has thus become ne-

cessary to create certain information files which could be used both for amending the already existing faults and dangers, and for planning purposes. Social indicators have, therefore, become an important data base used for planning and for conducting socio-economic policy. "Qualification of a level of living is not (however - F.S.) possible nor justified without the prior assumption of certain reference points"<sup>15</sup>. A reference point can be, for example, the situation of the previous year or a few years ago, or, as is the case with UNRISD's proposal, minimum and maximum thresholds. This would allow, according to followers of the normative approach, for the evaluation of results of the conducted socio-economic policy.

This kind of approach, justified in operational studies, is accompanied by grave dangers and severe cognitive limitations. The first and most often cited objection is whether it is possible to establish any thresholds, especially a maximum threshold for need satisfaction. It carries the possibility of manipulating numbers, a fact which may slow down the development of certain level of living elements.

Fixing thresholds, i.e., the normative approach, makes it more difficult to conduct dynamic analyses. Since what is a norm today will no longer be one in a year's time, not to mention what is going to happen in 5 or 10 years.

This kind of approach also blocks the making of any international comparisons. As Zienkowski has pointed out "Majority of needs are however variable in time and within one society different, depending on a person's status in the social structure and on his biological features. Needs are also a par excellence historic category, variable in time and space, dependent on level of development and the whole treasury of cultural heritage and on the accepted social and moral norms formed in the process of the social acquisition of need patterns"<sup>16</sup>, Need satisfaction, identical in their statistical shape; may in each country (region) mean something else, or, in other words, they are dependent on the local character and conditions. The distance method is there-



fore more useful for analysing the level of living of population (...) on the scale of a country and its regions than on an international scale"<sup>17</sup>.

Therefore, the normative approach, represented also by UNRISD, largely confines or even blocks attempts at comparative analyses on a global scale, which could be a very interesting research area for social geography.

Overcoming the above mentioned barriers will, I think, be possible when a definition of level of living is appropriately transformed through establishing conditions which would have to be observed while choosing diagnostic features describing level of living, and through the appropriate establishing of points of reference.

Therefore the level of living as a complex and integrated characteristic of a person's status in various socio-economic systems, reflecting the level of his social freedom, the possibility his full development, access to material, cultural and spiritual values can be said to be a socio-economic category. This category should therefore reflect the effects of a socio-economic system's functioning.

A thus formulated level of living definition must be followed by defining the assumptions which should be fulfilled while choosing diagnostic features so that it would be possible to make international comparative studies. The assumptions are as follows: (1) there is no single universal development model nor, a connected with it, a unified, universal hierarchy of values; (2) it is therefore necessary to abstract from the locally or regionally preferred style of living or values hierarchy; (3) the employed diagnostic features should reflect results not expenditure.

If anyone succeeds in choosing diagnostic features fulfilling the above listed conditions and in fixing for them suitable reference points limiting the line on which various countries will be placed, a new research area for geography will open up.

Notes

<sup>1</sup> Rakowski M., 1976, Pojęcie, wycena i analiza poziomu życia (The notion, pricing and analysis of the level of living). *Ekonomista*, 3, p. 484.

<sup>2</sup> Por. Barlow R., 1977, A Test of Alternative Methods of Making GNP Comparisons, *The Economic Journal*, 87, pp. 450-459; Kravis L.B., Heston A.W., Summers R., 1978, Real GNP Per Capita for More Than One Hundred Countries, *The Economic Journal*, 88, pp. 215-242.

<sup>3</sup> Nordhaus W., Tobin J., 1973, Is Growth Obsolete? (in:) Moss M. (ed.) *The Measurement of Economic and Social Performance, Studies in Income and Wealth*, 38, p. 512.

<sup>4</sup> See for example: Denison E.F., 1971, Welfare Measurement and the GNP, *Survey of Current Business*, 51, 1, p. 13; Okun A.M., 1978, Should GNP Measure Social Welfare, *The Brookings Bulletin*, 8, 3, pp. 4-7.

<sup>5</sup> Zienkowski L., 1979, Poziom życia. Metody mierzenia i oceny (The level of living. The methods of measurement and evaluation). Warszawa.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Drewnowski J., 1974, On Measuring and Planning the Quality of Life, Hague-Paris, p. 35.

<sup>8</sup> UNRISD, 1966, *The Level of Living Index*, Raport No 4. Geneva; Mc Granahan D.V. et al., 1970, *Content and Measurement of Socio-Economic Development: An Empirical Inquiry*, UNRISD, Geneva.

<sup>9</sup> Luszniwicz A., 1977, Efekty społeczne jako podstawa mierzenia poziomu życia ludności (The Social effects as a base for the measurement of the level of living of the people). *Ekonomista*, 4, pp. 831-851.

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MEASURING POLITICAL DISTANCE:  
INTERDEPENDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL WHEAT TRADE

1. Concepts of distance

Traditionally, the concept of distance was applied to the difference in location in physical space, which in geography was the earth's surface. In geographical research of the recent decades, new concepts of relative or functional distances and spaces have emerged. Cost, time, perception have become new dimensions which create distinct spaces. According to R. Abler, J. Adams, P. Gould (1972, p. 72-73), "the shift to a relative spatial context ... is probably the most fundamental change in the history of geography". We now use concepts of economic distance, time distance, social or political distance, cognitive distance etc. These relate to the difference in location in functional spaces.

In fact, there are many relations that may be regarded conceptually as having distance-like properties. Gatrell (1983, p. 35) calls them proximities and makes a distinction between an attribute proximity and interaction proximity. Attribute proximity refers to the measurement and comparison of the attributes of objects or places in a given space. The objects or places which have similar properties are thought to be close to each other.

The interaction proximity, on the other hand, is measured by the intensity of flows of people, commodities, information or energy between given locations. Whenever the interaction between

them is large. The greater the volume of interaction, the lower the distance between the places concerned. In this sense, two places are close or near not because they are similar or are located near each other, but because they interact intensively.

Political distance can be conceived in terms of both attribute similarity or interaction proximity. In this paper the latter concept will be applied. The intensity of interaction, and more specifically the measures referring to the international grain trade, will serve as indicators of political proximity between nations. The author hopes that the measures introduced in the paper will contribute to a better understanding of political distance between nations. By no means, however, are they meant to provide universal measures of political distance applicable under all circumstances.

## 2. Measuring and explaining interaction proximity

In evaluating the volume of interaction, one is inclined to search for a point of reference, a norm against which it would be possible to assess the intensity of actual interaction.

In the early studies of spatial interaction, particularly in gravity type modelling, the volume of interaction was analysed in terms of the masses of an origin ( $M_i$ ) and a destination of flows ( $M_j$ ) and a function of a distance variable between them ( $d_{ij}$ ).

$$T_{ij} = f(M_i, M_j) f(d_{ij})$$

In more recent and advanced modelling studies, the interaction between two places is influenced simultaneously by all the masses and distances composing a given spatial system (Wilson 1970, Alonso 1976). If  $M_i$  is assumed to be the total outflow from the place of origin ( $M_i = T_i = \sum_j T_{ij}$ ), and  $M_j$  - the total inflow into the place of destination ( $M_j = T_j = \sum_i T_{ij}$ ), the modern formula of interaction modelling becomes:

$$T_{ij} = k_i k_j T_i T_j f(x_{ij})$$

$$k_i = \frac{1}{\sum_j k_j T_j f(x_{ij})}$$

$$k_j = \frac{1}{\sum_i k_i T_i f(x_{ij})}$$

where:

$k_i, k_j$  = balancing factors closely related with the potentials of  $i$  and  $j$ ,

$$T_i = \sum_j T_{ij},$$

$$T_j = \sum_i T_{ij},$$

$f(x_{ij})$  = a function of distance variable (physical distance, time, cost of movement).

In order to achieve a matrix of hypothetical flows not influenced by the pattern of distance variables, we must assume  $f(x_{ij}) = 1$ . Then the above formula becomes:

$$\hat{T}_{ij} = \frac{T_i T_j}{\sum T_{ij}}.$$

In this form the formula is a simple expression of probabilistic principles. Each hypothetical flow  $\hat{T}_{ij}$  can be considered as a product of independent random occurrences. With the absence of any resistance factors in the interaction process, each expected flow  $\hat{T}_{ij}$  is determined only by the volumes of flows generated at  $i$  and that received at  $j$ <sup>1</sup>. The expected flows will, thus, be at the "independence level".

