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

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REGIONAL TRANSBORDER CO-OPERATION IN COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE – A BALANCE OF ACHIEVEMENTS

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Warsaw 2006

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CONTENTS

PART I

TRANSBORDER CO-OPERATION IN COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

TRANBORDER COOPERATION: ACHIEVEMENTS, HOPES, DISAPPOINTMENTS, AND FEARS

Roman SZUL

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The aim of this paper is to present some ideas and reflections concerning transborder cooperation in Poland after the change of the economic and political system in 1989. The focus of the paper are tendencies, problems and issues rather than numbers. In other words, the paper serves as a proposal of ideas that should be taken into account when preparing synthesis of experience of transborder cooperation rather than a synthesis itself. Therefore, the aim of the paper is not a detailed quantitative analysis of developments in the field of cross-border relations[1]. By „transborder cooperation" various kinds of legal border-crossing relations are meant, including informal commercial relations (trading, shopping, investment), as well as formal (institutional) agreements on cooperation between regional or local governments on both sides of the border, etc.

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[1] There are several valuable works presenting the quantitative aspect of cross-border relations, first of all volumes of the „Polańczyk conferences" on transborder cooperation in the 1990s edited by J. Kitowski. Border areas and transborder cooperation were among the main subjects of regular international conferences organized by the University of Lodz and Silesian Institute in Opole and published in *„Regions and Regionalism"*, see e.g. the latest issue *The Role of Borderlands in United Europe, „Regions and Regionalism"* No.7 vol 1 (edited by Marek Koter and Marek Sobczyński), No. 7 vol. 2 (edited by Marek Koter and Krystian Heffner). As regards transborder trade between Poland and its neighbours, a very detailed analysis of the situation and its evolution since the early 1990s to 2002 is ph.d. thesis by Elżbieta Wojnar: *Handel przygraniczny w Polsce w okresie transformacji systemowej.* Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej w Lublinie, Lublin 2005. A lot of data and facts (economic development, population, spatial planning and management, etc) describing border areas in Poland, especially the Polish-German border area, and the Polish-German cross-border cooperation can be found in: Stanisław Ciok *Pogranicze polsko-niemieckie. Problemy współpracy transgranicznej,* Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2004. See also: Agnieszka Mync, Roman Szul (eds), *Rola granicy i współpracy transgranicznej w rozwoju regionalnym i lokalnym,* Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warszawa 1999.

Opening up of state frontiers and intensification of cross-border interactions was one of the most spectacular phenomena accompanying the economic and political transformation associated usually with events of 1989, which actually started a few years earlier. Since that time the evolution of the transborder relations (cooperation) can be roughly divided into two periods:

1. „heroic period" – the period of opening up of all borders and of the immediate results of the opening. It lasted to the late 1990s (the year 1998 can be considered as the end of this period). The main characteristics of this period were:

- growing cross-border movements of persons and goods
- opening of new crossing points
- spectacular increase in transborder trading and shopping, especially irregular, accompanied by emergence of a large number of border commercial centres (bazaars), with considerable positive trading balance of the Polish side; border location is no more a disadvantage for local communities, rather it starts to be considered as an advantage („rent of location")
- bottom-up pressure of local border communities (usually on both sides of the border) to open border crossings and thus to increase of transborder relations regarded as a means to improve economic development, quality of life, to break the „periphery syndrome" etc.
- establishing of institutional transborder relations on all levels (national: international agreements on transborder cooperation, regional and local)
- establishing of „euroregions" as a special kind of transborder institutional cooperation

2. „period of normalization" – the period of weakening dynamics of cross-border interactions and of stabilization of institutional forms of transborder cooperation. The following elements of this new situation should be mentioned:

- stabilization, sometimes even decrease, in cross-border movements of persons and vehicles
- the number of border-crossings remaining rather stable (new crossing point being very few)
- preparation of Poland to join the UE resulting in introduction of some obstacles to cross-border movements on its borders with its eastern neighbours (Russia, Belarus and Ukraine), first of all the visa requirement
- irregular cross-border trading and shopping, generally, decreasing and border trading centres, declining, the balance of transborder trade and shopping becoming more equal (the number of foreigners shopping in Poland is decreasing while the number of Poles shopping abroad, especially in Germany, is growing) which is mostly due to the evening up of prices on both sides of the border, to the above mentioned restrictions on cross-border move-

ments (on the eastern borders), support for local business on the German side to cope with the Polish competition, etc

- the regular cross-border trade (between enterprises) and investment continuing to grow; because usually the cooperating enterprises and investments are located not in the immediate border zone, they usually „jump" over the border area thus depriving it its previous advantages
- dynamics of the institutional cooperation losing its impetus, cooperation becoming quite often routine and stagnating, and oriented more on external ideas (to fulfill intergovernmental agreements, EU-requirements, etc) than on needs and expectations of the local border area inhabitants.
- growing differentiation of the situation on the two kinds of border: while the frontier with other EU members as an obstacle to cross-border relations and as a source of specific „border rent" (small smuggling, etc) disappears, the border with the non-EU countries, especially with Belarus, is becoming again an obstacle to free interactions.

When trying to evaluate the 15-20 years of cross-border cooperation one has to take into consideration not only the current state of affaires but also expectations and fears that accompanied the initial stage of the „heroic period" of transborder cooperation.

At the beginning of the 1990s two emotions dominated: 1) hopes for improvement of the economic situation and living standard in the border areas due to the transborder cooperation (and due to the external financial support for the cross-border cooperation) – expressed by inhabitants of these areas, and 2) fears that cross-border institutional cooperation, especially in the form of euroregions, would undermine national sovereignty on a part of national territory – expressed by some politicians, mostly those acting at national level and living far from border areas. Against this background we can assess the achievements, hopes, disappointments and fears.

As an **achievement** of cross-border cooperation one may mention „normality" of cross-border contacts on some borders. Today shopping or visiting places on the other side of the border – in Germany, Czechia, Slovakia or Lithuania, or visits of shoppers, clients or tourists from the other side of the border – although not so frequent as in times of explosion of the cross-border trade – is a normal everyday phenomenon.

Perhaps the most indicative achievement in the cross-border relations is the cooperation between the Kaliningrad district of Russia and Poland[2]. It is

[2] On the issue of cross-border cooperation between Polish regions and Kaliningrad, and in general on cooperation in the Baltic Sea area see issues of *Costal Regions* published by the University of Gdańsk, e.g. *Economic, Geopolitical and Social problems of Cooperation between Kaliningrad and Poland*, edited by T. Palmowski, G. Fedorov, V. Korneevets, „*Costal Regions" nr. 6* University of Gdańsk, Gdynia-Pelplin 2003, see

reflected in a high number of Polish investments in Kaliningrad (mostly small ones) as well as in regular contacts between Russian (from Kaliningrad) and Polish (mostly from north-eastern regions) universities, local and regional authorities, etc. This cooperation deserves special appreciation as it takes place in sometimes not favourable conditions of tensions between central governments in Warsaw and Moscow. (To be true, from time to time these tensions do affect cross-border relations by periodical introduction by Russian authorities of restrictions on navigation in the Vistula Golf, which is especially disadvantageous for the cross-border tourism).

Another area of intense cross-border links that deserves special attention is the Polish-Czech border area in the Cieszyn (Teschen) region. It is probably the only area in Poland where a real cross-border regional economy and society emerges, despite some historical resentments. The Polish-Czech Cieszyn cross-border labour market (living on the one side and working on the other side), service market, etc. and their perception by the local population as something „normal" may be considered as the best achievement of the transborder cooperation.

Cross-border relations has been accompanied by some **hopes**. Two kinds of hopes may be distinguished: pragmatic and idealistic. The first ones were related to the economic development and living standard of border regions. These hopes were based on two assumptions: first, the cross-border cooperation (relations) would improve attractiveness of these areas for external investments and would strengthen local grass-root firms; second, the transborder cooperation, especially the euroregions, would attract considerable foreign (EU) funds. All these factors should improve the economic situation, especially should reduce the unemployment.

As regards the „idealistic" hopes, they were consisted in expectations that the intensified cross-border contacts would result in better understanding and thus in elimination or reduction of old prejudices.

In can be said that the hopes have been partially fulfilled, partially are still alive and wait for their fulfillment, but also have partially faded out transforming into **disappointments**. Probably the biggest disappointment regards the eastern border. Its peripherality persists. The initial incentives for growth due to cross-border interactions (in the 1990s) turned out to be fragile and did not result in a strong development and breaking the "peripheral syndrome". Hopes for this area is no more related to a cross-border cooperation, but mostly to the regional policy of the EU and to other implications of Poland's EU membership.

It should be underlined that the EU is also perceived as a source of disappointment. This regards the EU-sponsored euroregions. They have turned into

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also: *Baltic Europe. From Idea to Reality.* edited by T. Palmowski *„Costal Regions" nr. 11,* University of Gdańsk, Gdynia-Pelplin 2006.

rather „decorative" institutions engaged in activities without relevance for everyday life of inhabitants of border regions. It is especially true for those euroregions that were created and „brought down" by central authorities. Is can be said that the expectations were too high compared to financial capacities and even to original scope of activity of euroregions. (This scope includes, first of all, culture and information exchange, without immediate results on economic development, reducing unemployment, etc).

It is an open question if the intensified cross-border contacts of inhabitants have resulted in better understanding and reduction of old stereotypes and prejudices. It should be taken into consideration that the cross-border contacts, especially in the „heroic period", were accompanied by increased criminality and various kinds of inconveniences. Many visitors, especially from the former USSR, were victims of such inconveniences and criminality (regardless that quite often other visitors from the former USSR were perpetrators of crimes).

Beside disappointments, there are some old and new **fears** related to cross-border relations and border areas in Poland.

From the economic point of view, the greatest fear is the threat of further marginalization of the eastern border area. This marginalization would be a combined result of closed frontiers with the non-EU countries (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine), vulnerability (already strongly felt) of eastern border regions' exports to those countries to volatility of international political circumstances (e.g. politically motivated ban on Polish exports of agricultural products in Russia and Ukraine), and eliminated (or reduced) external support from the regional and agricultural policy of the EU, if the EU is to evolve into a „free trade area". So far, disadvantages of Polish eastern regions resulting from location at EU external borders are (at least partially) offset by advantages of the EU cohesion policy.

Cross-border (and not only cross-border) economic links have (re)generated an „old-new" phenomenon that can be considered as a threat. It is socio-economic asymmetry of cross-border and international relations. It is especially true for Polish-German relations, particularly in the border area where these relations are the most intensive. An old pattern in these relations is reemerging: poor Polish workers and rich German employers; poorer and passive Polish local and regional authorities and richer and active German local and regional authorities with ideas how to organize the border area on both sides (regarded sometimes as beneficial only for the German side); Polish children learning German and attending German schools (in towns divided by the state frontier) and becoming German (loosing contact with Polish culture and even denying relations with Poland) while German inhabitants are not eager to learn Polish or to know Poland (let alone being „Polonized"). In the past, such asymmetry was a source of stereotypes and prejudices.

It should be noted that achievements and fears, hopes and disappointments are mutually inseparable: some fears are by-products of achievements (asymmetry became visible after opening up of borders and starting transborder cooperation), disappointment is a by-product of excessive hopes. It should also be remembered, that in the real life there are always problems, fears and disappointments. The question is not how to avoid them, but how to solve and minimize them. In the case of transborder cooperation the questions are: how to minimize the adverse effects of cross-border asymmetry while keeping intense cross-border relations?, how to minimize the syndrome of closed frontier (on Poland's eastern borders)?, how to use EU funds (as long as they are available) for promoting economic development of border areas and thus to increase their potential for mutually beneficial transborder cooperation?

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Streszczenie

WSPÓŁPRACA TRANSGRANICZNA: OSIĄGNIĘCIA, NADZIEJE, ROZCZAROWANIA I OBAWY

Artykuł przedstawia ogólną ocenę współpracy (relacji) transgranicznej między Polską a jej sąsiadami po roku 1989. Wskazuje na najważniejsze osiągnięcia („normalność" kontaktów transgranicznych z innymi krajami członkowskimi UE, współprace polskich regionów z Kaliningradem, itd.), nadzieje (na poprawę sytuacji ekonomicznej i warunków życiowych na obszarach przygranicznych, na eliminację dawnych stereotypów i uprzedzeń), rozczarowania (przede wszystkim brak widocznego wpływu współpracy transgranicznej na rozwój ekonomiczny wschodnich obszarów przygranicznych) i obawy (utrwalenie syndromu zamkniętej granicy na wschodnim pograniczu, asymetryczne relacje na pograniczu polsko-niemieckim).

INTERREG IIIA PROGRAMME IN COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Stanisław CIOK

University of Wrocław

Border areas, due to their location (and the consequences arising from it) are usually regarded as undeveloped regions, requiring mobilization (Ciok 2003 b). The delay in the economic development of the border area usually has various causes: firstly, it may arise from the low level of development, secondly it may be the result of changes in the run of the border or its function. Because of the fact that these types of areas are located on the outskirts, and thus remote from economic and decision centres, they are less competitive and attractive for the influx of new investments and capital. They are frequently unable to eliminate their backwardness and must seek external help. These areas, among others, are the centre of the attention of the regional policy of European Union countries (they are ranked among so-called problem areas). With a view to developing border areas and supporting cross-border cooperation, the European Union launched special programmes and allotted special funds to their realization (Ciok, 2004).

Depending on the locations of the border areas, special support programmes were created for them: for European Union countries – INTERREG and for the Central-Eastern candidate countries – PHARE CBC and PHARE CREDO. Also the border areas of other countries may use appropriate sources of financing: 13 countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia comprising the Community of Independent Countries together with Mongolia – TACIS programme, Mediterranean countries – MEDIA programme and the countries of the former Yugoslavia- OBNOWA programme (Ciok 2003a).

Interreg Programme

Interreg is one of the four Community Initiatives. The first projects within this Initiative were proposed by the European Commission in 1989, although 14 pilot projects to the amount of EUR 21 mln had been realized before. The first edition of the Interreg I programme covered the period between 1990-1993, under which 32 projects to the amount of nearly EUR 1,1 mln were real-

ized. These were the projects concerning mainly tourism, environmental protection, agriculture, human resources and regional development.

As the realization of these projects was positively assessed, the European Commission decided to continue this initiative and in 1994 implemented Interreg II for the period between 1994–1999 dividing it into 3 sub-programmes: Interreg IIA (transborder cooperation), Interreg IIB (the development of power networks) and Interreg IIC (supranational cooperation). Within the framework of these 3 sub-programmes altogether 75 projects were realized to the amount of nearly EUR 3,5 mld. In the second edition of the programme EUR 2,6 mld was spent on transborder cooperation (IIA) only, thus realizing 59 programmes, 24 of which were carried out at the external borders of the Community.

Because the participants of the Interreg programme have to have a partner on the other side of the border, for the border areas of the countries who aren't members of the European Union a sub-programme Phare CBC (Cross-Border Co-operation) was created within the framework of the Phare Programme. It's first edition covered only the border areas adjacent to the external borders of the European Union. The programme played a crucial role in the creation, supporting and development of transborder cooperation (Ciok, 2003b).

The currently realized programme for the years 2000-2006 (Interreg III) is the continuation and extension of the former programmes. The aim of Interreg is to finance cross-border, international and interregional cooperation at internal as well as external borders of the European Union. Thus, three budget components (A, B and C) were created, allotting nearly 5 billion EUR for their realization, from which the majority was given to Spain, Germany and Great Britain. Among the three components, the vast majority (67%) was allocated for the component III A, that is for supporting transborder cooperation between neighbouring border areas. The following enterprises were particularly supported:

- the promotion of urban, rural and coastal areas,
- supporting small and medium enterprises,
- the creation of new workplaces,
- supporting environmental protection activities,
- improvement of transportation systems,
- activities boosting economic and social development activities, etc.

Within the framework of Interreg III A for the years 2000–2006, 53 programmes supporting transborder cooperation between EU countries were approved. The majority of funds was allotted to the border areas between Spain-Portugal (807 mln EUR), Saxony-the Czech Republic (181), Greece-Bulgaria (170), Spain-Morocco (169) Ireland-Northern Ireland (130).