Having established a matrix of expected flows  $\{\hat{T}_{ij}\}$  the next step is to compare real flows  $T_{ij}$  with their hypothetical equiva-

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<sup>1</sup> The probabilistic approach was introduced in gravity modeling by several authors in the 1950s. For an early review and presentation of the approach see Isard (1960).

lents  $\hat{T}_{ij}$ . The ratio  $\frac{T_{ij}}{\hat{T}_{ij}}$  shows the relative intensity of interaction between  $i$  and  $j$ .

One might expect a distribution of flows on pure probability principles only if there was no resistance of interaction between all the places of origin and destination. However, the expected flows do not, in general, coincide with the observed flows. In reality a potential flow (commodity transaction, migration movement, information transfer etc.) comes across a number of barriers and preferences which form a resistance matrix  $\{R_{ij}\}$  between origins and destinations. Any resistance factor  $R_{ij}$  between a pair of places is composed of a number of elementary resistances and preferences, which include physical distance, cost, time, information availability, accessibility, intervening opportunities etc.

$$R_{ij} = \sum_{k=1}^m R_{ijk}$$

where

$R_{ijk}$  = elementary resistance/preference between  $i$  and  $j$ .

As the individual resistance/preference factors  $R_{ijk}$  are not distributed evenly across the field of interaction they distort the expected (hypothetical) pattern of flows.

The individual barriers and preferences may also be visualized as relative distances in various dimensions between origins and destinations. If these barriers and preferences could be effectively transformed into distances or proximities, a multidimensional distance between each origin and destination would be created.

$$D_{ij} = \sum_{k=1}^m d_{ijk}$$

where

$d_{ijk}$  = elementary distance in  $k$  dimension between  $i$  and  $j$ .

The concept of effective distance has been introduced long ago (Deutsch, Isard 1961) but the operationalization of the concept has proved to be difficult. Instead, in geographical studies, particularly in gravity type modelling, the assumption has

been usually made that physical distance reflects to a sufficient degree other functional distances. In other words, it is assumed that a number of barriers to interaction increases with physical distance. In numerous studies of spatial interaction, particularly at inter-regional or local scale, physical distance, and sometimes cost or time distance, are used to explain the diverging ratios of real to expected flows  $\frac{T_{ij}}{T_{ij}^e}$ . The problem of distance decay, the choice of an appropriate mathematical function to measure the friction of distance have become central themes of research in geographical studies of spatial interaction.

### 3. Interaction studies at international level

When interaction flows cross national borders, new and different factors have to be considered. This is reflected in research on international migration or commodity flows.

First of all, much more attention is given to the analysis of the relative interaction intensities themselves. In the studies of international trade a number of coefficients measuring trade preferences have been introduced and widely recognized. The best known are the  $\delta$  (delta) coefficient  $\delta_{ij} = \frac{T_{ij}}{T_{ij}^e}$ , relative acceptance coefficient  $RA_{ij} = \frac{T_{ij} - T_{ij}^e}{T_{ij}}$ , mutual information  $t_{ij} = \log \delta_{ij}$  (for a review see Kotyński 1979). These coefficients are used in modelling and predicting trade flows.

At the level of explanation, it is evident that the role of physical distance is much less satisfactory in explaining international commodity flows. Models of international trade include, along with physical distance, institutional and political factors as explanatory variables (Linneman 1966, Johnston 1976). Maciejewski (1981, p. 95) in his econometric study of international trade among 10 groups of countries has found that the role of physical distance in explaining the flows of trade is several times smaller than that of institutional barriers. Furthermore, that role of physical distance declined substantially over the period 1954-1970.



Johnston (1976, p. 84) in one of the rare studies of foreign trade made by geographers (see also Freeman 1973) states that "distance - as a surrogate for cost, time information and opportunities - influences decisions on where goods should be obtained from or sent to". Yet "in very few cases was a majority of the variation in flows accounted for by the distance variable" (ibid., p. 77). Those conclusions refer to total trade flows. In more disaggregated, specialized commodity flows, however, "distance ... proves to be relatively unimportant predictor of commodity trade flows in the total interaction model, once the influence of size of trading partner and membership of various trade blocs is held constant" (ibid., p. 91).

It is evident that in international trade relative intensity of trade flows is conditioned largely by institutional and political factors. These factors, acting as deterrents and preferences, create functional distances, which in their turn reflect the pattern of political distances between nations. The influence of political factors is even greater in international trade in certain commodities which have acquired certain strategic importance. The next paragraph should make this point clearer.

#### 4. The role of distance in international wheat trade

International trade in wheat forms a network of flows of varying intensity between individual nations. It may be assumed that the relative intensities of wheat trade can be attributed to different and changing distances between the nations concerned<sup>2</sup>. Distances, however, should be understood in their multidimensional context.

What are the most important distance variables that influence the flows of wheat at international level? It seems they can be grouped into two categories.

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<sup>2</sup> We take no account of the differences in wheat quality, which may influence trade preferences, particularly in favour of Canada.

The first group of variables includes transport cost, time and cognitive distances, which usually are thought to be proportional to physical distance.

The other group includes pricing, credit policies, institutional preferences or barriers, which altogether can be associated with political distances.

Starting with cognitive distance, it is evident that in present-day wheat trade information availability is no longer a limiting factor. The product (wheat) is largely uniform, the number of important suppliers is rather small, and the modern techniques of communication provide sufficient information on even the most distant potential partners.

Time distance or the period between placing an order and the actual arrival of goods is also an important factor from an importer's point of view (Konandreas 1978, p. 13). However, the relation between time of delivery and physical distance between two partners is not usually so simple. The practice of emergency food supplies coordinated by FAO (Konandreas - personal communication), has shown that it is administrative procedures that are most time consuming and not actual transport of grain. An efficient marketing and administrative system is now the most important factor in cutting the time of delivery.

The cost of transport is a variable which is most often assumed to grow with physical distance, but again the actual relation is more complicated. The nature of route (land, river, sea) plays an important role. Even if we confine ourselves to sea transport, by far the most common in international wheat trade, the freight structures are not always proportional to distance.

Generally, the freight rates are lower when wheat is shipped along main routes, with extra preference for Europe. In 1987, for example, it cost more than 20 USD to ship 1 ton of grain across the Pacific from Vancouver to Yokohama (4216 nautical miles), while the respective figure for the shipment across the Atlantic from New Orleans to Rotterdam (4813 miles) averaged around 10 USD per ton (International Wheat Council, Market Report 160, 1987).

Even along the same route, the freight rates to different ports may fluctuate widely. In July 1988, for example, it was cheaper to ship grain from US Gulf to Black Sea (6700 miles) than to Morocco (4500 miles) (IWC Market Report 169, 1988).

Probably the most surprising example of the divergence between physical distance and the freight rate applies to shipments from Australia to Western Europe. The freight rates from Sydney to England are usually the same or sometimes even lower than similar rates from Sydney to India. Yet the distance to London is exactly double that to India.

Estimating the cost of shipping grain from one country to another gets complicated when there are two or more sea ports available. The cost of internal transport must then be considered. For instance, in estimating the cost of shipping grain from France to Egypt one naturally takes the distance between southern French ports (Sete, Marseille) and Alexandria.

The study made by INRA/ENSA research group from Montpellier (Les échanges ... 1987) shows that the problem is more complex. It appears that inland transport costs are relatively high, and therefore it is cheaper to send grain from wheat producing regions to northern or western French ports and from there to ship it to Egypt. In such a situation which distance from France to Egypt should be considered? The difference is substantial: it is 1400 miles from Marseille to Alexandria, but as long as 3000 miles from Rouen.

The pattern of transport costs can thus be quite different from that of physical distances between nations. Summing up, it seems that in explaining the pattern of wheat trade, physical distance can only be a very crude surrogate for cost, time and information variables. Other factors, which reflect international power structure and political interdependences, play an important - if not decisive - role in determining mutual preferences in wheat trade.

Food supply has always been a matter of concern for governments and political leaders. Natural fluctuations in agricultural production create potential insecurity. To ensure satisfactory

levels of food supply and/or farming incomes, governments throughout the world intervene, though in different ways and degrees, in the process of production and marketing of food. The power of the state to regulate food flows is probably the strongest at national border. Duties, export and import licencing, price subsidies and taxes, trade embargoes, food aid and state trading have been traditional measures used to encourage, restrict or divert food flows across national borders.

Among food items traded internationally, grains and wheat in particular have acquired political significance. There are a number of reasons for that. Wheat is consumed nearly all over the world, it can be easily stocked, transported and distributed. It is an effective means of solving both emergencies and structural deficiencies in food supply, for which all government are held responsible. The spectrum of political measures to influence trade flows ranges from a total embargo to free shipments of grain within food aid programmes. Normally, government policies do not take such extreme forms, but political factors are nevertheless present in most transactions of wheat trade. In a market where occasional shortages on a world scale (mid 1970s) are followed by relative oversupply (mid 1980s), political interventions are bound to be strong.

In the mid 1980s, the interference of political factors in market forces is so great that we can hardly use a notion of a world wheat market. This market is fragmented into distinct segments, where completely different prices prevail (Tubiana 1984). The concessions (subsidies, rebates) given to selected countries may reduce current market prices by half, diverting effectively traditional wheat flows and eliminating previous suppliers. Price reductions of this magnitude can easily overrule any differences in transport costs, which normally do not exceed 10% of wheat prices. In real decision making, the choice of partners in wheat trade goes far beyond pure technical or economic considerations. It can be therefore hypothesized that the pattern of wheat trade reflects, to a considerable degree, the structure of political interdependences between nations. The empirical evidence presen-

ted in the next paragraph should make this point clear.

## 5. International preferences in wheat trade: empirical analysis

### 5.1. The data and methodology

The approach used here to identify and to measure international preferences follows the discussion presented earlier in the paper. The point of departure is a distribution of the observed wheat flows between individual countries, including their total exports and imports of wheat. For this we need data in a matrix form, so that each flow can be identified by its origin and destination.

The data on wheat trade have been obtained from the computerized data bank in the Food and Agriculture Organization head office in Rome. Numerous inconsistencies, which often occur in reporting the same transactions by exporters and importers, had been already adjusted by FAO. Other corrections, particularly referring to the trade of the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, have been introduced by the author of this paper. In the correction process, several sources were used, including the publications of International Wheat Council, OECD Statistics of Foreign Trade, and the statistical yearbooks of individual countries.

The data cover two periods: 1970-72 and 1980-82. They are recalculated to form three-year averages. This should have eliminated some, if not most, of the year-to-year variability in volume and distribution of flows among individual countries.

In order to achieve a clear picture of the pattern, small and occasional exporters were eliminated from the analysis. The limit was fixed at 1 million ton of wheat exports, which equals approximately 1 per cent of the world wheat trade. Among importing countries, 148 nations were included, with only the marginal importers left aside. Altogether the flows covered by the analysis make approximately 97 per cent of the total volume of international wheat trade.

On the basis of total volumes of wheat exports and imports of each country, it is possible to establish a matrix of expected flows at the independence level. The distribution of predicted flows will be determined by the joint probability of independent random events.

It is assumed that the wheat trade for each period is composed of a large number of individual shipments (transactions). The ex post probability that an individual shipment originates from exporter  $i$  is equal to its export share ( $p_i = \frac{x_{i.}}{\sum x_{ij}} = \frac{x_{i.}}{X_{..}}$ ) in wheat trade. Similarly, the ex post probability that an individual consignment reaches importer  $j$  is equal to its import share  $p_j = \frac{x_{.j}}{\sum x_{ij}} = \frac{x_{.j}}{X_{..}}$ .

Following probability principles, each hypothetical flow is thought to be a product of two independent occurrences. Thus, the probability ( $p_{ij}$ ) that an elementary consignment flows from exporter  $i$  to importer  $j$  is equal to the product of export share of country  $i$  and of import share of country  $j$  ( $p_{ij} = p_i p_j$ ). Such a distribution of expected flows will be at independence level. It means that if - for example - an exporter has 30 per cent share in world wheat exports, we expect each importing country to buy 30 per cent of its own imports from that particular exporter.

The absolute volume of expected flow from  $i$  to  $j$  is:

$$x_{ij} = p_i p_j X_{..} = \frac{x_{i.}}{X_{..}} \cdot \frac{x_{.j}}{X_{..}} \cdot X_{..} = \frac{x_{i.} \cdot x_{.j}}{X_{..}}$$

The distribution of real flows is usually different from the hypothetical one. Following remarks made earlier in the paper, for each pair of countries a  $\delta$  (delta) coefficient can be calculated, measuring the ratio of the observed ( $x_{ij}$ ) to the expected volume of trade.

$$\delta_{ij} = \frac{x_{ij}}{\hat{x}_{ij}}$$

where  $x_{ij}$  = observed flow of wheat from  $i$  to  $j$   
 $\hat{x}_{ij}$  = expected flow of wheat from  $i$  to  $j$

If  $\delta_{ij}$  equals 1, the trade between the two countries is at the expected level. If  $\delta_{ij} > 1$ , it indicates higher than expected intensity of trade between a pair of countries. Thus, it implies preference in mutual trade relations. The opposite situation prevails when  $\delta_{ij} < 1$ .

The analysis which follows is of a preliminary nature. The main objective is to present a distribution of trade preferences by calculating coefficient for each pair of countries engaged in wheat trade. This is followed by cartographic presentation and tentative conclusion explaining the pattern.

To give an example of the method applied, Table 1 contains delta coefficients in wheat trade calculated for selected countries.

We can see that USSR, for example, imported during 1980-82 3.74 times as much wheat from Argentina as might be expected from pure probability distribution of flows. On the other hand, the wheat trade between USA and USSR was just a half of what might be predicted. Thus, for USSR during 1980-82, Argentina, followed by Canada, was the most preferred supplier of wheat. The same procedure has been repeated for each of the 148 importing countries included in this analysis.

The final results, showing the most preferred supplier of wheat for each importing country, are presented on Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. If two exporters score approximately the same values of delta coefficient they are both mentioned.

## 5.2. Interpretation of the results

At first glance, the pattern of dominant preferences gives an impression of a physical distance decay. We can see that the US wheat exports are preferred in most Latin American and East Asian countries. Argentina is the most preferred supplier of her neighbours. Canada's exports enjoy relative preference in USSR, China and Japan. The highest delta coefficients for the EEC are recorded in European countries, in the Mediterranean as well as in most of Africa. Australia, on the other hand, keeps the stron-

Table 1. Relative intensity of wheat trade  $\delta_{ij}$  coefficients of selected countries in 1980-82

Importers Exporters	USSR	Poland	Italy	Egypt	Senegal	Brazil	Venezuela	Iran	Japan	China	Vietnam
USA	0.51	0.14	0.65	0.92	0.07	1.48	2.45	0.53	1.51	1.35	0
Canada	1.74	1.99	1.06	0.11	0.52	1.63	0.16	0.30	1.28	1.39	0
Australia	1.09	0	0.02	2.76	0	0	0	4.25	1.45	1.28	0.71
Argentina	3.74	0	0.48	0.	0.16	2.31	0	0.91	0	0.60	0.12
EEC	0.46	2.07	2.50	1.36	4.11	0.08	0.01	0.59	0	0.19	1.28
USRR	-	4.11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19.61

Source: computed from the data obtained from the FAO head office in Rome, supplemented by various issues of World Wheat Statistics, Exports of Cereals by Source and Destination, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, and national statistics



gest positions in South-East Asia, the Persian Gulf and in East Africa. Finally USSR, particularly during 1970-72, is preferred in Central (Eastern) Europe, Mongolia and North Korea.

Clearly, the pattern that we have identified is not random. The importing countries tend to give preference to those suppliers which are relatively near, or alternatively, the exporters concentrate their efforts on near importers. Is it just a friction of physical distance?

The answer requires a more detailed inspection of the pattern. It reveals then the role of political factors which influence the choice of partners in wheat trade.

Beginning with USA, we can see that those regions (Latin America, East Asia) which prefer American wheat exports are close to USA not only geographically but equally so politically. There are, however, individual countries within those regions which do not follow the general pattern. They include Cuba, Jamaica, Nicaragua (1980-82), Chile (1970-72) in Latin America, North Korea and North Vietnam (1970-72) in East Asia. All those countries in the respective periods were politically distant from USA. The large political distance overruled the physical one.

The countries which do not want to be overdependent on USA choose often Canada as their favourite supplier. These political motives can explain, in some degree at least, the relatively high intensities of trade between Canada and USSR, China, Jamaica, Ghana, and in 1970-72 also Syria and Burma.

The high degree of interdependence in wheat trade between Argentina and USSR in 1980-82 was a direct consequence of American grain embargo imposed by President Carter in 1979.

Political factors seem to determine the volume and the pattern of Soviet wheat exports. All countries for which USSR is the most preferred supplier are in close political alliances with Moscow. Some of them are close in physical distance to USSR (Eastern Europe, Mongolia, North Korea) but others (Cuba, Kampuchea, Vietnam) are much closer to alternative sources of supply.