Later on, the Phare CBC programme was maintained, but in its second edition, its territorial scope was extended i.e. its funds are now available to the border areas of all the countries realizing the PHARE programme and not

only to the areas at the external borders of the European Union. (Fig.1). It means that these funds are now accessible to the border regions of the candidate countries too. The biggest beneficiary of the funds among Central and Eastern European countries in the period between 2000–2003 is Poland (EUR 56 mln annually), Bulgaria (28), the Czech Republic and Hungary (19 mln each). Altogether, the average of EUR 163 mln annually will be allotted to the areas covered by the PHARE CBC programme – 61% to the external borders of EU, 32% – to the borders between the Central and Eastern European countries and 7% – to the Baltic CBC programme (Tab.1 and Fig. 1).

Table 1. Phare – CBC yearly allocations 2000 – 2003 (mio Euro)

Country	PhareCBC allocation	EU – Phare borders			Phare – Phare borders				Baltic CBC
		total	per EU border:		total	per CC border:			
Poland	56	44	D:44		9	CZ:5	SK:4		3
Bulgaria	28	20	GR:20		8	RO:8			
Czech Rep.	19	14	D:10	A:4	5	SK:0	PL:5		
Hungary	19	10	A:10		9	RO:5	SK:2	SL:2	
Romania	13	0			13	BG:8	HU:5		
Slovakia	12	6	A:6		6	CZ:0	HU:2	PL:4	
Slovenia	7	5	I:2,5	A:2,5	2	HU:2			
Estonia	3								3
Latvia	3								3
Lithuania	3								3
Total	163	99			52				12

Source: PHARE – CBC, European Commission DG Enlargement, Nov. 2002.
CZ – Czech Republic; RO – Romania; SK – Slovak Republic; BG – Bulgaria; HU – Hungary; SL – Republic of Slovenia; PL – Poland; D – Germany; A – Austria; I – Italy; GR – Greece.

Fig. 1. Interreg IIIA (2006 – 2006)



With the accession of the new members to the European Union, between 2004 - 2006 they received over EUR 424 mln from the Community Initiatives programme Interreg III. Poland received he majority of these funds (over 46%), Hungary and the Czech Republic (14% each) and the remaining ones respectively less (Tab. 2).

Table 2. Alocation of INTERREG III funds for the 10 new Member States (2004 – 2006)

Country	mln Euro
total	424,4
Poland	196,1
Czech. Rep.	60,9
Hungary	60,9
Slovak Rep.	36,8
Slovenia	21,0
Lithuania	19,9
Latvia	13,5
Estonia	9,4
Cyprus	3,8
Malta	2,1

Source: Peters D., 2003, Introduction to INTERREG and managing transition for the 2004-2006 period, European Commision, Warsaw.

The vast majority of the funds from this programme was allotted to the component A (transborder cooperation). Its biggest beneficiaries are the border areas between Poland – Germany, the Czech Republic – Germany and Greece - Bulgaria which constituted external borders of EU until recently. (compare Tab. 3 and Fig. 2)

Table 3. Interreg IIIA: Cross-border cooperation

No	Programme	Total cost	UE Contribution
		in million euros	
1.	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern/Brandenbur (DE) / Voivodship Zachodniopomorskie (PL)	157,6	118,2
2.	Brandenburg (DE) / Woiwodschaft Lubuskie (PL)	176,9	132,3
3.	Saxony (DE) / Lower Silesia (PL)	95,9	71,9
4.	Czech Republic / Poland	46,0	34,5
5.	Poland - Slovakia	26,7	20,0
6.	Poland - Belarus - Ukraine	50,4	37,8
7.	Lithuania - Poland - Kaliningrad	48,7	36,5
8.	Latvia-Lithuania-Belarus	13,9	10,4
9.	Estonia-Latvia-Russia	10,5	7,8
10.	Saxony (DE) / Czech Republic	255,0	191,2
11.	Bavaria (D) / Czech Republic	147,1	76,4
12.	Austria / Czech Republic	69,2	38,3
13.	Slovak Republic - Czech Republic	18,2	13,7
14.	Austria / Slovak Republic	68,0	37,2
15.	Hungary - Slovak Republic - Ukraine	31,7	23,8
16.	Hungary - Romania and Hungary - Serbia & Montenegro	31,9	23,9
17.	Austria / Hungary	77,0	41,5
18.	Slovenia - Hungary - Croatia	27,4	20,5
19.	Austria / Slovenia	63,7	33,4
20.	Italy/Slovenia	101,0	48,7
21.	Italy/Balkan	101,0	50,5
22.	Italy/Albania	72,8	33,2
23.	Greece / Bulgaria	268,7	186,1
24.	Greece / FYROM	103,3	73,0
25.	Greece / Albania	123,5	90,0
26.	Italy/Greece	157,9	84,5

2000-2006
2004-2006

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/interreg3

Fig. 2. Alocation of Phare CBC (A) and Interreg III (B) funds in Central-and-East European Countries (in mio Euro)



Source: Phare CBC, European Commission DG Enlargement, Nov. 2002; http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional-policy/interreg3/abc

In Poland, from the total of 196,1 mln EUR, 80% of the funds were allocated to the component A, 14% – to component B, and 6% – to component C. In other words, a little over 149 mln EUR was dedicated to supporting transborder cooperation (component A). Funds were distributed according to the following pattern (the records of the National Development Plan):

- the western border: nearly 73 mln EUR (over 24 mln annually),
- the southern border: with the Czech Republic 15 mln (5 mln annually), with Slovakia 9mln (3 mln annually),
- the eastern and northern-eastern borders: over 52 mln (over 17 mln annually).

Poland, within component A, will take part in 7 transborder cooperation programmes, including 2 bilateral programmes: Poland – Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Poland – Brandenburg, Poland – Saxony, Poland- the Czech Republic and Poland – Slovakia as well as 3 trilateral programmes: Poland-Lithuania-Russia (the Kaliningrad Oblast) and Poland-Belarus-Ukraine (Ciok, Raczyk, 2006), (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Spatial scope and financing of the programmes within the framework of Community Initiatives Interreg III A carried out in Poland between 2004 –2006



Source: Ciok, Raczyk (2006)

The future of transborder cooperation financing

As the territorial cooperation programmes were met with high approval of the European Commission, it was decided that the experiences of the Interreg initiative should be used for other purposes. In this way, the initiative of the Community rose to the rank of one of the three aims i.e. Aim 3 (European territorial cooperation). Thus, in the next stage of financing, between 2007–2013, the cohesion policy will be realized through the realization of the three aims:

- Aim 1 – convergence (the poorest regions and countries)
- Aim 2 – competitiveness and employment (in the regions where GDP / 1 inhabitant exceeds 75% of the EU's average)
- Aim 3 – European territorial cooperation (in the internal and external borders regions).

The amount of the funds allotted to particular aims is presented in Fig. 4.

Fig. 4. The distribution of the resources according to the following objectives



Source: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/slides/slides_en.htm

Assessment

Thanks to the aid funds and more intensive transborder cooperation the modernization of economic and spatial structure is likely to be faster, which will, in turn, raise location attractiveness and competitiveness of the border regions. Benefits of the border location are more and more appreciated by a number of investors (including overseas ones), who invest their capital there hoping to gain fast profits, by local governments hoping to raise revenues and by the general public hoping for new workplaces and the development of the region. The structural transformations may contribute to quicker elimination of economic and infrastructural disproportions in the level of development of border areas and quicker adaptation of spatial-functional, production and service conditions to European standards, which may result in further and more extensive influx of capital and new technologies into the border regions.

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Streszczenie

PROGRAM INTERREG III A W KRAJACH EUROPY ŚRODKOWEJ I WSCHODNIEJ

Obszary przygraniczne z racji swego peryferyjnego położenia uważane są zazwyczaj za regiony nierozwinięte, wymagające aktywizacji. Ponieważ często same nie są zdolne zniwelować zacofania korzystają często z pomocy zewnętrznej. To właśnie m.in. te obszary są przedmiotem szczególnego zainteresowania polityki regionalnej państw Unii Europejskiej. Dla rozwoju obszarów przygranicznych i wsparcia współpracy transgranicznej Unia Europejska uruchomiła specjalne programy wsparcia; dla państw Unii jest to przede wszystkim INTERREG, obecnie trzecia jego edycja (Interreg IIIA)

Celem jego jest finansowanie współpracy przygranicznej. Szczególnie wspierane są takie przedsięwzięcia jak: promowanie rozwoju obszarów miejskich, wiejskich i przybrzeżnych, wspieranie małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw, kreowania nowych miejsc pracy, wspieranie działań w zakresie ochrony środowiska, poprawa systemu transportowego, działania na rzecz rozwoju ekonomicznego i społecznego i in.

W ramach Interreg IIIA na lata 2000-2006 zatwierdzono w Europie 53 programy. Polska w ramach tego programu otrzyma nieco ponad 149 mln Euro, a na poszczególne granice przypadnie:

- Granica zachodnia: blisko 73 mln Euro (rocznie ponad 24 mln),
- Granica południowa: z Czechami 15 mln (po 5 mln rocznie), ze Słowacją 9 mln (po 3 mln rocznie),
- Granica wschodnia i północno-wschodnia: ponad 52 mln (rocznie ponad 17 mln).

Ponieważ programy z zakresu współpracy terytorialnej spotkały się z wysokim uznaniem Komisji Europejskiej, postanowiono w następnej perspektywie finansowej (2007-2013) wykorzystać doświadczenia inicjatywy Interreg do sformułowania odrębnego celu. W ten sposób ta inicjatywa wspólnotowa „awansowała" do rangi jednego z trzech celów, tj. celu 3 (europejska współpraca terytorialna).

BORDER TRIPOINTS AS TRANSBORDER COOPERATION REGIONS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

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Integration processes are the questions of interest for scientists and the discussion subject for politicians, simultaneously they are the one of important problems of press release. The still growing interest in these areas does not mean that this is a new issue. Using the pompous style we can say that the beginnings of European unification process „are lost in the deepest history". These traditions are currently quoted by Euroenthusiasts. They underline the unity of European culture and its Hellenic basis. From many ideas originated in XX century it is essential to mention the proposal of Europe's unification in a form of so called *Paneurope*. It had not to comprise only Great Britain more interested in its empire than in the neighbours from the continent and Russia, as a country from Eurasia. At the forum of Nations' League in 1929 the French conception of united Europe, that assumed the close cooperation with all countries without violating its sovereignty, was presented.

In the period after the II World War, Europe was featured by the integration dualism. In the East of continent the group of countries connected with Soviet Union was founded, later it was called the „outer empire".

On the other side of „iron curtain" the integration was developing within the framework of European Common Market. The mile steps in Europe's unification could have been observed after communist system's breakdown. The most important role was performed by European Union.

We observe also the development of many forms of integration including different forms of social and economy activities within different territorial extent.

The processes mentioned above raised in Poland an immense interest of scientists from different knowledge areas. But geographers demonstrated rather low interests in these processes. It is worth here quoting the view of J. Smoleński (1931), who in the thirtieths of XX century proposed „inquiring of laws governing the units of countries as such and their role within those units". In first postwar years the lack of interest in the integration subject matter can be explained by the torpor in our political geography (Grzeszczak J. 1993).

Certain liveliness took place at the end of the eighties. The interferences of omnipotent censorship ended and the political changes on the Europe's map encouraged to their geographical view.

The particular interest of geographers was evoked by founding and functioning of transborder regions. It could be by the fact that this idea comprises one of the „fundamental geographical notions" - e.g. region. (Miszczuk A. 2003).

This is a vital but very controversial notion. In the literature we can meet the ideas and arguments of many determined adherents of „region's" idea and beside the denying attitudes of this concept. The arguments often arise from emotions and do not create a logical deduction.

We can even meet the opinions that the region „is ideologically entangled concept" (Harvey D. 1973). In Poland it is perceived by (Rykiel Z. 2001) who claims that „opinion concerning regionalization could be a loyal testimony towards national power". Of course this observation is appropriate during the time of Polish People's Republic.

The variety if assessments of an active transborder cooperation we can find in the bibliography of „all former bloc of socialist countries". This name „Central and Eastern Europe" is often used instead. But it is not an unambiguous idea. It is a result of many conditionings:

- the names „Central-Eastern Europe" and the „countries of Central-Eastern Europe" should be perceived differently as it states in the conference's title.
- The name „Eastern Europe" requires the delimitation of its Eastern border which is a very controversial problem.
- The problem of territorial extent's marking is not only a question of borders' and Europe's division. It is also a question of accepting or omitting the territorial unit which is sovereign but not recognized in the international arena. Its official name is the Moldavian Republic of Dniester.

The above mentioned three problems are widely described in all European languages.

For the needs of this publication (realizing that it is a kind of simplification), the author assumed the following territorial extent of Central and Eastern Europe:

- the northern border is described as a border tripoint of Russia, Finland and Sweden. The part of European Russia is important here as a country of Eastern Europe.
- The southern border runs according to the parallel run of Danube with tripoint Romania-Ukraine-Moldavia. The justification here is the fact that Danube is often recognized as a northern border of Balkan countries.
- The political Russian border with Georgia and Azerbaijan running along the main Caucasus edge was accepted as a southern-eastern border.

– The western outskirts was described as a junction of Slovak-language areas with German-language areas. For this publication it is marked as a border tripoint of Czech, Austria and Germany.

It is necessary to explain that the simplified method of Central-Eastern Europe's marking most often identified with out- of- Russian., post-communist Europe, was not done here.

It is a result of a differentiation ,already mentioned, between the Central-Eastern Europe and the Central and Eastern Europe.

In case of the Republic of Dniester, which in fact is not consistent to country's definition, it is essential to write that it was not included here, although as a political unit it does exist. For this consideration it is important that the borders of this not large territory (3567 km²) are formed by two tripoints: - northern and southern: Moldavian-Ukrainian – Republic of Dniester.

Within the limits of such area we can find 23 border tripoints (see the table no.1). The term „border tripoint" has its name in different languages eg. German: „Dreilenderech" or it is defined in a more descriptive way. In Polish language the term „trojstyk" is used although it is not found in Polish Language Dictionary.

In the title of this paper border tripoints were defined as transborder cooperation regions. It means that the geometrical point of borders' convergence is as important as the area , the same which was described in case of transborder region on the borderland of two countries.

They were presented as areas of transborder cooperation, which does not mean that in this region it is particularly active. It depends on many factors: historical, ethnical, natural ones and on present political conditions. We can divide them into two groups: first one that impedes or second one that supports the processes of transborder cooperation.

The role of convergence of three countries' borders as a space barrier is one that belongs to the first group. The fact that political borders are vital space barriers is perceived by many geographers. They point out their different conditionings and features. (YouillR. S. 1965, McNatty M. 1968 and in the Polish literature: Łoboda J. 1983, Kałuski 1992, Komornicki T. 1999).

Most often two kinds of barriers are mentioned: socio-economic and natural ones.

Legal, infrastructural and language barriers, hardly - measured and controversial psychological barriers belong to the first group. Landscape configuration, hydrological and ecological barriers belong to the second group.

Table 1.

Border tripoint	Number of official languages	Number of EU's states	Number of NATO's states
1. Poland- Lithuania-Russia	3	2	2
2. Poland-Lithuania-Byelorussia	3	2	2
3. Poland-Slovakia-Ukraine	3	2	2
4. Poland-Slovakia-Czech	3	3	3
5. Poland-Czech-Germany	3	3	3
6. Poland-Byelorussia-Ukraine	3	1	1
7. Czech-Austria-Germany	2	3	2
8. Austria-Slovenia-Hungary	3	3	2
9. Austria-Hungary-Slovakia	3	3	2
10. Austria-Slovakia-Czech	3	3	2
11. Slovakia-Hungary- Croatia	3	2	2
12. Hungary-Serbia- Romania	3	1	1
13. Hungary-Ukraine-Romania	3	1	1
14. Hungary-Slovakia-Ukraine	3	2	2
15. Ukraine-Moldavia- Romania/northern/	3	0	0
16. Ukraine-Moldavia-Romania/southern/	3	0	0
17. Ukraine-Russia-Byelorussia	3	0	0
18. Latvia-Lithuania-Byelorussia	3	2	2
19. Latvia-Russia-Byelorussia	3	1	1
20. Latvia-Estonia-Russia	3	2	2
21. Romania-Bulgaria-Serbia	3	0	0
22. Russia-Finland- Norway	3	2	1
23. Russia-Georgia- Azerbaijan	3	0	0

The language barrier as a vital obstacle for integration processes at the tripoints' area was recognized as a very important one. It is perceived here as a differentiation of official languages in three bordering on countries. At the investigated area of Central and Eastern Europe it is very big. In the table no. one, 23 tripoints were presented and in 22 in each country the official language is different. Only in the tripoint: Czech-Austria-Germany in two countries German is spoken. But, as it was underlined ,we mean official languages and not a possibility of using them. It can be a result of the similarity of languages (Poland, Slovakia, Czech) or of the common knowledge of one language in three countries of tripoint. (Belorussia, Russia, Ukraine). Anyway in some tripoints' area the official languages could be very different (Austria-Hungary-Slovakia) or (Austria-Slovenia-Hungary). Sometimes we can even perceive the dislike for using the language of neighbours in the other parts of tripoint. eg: Russia-

Georgia-Azerbaijan or Estonia-Latvia-Russia. The enormous differentiation of official languages leads to the must of writing the transborder cooperation documents in three languages. It is also a vital obstacle when publishing maps and tourist guides of tripoints' area. The widespread use of English can be perceived as a facilitating factor.