Among countries favouring wheat imports from the European Economic Community, we can also identify political influences. Practically all countries in North, West and Central Africa which choose wheat from EEC are the former colonies of certain European countries. The political links which persist between former metropolies and their colonies explain much of the pattern. That attitude is not followed by all African countries. In 1980-82 Sudan, Zair, Nigeria, Liberia and South Africa gave relative preference to the US wheat exports. Is it just a coincidence that all those countries had (and still have) rather right-wing governments at that time?

The opposite tendency of left-wing governments preferring wheat imports from the EEC rather than from USA is seen in 1980-82 in Nicaragua, Jamaica, Vietnam, and North Korea.

Finally, the case of Australia, is somewhat different. It seems that the geographical distribution of preferences for Australian wheat exports is determined primarily by commercial and not by political reasons. Hence the concentration of exports on relatively near and/or rich markets.

As the physical and political distances exert a simultaneous influence on the pattern of preferences, it is difficult to isolate one from the other. The role of political factors becomes evident if we compare two time periods, when the physical distances remain, naturally, constant.

Though not all change in trade preferences can be explained by political motives, some examples are very instructive. Between 1970-72 and 1980-82, radical changes of governments and political orientations took place in several countries. The examples include: Chile, Nicaragua, Iran, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cambodia, and to a certain degree China. In all those countries the political changes produced a different set of trade preferences, which can be clearly seen by comparing Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.

It is worth adding that due to the methodology applied and the limitation of cartographic presentation, it is not possible to present all important changes in the pattern of preferences.

Egypt, for example, in 1970-72 did not import any wheat from USA. Ten years later, under a different government, the US share rose to 36.5 per cent of Egypt's wheat imports. The corresponding delta coefficient rose from 0 in 1970-72 to 0.92 in 1980-82. This substantial change cannot be seen, however, in Fig. 2 because Australia remained in 1980-82 the most preferred supplier with delta coefficient lower than before, but still at 2.76.

## 6. Concluding remarks

The preceding discussion has shown that the pattern of international wheat trade diverges remarkably from the distribution of expected flows, proportional to the total volumes of wheat exports and imports. The relative intensity of mutual trade indicates the degree of interdependence between a pair of countries.

The analysis has identified several factors which influence or explain the distribution of preferences. These determining factors could be interpreted as multidimensional distance variables between individual countries. Among them, physical and political distances can be taken as surrogates of other proximity variables.

Due to the specific conditions and significance of international wheat trade, the role of political factors is more pronounced than that of other variables. Changing political relations can easily divert previous trade patterns. The analysis of the most preferred suppliers of wheat for each importing country has shown real spheres of influence of major exporters. The role of political international relations in shaping those spheres seems to be crucial, all the more so because physical and political distances are, to a certain degree, intercorrelated.

As political distance cannot be measured directly and explicitly like the physical one, we have to accept indirect and less accurate measures. The paper has tried to show that the relative intensities of wheat trade, determined largely by political factors, can serve as approximate indicators of political distances between nations.

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PROCESSES OF DEPOPULATION OF  
THE NORTH-EASTERN AREAS OF POLAND

1. Introductory remarks

The present paper is intended to demonstrate the depopulation processes in rural areas in Eastern Poland, especially over the period from 1970 till 1985. Because of the limited extent of this paper it can only contain the outline of fundamental problems under consideration. It should be kept in mind, however, that the phenomenon considered is placed against a broad context of past and present socio-economic conditions, and of effective dependences upon the natural environmental endowment. There are, as well, distinct connections with the totality of processes of socio-economic transformations taking place in the country as a whole, in particular with the rural-to-urban migrations in whole Poland. As it is known, anyway, mass migrations from rural to urban areas appeared in Europe already during the 19th century, in relation to industrialization processes, and are still being continued in some countries today. Thus, the very phenomenon of rural-to-urban migration is not specific for Poland. This phenomenon, however, is not always having solely negative socio-economic consequences. In certain regions one can even speak of positive effects such as, for instance, reduction of the hidden rural unemployment and of rural overpopulation, creating therefore the way to a possibility of structural transformations in agriculture - decrease in agricultural employment per 100 hectares of agricultural land, increase of surfaces of modern farms, i.e. the ones corresponding to re-

quirements of modern agricultural technology, etc. Under the Polish conditions it is considered that the rural-to-urban migration phenomenon has negative socio-economic effects if, over a long period the net migration to towns is higher than the local natural increase, which entails a decrease in a total local rural population numbers as well as disturbances in the age-sex structure of the remaining rural population. The latter, in particular, has important negative social and economic effects. Thus, an overly share of population of 60 and more years of age causes an abrupt increase in demand for health care and welfare service and threatens the capacity of reproduction of local communities (a drop in natural increase). Then, there is also a great outflow of women in the "marrying" age, i.e. 20 to 34 years of age, and in particular 20-24 years, which causes the phenomenon of lack of candidates for farmers' wives, and consequently may lead to the downfall of private farming, founded, obviously, on family work. That is why one is looking in Poland with anxiety at the phenomenon of too great rural-to-urban migrations, touching, anyway, primarily the areas of low population density. It is intended here to illustrate this phenomenon with the case of one such an area, that is - the North-Eastern part of Poland.

After the World War II Poland has experienced the rapid demographic growth and concentration of the resulting population increase in the urban areas, in particular in large and medium towns. This process is illustrated by the data given in table below (numbers in million persons).

	Years:		Changes over the period considered:
	1946	1985	
Poland totals	23.6	37.3	+13.7
Urban areas	8.0	22.4	+14.4
Rural areas	15.6	14.9	- 0.7

As can be easily seen from this table, urban population numbers increased over the period almost threefold, while rural population numbers displayed relative stability. Thus, in 1985 some 60% of Polish population lived in towns, with bigger towns, i.e. the ones of more than 100 thousand inhabitants, accounting for

approximately 30% of country's population, meaning 1/2 of urban population. It is characteristic for the Polish rural settlement system that it is highly dispersed. There are, namely, some 43 thousand villages in Poland and the average population in a village is about 360 persons. Such a situation makes it decidedly difficult to equip rural areas with technical and social infrastructure which, in turn, influences in a direct or indirect manner the migrational motivation of rural population. Especially high number of small villages - where up to 200 inhabitants live - some 70% of all the villages - is in the North-Eastern areas of Poland, which undoubtedly has an impact on the accelerated migration flows out of the rural areas of this part of Poland. Net rural-to-urban migrations for the period 1951-1985 (there are data of acceptable reliability for this period) should be estimated at some 5 million persons. The greatest intensity of these migrations occurred during the decade of 1971-1980, when, on balance, some 2 million persons left rural areas, which was related to the period of the so called intensive development of industry in Poland. Motivations which appeared then were both economic and socio-psychological, in particular with regard to younger generation, and especially women. These people simply wanted to get away from the hard work in private farming to non-agricultural jobs in towns, where working hours are limited and normalized, where there is better accessibility to culture, entertainment and services, and a possibility of relatively quicker social and professional career. Such a motivation was also related to the decrease in social prestige and status of the position of private farmer, a farm-owner. It should be remembered that the average acreage of a private farm in Poland is no more than 5 to 6 hectares of agricultural land, and is quite stable over the recent years. Economic slowdown which occurred in the eighties in Poland, limitations of housing construction in towns in the years 1981-1985, and uncertainty as to the future have together contributed to a significant decrease in rural-to-urban migrations, which took place after 1980<sup>1</sup>. Thus, for instance, in the years 1976-1980, i.e. over 5

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<sup>1</sup> More detailed exposure of these problems is contained in A. Stasiak "Wieś polska się wyludnia" (Polish villages get depopulated, in Polish). "Wieś Współczesna", 6/1987.



years, net rural-to-urban migrations amounted to some 1 067 thousand persons, while in the years 1981-1985 this number was at 686 thousand.<sup>2</sup> The mass nature of rural-to-urban migrations and their consequences, appearing through a disturbance of the age-sex balance (overly rapid ageing of rural population, "flight" of young women), as well as important regional differentiation of these phenomena caused that the government of the People's Republic of Poland turned in 1986 to the Polish Academy of Sciences to ask for elaboration of an expertise on the subject. The report resulting from this demand was terminated in 1987 under my leadership and an important share of fundamental information contained in this paper is taken from this report.

## 2. Depopulation of rural areas of the North-Eastern Poland

The areas in question encompass, according to the assumption made in this paper, four voivodships created in 1975, namely: Suwałki, Białystok, Łomża, and Biała Podlaska. With the exception of Łomża voivodship, all the voivodships concerned border on the USSR. The border is, practically, since 1945, a dead-end frontier, which constitutes a limitation on the economic development of an important portion of rural areas of the voivodships reviewed. Besides that, these areas have soils of relatively weak quality, growing season is shorter there than in the central and Western parts of the country, and winters are colder, what put some limitations on the access to services. This is especially important insofar as population density is low there, approximately 30 persons per sq. km, and the settlement pattern is highly dispersed and characterized by the domination of small villages to 100-200 inhabitants. Thus, there are villages where many kinds of service, including health care and welfare, education, etc., are in fact absent, so that inhabitants of these villages have to reach greater rural centers or towns, which, on the other hand, requires existence of an effectively functioning public transport (bus connections, primarily), but such public transport often fails

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<sup>2</sup> Rocznik Demograficzny 1987 (Demographic Yearbook 1987), GUS, Warsaw 1987.

in winter.

Moreover, historical heritage of this area brought about backward economy and low urbanization level. The only bigger town in the area is Białystok, presently populated by some 250 thousand inhabitants. This town developed largely after the World War II. In 1950 Białystok had approximately 70 thousand inhabitants, in 1970 - approximately 170 thousand, in 1985 - some 241 thousand. Through its development this town acted as a vacuum pump, sucking in the population from the neighbouring rural areas, and from the smaller voivodship capitals, i.e. Suwałki, Łomża and Biała Podlaska, the latter having presently approximately 50 thousand inhabitants, while some 20 years ago these towns had merely 20 to 25 thousand inhabitants. Thus, rural areas, relatively poor and devoid of more important hopes for development, became the areas of long term process of outmigration of rural population. These areas have already in the periods 1950-1960 and 1961-1970 suffered absolute losses of rural population in many locations. Namely, in the period 1950-1970 constant losses of population have been noted in the areas of: Dąbrowa Białostocka, Kolno, Łomża, Mońki, Sokółka, Łosice<sup>3</sup>. This phenomenon gained in its intensity during the '70s and persists during the '80s. Thus, for instance, during the years 1970-1978, out of the total of 49 'gminas' (countries) of the Białystok voivodship as many as 30 have lost more than 10% of population, out of 42 'gminas' of the Suwałki voivodship - there were 16 such gminas, out of 39 gminas of the Łomża voivodship there were 15 such gminas. All this found, of course, its reflection in the age structure of rural population. Thus, rural areas of the Białystok voivodship had in 1978 approximately 20% of population of 60 and more years of age. Similar disturbances occurred in the sex structure of this population, especially in the age group 20-24 years. In the Eastern voivodships of Poland sex structures in this age group in 1978 were as follows: Białystok voivodship -  $\frac{144 \text{ men (M)}}{100 \text{ women (W)}}$ , Łomża voivodship -  $\frac{141 \text{ M}}{100 \text{ W}}$ , Suwałki -  $\frac{129 \text{ M}}{100 \text{ W}}$ . More detailed studies carried out for the Suwałki voi-

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<sup>3</sup> See A. Stasiak "Problemy 'płynności' ludności wiejskiej" (Problems of 'fluidity' of rural population, in Polish), in: Ludność (Population, in Polish), GUS, Warsaw 1972.

voivodship confirmed the supposition that there exists quite an uncomplicated correlation between the village size and outmigration intensity. As many as 768 villages of the Suwałki voivodship, that is - 57% of the total out of 1355, have lost during the period 1970-1978 at least 9.9% of population. Some of these villages, especially the smaller ones, almost ceased to exist; there were 21 villages which lost more than 50% of their population, and 104 villages which lost 30% and more of their population. In the studied sample of 768 villages which suffered important population losses there were 634, i.e. 83%, of such ones which are truly small, having up to 200 inhabitants. Generally, villages of this size constituted 75% of all villages in the voivodship. On the other hand, out of 58 villages inhabited by more than 500 people only 6 displayed thus important population losses, while none of the villages inhabited by more than 1000 people had such great losses<sup>4</sup>.

Our studies for the period of 1979-1985 indicated, in the scale of Poland, that 54% of 2121 counties experienced population decreases, while some 15% of counties (335 of them) demonstrated decreases of more than 5%. There were, on the other hand, only 40 gminas with positive net migrations, while approximately 1/3 of all the gminas (more than 600) had negative net migrations, attaining some 10% of their population at the end of 1978.

In the North-Eastern voivodships, considered here, the share of the gminas in which population decreased over the period 1979-1985, was very significant. Thus, in the Białystok voivodship there were 46 such gminas out of the total of 49, in the Biała Podlaska voivodship - 30 such gminas out of 36, in the Łomża voivodship - 40 out of 40 (!), and in the Suwałki voivodship - 31 out of 43. Definitely, these processes reinforced the disadvantageous age and sex structure on the rural areas of this territory. It is for instance estimated that in 1986 in the rural areas of the Białystok voivodship population in the "marrying" age group, i.e.

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<sup>4</sup> See Elżbieta Stasiak "Wyludnianie się obszarów Suwalszczyzny" (Depopulation of the Suwałki region, in Polish), in: *Więść Współczesna* 6/1980, and doctoral dissertation of the same author concerning the same subject, in typescript.

20 to 34 years of age, constituted 18.2% of total rural population, while population of the, in principle, post-productive age (60 years and more) - 22.9%. For comparison the same shares for Poland totals of rural population were in 1986 at 23.2% (20-34 years) and 16.3% (60 years and more). It is therefore understandable that the natural increase indicators were also low in the North-Eastern areas of Poland. In the years 1979-1985 there were 9 rural gminas of the Białystok voivodship in which negative natural increase (decrease, in fact) appeared, while in general rural areas in Poland characterized positive natural increase of the order of some 0.9-1.0% annually. In 1986 natural increase in the rural areas of the Białystok voivodship amounted to mere 2.2%.

Such a concentration of the negative demographic effects of outmigration in the Eastern areas, and especially in the Białystok voivodship motivated us to undertake a detailed analysis of demographic processes in selected gminas of the Eastern part of the Białystok voivodship. These detailed studies encompassed 24 gminas in which approximately 138 thousand people lived in 1985, with population density of 25 persons per sq. km. There were 673 villages in the area in question. Even more in-depth interdisciplinary studies were undertaken for 7 gminas with 221 localities<sup>5</sup>. It is not possible to report here the contents of the document resulting from these latter interdisciplinary studies, altogether 150 pages of typescript. I would like, though, to turn attention to some essential findings. Namely, rural population of the area under study decreased over 15 years (1970-1985) from some 173 thousand down to 138 thousand, that is, by more than 20% of the state for 1970. Out of 24 gminas considered in 11 population decreased by more than 20%, and in 6 gminas by 25 to 30%. Furthermore, out of 686 localities accounted for in the studies there were only 47 (that is, 7% of the total) which noted population increase. This latter group includes 10 villages which are the seats of

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<sup>5</sup> "Problemy aktywizacji społecznej i gospodarczej gmin położonych we wschodniej części woj. białostockiego" (Problems of social and economic activation of counties located in the Eastern part of the Białystok voivodship, in Polish). Report elaborated under the leadership of profs. R. Horodeński and M. Serwin of the Scientific Research Center in Białystok, in 1988; in typescript.

county offices, and therefore are concentrations of social and technical infrastructure. Still, there were also 7 county seats in which population decreased, and in 3 county seats this decrease amounted to approximately 20%. These data would indicate the fact that gmina centers are not attractive enough to motivate people to choose permanent residence there. Such phenomenon makes it necessary to conduct more in-depth studies of sociological nature on the causes of this unwillingness to stay in the gmina centers. In the other 632 villages population decreased over the period 1970-1985 on the average by some 27%. On the top of that there was an important group of villages, 195 of them, that is - approximately 28% of the total, in which over 16% of rural population of the area considered lived in 1985, such that population decrease in them was greater than 30%, and in 29 villages - this decrease was greater than 50%.

Among villages characterized by population decrease small localities of up to 200 inhabitants dominated. These localities constituted altogether approximately 60% of all villages with population decrease tendency. Villages of 200 and more inhabitants, in which population decrease over the period 1970-1985 was greater than 30% constituted some 88% of all the localities with such decrease<sup>6</sup>. This is very similar to the result for the period 1971-1978 obtained in the Suwałki voivodship. Thus a statistical confirmation of the working hypothesis, according to which village size plays an important role in depopulation processes of rural areas, is provided. This is essentially related to the equipment with social and technical infrastructure and with service accessibility for population.