The evaluation of political borders' role as a barrier must take into consideration the peculiarity of investigated area. In case of Central and Eastern Europe we must consider the fact that through its territory run anthropogenic borders, which is a very important fact for trabnsborder cooperation. These are outer borders of the EU and NATO. Among 23 tripoints hardly 6 of them are within the EU's territory. In case of 12 tripoints only 2 or 1 country belong to this organization. So the converging border of those countries is simultaneously the EU's border.

Territories of two tripoints: Russia-Georgia – Azerbaijan and Romania-Bulgaria-Serbia are completely out of the EU.

The EU's borders are a very important problem on the transborder integration scale of tripoints e.g. the conditions of crossing borders are different on both side of a border (often there is a demand of having visa). The custom rules impede even the legal, border trade. It does not encourage the activating of tourist economy on both side of the border.

Even within EU's territory the necessity of changing the national currency is a vital obstacle.

Inside EU there are borders, which are often the ones of countries with different level of wealth. It often leads to illegal emigration of people looking for employment or even for asylum. It results in necessity of diligent borders' guarding, which does not support the transborder integration.

We can perceive a similar situation ,as in case of external EU's borders within the investigated tripoints, in case of external NATO's borders. Hardly territories of 2 tripoints are completely within the territory of this military grouping. (Poland-Slovakia-Czech and Poland-Chech-Germany). Four tripoints are completely out of NATO's territory.

As many as 16 tripoints are divided by NATO's borders, which significantly impedes transborder activities of various type. It is well seen within tripoints, where Russia makes the part of e.g: Latvia-Poland-Russia (Kaliningrad oblast) or Finnland-Norway-Russia.

Following the course of external EU's and NATO's borders we can see that they often divide member states of those groupings and states accessing to them. We can risk and claim that the shorter time of external EU and NATO borders' functioning the easier the later process of transborder integration.

The processes of complex European integration are accompanied by forming at border lands the transborder regions of various type including Euroregions. About a half of investigated tripoints (all of them include Poland) are

within those territorial units. It is hard to point out concrete activities or even plans or projects concerning border tripoints as elements of territorial structure. It results from the fact that in majority of Euroregions activity programs are divided according to activities that require a solution of problems: common business activities, cultural contacts, ecological problems, but not necessarily according to aspects essential for each territorial units.

The vital problem here is the lack of splinting off the zone directly adhering to border, often the zone with particular features and problems different to those which are hundreds km. away from border line. The similar situation we can notice within border tripoints' areas. Often one reaction of their existence is a border pile allocation at a place of borders' convergence.

But almost all border tripoints we can describe as areas requiring a complex, often interdisciplinary and common solution of peculiar problem or necessity of restructuring or activation of area.

In recent years in Central and Eastern Europe many states' outskirts became an area of interest of many investors and businessmen. But often they are unique natural areas on continental scale. Just pro-ecological activities as forming transborder territorial units should have priority here.

A good example here is a range of Bieszczady mountains, at the border areas of Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine. In 1973 Bieszczadzki National Park was formed here. From 1992 it became a part of International Biosphere Reserve formed in order to raise the effectiveness of nature protection in Eastern Carpathians. It consists of Bieszczadzki National Park, San's Valley Landscape Park, Cisniańsko-Wetliński Landscape Park and of valuable nature areas adhering to Polish border. - on Slovak side, National Park Płoniny and Ukrainian side, Nature Reserve Stuicza.

The idea of forming a common territorial unit at states' tripoint was absolutely right.

Unfortunately up to now no common nature protection rules, clerks' competencies and border guards' rules were established. So it comes to the complete prohibition of shot of bear at the Poland's territory. Slovaks hunt temporarily, Ukrainians treating him as a pest, shot all the year round. Bieszczady's bears treat the Poland's territory as a mainstay and a larder and we protect him for other hunters.

We can observe the similar situation at the Caucasian tripoint (Russia-Georgia-Azarbijan). There are National Parks in all parts of the region but with different nature protection rules.

From the tripoints set in table we can point out those, where remarkably valuable nature resources are protected according to different rules. We can mention here the tripoint: Poland-Bielorussia-Ukraine. Szacki National Park is close to Włodawskie Lake District and areas of virgin, lake - marshy nature at Bielorussia.

Photo 1. The border tripoint beetween Poland, Lithuania and Russia (Kaliningrad District)

Photo 2. The border tripoint between Poland, Ukraine and Belarus. Szackie Lake District

Photo 3. „Black Triangle". Borderlands of Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic

Photo 4. Lapland. The border tripoint between Finland, Russia, and Norway

There are places where at the junction of three borders we can find big lakes e.g.Lisztynieckie, (Poland-Lithuania-Russia) or Dryświaty (Latvia-Lithuenia-Bielorussia). Those kind of places are particularly predestinated for forming three-states nature protection units. Mentioned here tripoints, as well as the others in Central and Eastern Europe can form remarkably attractive transborder tourist regions.

The possibility of visiting three countries during one trip can be an incentive for tourists. The sign of forming of this kind of region is a tourist guide recently appeared on Polish book market: „Sudety, Polish, Czech and German ones" (Skała C. 2006). The guide presents the mountains as a geographical and cultural unit. This book will encourage tourists to plan their trips in three countries. It would be advantageous if local authorities perceive the chances of economy activation due to tourism development within tripoint's area.

Nature protection at territorial units and tourist economy are only two examples among many other problems that require coordination at border tripoints' areas. Almost each of them in Central and Middle Europe could be described as a problematic one. It justifies the existence of the dominant question that demands common coordinated activities of three states. The tripoint Poland-Czech-Germany serves as a good example here. It is called the „Black Tripoint", no without the reason. The nature was here dramatically devastated. There are high pollution levels of air, soils, water and plants. It is a result of lignite extraction and burning it in on-site, old power stations. So far activities in order to improve the ecological situation at border tripoint's area do not result in positive effects. The arising role of border tripoints in Central and Eastern Europe's transborder integration processes require the specified and unanimous activities from local authorities. Determining priority activities, satisfying three states within border tripoint's area, seems to be essential. Almost everywhere the enlargement of infrastructure buildings needs to be done. The local society should know the neighbours' languages. If a tripoint is found within Euroregion's area it is vital to determine common integration activities.

At the Central and Eastern Europe's territory all those activities are difficult questions that require a lot of years of coordinated efforts. Although in unifying Europe of XXI century they are indispensable.

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Streszczenie

GRANICZNE TRÓJSTYKI EUROPY ŚRODKOWEJ I WSCHODNIEJ JAKO REGIONY WSPÓŁPRACY TRANSGRANICZNEJ

Opracowanie – nawiązując do tytuły konferencji skrótowo prezentuje problem granicznych trójstyków państw jako regionów współpracy transgranicznej. Na obszarze Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej znajdują się 23 takie miejsca. Oczywiście prezentowany zakres terytorialny opracowania, a zwłaszcza jego wschodnie rubieże to problem dyskusyjny. Starano się ukazać zarówno czynniki utrudniające jak i sytuacje sprzyjające współpracy transgranicznej. Do pierwszych zaliczyć można funkcje zbiegających się granic politycznych jako barier przestrzennych. Mają one różnorodny charakter jak np. bariery językowe czy pokrywanie się granic wielu państw z zewnętrznymi granicami Unii Europejskiej czy NATO. Czynnikami stymulującymi współprace transgraniczną może być ochrona często unikalnych walorów przyrodniczych czy skoordynowany rozwój gospodarki turystycznej. Zwrócono uwagę na konieczność tych działań jako istotnego elementu kompleksowej integracji europejskiej.

REGIONAL CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION WITHIN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC EDUCATION INFRASTRUCTURE FRAMEWORK

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We are witnessing a multilateral, complex and still increasing development of cross-border cooperation in our country. The Author aims at seeking new areas for this cooperation in the field of economic education infrastructure shaping in the neighbouring countries. Until this day, the specialists researching the field of borderlands' cooperation, especially the geographers, have been focusing on the questions of social and economic technical infrastructure, such as motorways, railways, airports, communal and residential management. However, within the last years, the importance of human capital educational development has been increasing, as well as cultural aspects of running multinational businesses or ways for the borderland citizens to communicate smoothly. These interdisciplinary, intercultural problems are becoming a substantial addition to the set of research threads within the activity of i.e. Economic Geography Chair at the Warsaw School of Economics or the National Economy Institute (Instytut Funkcjonowania Gospodarki Narodowej). They are often „forced" by the research addressees, tightly bound with business practice. Problems of international cooperation shaping in the area of economic infrastructure development are examples of such studies.

1. Technical infrastructure of education

Under the term „infrastructure" we understand a configuration of tools, objects and institutions running spatial systems and combining them into one entity. Education, especially economic education, should be such an entity in Central European countries' and their borderlands' scale since there are no significant structural differences between these lands, their economies are market-based and the societies represent similar, comparable level of material development. Moreover, education belongs to the so-called social infrastructure combining tools and institutions directly fulfilling people's needs in the areas

of learning, science and culture as well[1]. Itself a very important part of social infrastructure in a developed country, education has its own material base, its tools, objects and institutions enabling its functioning and achieving planned goals. These items are the technical infrastructure of education.

Today, in a globalizing world, the technical infrastructure of education inevitably gains a network characteristic, this amplified by the network characteristics of modern economy and society themselves. J. H. Dunning draws our attention to that, writing „...increasing phenomenon of „networking" is one of the so-called alliance capitalism dimensions. This alliance capitalism expresses itself on one hand in macro-scale through regional integration processes, on the other – in micro- and mezzo-scale through development of inter-company networks..."[2]. It is important to mention here that the described phenomena relate not only to industrial companies but also institutions and social systems. International alliances are formed by the universities, i.e. Viadrina University in Frankfurt / Oder, numerous high schools and colleges in Central Europe cooperate on set terms, swapping of teachers is occurring.

By 2010 the Central European countries and their borderlands should have been incorporated in a Common European Educational Space (including European Higher Education Area). It is served by the so-called Bologna Process and programs supported by the EU. The Bologna Process realization includes:

- Introducing clear and comparative grade systems,
- Implementing diploma supplement,
- Transgression towards two-stage education system in the majority of study disciplines (three stage system including Ph.D.),
- Introducing ECTS system,
- Promoting students' and university employees' mobility,
- Developing international cooperation in the area of higher education quality growth,
- Development of common diplomas formula[3].

Within the above actions numerous examples of regional cross-border cooperation aimed at academic economic education can be shown. T. Dołęgowski

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[1] More on this subject: L.Kupiec, *Rola infrastruktury w zagospodarowaniu przestrzennym.* Miasto, 1971, no. 9 and K.Kuciński, *Geografia ekonomiczna. Zarys teoretyczny.* SGH, Warszawa 1994, pages 155-156.

[2] J.H. Dunning, *Global Capitalism at Bay?* Routledge, New York 2003, re-translated from Polish translation. See also: T.Dołęgowski, *Współpraca akademicka jako czynnki konkurencyjnego rozwoju wschodniego pogranicza rozszerzonej Unii Europejskiej.* SGH, Warszawa 2006 (script) – chapter of a handbook prepared for print, edited by Prof. E. Teichmann.

[3] *Realizacja Europejskiego Obszaru Szkolnictwa Wyższego* – materiały związane z procesem bolońskim. MEN, Warszawa 2003, page 12.

emphasizes i.e. successes of the Baltic States in creating the basis for a common academic network, the following items belong to:

- Activity of various organizations and associations covering regional universities within their range (including, among others, Baltic Sea Region University Network BSRUN),
- Functioning of EuroFaculty in Vilnius, Riga, Tartu and Kaliningrad,
- Appointment of the Stockholm School of Economics in Riga (university being a foreign subsidiary of the Stockholm School of Economics in cooperation with the Latvian government),
- Norwegian-founded International School of Management in Kaunas (with subsidiary in Vilnius),
- Appointment of numerous international universities, i.e. International Business School with the University of Vilnius, Estonian Business School,
- Partly successful initiative of appointing Polish University in Vilnius or the Batory Collegium with the University of Vilnius[4].

It is necessary to express hope that Poland will take part in the described processes of creating common educational space and infrastructure in the Central Europe more vigorously[5]. It is possible that an initiative of the Society of Scientists – Poles in Lithuania to create, together with the University of Białystok a foreign subsidiary of the latter in Vilnius, will require government and diplomatic support. The motion has received positive opinion of the Ministry in Poland, however it has yet to get acceptance by the government of the Republic of Lithuania, what is not so easily done.

While showing examples of regional cross-border cooperation aimed at academic education is relatively easy, it becomes increasingly difficult in case of mid-level education, i.e. high schools, due to high degree of differentiation and dispersion of particular units (educational entities). In the latter case, Internet accessibility becomes the common denominator of educational technical infrastructure development.

Borderlands in Poland and in the neighbouring countries (except maybe Germany) are characterized by difficult Internet access, poorly developed technical – social and economic – infrastructure, low population density, low level of citizens' education, high unemployment and low purchasing power of telecommunication and IT services bound with citizens' distrust towards them. In this situation building information society, creation of knowledge-based hu-

[4] T. Dołęgowski, *Współpraca akademicka jako czynnik konkurencyjnego rozwoju...*, op.cit., page 317.

[5] At the time his text was written – mid-2006 – the Polish government decreased its share in financing Viadrina University on the western border and the academic society started to pay more attention to the problem of lustration rather than to international cooperation.

man capital or development of „networking" in local communities on both sides of the border must be based on young people educated within the institutional system of education, and not only economic. Since September 2004 over 6,000 schools have joined the „Education with the Internet" program in Poland. In many of them, the Internet remains the only opportunity for the students to learn the World and start international cooperation. Local, mostly rural, community leaders, small town mayors, voivodship marshals are looking for the ways of financing IT infrastructure from EU funds[6]. More and more often local initiatives gain a more mature, network character. As an example, the project „Wrota Parsęty" in Zachodniopomorskie voivodship may be quoted. It is the largest undertaking in northwest Poland aimed at information society development, being a certain kind of alliance of local authorities with the Association of Parsęta River Towns and Communities in Karlin. The project covers 23 communities, among others Kołobrzeg, Borne-Sulinowo, Białogard and Szczecinek. It aims at IT technical infrastructure development and introducing local societies into country-wide and international undertakings (including educational ones). A special attention is paid to rural areas and small towns[7]. It will focus on IT use in local administration functioning (electronic document sharing, document archiving, electronic services for people and companies) and Internet access in public areas (i.e. schools, libraries, culture and civic centres). Along with the office computerisation, Local Information Society Operator, responsible for webpage and program maintenance, will be created. It will also support GIS system for local communities and administrative districts[8]. The project will be financed in 49% from the ILDOP funds (PLN 3.9M). The rest (PLN 4.1M) will be paid by participating local authorities. The „Wrota Parsęty" project has followed survey examining in what degree information and communication technologies influence a region's economic development and what the chances of career for the youth are. In the Koszaliński administra-

[6] One of the many examples of such activity is the village of Korytowo, where priest Sławomir Kokorzycki inclined Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. to installing ISDN. Today it is enough to buy a special adapter worth PLN 10,000 for the telephone exchange in nearby Zieleniewo (5 km) which has a direct line to Strzelce Krajeńskie, in order for the Neostrada TP to be available in the country. The mayor of Biała Podlaska will install 80 broadband Internet access units in town that will cost PLN 8M of EU funds. Its users will be mostly offices, banks and various schools. The Kujawsko-Pomorskie voivodship's town authorities have remitted PLN 48M out of PLN 54M within the 1.5 Integrated Local Development Operational Plan (ILDOP) framework, for the build of Kujawsko-Pomorska IT Network. Its effect will be important for less urbanized areas in the first place, what rises discontent in larger towns and cities. See W. Pander, *Dla kogo infostrada?*, Computerworld, May 24th, 2005, page 8.

[7] See W. Pander, op.cit., page 8.

[8] Ibidem, page 8.

tive district 40% of students use the Internet on a daily basis. As their web-workplace they list first of all home, and, less often, internet café or school. Few countryside school students have their own e-mail address, so the communication with outside world is severely hampered. If we add lack of perspective for a quick improvement of the labour market situation, the great majority of students points on migration as the only way of solving their existence problems.

2. Program cooperation in economic education development

Development of economic education aimed regional cross-border cooperation cannot be limited only to technical infrastructure. It should also contain quality changes in its program and methodology. Without them we will be left with educational technical base but without intellectual features. Because of that, the Author points out that: traditional cross-border cooperation – both on school and academic levels, though very precious itself, is insufficient and should be supplemented by international program and methodological cooperation.

We have interesting examples of research conducted in Polish borderland voivodships, connected with economic education system changes on medium and higher levels, aimed at better matching of education service with very difficult local labour markets[9]. Everything shows that these works, including those of implemental character will be extended into Zachodniopomorskie, Lubelskie and Podkarpackie voivodships in the coming years. In their effect, handbooks of modern economic education, students' entrepreneurship development programs and proposals of specialist and vocational schools restructuring will be created.

A new field for cross-border cooperation is being introduced – development of international educational programs for youth based on modern methodology bound with economic practice. Even though decisions in this area are often made on the government level, the problematic borderland areas (mostly because of unemployment) are their main addressee and executor. Academic cooperation in this area, strengthening of mutual bounds between borderlands' high schools and creation of communication infrastructure will be crucial for broad Central and Eastern European areas' competitiveness and directions of further development.

So far, unfortunately rare practical examples of program cooperation in the area of economic education confirm that this direction of activity is correct. One of them is the European educational Project OLMOS (Oldenburg-Moskau-Warschau-Projekt – Oldenburg-Moscow-Warsaw-Project). The Program concerns matching economic education in Russia's leading universities to the requirements and spirit of the Bologna, its coordinator being the Institute

[9] Ibidem, page 8.

of Economic Education of the Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg (Lower Saxony, Germany) led by Professor Hans Kaminski (doctor honoris causa). The OLMOS Project's EU partner and subcontractor is Warsaw School of Economics and the Russian economic educational research motion makers are universities in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Perm.

The project executors' task is to prepare and implement programs of broadly understood economic education – education of economic behaviour to be exact – in economy teachers preparing universities and in high schools. This target perfectly fits into the framework of quality changes taking place in Polish mid- and higher-level education systems. Namely, it turns out that entrepreneurship and economic culture should be taught from the earliest stage possible. High school students ought to be aware of the basic correlation between their individual and group activities in certain societies, associations or institutions and their chance of succeeding from the very first years of their education. They should also possess a broad view of the world, understand mechanisms of socio-economic life and show greater determination and innovativeness in achieving intended objectives. The Russian partners, and also Belarusian, Ukrainian and Lithuanian ones emphasize that the mental barriers remain one of the heaviest obstacles for their societies to open for the World and Europe. The simple, nineteenth-century economy based solely on the gain maximization rule, supported by a belief that the first million is always stolen, does not help in the process either.

There may be many ways of achieving the described targets of universal economic education. One of them is matching each of the areas of human activity with a suitable part of environment being a source of both opportunities and threats[10]:

- I (student, person, human) in close environment, i.e. family, school, workplace, society;
- I as an entity of socio-economic life in further environment, functioning in certain political, geographical, legal, social, demographic, economic and international status of the country or region - based conditions.

Another approach to education in entrepreneurship spirit[11] puts the main accent of methodological concept on the student. Because of that, education of economy and entrepreneurship is executed along with the following pattern:

- Entrepreneurial attitude bound with self-cognition and own potential of entrepreneurial behaviour;

[10] H. Kaminski, J. Brdulak (editorial), *Edukacja ekonomiczna w procesie transformacji w Polsce,* IfOeB, Oldenburg 2003, page 4.

[11] F. Żurakowski, *Podstawy przedsiębiorczości. Zakres podstawowy.* MAC Edukacja S.A., Kielce 2002 and J. Brdulak, *Projekt europejski OLMOS,* PTE bulletin, 2006 no.2, pages 12-13.

- Ability to cooperate with other people and communicate with them in decision-making, work, organizational and negotiation processes;
- Social, professional and economic activities – motives, conditions;
- Human's place in market economy, understanding of its various manifestations;
- Concept of economic activity – creativity, idea verification, communication with the potential client.

The problem of companies' functioning within the economy, questions of labour market, macroeconomic and social conditions play a significantly less important role in this proposal. Success is achieved thanks to personal convictions, adaptability and efficiency in executing one's economic ideas.

A set of economy and entrepreneurship teaching handbooks in Polish (soon in Russian as well) edited by Prof. H Kaminski's team in cooperation with Polish partners is an attempt of combining the above methodological approaches[12]. Hence the specific offer of economic education programs composition on both mid- and higher education levels made by reputable Russian universities.

It is necessary to realize that any changes in intellectual, program or methodological superstructure of the real economic education system beyond our eastern border will take years to complete and will face vast resistance of various milieus. Even now, seemingly obvious premises of conducted international cross-border educational research cause numerous discussions and controversy:

- Economic education is an integral part of young people's general education, not just a part of professional education for students bearing significant branch or market nature;
- Authors of the presented approach care especially for qualitative improvement of students' education aimed at: broad, open view of surrounding socio-economic reality, systemic perception of economy and its ties with various aspects of social life, use of gained economic knowledge in practice, formulating self-evaluation of own abilities by the student and, last but not least, team work and effective communication with the environment;
- In setting objectives for economic education, great emphasize is put on practical matching student activities with certain economic situation. It is not enough just to teach laws determining, for example, consumer behaviour in households. This knowledge must be supplemented by issues of present proprietary relations, what proves extraordinarily difficult in young democracies;

[12] *Ekonomia w praktyce* (edited by Prof. H. Kamiński), Oldenburg-Warszawa 2005 and C. Hotel, *Zakładamy firmę uczniowską!* Oldenburg-Warszawa 2005.

– In education programs the issue of social market economy and ethical business behaviour is emphasized, a matter that is often neglected in socio-economic practice. Among the young people, not only in Poland, a belief exists that the whole economy is based solely on cynical, inhuman competition.

To sum up, it seems that the results of ongoing works within the international, trilateral research framework concerning qualitative development of economic education will soon become basis for creative, humane, socially friendly economy and entrepreneurship teaching, so that the students could become real Euro-economists.

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Streszczenie

REGIONALNA WSPÓŁPRACA TRANSGRANICZNA W RAMACH ROZWOJU INFRASTRUKTURY DLA EDUKACJI EKONOMICZNEJ

Trwa realizacja szeregu projektów rozbudowujących i wzmacniających infrastrukturę techniczną edukacji w polskich województwach nadgranicznych oraz w państwach ościennych. Mają one najczęściej „sieciowy" charakter, a w przypadku edukacji, w tym także ekonomicznej, na poziomie szkoły średniej koncentrują się na umożliwieniu uczniom szerokopasmowego dostępu do Internetu. Postawiono tezę, że prace nad rozwojem międzynarodowej infrastruktury technicznej edukacji ekonomicznej muszą być uzupełniane o współpracę programową i metodologiczną, bez której techniczna baza edukacyjna nie zostanie wykorzystana. Omówiony przykład niemiecko-rosyjsko-polskiego projektu edukacyjnego OLMOS, realizowanego w celu zapewnienia zmian jakościowych w sposobie nauczania ekonomii w Rosji.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEM WITHIN THE POLISH-GERMAN BORDERLAND AS THE INTERNAL BORDER AREA OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Introduction

In the assessment of the mutual relations, which take place between the ecological space and the socio-economic space in the transborder areas it is very useful to cognise the potential and the mechanisms of functioning of the socio-ecological system in the two bordering countries. The socio-ecological system (SES) was defined more than 30 years ago (Holling, 1973), as the setting of closely mutually linked and interactively mutually influencing two basic components of geographical space: its natural and human resources. The concept of the socio-ecological system is continuously verified through its application in practice, as well as through the on-going studies of the flexibility of the system with respect to external factors (Holling, 2001; Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Carpenter et al., 2005), the studies determining the directions of activity, whose objective is to optimise the use and protection of the resources of the natural environment (Barrenda and Georgantzis, 2000), and the studies on securing the multi-functional landscape development (Degórski, 2003). The socio-ecological models are being constructed (Nijkamp, 1987; Domański, 2004), linking internally the technical and procedural solutions applied for years in the single-discipline models (ecological and economic ones), and integrating mutual relations between the economic and natural processes, taking place in the environment. The concepts of these models tend to grasp the theoretical reflection of and then to verify the relations which take place between the socio-economic factors and the properties of the environment in geographical space. These models are most often dynamic in character, that is – they contain the diagnosis of the state, the directions of change and the forecast of development of geographical environment, treated as an interactive metasystem, composed of the natural environmental and the anthropogenic systems.

A perfect example for this kind of cognitive solutions is provided by the environmental-agricultural models, environmental-forestry models, or the functional-structural models of the multi-functional landscape, which account, in particular, for the dynamics in land use changes and transformations taking place in the environment, conditioned by a set of mutually interconnected natural, social and economic factors. The objectives of the models constructed are therefore to cognise the transformations that have been taking place in the geographical environment under the impact from human activities, to identify its original properties, as well as the historically conditioned changes and the conformity of the current state with the environmental potential, and then to predict the envisaged way of spatial development of the area considered, along with the socio-economic and environmental consequences thereof.

The purpose of the present report is to assess the conditions for and the functioning of the Socio-Ecological System (SES) within the Polish-German borderland, with special consideration of its state after Poland became a member of the European Union. The results here presented are partly the aftermath of the PHARE project ref. PL2002/000-606.21.02 – „The directional study of the spatial development of the area along the Polish-German border", carried out by the Institute of Geography and Spatial Organization of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

The legal prerequisites for the development of the socio-ecological system

The legal prerequisites for the development of the socio-ecological system are defined, just like on all the other areas of a given country, by the internal national and international general regulations from the domain of environmental management and protection.

The external conditions are first of all constituted by the conceptual prerequisites for the ecological policy of the European Union (La Morvan, 1999; Degórska, Degórski, 2000; Williams, 2000) and the regulations contained in the principal legal documents of European reach, such as the Pan-European Strategy of Biological and Landscape Diversity (1995), European Spatial Development Perspective (1999), European Landscape Convention (2000), European Strategy of Sustainable Development (2001), and, additionally, in numerous other international legal regulations. They include international conventions, EU directives and bilateral agreements between bordering countries (Degórski, 2005). Among the latter, the most important ones, from the point of view of natural environmental systems, are the Environmental Impact Convention in the transboundary context (1991), the Cartagena Protocol (2000) on biological safety, referring to the Convention on Biodiversity, and related to the transboundary movement of the modified living organisms, the Helsinki Convention (1992) on the cross-border consequences of the industrial catastrophes,

and the Basel Convention (1989) on control of cross-border movement and removal of dangerous waste. To those, one should add a dozen or so of the Directives and the associated by-laws. The primary purpose of these documents is, on the one hand, to indicate the directions of action that are aimed at optimisation of the use of natural environment potential, limitation of it degradation and protection of its most valuable resources, as well as determination of the activities, meant to achieve the coherent ecological policy in the frameworks of bilateral collaboration and of the entire Union, and on the other hand – development of solutions for the individual sectors of the transboundary ecological policy of the neighbouring countries. Among the sectoral tasks particular attention is paid to the transborder movement of waste (Council Directive 84/631/EEC of 06.12.1984, and its modification of 1986 – 86/121/EEC and 86/279/EEC), including also hazardous waste (Commission Directives 87/112/EEC of 23.12.1987, with an extension 90/170/EEC), integrated prevention of contamination and monitoring of the flow of contaminants (Council Directive 96/61/WE of 24.09.1996), and protection of the most valuable natural resources (Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2.04.1979 on protection of wild birds, Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21.05.1992 on protection of natural and semi-natural habitats of fauna and flora), the latter having become, by virtue of the European Commission Decision 97/266 of 18.12.1996, concerning the definition of the scope of information on the areas proposed for entering the ecological system NATURA 2000, the basis for establishment of this system in the countries of the Union (Lanchbery, 1998).

The internal conditions of formal-legal character result directly from the regulations valid on the territory of a given country. In Poland these conditions result from the laws passed by the Parliament (concerning, e.g. nature protection, protection and development of the environment, water law, forests, geological and mining law, waste economy, etc.), the by-laws issued by the ministry of the environment (concerning, in particular, the establishment of the legally protected areas with a higher category of protection, such as national parks and nature reserves, delimitation of the areas of special protection of birds and habitats conform to the prerequisites of the NATURA 2000 network, specie protection of fauna and flora etc.), the by-laws issued by other ministries (e.g. by the ministry of agriculture in the domain of policy with respect to agricultural land and its protection), or the motions passed by the regional and local self-governmental bodies (establishment of the legal protection entities of a lower category, like, for instance, landscape parks, nature monuments, protected landscape areas), and numerous other regulations issued by the regional and local administrative authorities.

Environmental prerequisites for the socio-ecological system

The resources of the Polish-German borderland do not differ significantly on the two sides of the border. This concerns both the biotic potential and the geodiversity, characterising the state of the abiotic elements of the natural system.

Among the most important resources of the biotic environment within the Polish-German borderland one should mention forests. On the Polish side the highest share of forest land is observed in the province of Lubusza (48.8% - the highest share in Poland), followed by Western Pomerania (34.6%), while in Lower Silesia this share is close to the average for Poland (28.5%). Compact forest areas, most valuable in biocoenotic terms, exist in the region of Sudety Mts, in Lower Silesian Forests, in river valleys and on the island of Wolin (the Forests of Rzepin, Noteć River, Goleniów and Wkra River). These compact forest areas find often a continuation on the other side of the border. Alas, the ecosystems of a significant part of forests are strongly transformed, and their tree stands do not take adequate advantage of the fertility of habitats, and feature high degree of specie inconsistency. There is a significant share of stands damaged by the action of gases and dusts, although it is strongly differentiated in regional terms, with a decreasing tendency towards the North. In the Lower Silesian forests this share amounts to as much as 98.1%, in the forests of the Lubusza province – 51.3%, while in the forests of Western Pomerania – only 3.9% (*Raport...*, 2004). On the Polish side of the border the shares of forest areas in towns is rather low. These areas total, namely, 48.5 hectares in Lower Silesian province, 54.6 hectares in Lubusza province, and 54.7 hectares in Western Pomerania. The urban forest areas are characterised by the poor state, caused mainly by the intensive penetration by the inhabitants, and low specie diversity (primarily Scotch pine).

An unquestioned asset of the environment of the Polish-German borderland, associated with high forest share and a significant surface of wetlands and aquatic bodies, is the richness of fauna, especially with respect to birds. The number of nesting species of birds is estimated at more than 250, of which many are protected. Recently, hatching of more than 30 endangered bird species, included in the Polish Red Book, has been observed. The most valuable areas in terms of ornithology are the river vallyes – of Odra, Warta, Noteć, Barycz, Bystrzyca, Strzegomka, and Ina, as well as the Szczecin Lagoon and the lake district belt with the characteristic nesting of cormorants (Photograph 1). A wealth of ecologically valuable fish species live in the pure and rich in oxygen upstream stretches of the mountain rivers, flowing through the sparsely developed areas, while amphibians – on the areas with still water bodies, such as old river beds (especially in the valleys of Odra and Warta rivers), ponds (in Ponds of Milicz, in Parowa, Przemków, and Łagów), small in-field ponds, lakes, and the surroundings of the artificial reservoirs. For the reptiles

and mammals most important are the areas of forests, meadows, and pastures with limited human penetration.