### 3. Perspectives of further development

If trends to date in the dynamics of migratory processes from villages of the North-Eastern Poland persist, then one could predict that at the turn of the next century a major part of these areas would become "social deserts". Such warning forecast was

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<sup>6</sup> All data after Report cited in footnote 5.

outlined in the demographic development forecast for Poland until 2000, elaborated in 1984<sup>7</sup>. This forecast says that total population of Poland in 2000 will be approximately 40.6 million people, with urban population at some 26.1 million and rural population at 14.5 million people. These estimates do not raise doubts and seem to be rational. The newest forecasts of demographers, prepared in 1987, diminish the expected total population in Poland down to, approximately, 39.7-40.0 million people and, in principle, do not change the proportions of population shares between urban and rural areas<sup>8</sup>.

Situation is worse, though - here I am referring to the 1984 forecast, but the data generated in 1987 do not change much in that respect - when the forecast is regarded from the point of view of regional population distribution, especially concerning the North-Eastern areas, here considered. Namely, forecasts indicate for three voivodships: Białystok, Białą Podlaska and Łomża rural population losses in 2000 at some 10% of the 1985 level. This would have to entail further disadvantageous changes, especially in age structure, but probably also in sex structure in the "marrying" age groups. Thus, for instance, the share of the age group of the elderly people: 60 years and more for women and 65 years and more for men, would exceed 20% in the Białystok, Białą Podlaska and Łomża voivodships, attaining some 27% in the Białystok voivodship. Situation would be a bit better in some parts of the Suwałki voivodship. Certainly, such a forecast indicates the necessity of considering in a comprehensive way all consequences of the processes observed and forecasted in the elaboration of spatial and socio-economic development plans for the country, and that adequate thought should be given to the manner in which the overly outflow of rural population from these areas could be stemmed.

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<sup>7</sup> Prognoza ludności do roku 2000. Wersja pomigracyjna (Population forecast until 2000. Post-migrational version, in Polish). GUS, Warsaw 1984.

<sup>8</sup> See M. Latuch, J. Witkowski "Perspektywy rozwoju demograficznego a polityka ludnościowa" (Perspectives of demographic development and population policy, in Polish), in: "Myśl społeczna i ekonomiczna wobec współczesnych problemów Polski" (Social and economic thought facing contemporary problems of Poland, in Polish), SGPiS-ES, Warsaw 1988.

Awareness as to these dangers has been partly reflected in the draft plan of spatial organization of the country, where in Map no. 15A the Eastern part of the Białystok voivodship and smaller portions of the Suwałki, Biała Podlaska, Siedlce and Łomża voivodships are distinguished as forming the problem area no. 9 in terms of spatial economy. Likewise, in Map no. 16 areas threatened with economic depression are distinguished, encompassing here the Białystok and Łomża voivodships in their totality, a large portion of Ostrołęka voivodship, and smaller parts of Biała Podlaska and Siedlce voivodships, while Suwałki voivodship is not included in this area at all. The draft plan also advocates elaboration of methods of intensification and typology, as well as delimitation of the problem and conflict<sup>9</sup>. It seems, however, that such information and statements contained in the draft plan of spatial organization of the country are not sufficient. Processes of the overly depopulation of rural areas in Poland do not, in fact, concern not only North-Eastern Poland, but some 1/3 of the country (approximately 100 thousand sq. km)<sup>10</sup>. Too great decrease of the number of agricultural and rural population, not compensated by an adequate inflow of production means and by changes of systemic and organizational nature shall make the country's crisis even deeper. This makes it necessary to undertake a wide activation and assistance action for the distinguished rural problem areas. An introductory stage for such an action could be constituted by elaboration of a comprehensive concept of future developments and changes in the areas presently in depression and facing demographic and socio-economic breakdown threat. We believe that a logical and well argued concept of saving the depopulating areas, taking into account their regional specifics can be elaborated only on the basis of detailed studies and in-depth research. That is why appropriate research

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<sup>9</sup> Plan perspektywiczny do 2000 r. Część II: Przestrzenne zagospodarowanie kraju (Long-term plan till 2000. Part II: Spatial organization of the country, in Polish). Komisja Planowania przy Radzie Ministrów, Warsaw, Sept. 1988.

<sup>10</sup> See P. Eberhardt "Obszary o wysokim stopniu wyludniania się ludności wiejskiej w Polsce" (Areas of high degree of depopulation of rural territories in Poland, in Polish), Warsaw 1987.

program sponsored by the Polish Academy of Sciences was created in the Institute of Geography and Spatial Organization of the Academy, and is being carried out since 1988.




Fig.1. Rural population changes by voivodships, 1979-1985  
(31 Dec., 1978 = 100)  
Poland's median - village = 100.2






Fig.2. Gminas of the Białystok voivodship situated near the state border  
 1 - in gminas eastwards - general research, 2 - gminas under detailed research




Fig.3. Rural population changes by voivodhips, 1985-2000  
(GUS post-migration forecast, 1984; 31 Dec., 1985=100)

Poland's median - village = 87.9



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## REGIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN AN INDUSTRIALIZED REGION OF POLAND AND SPATIAL STEREOTYPES

### 1. On regional consciousness

Regional consciousness may be defined as that part of people's (social consciousness which refers to their perception of the distinctiveness of their own region or regional group (Rykiel 1985b). Regional consciousness is not given forever as stable; rather it changes over time. The changes in regional consciousness are related to those in the objective socio-economic region.

Four stages may be identified in the process of change in regional consciousness. At the initial stage, regional consciousness is manifested mostly in negative categories, i.e. as an opposition of the given regional group to the rest of the nation. At this stage, individuals from the regional group would refer to themselves as 'the local people' or some similar phrase. At the second stage, the feeling of regional distinctiveness is accompanied by the coinage of a unique name for the region and/or the regional group. At the third stage, the given regional group becomes less distinct in objective terms, yet its members still feel that they are subjectively distinct. This is marked by an emotional attachment to the regional name. At the final stage, the advancement of the regional integration process involves both objective and subjective homogenisation as reflected by the prevailing regional names (Table 1).

Table 1. Stages of the development of regional consciousness in a given regional pattern

Stage	Interregional differences in		The state of regional consciousness
	existence	consciousness	
I	+	-	negative
II	+	+	positive
III	-	+	distinct
IV	-	-	weak

The subjective regional consciousness refers to the traditional divisions of the country, which are predominantly stable. The traditional regional system has been threatened by the industrial revolution which has produced a new regional system. The latter has changed the prevailing regional pattern considerably. Radical changes in objective regional patterns are followed by regional consciousness, however with a considerable time lag. This produces a disparity between regional form and regional consciousness. In historically new regions, including industrialised and industrial regions, a process of the emerging of new regional consciousness may be, therefore, expected. The Katowice region in mid-southern Poland may be taken as an example of this development.

## 2. Regional consciousness in the Katowice region

The historically new industrialised Katowice region has developed across the traditional Polish inter-provincial boundary between Silesia and Lesser Poland, and across the nineteenth-century international boundaries. A survey was carried out in 26 urban places of this region in which a sample of 779 primary school pupils, aged about 14, was taken. The sample was 'accidental' (Downs 1970), i.e. taken in a haphazard way (Barnett 1974), i.e. one which stressed accessibility of respondents, rather than random in the probabilistic sense. The respondents were asked,

without prior warning, to answer, anonymously, three basic questions: (1) to list the localities in the area one identifies with his/her homeland; (2) to indicate the name the respondent thinks is coined for this area; (3) to list the towns the respondent thinks are located in Silesia.

When asked to name their homeland, the respondents provided four basic groups of names: (1) those derived from geographical directions (e.g. South, Southern Poland, etc.); (2) physical geographic names; (3) the official names of voivodships and industrial districts or those of the environs of cities; (4) regional names in a strict sense. Of the latter, that of 'Silesia' was most often used not only in proper Silesia but also in the areas located east of the traditional Silesian boundary. In that case, 'Silesia' was used as a more general name while individual sub-regional names were used besides (Rykiel 1985a, b).

When asked to indicate the towns located in Silesia, the respondents provided predominantly those of the Katowice region, both within and outside proper Silesia. It is interesting to find that the notion of Silesia, which had originally been related to the tribal state around Wrocław (i.e. to what is today Lower Silesia), and which expanded a millenium ago to cover an extensive province, is being now contracted in the west to be identified with Upper Silesia, and expanding to the east to identify with the contemporary Katowice region (Rykiel 1985c).