Phot. 1. Cormorants nesting in the gates of Świna river

The soil potential of the borderland is also valuable, although, in view of the paedogenic factors, it is in a natural manner limited from the point of view of fertility of the soil cover. Zonal soils, having developed in the post-glacial formations, both sandy and clayey, dominate. Within the agricultural land on the Polish and German sides of the border the best quality soils appear in the South of the area in question. From the sanitary point of view these soils are pure, while the content of the basic heavy metals (lead, zinc, copper, nickel and cadmium) classifies 98-100% of them in the contamination groups 0 or I (*Ochrona Środowiska,* 2005). Soils characterised by the highest degrees of contamination (IV and V) appear only in the point-wise manner around the plants of power generation and metal working industries. In the borderland area there exists also another kind of dangerous soil contamination, namely the one from the oil-related products, left by the military detachments of the army of the Russian Federation, stationing in Poland and in the former German Democratic Republic until the 1990s. Thus, for instance, in the Lower Silesian province total area of such locations amounts to 160 hectares, distributed among 8 places.

Water resources belong among the most differentiated components of the environment within the area in question. On the Polish side, the worst hydrological conditions exist in the Lower Silesian province, which is one of the water-poorest areas of Poland, and on the German side – in the eastern part of Saxony, while the best conditions exist in the North of the area in question. From the economic point of view the underground water resources, meant for exploitation, are highly significant as an important source of water supply, especially for the municipal economy and agriculture. The highest share of the underground waters older than Tertiary is characteristic for the southern part of the area under consideration. In the Lower Silesian province the share of the Tertiary waters amounts to close to 23%, it is equal 4% for the Cretaceous and exceeds 5.5% for the waters older than Cretaceous (Ochrona Środowiska, 2005). Their quality is good, although the underground waters of the highest quality are missing.

Due to high qualities of the natural environment, legal protection of the most valuable natural objects is applied on 27.8% of the Polish area of the borderland and close to 30% on the German side (Fig. 1). Additionally, 18 sites have been designated, associated with the special protection for birds, as well as 55 special habitat protection plots. Areas belonging to NATURA 2000 network, located close to the Polish-German boundary, are ecologically linked with the objects inside Germany and Poland. The transboundary character applies to the entire International Park of the Lower Odra River Valley. The aim of functioning of this area is to protect the entire ecosystem of the lower stretch of the river valley. The effect of the bilateral collaboration was creation on the Polish side of the Landscape Parks: of the Lower Odra River Valley and of Cedynia (1993), and on the German side – the National Park of the Lower Oder River Valley (1995). A valuable initiative in the Polish-German borderland was also constituted by the WWF project "Green Belt of Odra and Nysa Rivers". This project encompassed the preparation of the pro-ecological concept of development of the region and establishment of the protected areas along the course of Odra and Nysa rivers. WWF, together with the Polish and German partners, succeeded in covering with protection the area of some 90,000 hectares in the valleys of the two rivers. The effects of realisation of the project included, in particular, the establishment of the National Park of Warta River Mouth and the Landscape Park of Krzesin. Thereby, it turned out possible to protect one of the most important ecological corridors in Europe (Photograph 2).

Fig. 1. Selected legally protected objects of nature in particular communes in 2003 (according to Węcławowicz et al., 2005)



Phot. 2. Water pools in the National Park of Warta River Mouth

Anthropogenic hazards for the socio-ecological system

One of the most important threats to the environment is constituted by the emissions of atmospheric pollutants, and that is why so much attention is devoted to this subject in the transboundary collaboration. In comparison with 1990 the global emissions in the Polish part of the borderland decreased by more than 80% in case of dusts, by roughly 45% in case of sulphur dioxide, and by 30% for nitrogen oxides. This was caused, in particular, by the implementation of a number of pro-ecological projects in the largest industrial plants, such as the copper mining and processing combine KGHM „Polska Miedź" S.A., the metalworking plants of „Hutmen" S.A., the chemical plants of Zakłady Chemiczne „Wizów" S.A. and Zakłady Chemiczne „Police" S.A., as well as the power plants of Turów and „Dolna Odra" S.A. There was also a significant decrease of the emissions originating from the plants burning solid fuels on the German side (mainly lignite extracted in the Saxo-Lusitanian basin, Photograph 3). Despite the curbing of the industrial emissions, maintenance of the air quality standards within the Polish-German borderland encounters a very severe obstacle from the low-level emissions, especially in rural areas and in the peripheral parts of towns. In the health resorts and holidaymaking centres this fact brings about a decrease of their attractiveness. That is why increasing attention is paid to promotion of the non-conventional energy sources and to their use (Photograph 4).

Phot. 3. Opencast lignite mine in the vicinity of Bogatynia

Phot. 4. Power generating windmill farm (aeolic pwer plant) in Zagórze by Szczecin

Another problem with the correct functioning of the socio-ecological system is constituted by the emissions from the mobile sources, whose significance in terms of hazard for air quality is on the increase, especially within urban areas and on the territories directly neighbouring with the more important transport routes. Thus, during the last ten years, in Lower Silesia, the share

of pollution originating from road transport in total air pollution emissions increased by more than 10%, so that this share amounts now to roughly 30% in carbon oxides and nitrogen oxides, and roughly 20% in lead (Photograph 5).

Production and storage of waste are, as well, essential problems for the quality of environment. On the Polish side of the borderland the primary issue is still the lack of the system of a selective collection and re-use of waste, which has become standard on the German side (Photograph 6). On the Polish side, as well, an important problem is associated with the management of dangerous waste and the procedures connected with liquidation and reclamation of dumps.

Phot. 5. Customs terminal in Świecko, through which hundreds of trucks pass every day, entering Polish road network

Phot. 6. Segregation of garbage in the German part of the palace and park compound of Bad Muskau

Thus, for instance, Lower Silesian province contributes 25.7% of the total volume of waste produced in Poland (33 million tons). Within the entire territory of the borderland 99.3% of municipal waste is stored in dumps, while selective collection of garbage is conducted on a marginal scale. It encompasses between 0.5% of the total mass of waste produced in the Lower Silesian and Lubusza provinces, and 2% in the Western Pomeranian province. This is closely associated with another persisting problem of the waste management, namely that of too low degree of their salvaging and re-use, even though this process has been significantly accelerated. Thus, in 2004 the share of waste subject to recycling amounted to between 77% in Lower Silesia and less than 35% in Western Pomerania (*Ochrona Środowiska,* 2005). Low degree of salvaging and re-use of waste brings about a rapid increase of the volumes stored, which, at the end of 2004, amounted to 650 million tons (Lower Silesia – 550 million tons, Western Pomerania – 80 million tons, Lubusza – 14.6 million tons).

Yet another issue resulting from the anthropogenic impact on the socio-economic system is connected with the water-and-sewage economy. On the Polish side of the borderland the volume of liquid waste discharged to waters

decreased during the last decade by approximately 25% and in 2004 amounted for Lower Silesia to 227 hm^3, for Lubusza – to 38.5 hm^3, and for Western Pomerania – to 151 hm^3, with the discharges from sewage collection systems amounting to, respectively, 108.9 hm^3, 31.8 hm^3 and 73.8 hm^3 (Ochrona Środowiska, 2005). An especially high hazard is associated with the discharges of salty mining waters. The discharges of this kind from Lower Silesia alone account for roughly 8% of the respective Polish total. Water quality is largely influenced by the effectiveness of the wastewater treatment system. There were in 2004 on the area in question 387 industrial wastewater treatment plants (142 mechanical, 46 chemical, 186 biological, and 13 with enhanced removal of biogens), and 851 municipal wastewater treatment plants (53 mechanical, 586 biological and 212 with enhanced removal of biogens). Untreated waste constituted the following shares of the respective total discharges in particular provinces: 3.7% in Lower Silesia, 10.9% in Lubusza, and 26.3% in Western Pomerania.

Correct water economy in the catchment of Odra river is made difficult by the destruction of the existing flood protection system, covering of polder areas with structures, and poor technical state of the flood protection facilities, including walls. The weakness of the system got uncovered in 1997 during the secular flood, which caused on the Polish side of the border losses exceeding 8 billion PLN (roughly 2 billion €). Currently, work is underway aiming at reconstruction of the existing polders or construction of the new ones, this being especially visible on the German side.

The effectiveness of the water-and-sewage economy on the Polish side was undoubtedly influenced by the PHARE CBC programs, aiming at improvement of the quality of environment. Out of 100 projects, with total value of more than 80 million €, implemented in the years 1994-2000, as many as 35 concerned construction of wastewater treatment plants (Ciok, 2004). Despite a significant improvement, the state of purity of the majority of surface waters, both flowing and still, is as yet insufficient for securing adequate utility qualities of waters. In 2004, in terms of the physico-chemical criterion, in the basin of Odra river only 1.5% of the river length monitored was classified in class I of purity, 61.8% in class II, 25% in class III, while 11.7% of the length was beyond classification as being too polluted. The assessment is even worse in terms of the biological criterion. Thus, 0.1% of the length of monitored rivers belonged to class I of purity, 2.4% to class II, 50.9% to class III, with the exceedingly polluted waters accounting for as much as 46.6% of the total length of flows monitored (*Ochrona Środowiska*, 2004).

Collaboration between Poland and Germany is being conducted also in the framework of joint undertakings realised in four transboundary Euroregions: Nysa, Sprewa-Nysa-Bóbr, ProEuropa Viadrina, Pomerania, and also in the framework of the projects: „Oder-Regio", concerning the transnational concept of flood prevention in the basin of Odra river, with consideration

of activities from the domain of spatial development from 2001, and „Water-Front" – consisting in indication of the principles of developing coastal and water-adjacent areas in the Baltic Sea region of Europe.

If we look, therefore, at the effects of the bilateral transboundary collaboration between Poland and Germany, we should state that, beyond doubt, a lot has been achieved already. The most important achievements of this collaboration include:

- strengthening of the supra-regional natural system of Lower Odra river and its tributaries through support for the activities aiming at the natural consistency of the ecological system of the corridor of Odra river and its tributaries, as well as protection of its landscape assets;
- improvement of water quality and rationalisation of water economy through implementation of municipal and supra-municipal programs of protection of water quality and implementation of environmental management systems;
- reclamation of the abandoned extraction sites through planning and implementation of the optimum solutions concerning the development of former mining areas, accounting for the local specificity of these areas;
- putting in order the waste management through implementation of the programs of waste salvaging and safe storage, as well as increase of their economic re-use;
- construction of a modern, consistent system of flood protection, making use of technical and ecological means, and accounting for the administrative and economic means, by reaching the agreement on the transfer of water from the catchment of Odra to Germany (Nysa Łużycka, HoFriWa canal), as well as reconstruction and construction of polders on the territory of Germany.

Demographic prerequisites for the socio-ecological system

The peripheral location of the Polish-German borderland with respect to both countries involved shapes the demographic prerequisites for the socio-ecological system. On both sides of the boundary the borderland area is characterised by population outflow. In case of Germany the respective migrations have primarily the character of internal movements, meaning the movement of population towards the lands in the western part of the country. In Poland, on the other hand, these migrations are both internal and international. The consequence of the migration processes is the decrease of the population numbers.

The differences in the demographic conditions between the Polish and German parts of the borderland consist mainly in the natural aspect of the processes. On the Polish side in the majority of communes the level of natural increase against the background of the country is much higher, while on the German side it is the other way around. On the top of this, though, one can observe a distinct difference between the rural and urban areas, as well as a dichotomy

between the North and the South on both sides of the border. The areas situated in the southern part of the borderland are characterised by the lowest share of population in pre-productive age (20-22%) and the largest share of the population in post-productive age (up to 24%), while in the northern part the share of the population in pre-productive age in total population numbers reaches in some communes around 30%, the share of the population in post-productive age being at roughly 10% (*Studium kierunkowe,* 2005).

The demographic potential on the Polish side has a weak point in its educational level. Human capital features high polarisation, but on the Polish side of the border the share of persons with university education amounts to between 1 and 3%, increasing in the urban centres to 5%, and in large agglomerations, such as Szczecin or Wrocław, exceeding 15% (Studium uwarunkowań, 2005). There is also a spatial differentiation in the level of education between the northern and the southern parts of the borderland, where in many communes the population with primary and incomplete primary education accounts for more than 50% of the professionally active population (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2. Percentage share of the population of 13 and more years of age according to selected categories of education in particular communes in 2002 (according to Węcławowicz et al., 2005)



The level of education finds its reflection in the sources of upkeep of the population. The communes characterised by the least educated population usually feature the highest unemployment, and the highest share of persons living off welfare, the latter share reaching even 40% of the respective population totals. The areas characterised by the highest shares of persons with secondary and tertiary education are also characterised by the most intensive economic activity and entrepreneurship of the society. Thus, for instance, in numerous communes with such a social structure the share of persons conducting own businesses exceeds 20% of the professionally active persons (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Sources of upkeep of the population in particular communes in 2002 (according to Węcławowicz et aal, 2005)



Functioning of the socio-ecological system within the Polish-German borderland

As indicated by the studies to date, conducted also in the Polish-German borderland, the functioning of the socio-ecological system is conditioned by several factors, of environmental, economic and social character (Holling, 2001; Gunderson and Holling, 2002). The functioning of the entire system is also conditioned by the legal regulations, determined by both the internal and the international legislation. These regulations constitute, therefore, the surroundings of the system, defining the legal bases for its functioning. In the transborder areas the functioning of the socio-ecological system is addition-

ally conditioned by the special regulations, contained in the bilateral agreements, which are underwritten by the two neighbouring countries.

The framework of co-operation between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany is determined by the bilateral agreement signed in Schwerin on April 7th, 1994. The operational tasks resulting from this agreement are contained in three basic problem blocks, and encompass the following kinds of activities:

(1) the conservatory ones, consisting in the protection of the most valuable, in terms of nature, objects of geographical space as well as landscape;
(2) the logistic ones, concerning the establishment of the consistent and conforming with the international law operational goals, leading to evening out of the differences on two sides of the border, with preservation of regional identity;
(3) the planning ones, aiming at generation of a consistent planning and management system between both countries, whose result should be the improvement of consistent functioning of the socio-economic system on two sides of the border.

From the point of view of an effective functioning of the socio-ecological system of the Polish-German borderland its principles are based on creation of the policy of spatial and socio-economic development, in accordance with the strategic goals of sustainable development indicated in the Union document of the Council of Europe, adopted in Gothenburg in 2001. The postulates, contained in this document, which are most important from the point of view of functioning of the borderland zones, include:

- integration, for the sake of the principles of sustainable development, of the EU policies with the national policies, along with the strongly distinguished sectoral policies;
- equilibrated treatment of the social, economic and ecological effects of economic activity with emphasis on broadly conceived quality of life;
- implementation and consistent realisation of the programs requiring an integrated view on the environment, such as the new common agricultural policy, water framework directive, protection of biodiversity, common sustainable transport policy, European perspective on spatial development, and the union-wide promotion of public health;
- introduction into the system of environmental assessment of the new data sources and banks on the environment and hazards to it;
- strengthening the research side of environmental management through introduction of the instruments with deeper scientific justification, conform to the establishment of the knowledge society in Europe.

The question therefore arises as to the chances of attainment of the above goals in the context of the environmental and demographic conditions, which exist within the Polish-German borderland. From the viewpoint of the potential of natural environment, the socio-ecological system of the Polish-German bor-

derland is characterised by the differentiated conditions for the development of the SES. This involves, in particular, the issue of the average quality of soils, not advantageous for the intensification of agriculture, and the limited water resources, which may constitute a barrier in the development of the settlement system. On the other hand, this includes also the very high forest share, the diversified and unique on the European scale valley and seacoast landscape, with sandy beaches and cliff segments. A positive impulse for the correct – that is: conform to the sustainable development – functioning of the socio-ecological system within the Polish-German borderland is constituted by the continuously improving quality of the particular components of the environment.

Similarly as the environmental conditions, also the demographic potential of the SES in the Polish-German borderland features high polarisation. This concerns equally the processes associated with the natural demographic dynamics, migrations, human resources, their educational level, as well as the share in the labour market and the entrepreneurship.

Summing up the above considerations, we should conclude that the prerequisites, both in terms of environment and demography, characterised by a significant spatial differentiation, do, however, not constitute a barrier for the development of the socio-ecological system of the Polish-German borderland. The use of the existing environmental potential and of the human resources will allow for the further development of the border adjacent zone on both sides of the border, forming the foundation for the achievement an increasing functional and spatial consistency. All these activities started to intensify after the accession of Poland to the European Union, when the boundary between Poland and Germany became the internal boundary of the Union. Yet, this requires introduction of further systemic solutions, enabling at least the elaboration of common programs, whose objectives will be to smooth out the differences in the possibilities of realising the aspirations of the local societies on both sides of the border and the establishment of the bilateral solutions leading to greater consistency in the functioning of the system. An instance may be provided by the systemic solutions allowing Polish citizens to use the housing stock on the German side, or a much more intensive development of the tourist facilities on the Polish side for the German citizens.

Conclusions

1. The analysis of the socio-ecological system demonstrated that the environmental conditions, side by side with the social and economic ones, constitute a stimulator of regional development in the borderlands.
2. The natural and demographic conditioning of the system is characterised by a high polarisation of the resources, which makes difficult the achievement of the enhanced functional-spatial consistency within the Polish-German

borderland, but at the same time provides the possibility of preserving the cultural and social identity at the local level.

3. In the context of the Polish-German collaboration in the sphere of environmental management in the border region, it should be stated that despite numerous significant achievements, such as elaboration of a consistent system of protection of Odra river valley, establishment of the International Park of Lower Odra, joint undertakings from the domain of improvement of water quality, etc., there are still large potential possibilities of developing the collaboration, least in the establishment of the transboundary biosphere reserves, international peace parks, or the common areas of special protection in the framework of NATURA 2000 network.

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Streszczenie

ROZWÓJ SYSTEMU SPOŁECZNO-EKOLOGICZNEGO NA POGRANICZU POLSKO-NIEMIECKIM, JAKO WEWNĘTRZNEJ GRANICY UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

W celu oceny wzajemnych relacji jakie zachodzą pomiędzy przestrzenią ekologiczną a przestrzenią społeczno-gospodarczą w obszarach transgranicznych bardzo przydatne jest poznanie potencjału oraz mechanizmów funkcjonowania systemu społeczno-ekologicznego (SES) w dwu graniczących z sobą państwach. SES został zdefiniowany ponad 30 lat temu (Holling, 1973) jako układ ściśle powiązanych ze sobą i interakcyjne oddziałujących na siebie dwu podstawowych składowych przestrzeni geograficznej: zasobów naturalnych i zasobów ludzkich. Koncepcja systemu społeczno-ekologicznego jest w sposób ciągły weryfikowana na drodze jej stosowania w praktyce, jak również poprzez prowadzenie monitorowanie elastyczności samego systemu na czynniki zewnętrzne (Holling, 2001; Gunderson i Holling, 2002; Carpenter et al., 2005) oraz studia określające kierunki działań społecznych, których celem jest optymalizacja wykorzystania i ochrony zasobów środowiska przyrodniczego (Barrenda i Georgantzis, 2000), jak również kreowania rozwoju krajobrazu wielofunkcyjnego (Degórski, 2003).

Celem opracowania jest ocena uwarunkowań i funkcjonowania systemu społeczno-ekologicznego (SES) na pograniczu polsko-niemieckim, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem jego stanu po akcesji Polski do Unii Europejskiej. Prezentowane wyniki są po części pokłosiem projektu PHARE ref. PL2002/000-606.21.02 – „Studium kierunkowe zagospodarowania przestrzennego obszaru wzdłuż granicy polsko-niemieckiej" realizowanego przez IGiPZ PAN.

Uzyskane wyniki badań potwierdziły tezę, iż funkcjonowanie systemu społecznego-ekologicznego uwarunkowane jest przez cały kompleks powiązanych ze sobą czynników środowiskowych, ekonomicznych i społecznych oraz wyznaczone jest ramami prawnymi, wynikającymi z wewnątrz krajowych i międzynarodowych aktów legislacyjnych, w tym przepisów specjalnych, zawartych w umowach dwustronnych, które desygnowane są przez dwa sąsiadujące państwa.

Wykazano, że potencjał środowiska przyrodniczego wyrażony jego zasobami może stanowić stymulator rozwoju regionu przygranicznego, tak samo jak i potencjał społeczny czy tez gospodarczy. Wyniki analizy przestrzennego zróżnicowania systemu społeczno-ekologicznego na pograniczu polsko-niemieckim wskazały również na polaryzację przestrzenną uwarunkowań zarówno środowiskowych, jak i demograficznych, która nie tworzy jednak barier dla rozwoju i prawidłowego funkcjonowania SES. Wykorzystanie istniejącego potencjałów środowiska, jak i zasobów ludzkich, umożliwia dalszy rozwój strefy przygranicznej po dwu stronach granicy, tworząc podstawy do uzyskania coraz większej spójności funkcjonalno-przestrzennej. Działania, których celem stało się osiągnięcie coraz większego stopnia kohezji pomiędzy obszarami położonymi po dwu stronach granicy, zintensyfikowały się po przystąpieniu Polski do Unii Europejskiej, kiedy granica pomiędzy Polska a Niemcami stała się wewnętrzną granicą UE. Niemniej jednak wymagają one dalszego wzmacniania, poprzez wprowadzanie rozwiązań systemowych, umożliwiających choćby generowanie wspólnych programów, których celem będzie niwelowanie różnic w możliwościach realizacji aspiracji społeczności lokalnych po dwu stronach granicy. Przykładem może być stworzenie systemowych rozwiązań umożliwiających korzystania z zasobów mieszkaniowych po stronie niemieckiej przez obywateli polskich, czy też znacznie większy rozwój bazy turystycznej po stronie polskiej dla obywateli Niemiec.

Konkludując należy stwierdzić że:

- analiza systemu społeczno-ekologicznego wykazała, iż warunki środowiska obok czynników społecznych i gospodarczych są stymulatorem rozwoju regionalnego na obszarze pogranicza polsko-niemieckiego,
- przyrodnicze i demograficzne uwarunkowania systemu charakteryzują się dużą polaryzacją zasobów, co utrudnia uzyskanie coraz większej spójności funkcjonalno-przestrzennej systemu społeczno-ekologicznego na pograniczu polsko-niemieckim, ale jednocześnie tworzą możliwości zachowania tożsamości kulturowo-społecznej na szczeblu lokalnym,
- w zakresie kształtowania środowiska pomimo wielu znaczących osiągnięć jak: opracowanie spójnego systemu ochrony doliny Odry, utworzenie Międzynarodowego Parku Dolna Odra, wspólnych przedsięwzięć z zakresu poprawy jakości wody itd., nadal istnieją duże potencjalne możliwości rozwijania tej współpracy, chociażby w tworzeniu transgranicznych rezerwatów biosfery, międzynarodowych parków dla pokoju, czy też wspólnych obszarów ochrony specjalnej w ramach sieci NATURA 2000.

INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES AND A NEW APPROACH TO MANAGEMENT OF SPACE ORIENTED AT IMPROVEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND QUALITY OF LIFE IN THE URBAN AREAS

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Main challenges

Towns, and in particular large towns, are considered to be the engine of the economy, so the increase of economic competitiveness is usually postulated as the priority objective of development. High concentration of population in towns causes, on the other hand, that inhabitants expect an adequate quality of life.

One of the primary factors decisive for the quality of life in towns and urban regions is the quality of the environment and the availability of green areas in the town and in its surroundings, perceived in the aspect of the green neighbourhood of the place of residence and place of work, as well as recreation areas.

Improvement of environmental quality in towns may not only contribute to making more attractive and healthy space for living, working and investing, which would enhance the competitiveness of the urban centres, but also decreasing the harmful influence of the towns on the functioning of natural systems.

In the development of towns and regions of the world, oriented only at economic growth, establishment of space, ensuring high quality of life, was often neglected or treated marginally. Due to such a setting of development priorities, numerous urban centres, and especially the industrial centres, became the locations of appearance of multiple ecological problems, whose consequences constitute a threat to human health and to ecosystem functioning. These problems include, in particular: air pollution, excessive noise, unmanaged water-and-sewage economy and solid waste economy, existence of degraded and abandoned areas, as well as spatial chaos and urban sprawl.

It is constantly necessary to remove the effects of the past and current threats and to prevent their appearance. A new, not always perceived challenge is associated with prevention of the hazards that may appear in the future, e.g. in

connection with global warming or with energy crisis. When considering the rational management of natural resources one should also take into account the interests of the supra-national corporations, which make use, in particular, of the still available urban areas and the easily accessible main d'oeuvre, for the conduct of their activity. A particular danger is associated with the location of the projects, which are dangerous for the environment and the inhabitants. This concerns especially the countries with a weak system of spatial planning, where investors often force the location decisions. Besides, globalisation and "europeisation" of space constitute an increasing threat for the preservation of local and regional identity, reflected in the spatial-visual terms through depriving landscape of its regional features. A new challenge for the management of the environment in urban areas is also constituted by the increasing significance of the knowledge-based economy, at the expense of the development of conventional enterprise, this process resulting in an additional demand for clean environment and open spaces vested with recreational functions. While trying to improve the competitiveness of urban space, towns often forget about social participation in management processes, as well as about the protection of natural, cultural and landscape assets, which are largely decisive for the quality of life in a urban areas. *A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development*, obliges the member countries to observe the principles of sustainable development, including in particular: quality of life, environmental protection, open spaces and urban sprawl.

Improvement of the quality of environment in towns, and in the urban region is particularly important, because, side by side with the direct influence on the state of physical and mental health of the urban dwellers, and on the state and functioning of the very environment within the administrative confines of towns, this concerns also the environment and the inhabitants of the suburban zones, and quite often of the farther off areas, as well, which are affected by the consequences of the disadvantageous impact from the town on the quality of life and on the functioning of ecosystems.

Urban areas play, therefore, a very important role in the improvement of quality of life, this fact being reflected in numerous documents of the EU, including *A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development* and the *European Perspective on Spatial Development*, as well as in numerous international resolutions, among which an important position is occupied by the *New Athens Charter*.

Improvement of the quality of environment and of the closely associated quality of life on the urban areas requires taking a look at the town as an organism – the urban environmental-social-economic system. This issue became the subject of discussion in the European Union, oriented at the development of thematic strategy in the domain of urban environment.

Eco-management and environmental behaviour

The actions, undertaken by the governmental institutions, NGOs, companies, and, in fact by every inhabitant of the Earth, lead to an improvement or worsening of the quality of the environment. The effects of such actions influence in a direct or indirect manner the human living standards – the state of physical and mental health of the inhabitants, as well as the safety of functioning of the economy and nature, which bears an influence also on the competitiveness of the regions. An improvement in the state and functioning of the environment and of the quality of life on urban areas requires, therefore, multidirectional activities, in which ecological aspects should be accounted for, jointly with the economic, social, institutional and cultural aspects.

The superior objective of the environmental management and behaviour is to improve the quality of human life in such a manner as to reconcile the developmental and environmental needs of the present and future generations. This requires not only introduction of safeguards against the disadvantageous effects of the human impact on the environment through imposition of limitations on the pollutants emitted, restitution and reclamation of the degraded areas, but also preservation of natural resources, adequate in terms of quality and quantity (natural raw materials, freshwater resources, agricultural space, forest areas, recreational space, preservation of natural heritage), and reacting to the potential climatic changes as well as natural catastrophes.

In the management process the requirements concern a more comprehensive, integrated management and the activities, whose effect would consist in the attainment of harmony between the social, environmental, cultural, landscape and economic aspects. In the approach proposed collaboration is necessary in numerous domains of human activity, and primarily in the legal, economic-financial, technical, political, institutional, social, scientific and educational domains. The integrated horizontal approach linking branch policies, programs, plans, actions and different actors, is necessary, just as the vertical one – between the various levels of management. Of extreme importance is also the responsibility of both local and regional authorities.

The Eco-management and Audit Scheme EMAS is the European instrument implemented based on Regulation of European Parliament and Council which encourages different organizations (companies, plants, institutions, etc) to continuously improve the environmental performance focusing on:

- "Identifying the areas for which it is necessary to develop, improve and increase effectiveness of environmental performance;
- Systematic seeking of opportunities to reduce the environmental impact and setting new environmental goals;

- Systematic identifying and eliminating non-compliance with internal and external requirements;
- Systematic identifying of environmental aspects which require supervision or improvement;
- Training of personnel to increase the effectiveness of environmental activities" (www.emas.gov.pl.)

In order to attain the objectives of sustainable development all the management processes, and not only of the entities having adopted the EMAS system, should be based on environmental behaviour. Environmental behaviour can also be referred to as ecological behaviour or environmental conduct. This requires undertaking of a number of integrated activities.

Technical undertakings may contribute to prevention, limitation and alleviation of the degrading action of the civilisation-related factors on the environment. In this context environmental conduct consists in the elaboration and implementation of the best available pro-ecological technologies (BATs), processes and materials, alternative solutions, and modern pro-ecological infrastructure, which is connected with the scientific and technological progress.

The economic and financial mechanisms constitute a very good direction of orienting and stimulating definite pro-ecological actions. We speak not only about the system of penalties, but also of the system of ecological fees and taxes, subsidies, special funds and credit lines for the businesses improving the pro-ecological activities, and especially those that enter the eco-management pathway, as well as of other economic mechanisms meant to improve or protect the environment.

The legal and administrative undertakings complement the economic-financial and market-based mechanisms. They consist in the establishment of the economically-oriented stimuli for the observation of the legal and administrative requirements concerning protection of environment. Along with the enactment of law its effectiveness is equally important. The legal and financial mechanisms enforce definite environmental behaviour patterns through the action of economic calculus. They also create the possibility of minimising social costs of environmental protection. In the integrated management systems the decrease of ecological risk and of production costs are the optimum effects achieved.

Environmental behaviour is largely dependent upon the level of education and of the development of research, as well as the availability of information on the environment, being the basis for the development of the modern, integrated environmental monitoring systems. The effectiveness of activities depends to a large extent upon the activity and collaboration of the governmental and non-governmental organisations, and the business sector, politicians, scientists, the interest from the side of the society, etc.

The effects of activities aimed at the improvement of the quality of environment and its ecological efficiency, protection of its natural and land-

scape assets, even though frequently little visible for the contemporary generation, will in the future play a decisive role for the development of towns and urban regions. Modern civilisation caused that in many urban regions of the world the environmental foundations of human life are subject to threat. An example of a region, where environmental degradation significantly lowered regional attractiveness is Upper Silesia in Poland. A positive example of re-establishment of the natural values, improvement of the quality of life and of attractiveness is, in particular, the Ruhr Basin in Germany.

The system of eco-management must be conform to the international conventions concerning environmental protection and sustainable development, and associate ecological and economic effectiveness with social acceptability.

It became necessary, therefore, to elaborate a system of environmental indices allowing for the monitoring of changes in the environment, referred to as the indicators of sustainable development.

Currently, one of the most important objectives of the ecological conduct in the management of development of towns and urban regions must be to integrate the activities aiming at the enabling of the spatial development of towns with protection and strengthening of the local and regional natural patterns of the region and the enhancement of the quality of environment, provided that such patterns are the subjects of spatial planning and the development policy at the local and supra-local levels. The achievement of the environmental effects is conditioned, though, by the effectiveness of the undertaken activities and endowing them with a supra-local character – they should encompass not only the town within the administrative boundaries, but also urban functional areas.

Reference to the situation in Poland

The existing system of spatial planning in Poland, despite numerous legal regulations and the stipulations concerning environmental protection, does not provide the obligatory foundations for the implementation of the principles of persistent and sustainable development of towns and urban regions, even though the paradigm of sustainable development of the country is inscribed into the constitution and several other laws, and into virtually all the planning elaborates and development strategies. Gaps in the domain of substantially justified and effective instruments of spatial planning are conducive to inadequate solutions, which may bring irreversible degradation of natural environment and landscape, and in a longer time horizon – also a decrease of the quality of life, especially in large towns, and in their suburban zones.