### 3. Images of Silesia

In order to verify the hypothesis that the notion of Silesia is being progressively identified with the Katowice region, a survey was made outside that region. A sample of 739 respondents was taken in 8 Greater Polish and 2 Lower Silesian urban places of different sizes. A methodology similar to that in the Katowice region case was used. The respondents were asked to answer two basic questions: (1) to list the towns the respondent thinks are located in Silesia, and (2) to indicate what features and phenomena the respondent thinks are characteristic of Silesia.

To ask the respondents to list the towns they think are located in Silesia was to indicate what an area is perceived as Silesia. The analysis indicated that the city of Katowice was the most frequently listed town, which gained 90 per cent of answers. It was followed by 5 towns from the same region, including the city of Sosnowiec, located next to the traditional eastern Silesian boundary. Two largest Lower Silesian towns, Wrocław and Wałbrzych, gained 25 per cent of answers each, while every fifth respondent pointed to Cracow, the Lesser Polish traditional centre, as a Silesian town.

While the traditional Silesian territory covers, roughly, 11 south-western Polish voivodships, the towns listed as ones in Silesia are located in 36 voivodships, dispersed rather extensively, out of the total number of 49. Generally, the mental map of Silesia, as defined on the 1% frequency level, covers a wide belt along the southern and western Polish boundaries, from Przemyśl to Szczecin (Fig. 1). With the 10% frequency level taken, Silesia appears as five enclaves, i.e. those around Wałbrzych, Wrocław, Opole, the Katowice agglomeration and, interestingly, Cracow. Taking the 25% frequency level, one can identify the perceived Silesia with the Katowice conurbation and the city centre of Wałbrzych while Wrocław is to be found just beneath this level. If the 50% frequency level is taken as indicative, the notion of Silesia is identified with the very centre of the conurbation. This may be, therefore, recognized as the perceptual core of Silesia (Rykiel 1988a).

As was suggested elsewhere (Rykiel 1985b), the information about Silesia acquired by individuals is propagated through specialised channels of information. These include non-spatial associations, e.g. similarity of the local names, and the presence of steelworks and famous football clubs. This may suggest the existence of spatial stereotypes. To ask the respondents to indicate the features and phenomena characteristic of Silesia was aimed at the identification of the associations or other mental mechanisms responsible for the identification of the listed towns as ones in Silesia.

Generally, over thirty main types of associations with the notion of Silesia were identified. Coal and mining have most commonly been associated with Silesia (3/4 of the respondents). The complex of the features and phenomena related to air pollution takes the second place, as indicated by every second respondent. Industry, indicated by 2/5 of the respondents, takes the third place. Two further places are occupied by the syndrom of the conurbation (the concentration of towns, buildings and population) and denatured environment, indicated by every fourth respondent each. Interestingly, air pollution has been associated with another syndrom than the denaturation of environment; while the former has basically been perceived in aesthetical terms, the latter has been viewed as a social menace.

Metallurgy and a dialect occupy two successive places, indicated by nearly every fifth respondent each. Interestingly, however, few Lower Silesian respondents indicated a dialect as a characteristic of Silesia since the Silesian dialect is, indeed, spoken merely in Upper Silesia. Dumps and uplands, indicated by less than every tenth respondent each, close the list of the most characteristic features and phenomena of Silesia.

Besides the nine characteristics which account for the dominant part of the total variance of the respondents' image of Silesia, few more are worth to note, i.e. those which have been associated with the notion of Silesia only in some of the surveyed towns, yet indicated by a considerable proportion of the local respondents. Those characteristics were indicated by 1 to 5 per cent of the total sample of the respondents each, the figures, however, amounting 11 to 95 per cent of the respective local respondents. To those characteristics following were included: (1) mining damages, (2) football, (3) folklore, (4) cokeries, (5) mountains, (6) deficiency of green, and (7) iron ore.



#### 4. Stereotypes of Silesia

A stereotype is an image containing distorted or erroneous information. Whereas the image is a simplification of environmental experience, the stereotyped image represents an oversimplification (Burgess 1974). Stereotypes may be said to be value-coloured and to develop by the frequent associating of certain symbols with certain category of phenomena. Stereotypes become autonomous because their validity cannot be asserted (Fishman 1956). The stereotyping of places may be seen as the development of images which are mostly generated from secondary sources (Burgess 1974).

There is a good reason to think that the basic complexes of characteristics associated with the notion of Silesia may be stereotypical. Especially, it may be evidenced by the results of the survey that the association of the notion of Silesia with metallurgy appears to be a stereotype. Every third respondent from Gniezno, Greater Poland, indicated the Lenin Steelworks at Cracow as characteristic of Silesia. The de facto association must have been even more frequent than the empirical figure indicates, as a relatively high, the ninth, place of Cracow on the list of towns perceived as being in Silesia seems to evidence.

Also the association of Silesia with any mining seems to be stereotyped. A response of an individual from Września, Greater Poland, seems to be rather indicative for this association: "There are many mines and something is extracted in each".

The relatively high position of the city of Mielec, 170 km east of the traditional Silesian boundary, on the list of towns perceived as being in Silesia and the context in which it appeared in the response suggest, that more respondents shared the stereotypical association of Silesia with the first league football clubs that the empirical figures indicate.

While considering the coherence of the outsider respondents' answer to both Silesian questions, two main groups of respondents may be identified. To the first group those respondents may be included whose answers to both questions, even though odd, are consistent. This is the case of those who identify sulphur or oil

as characteristic of Silesia and list Tarnobrzeg or Krosno, respectively, as towns in Silesia. To the second group those respondents may be included whose answers to both questions not only seem odd, but also they are inconsistent. This is the case of those who indicate a dialect as a characteristic of Silesia and list Cracow or Przemyśl as towns in Silesia. The individuals of the second group seem to provide highly stereotyped views of spatial patterns.

The general stereotype associates the notion of Silesia with mines, factories, foundries, polluted air, denatured environment, first league football clubs, densely populated and built-up areas. Any place of which at least some of these features are characteristic is stereotyped as Silesia (Rykiel 1988b).

## 5. Conclusions

The analysis of characteristics which are perceived as indicative for Silesia pointed out that the term "Silesia" has, in the contemporary Polish consciousness, three basic meanings. Firstly, in the traditional meaning, "Silesia" is understood as a geographical, spatial and regional name. In the more traditional version, it is the name of a Polish historical province which has also been experienced by the Czech and German national communities. In the less traditional version, it is the name of the contemporary Katowice region, and as such it seems to be specific for the Polish national community.

Secondly, "Silesia" is understood as the name of the Katowice conurbation/agglomeration. It was in this sense that some respondents provided names "Silesia" and "Upper Silesia" when listed towns perceived as being in Silesia.

Thirdly, "Silesia" is understood as a non-spatial notion, i. e. as a slogan, symbol or a complex of basically non-spatial associations which compose a stereotypical syndrom of the traditional industrialisation process. The latter comprises the raw-material, heavy, and "dirty" industries, prodigal if not depredatory economy, and social traditionalism. Because those were characteristics

of the prevailing post-war model of industrialisation in Poland (Jałowiecki 1982, Pietraszewski 1982), any industrialisation process of this type have been easily identified with the notion of Silesia. The extensive dispersion of towns perceived as being in Silesia seems to confirm that.

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Fig.1. The mental map of Silesia

1 - traditional boundaries of Silesia, 1790; 2 - surveyed towns;  
3 - areas identified with Silesia by indicated percentage of respondents

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### ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN POLAND AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The administrative division largely determines the powers of the central, regional and local authorities on the one hand, and the scope of citizens' participation in the government of certain geographical area on the other. It encourages a certain - larger or smaller - measure of society's autonomy at the regional and local scale and determines the spatial framework for contacts between the community and individual people and the central and local authorities and various institutions. As civilization progresses and processes of urbanization intensify, the network of contacts which individuals and social groups need to have with the local authorities and social institutions (education, culture, health care) grows substantially denser. The weight of these spatial relations, which are to a considerable extent determined by the division of the country into basic units with administration and spatial organization representing a certain hierarchy of administrative and political authority, is of essential importance for citizens, formal and informal social groups and those governing the country. Spatial organization cannot, or rather should not, be severed from realities of the country - the system of settlements which has evolved over centuries, the existing links between the units of this system and the natural conditions.

The administrative division of Poland has been in a state of flux ever since the end of the Second World War. The reforms have had various aims and were never completed. However, they involved nearly exclusively the smallest administrative units. It was not until June 1975 that an administrative reform was performed which fundamentally altered the structure of the country's division by replacing a three-tier with a two-tier system of administrative units.