The primary fields of activity, which should be indicated in the context of liquidation of barriers to sustainable development of urban areas in Poland, are: transport, construction, sewage economy, and mainly wastewater treatment plants (Fig. 1, Fig. 2), as well as waste economy (Fig. 3).

Fig. 1. Population using the municipal waste water treatment plants in Poland and in the selected countries of the European Union, characterized by the best solutions, in 2003 year (*Statistical Yearbook, CSO, Warsaw, 2005)*



Fig. 2. Urban population using the municipal waste water treatment plants in 2004, and the examples of the voivodships with the most difficult situation in Poland (*Ochrona Środowiska. GUS, Warszawa, 2005)*



Fig. 3. Management of the urban municipal waste collected during the 2004 year (*Ochrona Środowiska. GUS, Warszawa, 2005*)



In the perspective of improvement of quality of the environment, and ultimately – of quality of life in urban areas, spatial planning gains a special importance. Side by side with many activities aimed at the improvement of the quality of the environment, there should follow strengthening of the activities directed against the spontaneous spread of residential areas (Photograph 1) and preventing as well as liquidating spatial chaos (Photograph 2).

Photo. 1. Spontaneous expansion of the residential areas to the forest near Warsaw

Photo. 2. Space organisation without order on the one of the main road leading to Warsaw

Following the planning practice of numerous countries of the European Union, owing to creation of compact systems of open spaces within the urban areas, it is possible to counteract uncontrolled urban sprawl, and at the same time to prevent individual settlement units from amalgamating. An equally important goal, which should be attained through creation of compact systems of open spaces in large population concentrations, is the establishment of the recreation and leisure space. It is commonly known that the closeness of the open natural areas has a positive influence on the state of human physical and mental health, because these areas are the places of active leisure and psychological regeneration of the inhabitants. A continuous system enables spatial linkage of the most valuable natural areas and recreation-and-sports grounds, as well as their more effective protection and increased resistance. Formation of a continuous system allows, in particular, for the establishment of bicycle paths and walking routes in the natural settings. Besides, open spaces perform climate forming and sanitary functions, as the areas of air regeneration and exchange, and as belts controlling the flow of air masses. A compact system of open spaces allows also for the ensuring of a better functioning and protection of natural ecosystems, securing linkages between the priority areas.

Another important problem, which deserves more attention, is the quality of the conducted monitoring, concerning the effects of the spatial policy and spatial development for the environment and the quality of life within urban areas. Not less significant is also the feeling of responsibility of the local and regional authorities, citizen participation, and public good orientation in the processes of development planning and management of urban areas.

Conclusion

Spatial planning and spatial economy are the domains, within which many of the objectives of sustainable development of towns and their suburban zones can be attained, under the assumption of an integrated approach to spatial economy, rational space development, popularisation of the methods of eco-management, as well as continuing ecological education of both the society and all the subjects of management. In the domain of spatial planning it is particularly important to encompass with the spatial development plans the entire urban functional areas, and not only towns within their administrative boundaries and the areas considered to be the metropolitan areas, in which the question of the pattern of open spaces is treated very arbitrarily.

Streszczenie

MIĘDZYNARODOWE WYZWANIA I NOWE PODEJŚCIE DO ZARZĄDZANIA PRZESTRZENIĄ UKIERUNKOWANE NA POPRAWĘ JAKOŚCI ŚRODOWISKA, I JAKOŚCI ŻYCIA W OBSZARACH MIEJSKICH

Miasta, a zwłaszcza duże miasta traktowane są jako siła napędowa gospodarki, dlatego też zwiększanie konkurencyjności ekonomicznej stawiane jest zazwyczaj jako priorytetowy cel rozwoju. Wysoka koncentracja ludności w miastach sprawia także, że mieszkańcy oczekują odpowiedniej jakości życia. Jednym z głównych czynników decydujących o jakości życia w miastach i regionach miejskich jest jakość środowiska oraz zasoby terenów zielonych w mieście i jego okolicach, postrzegane w aspekcie zielonego otoczenia miejsca zamieszkania i pracy oraz otwartej przestrzeni rekreacyjnej. Poprawa jakości środowiska w miastach z jednej strony może przyczynić się do uczynienia z miast bardziej atrakcyjnej i zdrowszej przestrzeni do zamieszkania, pracy i inwestowania, podnosząc konkurencyjność ośrodków miejskich, z drugiej natomiast wpłynie na zmniejszenie szkodliwego wpływu miasta na funkcjonowanie układów przyrodniczych.

W rozwoju miast i regionów miejskich świata ukierunkowanym wyłącznie na wzrost gospodarczy często niedostrzegano lub traktowano w sposób marginalny wytworzenie przestrzeni zapewniającej dobrą jakość życia. W wyniku takiego priorytetu rozwoju, wiele obszarów miejskich, a zwłaszcza ośrodków przemysłowych stało się miejscem występowania licznych problemów ekologicznych, których skutki są zagrożeniem dla zdrowia ludzkiego oraz funkcjonowania ekosystemów. Wśród mich wymienić można: zanieczyszczenie powietrza, nadmierny hałas, nieuregulowana gospodarka wodnościekowa i gospodarka odpadami stałymi, istnienie gruntów zdegradowanych i opuszczonych oraz chaos przestrzenny i niekontrolowane rozlewanie się miast.

Ciągle aktualną potrzebą jest likwidowanie skutków byłych i istniejących zagrożeń oraz przeciwdziałanie ich powstawaniu. Nowe nie zawsze dostrzegane wyzwanie wiąże się z zapobieganiem zagrożeniom, które mogą wystąpić w przyszłości, np. w związku z globalnym ociepleniem, lub z kryzysem energetycznym. Nie bez znaczenia dla racjonalnego gospodarowania zasobami przyrodniczymi są interesy ponadnarodowych korporacji wykorzystujących m. in. niezainwestowane tereny miejskie oraz tańszą i łatwo dostępną siłę roboczą, dla prowadzenia własnej działalności. Szczególne zagrożenie związane z lokalizowaniem niebezpiecznych dla środowiska i mieszkańców inwestycji, dotyczy głównie państw o słabym systemie planowania przestrzennego, gdzie inwestorzy niejednokrotnie wymuszają decyzje lokalizacyjne. Ponadto globalizacja i europeizacja przestrzeni stanowi coraz większe zagrożenie dla zachowania tożsamości lokalnej i regionalnej, czego przestrzenno-wizualnym wyrazem jest m. in. pozbawianie krajobrazu cech regionalnych. Nowym wyzwaniem dla gospodarowania środowiskiem obszarów miejskich jest także wzrastające znaczenie gospodarki opartej na wiedzy nad rozwojem konwencjonalnej przedsiębiorczości, czego wynikiem może być większe zapotrzebowanie na czyste środowisko i tereny otwarte o funkcji rekreacyjnej. Dążąc do podniesienia konkurencyjności przestrzeni gospodarczej, miasta często zapominają o społecznym uczestnictwie w procesach zarządzania, a także ochronie wartości przyrodniczych, kulturowych i krajobrazowych, decydujących w znacznym stopniu o jakości życia w mieście. „Strategia zrównoważonego rozwoju UE" obliguje państwa członkowskie do przestrzegania zasad zrównoważonego rozwoju, w tym m. in. podnoszenia jakości życia, ochrony środowiska, kształtowania i ochrony przed zabudową terenów otwartych.

Poprawa jakości środowiska w miastach jest szczególnie ważna, ponieważ oprócz bezpośredniego wpływu na stan zdrowia fizycznego i psychicznego mieszkańców miast oraz stan i funkcjonowanie samego środowiska w obrębie administracyjnym miasta, dotyczy także środowiska i mieszkańców stref podmiejskich a niejednokrotnie dalszych obszarów, do których docierają skutki niekorzystnego wpływu miasta na jakość życia oraz funkcjonowanie ekosystemów.

Poprawa jakości środowiska oraz związanej z tym jakości życia na obszarach miejskich wymaga spojrzenia na miasto jako organizm – miejski system środowiskowo-społeczno-ekonomiczny. Konieczne jest zatem podejmowanie wielokierunkowych spójnych działań w wielu dziedzinach aktywności człowieka, a głównie prawnej, ekonomiczno-finansowej, technicznej, politycznej, instytucjonalnej, społecznej, badawczej i edukacyjnej. Niezbędne jest zarówno zintegrowane podejście horyzontalne między branżowymi politykami, programami, planami, działaniami i różnymi podmiotami, jak i podejście wertykalne – pomiędzy różnymi poziomami zarządzania. Niezmiernie ważna jest także odpowiedzialność władz zarówno lokalnych jak i regionalnych. Problem ten stał się przedmiotem dyskusji Unii Europejskiej ukierunkowanej na opracowanie strategii tematycznej w sprawie środowiska miejskiego.

TRANSBOUNDARY COOPERATION IN PROVINCES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PROGRAMMES – PLANS AND REALITY

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Introduction – background and methods of research

Currently one of the most important directions of the government actions is execution of the ecological policy heading towards more effective protection of the environment and sustainable development of the country. This policy is implemented by administrative authorities at various levels – from central government administration, through province council to county and district councils. The scope and way of implementation of this policy is regulated by the act Environmental Protection Law. In the light of article 14 of this act, the main task of the governmental ecological policy is – based on the information about state of the environment – defining the following issues designed for execution in the established time period:

- ecological goals (environmental protection);
- ecological priorities;
- types and timetables of pro-ecological activities;
- resources essential to achieve the goals, including legal and economic ones.

The basic document enlisting these arrangements at the national level is „National Ecological Policy" which – in agreement with the mentioned act – is drawn up for the period of four years, in prospect of the consecutive four years. It constitutes the basis for the regional and local ecological policy whose findings are presented – on the grounds of regulation of article 17 of the act Environment Protection Law – in the provinces, counties and districts environmental protection programmes and which are passed by the province parliament and county and district councils. Their time scope should be convergent to the national policy duration.

The aim of research presented in this article is the review of the provinces environmental protection programmes in the view whether international cooperation in environmental protection is included in their contents. Such coopera-

tion is usually conducted with the countries that have common borders with some provinces. For this reason, the focus is on the 11 bordering regions of Poland and the review of their environmental protection programmes that were drawn up for them between 2002 and 2005 and additionally there is an analysis of the parts of the projects pertaining to the international cooperation. Because of the short time span of the most projects which are ending in 2006, there is also an attempt to determine how in the preceding 3-4 years the findings of the programmes pertaining to the transboundary ecological cooperation were carried out and whether the indicators of these documents were satisfactorily completed.

Such evaluation was partially possible thanks to statutory obligation to produce reports every two years by the Province Board on the progression of the programmes implementation, also to accessibility of the province council documents and some information publicized on the Internet web sites of the marshal's offices and Euroregions. In the conclusion of the article there are some reasons listed that influenced the unsatisfactory – as the outcome of the research shows – level of transboundary cooperation in the environmental protection.

Results of the environmental protection projects analysis

Currently the National Ecological Policy II from the year 2000 (updated in 2002) is implemented. Its short span period covers years 2003-2006, and the medium span prospect years 2007-2010. The document also includes a range of suggestions in regards to the international environmental protection cooperation. Due to the fact that it was drawn up before Poland joined the European Union, focus was placed on the „old" and „new" union members cooperation that led to better fulfilment of the requirements of the union law in respect to the environmental protection. Among the tasks there were:

- adaptation of legal regulations, organizational structures and administrative procedures to the requirements of the EU;
- bilateral cooperation with the EU countries focused on acquisition of experience in the usage of structural and regional funds, application of the best available techniques, joined fulfilment of obligations, trade of issues and ecoconversion (of debts);
- bilateral cooperation with new members and EU candidates in order to execute the EU ecological policy – so to maximalise implementation of the EU standards in solving transboundary problems of the environmental protection.

Except for the mentioned goals, it was pointed in the discussed document that there is a need to fulfil the following:

- international cooperation locally and regionally in the field of fulfilling obligations resulting from signing and ratification of international ecological conventions and official reports;
- priority cooperation in the scope of the environmental protection with the potential strategic partners of Poland – Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

As one may expect, some political conditions present while writing this document (right-wing government), resulted in not mentioning among the priority partners such countries as Russia and Belarus, but on the other hand pointing at such exotic and distant countries like – Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. These partners may nevertheless have some importance in diversification of energy resources obtained by Poland, natural gas, in particular. The energy policy is connected with the ecological policy because increase of gas share in the consumption structure of these raw materials might lead to a drop in emission of air pollutants and bring a profit to the country from selling the emission quotas in accordance to the rules established in the Kyoto Protocol. From a few years perspective that passed from drawing up the National Ecological Policy, it should be stated that cooperation with the above mentioned Central Asian countries was not undertaken in the broad enough sense and did not bring the expected results.

Based on the National Ecological Policy II, in the years 2002 – 2005 there were regional environmental programmes projects drawn up. Among 11 projects drawn up for the bordering provinces, for majority of them the short span period covers the years 2003-06 and the medium span prospect years 2007-10, except for the Malopolska programme whose current version was accepted in 2005 and covers respectively period of 2005-08 and 2009-12. In some programmes (Dolnoslaskie, Lubelskie, Slaskie, Zachodniopomorskie) some long span task were formulated in order to be implemented in 2015.

Review of the tasks included in the programmes and related to international cooperation in the environmental protection showed that they were taken into consideration to a very limited extend. It resulted from the way the programmes were drawn up that varied greatly in the range of the issues taken under consideration, as well as the length. The most extensive programmes amounted to several hundreds of pages (Podkarpackie), while the least extensive included about 50 pages (Zachodniopomorskie). The analysed issues were devoted the most space in Podkarpackie programme (7 pages) and Podlaskie programme (3 pages). Slightly less in Warminsko-Mazurskie (1.5 pages) and Dolnoslaskie (1 page). Half of page or less information on the transboundary cooperation subject was in the programmes of: Lubelskie, Opolskie, Malopolskie, Lubuskie, Pomorskie, and Zachodniopomorskie. It was totally omitted in the Slaskie programme. All together in all evaluated documents, around 15 pages were devoted to this topic which comes down to less than 1% of their length. The problem of transboundary cooperation took up more than 1% of the

document size in only three projects: Podkarpackie, Podlaskie and Warminsko-Mazurskie.

More important evaluation criterion than length was its content. Its analysis led to establishment of 15 groups of action that in the particular regions were planned in the scope of the international cooperation. The results of this analysis are presented in the table 1. As it stems out of it, not in all cases content length of findings was in proportion to the number of planned actions. Apparently in Podkarpackie the number is the greatest, but there are significantly less actions that were planned in Podlaskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie and visibly more in Dolnoslaskie and Opolskie. Summing up the actions from all identified groups in the provinces where they were indicated for execution (fig. 1), it was established that in the largest number of projects environmental protection issues were included (6) and connected with it creation of transboundary protected areas (4). In several projects (3-4) there were actions planned to put the union environmental protection regulations into practice[1], air protection, water protection, euro-regional cooperation (which is rather the way of project tasks execution, and not the task itself) and prevention of some serious industrial breakdowns or ecological disasters. Incidentally (1-2) execution of actions in relation to environmental management and environmental monitoring, scientific and research cooperation, energy production from renewable sources and forest economy were planned. In the programmes there were also some tasks found that were not directly related with the environmental protection, such as tourism development (Dolnoslaskie, Opolskie, Podkarpackie) or may even have unfavourable impact on the natural environment, such as flood control (Dolnoslaskie, Lubelskie, Opolskie, Podkarpackie) or construction of huge retention tanks (Podkarpackie). Apparently ventures connected with water economy are traditionally – in the 'ministry' sense – linked with environment protection, it should be emphasized that more often they contribute to some significant changes in the water supply than to improvement of ecological condition of surface and underground water. Protection programmes should at most include some indicators to as how to implement the actions with the least damage to the nature.