The establishment of gminas was the first stage of a fundamental reform of the administrative system which changed the system from three-tier to two-tier. The existing model of gromada - powiat - voivodship was transformed into gmina - voivodship. At the second stage, in 1975, the intermediate administrative unit, the powiat, was eliminated and the number of the largest units, voivodships, was increased from 17 to 49. Although the foundation of gminas made powiats largely superfluous (there were 7-8 gminas to the average powiat), the operation was a shock therapy, for the powiat had had very long tradition as a unit of administrative division. It had survived all the earlier administrative reforms; the elimination of powiats weakened traditional local centres and various kind of local links, causing many conflicts and inconveniences which the present administrative division of the country has so far not solved, or at least has not solved them in a way which would completely satisfy the local communities.

The two stages of this reform were separated by a period of two years, which was considered necessary for gminas to consolidate as basic-level centres of the state authority and administration to be able to assume the socio-economic functions assigned to them when powiats were disbanded and old voivodships were split into new ones.

The new administrative division of the country was to represent a clear-cut and very logical pattern of competence: the gmina was to perform organizational and managerial functions while the voivodship was to coordinate and supervise (Panko, 1983). This division of competences into two levels had been intended

as an improvement on the not very clear division of competences under the previous, three-tier system and was also to satisfy the requirements of a decentralized model of the state authority and administration. However, there are so many voivodships that it is difficult to stick to voivodship borders when administering various spheres of the country's life. For instance, supravoivodship units, so-called macroregions, have had to be established for spatial planning. On the other hand, voivodships being of a small size, many institutions have established their own special-purpose "administrative divisions", which are called special divisions and are understood as the spatial structure of the economic administration and culture. The economy should correspond to the administrative division, but this is not always possible.

Several practical considerations should speak in favour of the present administrative division. First of all, the distance between the authorities and citizens has become shorter in a direct and indirect meaning. Basically, it is possible to reach the voivodship capital by public transport and go back home in a day from any locality in the country. The same could in the past be said of connections between poviats and poviat centers. Citizens should benefit from this. It is especially important for those living in small towns and villages. The new voivodship capitals are new centres of socio-economic development; they should strongly stimulate the development of the backward areas and the enterprise of local communities. Where voivodship capitals are relatively small towns, it is assumed that they will fast receive investments, what is a condition of fulfilling of their designated central functions.

Another advantage of the present administrative division is a reduction in the number of hierarchic levels in the administrative structure, which could reduce distortions in the informations flow and should accelerate decisions making.

Speaking of the advantages of the present administrative division of the country, we should realize that many of them are of a potential character, which means that the present administrative division creates conditions encouraging certain kinds of situ-



ations or more efficient methods of operation than was the case under the previous administrative division. One such element could be the rebuilding of self-government, at least at gmina level. Until 1950, gminas were self-governed and local self-government bodies performed certain functions "assigned" to them by the state administration. Later on, gminas were transformed into the basic bodies of the state authority. The development of self-government at the level of small towns or gminas is now possible because these are small communities in which people know one another, so they can choose people who indeed enjoy high moral, professional and public prestige as their representative in self-government bodies. Naturally, in large towns self-government structures have to be more complex and hierarchic.

The number of voivodships and basic units (gminas) in the two-tier administrative division interferes with efficient supervision and coordination and produces a tendency to the establishment of intermediate levels (regionalization of voivodships). This may destabilize the organization of the administration (Kruczala, 1983). It should be admitted that even under the previous, three-tier system, territorial divisions were performed for special purpose which did not converge with the basic division. To some extent, these are justified, even indispensable operations. However, under the present, two-tier division the number of special divisions has soared, which indicate that the current administrative division is ineffective. But it would be difficult to venture any generalizations in this respect. The problem of special divisions is currently being investigated.

The introduction of the new administrative division disrupted the existing structure of spatial planning, affecting regional planning particularly severely.

The voivodship system turned out to be inadequate in relation to a considerable number of issues concerning the formation of regional structure. The realization of the goals of the national plan at the regional scale required the introduction of large supra-voivodship units, which would permit the grasping of proper-

ties of spatial macrostructures which have significance in the differentiation of the country from the viewpoint of socio-economic development processes. Further, in the new administrative division certain elements of the infrastructure serve the inhabitants of several voivodships and hence the planning of the infrastructure network must be applied to a macroregion. Finally, there exist certain areas of specialization common to several voivodships, like maritime affairs or tourism.

It should be noted that macroregions have a plan preparation character. As distinct from the planning of voivodships, macroregional planning does not constitute a separate planning level. The macroregional plans are an integral part of the national spatial development plan and thus belong to the central planning apparatus. The specific role of the macroregional plan in the spatial planning system is based on the fact that it is as it were a bridge linking the national plan with the voivodship plans. The need for intervoivodship coordination and cooperation is revealed especially in migration flows, food-stuffs, land use, raw materials exploitation and the conservation of the environment.

The small area of voivodships restricted the opportunities for using the methodological experiences acquired in regional planning. The administrative approach to spatial planning started to prevail over an approach to individual problems. The substantial increase in the number of voivodships had one more consequence - the scope of the so-called trans-voivodship issues increase. As it had been decided that all issues which reach beyond the competence of one territorial unit are passed over to higher administrative levels, the large number of voivodships in the country (and gminas in voivodships) became a natural pretext for the centralization of decisions. This trend may disappear in the future; at any rate, it should be expected that its scope will diminish substantially. The centralization of decisions often stems from the existence of a large number of economically weak voivodships.

The problem of Poland's administrative division should be approached from two basic angles, namely the optimum territorial domain of representative bodies and a territorial organization of

administration which would be the most efficient (from the point of view of the authorities) and the most convenient (from the point of view of the public). The representative system involves two natural dimensions of communicating the public will - the regional and the local. The latter, but more important, has an influence on the population's living conditions and the basic spatial structures which people need in all spheres of their daily existence (housing, employment, rest, services). It will easily be noted that the quality of the citizen's life and his participation in public life are decided at the basic level of territorial organization. Hence the immense importance of the representative system at the basic level of the administrative division.

The other dimension of the operation of the representative system is the region, the delimitation of which is an outcome of economic, historical and cultural factors. Regional development policies stem from a combination of central policies with the diverse aspirations of local communities. A region understood in this way should comprise a powerful urban center and, perhaps, should be relatively self-sufficient. From this point of view the present voivodships are too small.

The foregoing assumptions clearly indicate that the organization of the representative system in Poland requires only two levels of administrative division - the gmina and the voivodship. The problem whether the present size of administrative units is adequate, and, if not, how it should be changed, has not yet been solved. The evaluation and proposals for change presented so far have based on intuition rather than reliable evidence.

At present, there is nearly universal agreement that the existing two-tier administrative system in Poland should be preserved (although the reasons of this acceptance vary) and only corrections should be made to improve its effectiveness. The corrections should involve mainly voivodships, for the division into gminas has generally been approved by the population. The division into gminas was accurate, which augurs that it should last. After very slight corrections have been introduced, the present

gminas may constitute basic units - socio-economic microregions. From the point of view of spatial economy, it is essential that we decide whether to preserve the voivodships with a low economic and population potential. It is generally believed that they should be preserved if they have a chance of even moderate development. On the other hand, the area of the voivodships whose capitals are the largest urban agglomerations should be expanded.

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## RESOLUTION

- I. World political map is changing in many ways. Provided that number of states and their political boundaries remain stable in the near future - the inner realities of states are subject for almost permanent change. The internal situation is affected especially in two ways:
  1. Regions or cities are now competing with states in cultural and economic fields. The regions develop ever more dynamic policies and activities in these respects.'
  2. Supra-national organizations are increasing their activities and take over still more responsibilities controlled previously by a sovereign states. Such an evolution is linked with:
    - a) Growing role of communication and mass-media along with the growing strength of international opinion,
    - b) Growing mobility of the world population,
    - c) Enlarged scale of operations of the corporations and the fact that still more corporations become multinational or transnational.
- II. It would be advisable for the IGU to be Commission on World Political Map to focus on the new forms of state, either local or transnational, to picture their relations with national states and to look at the factors which explain such evolutions.
- III. For exploration of these new areas - new appropriate theoretical tools are needed and new reflections on the basic principles of the territorial state are necessary. We need:
  - to clarify the links between economic, social and cultural spheres on the one hand, and politico-territorial organizations on the other,

- to replace the old "centre-periphery" paradigm which has ceased to function properly in a world where physical distance and communication distance differ more and more.
- IV. The extension of knowledge and better information for educational purposes related to political life and political relations - ought to be one of the major results of the works carried out within the IGU Commission on World Political Map.





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- 1 — Restructuring of economies and regional development, Warszawa 1988, 156 s.
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