[1] However – it appears that – they should be put into practice in all provinces and the need to take them into consideration should not be formulated as an action, but rather as a task of environmental programme execution

Table 1. The scope of actions related to environmental protection transboundary cooperation in Provinces Environmental Protection Programmes

Groups of actions related to transboundary cooperation in the scope of environmental protection	**Provinces**										
	Dolnoslaskie	Lubelskie	Lubuskie	Malopolskie	Opolskie	Podkarpackie	Podlaskie	Pomorskie	Slaskie	Warminsko-Mazurskie	Zachodnio-Pomorskie
Air protection	•					•	°			•	
Water protection	•				•	•	°				
Flood protection	•	•			•	•					
Construction of retention tanks						•					
Nature conservation	•				•	•		•		•	•
Setting up transboundary protection areas		•				•		•		•	
Production of renewable energy	•										
Environmental management (BAT)					•		•				
Environmental monitoring		•				•					
Serious breakdowns prevention						•	°				•
Joint scientific and research projects		•				•					
Forest economy			•								
Tourism development	•				•	•					
Implementation of the EU ecological regulations				•	•	•	•				
Cooperation within Euroregions			•			•	•				

• groups of actions directly formulated
° groups of actions indirectly formulated

Fig. 1. Frequency of taking under consideration various groups of actions in the scope of international cooperation in the environmental protection programmes in the bordering provinces



As regards proposed number of transboundary action groups, Podkarpackie project leads by far where 12 out of 15 groups were indicated in all projects (fig. 2). In this case the length of the programme accounted for its content variety. 6 groups of actions were taken under consideration in the following programmes: Dolnoslaskie, Opolskie, and Podlaskie, but in the latter half of the groups were formulated in the indirect way. Four groups of actions were found in the Lubelskie programme and three in the Warminsko-Mazurskie one. In the remaining programmes, the range of proposals was quite small and covered only one or two groups of actions. It is worth noticing that significantly more intensive cooperation was planned for the provinces in the eastern part of the country and also in the south-western regions bordering with the Czech Republic and very limited in the provinces of north-western Poland bordering with Germany. In the light of needs, lack of transboundary cooperation issues is quite characteristic in the projects of Malopolskie and Slaskie programmes.

More detailed analysis of the programmes content proved that they often, to the great extend, report on the projects currently executed that propose some future actions. The Dolnoslaskie project is about that where the achievements of the „Black Triangle" Project was described and the Project for the Oder River as well as in the Podlaskie one where in the chapter about international coopera-

tion a great amount of deal is devoted to current contacts with Belarus and Lithuania. Next, in the other projects some aspects of a great importance in intensifying cooperation were omitted, e.g. in the Lubuskie project nothing was mentioned about the protection of the bordering waters of the Oder and the Neisse and in the Malopolskie one the issues of implementing 'The Carpathian Convention' were omitted.

Fig. 2. The number of actions in the scope of the international cooperation proposed in the single programmes of the environmental protection of the bordering provinces



As it was mentioned previously, the analysed issues received the fullest coverage in the environmental protection programme of the Podkarpackie Province. A bit debatable might appear the fact that all actions related to the international cooperation were placed in the frame of the strategic goal 1/3 „Limitation of the transboundary pollution" which „is meant to contribute to the development of the international cooperation in the field of limitation of the transboundary pollution, counteract serious breakdowns, protection and sensible use of natural resources".

Four medium span (until 2010) goals were formulated in its framework:

1. Assurance of the proper functioning of the transboundary natural systems;
2. Protection and sensible usage of the bordering waters;
3. Sustainable usage of the environmental values for the development of tourist, recreational and spa functions;
4. Eliminating or minimising threats to the resources and the environmental values including safety of the ecological region.

These goals are to be fulfilled in the course of implementing of 25 action groups. More detailed analysis of its contents proves that not all of them pertain directly and even indirectly to the environmental protection issues. If within the second mentioned above goals, majority of actions (except the construction of big retention tanks) will serve the improvement of the environmental quality, for example, the actions to implement the third goal, to the great, extend are not related to this. And for example, among these first ones there were:

- conducting the monitoring and control of the boundary waters;
- drawing up joint projects of water economy and transboundary catchments protection including mineral water;
- water shortage prevention through the construction of a small retention tanks network;
- creation of plant waste water treatments, water conservation and anti-erosion systems;
- effectiveness improvement of existing purifying systems.

However, in the scope of the development of tourist, recreational and spa functions these were proposed:

- creation of inter-district bounds on both sides of the border so tourism management is done comprehensively;
- drawing up study cases in the scope of the transboundry promotion of tourism;
- development of the public transport systems including cars connecting Poland, Ukraine and Slovakia, building and opening new border checkpoints which cannot be considered as related to the environmental protection.

Nevertheless, also in this group, two tasks can be considered as the elements of the regional environmental protection project execution. These are:

- standard improvement of the tourist facilities, service and prevention against over-investment in the tourist regions;
- maintaining the monitoring of tourist traffic, especially in the unique natural areas.

The above examples point at frequent, improper approach to transboundary issues of the ecological cooperation in the environmental protection programmes.

Attempt at assessing the degree of realization of transboundary cooperation planned in the provinces environmental protection programmes

Based on the available documents, currently it was impossible to fully assess the effectiveness of implementing the findings of the environmental protection programmes pertaining to the tranasboundary cooperation. However, due to the information analysis in the Internet, especially on the Marshal's Offices and Euroregions web sites, some information was obtained that allowed to make an attempt to assess the quality of realization of some actions indicated in the programmes. Due to the fact that in the majority of the discussed documents no feasible tasks were specified in the scope of international cooperation, the number of feasible tasks that were verifiable was quite small (a few dozen) and a great part of them listed in fig. 3. It was tried to emphasize the priority tasks in the given province. More than half of them deal with creation of the transboundary nature conservation areas, either in the framework of Natura 2000 network (border with the EU countries) or in the form of a biosphere reserve. It proves that issues of the nature conservation are of the utmost importance within the scope of the border cooperation.

Fig. 3. Execution effectiveness of the chosen transboundary actions found in the provinces environmental protection programmes: 1 – effective execution; 2 – partially effective execution, 3 – lack of or ineffective execution.



As the information given concisely in fig. 3 points, only a small portion of actions ended in full success or is close to one. First of all, it can be accounted for the improvement of air quality in the region of „Black Triangle" (point of contact of Poland, The Czech Republic and Germany), as a result of implementation of technical measures to decrease gas and dust emission and the building of the environmental monitoring system. However, it has to be remembered, that these actions started already in the beginning of the 90's in the 20th century, and in the current period of the environmental protection programming they just were continued or benefited from the positive results of the previously implemented projects. What can be considered relatively successful are the actions ranging in the establishment of the transboundary-protected areas, especially the World Biosphere Reserves on the Polish-Ukraine border (Western Polesie) and the triple point of contact Poland-Ukraine-Slovakia (Eastern Carpathy) although these actions need continuation. In the organisational phase are also the international protected areas in the valley and mouth of the Oder on the Polish-German border, and also the biosphere reserve „Roztocze" on the Polish- Ukraine border. But not all of the nature protection actions have been so successful. Plans in the same scope were not successfully implemented on the border with Russia and Belarus yet, and also on the offshore waters of the Baltic Sea where three nature protection areas were planned to be created (Baltic Sea Protection Areas) in the framework of the joint network of the Baltic countries.

The forest protection project on the brandenburg-lubuskie border finished semi-successfully, however its range seems to be quite limited by focusing on the forest fire protection. Similarly, the joint actions of poland and the czech republic in the scope of the flood protection were partly successful, but one can doubt if all hydrotechnical actions undertaken there were conducive to the natural environment. The problem of impact of the sulphur deposit, exploited in the past in the borehole mines near basznia and niemirow in the polish-ukraine border zone, on the environment and people is still not completely solved. If on the polish side there was some reclamation work undertaken, on the ukrainian territory still in one of the holes the fire broke out in 2004 that forced evacuation of the polish village inhabitants.

In general, it can be stated that the effectiveness of the environmental protection cooperation is bigger on the border of the European Union member countries (Germany, The Czech Republic, Slovakia) than on the eastern Polish border. The exception here is Ukraine, with which contributing to the democratisation processes of this state, significant intensification of cooperation is noticed. It is also possible because of the active part of the Lubelskie Province administration and to a lesser extent of the Podkarpackie. However, such cooperation is at a standstill with the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation and with Belarus. The plans to bring the joint nature protection areas

into existence are implemented very slowly, as well as the river-catchments protection that have the alimentation areas outside Polish territory (e.g. Siemianowka reservoir on the Narew River). It appears that insufficiency of this cooperation lies greatly in the limitation of the development of the democratic system in these countries.

Despite better assessment of the ecological cooperation with the remaining countries it should be stated that in general, it leaves a lot to wish for. As it was previously mentioned, the range of actions proposed in the environmental protection programmes, pertaining to this cooperation, is insufficient. It turned out that the implementation even of these scarce tasks is unsatisfactory. Among the basic internal reasons for this situation we can list the following:

- weakness of the Polish environmental protection administration and in particular nature protection on the province, county and district levels;
- focusing on the transboundary cooperation in other than the environmental protection areas or on the activities only seemingly related to the environmental protection (tourism, water economy);
- limited flow of the funds for the pro-ecological actions, particularly „soft", e.g. in the range of the nature protection or insufficient fund raising.

Among the external factors or the bilateral limitation of opportunities for the international cooperation are:

- limited capacity for the cooperation from the administration and society on the other side of the border (mainly in Russia and Belarus);
- discrepancy in priorities in the scope of the environmental protection in the areas on the both sides of the border;
- diversity of the level of actions and law regulations so far in the scope of the environmental protection in the bordering countries (mainly between Germany and Poland).

In the light of the current development trends that promote broad international cooperation, not only bilateral, but also of a network character that is mentioned as one of the fundamental prerequisites for creating innovative economy and society, it should be recommended that in the next edition of the province environmental protection programmes and also in the county and district projects, especially for the border administrative units, the subject matter of the transboundary cooperation played significantly bigger role than it has taken place in the documents drawn up so far.

Streszczenie

WSPÓŁPRACA TRANSGRANICZNA W PROGRAMACH OCHRONY ŚRODOWISKA WOJEWÓDZTW – PLANY A RZECZYWISTOŚĆ

W latach 2002 – 2005, spełniając wymóg ustawy Prawo Ochrony Środowiska, została opracowana pierwsza edycja programów ochrony środowiska województw. W większości z nich uwzględniono problematykę współpracy transgranicznej w zakresie ochrony środowiska. W artykule dokonano oceny 11 z tych programów, sporządzonych dla województw posiadających granice są sąsiadami Polski. Analizowana problematyka została potraktowana w tych dokumentach marginalnie, zajmując przeciętnie 1% ich treści. Tylko w programach dla województw: podkarpackiego, podlaskiego, warmińsko-mazurskiego i dolnośląskiego poświęcono jej nieco więcej miejsca. Pominięto ją całkowicie w programie śląskim, a bardzo ograniczono w małopolskim, lubuskim, zachodniopomorskim i pomorskim.

Najczęściej planowano współpracę międzynarodową w zakresie ochrony przyrody, w tym tworzenie obszarów chronionych, gospodarki wodnej, wprowadzania regulacji Unii Europejskiej, ochrony powietrza i wód. W programach znalazły się także dość liczne propozycje działań należących wprost do sfery ochrony środowiska, takich jak ochrona przeciwpowodziowa (regulacja cieków) i rozwój turystyki. Próba oceny skuteczności implementacji działań zapisanych w programach wykazała jej znacznie zróżnicowanie. Jest ona stosunkowo wysoka na granicy południowo-wschodniej (ze Słowacją i Ukrainą) oraz południowo-zachodniej i zachodniej (z Czechami i Niemcami). Najsłabsza skuteczność współpracy występuję na granicy północno-wschodniej, z Rosją i Białorusią.

Wśród czynników ograniczających skuteczność tej współpracy wymienić można przyczyny wewnętrzne, takie jak słabość polskiej administracji ochrony środowiska, koncentrację na współpracy transgranicznej w innych sferach albo na działaniach pozornie związanych z ochroną środowiska oraz ograniczony dopływ środków finansowych na działania proekologiczne, szczególnie „miękkie" lub nieumiejętność uzyskania tych środków. Do barier zewnętrznych albo obustronnie ograniczających możliwości kooperacji międzynarodowej należą: ograniczona zdolność do współpracy ze strony administracji i społeczeństw po drugiej stronie granicy (głównie w Rosji i Białorusi), rozbieżność priorytetów w zakresie ochrony środowiska na obszarach po obu stronach granicy oraz zróżnicowanie dotychczasowego poziomu działań i przepisów prawa w zakresie ochrony środowiska w państwach sąsiadujących (głównie pomiędzy Niemcami a Polską).

REGIONAL AND TRANS-BORDER CO-OPERATION OF BULGARIA: REAL SITUATION AND PERSPECTIVES

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The regional and trans-border cooperation of Bulgaria has assumed new dimensions when certain political and economic changes occurred in Europe at the end of the 20th century as a result of the integration processes. The number of countries with which Bulgaria has a common border grew after Yugoslavia disintegrated and new sovereign states emerged on its territory, first five (Table 1), and since May, 2005 - six. They are small with respect to their area and population. At present Bulgaria borders on five countries, different in size, number of population and level of economic development - Romania, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece and Turkey.

Till the end of the 1980s the cooperation of Bulgaria with its neighbouring countries was at a national level. A true trans-border cooperation with Greece and Romania started in the mid-1990s. Much later began the trans-border cooperation with the other neighbouring countries – Serbia and Monte Negro, FYR of Macedonia and Turkey (2004). Considerable impetus to the trans-border cooperation is given by EU programs through, which various initiatives and activities are funded. Within the European Programs PHARE-CBC, INTERREG II, INTERREG III, etc., funds are allocated to promote the cooperation between the border-lying regions of Bulgaria, Greece and Romania; the cooperation with Serbia and Monte Negro, and with FYR of Macedonia and Turkey is financed by the Program PHARE „External border initiative" and PHARE-CBC-Neighbourhood in compliance with the EU initiative „Wider Europe:Neighbourhood: A new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours". Some initiatives are financially supported by individual organizations from Germany, Switzerland, Holland, etc. A comparison on the

allocated funds within the framework of PHARE-CBC shows that the Greek-Bulgarian border is one of the three border areas in Europe, which has received the largest grants. The funds granted by the EU are not only for the development of trans-border cooperation but also for activities, related to it - establishment of border check points, development of transport infrastructure, telecommunications and environmental protection (e.g. in the region of Rousse), stimulation of the border areas' economic development, etc.

Table 1. Some indicators for the neighbouring and other countries of Bulgaria

Countries	Total area (in th. km^2)	Population in 2003 (in th.)		Gross Domestic Products per capita in USD*		GDP at purchasing power parity per capita (current price)	Country's GDP in % of the world GDP
		Total	Per 1 km^2	1995	2004	2003	2003
Bulgaria	111	7786	70	1474	2533	7540	0,1
Romania	237,5	21616	91	1565	2550 (2003)	7140	0,2
Serbia and Montenegro	102,2	10527	103				
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	25,7	2056	80				
Greece	132	11001	83	11055	18629	20340	0,5
Turkey	774,8	70597	91	2747	4217	6937	0,7
Bosnia and Herzegovina	51,2	3720	73				
Croatia	56,5	4428	78				
Slovenia	20,3	1971	97	9347	13831 (2003)	19100	0,1

* According to official exchange rate

Source for information: Rocznik Statystyczny Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej 2005 (Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland), Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Warszawa, 2005

All districts (NUTS3), adjacent to Bulgaria's frontier, participate in different projects and initiatives for trans-border cooperation (Table 2). They embrace 63.5% of the country's area and 49.6% of its population. Four districts - Vidin, Kyustendil, Blagoevgrad and Haskovo - are involved in trans-border cooperation with two countries (Fig. 1) Only municipalities in west part of Sofia district participate in trans-border cooperation with Serbia.

Table 2. Regions for transborder co-operation of Bulgaria with neighbouring countries

Trans-border co-operation with:	Number of districts (NUTS3)	Territory (km^2)	Population (Th.)
Romania	8	29960	1841
Serbia and Montenegro	5	14123	673
FYROM	2	9501	492
Greece	4	18394	984
Turkey	3	16637	857
Total	17	70548	3932

Source of data: Statistical Yearbook 2004. National Statistical Institute, Sofia, 2005

Fig. 1. District participation in transborder co-operation



In comparison with the West European and Central European countries, the cooperation between Bulgaria's border regions and those from the neighbouring countries is inadequate nowadays. There are many causes for this fact. The natural conditions, mainly the relief and climate, exert a certain influence because most of the frontiers with Serbia, FYR of Macedonia and Greece cut through mountain regions of different height and crossing (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2.

Over one fifth of the total length of the state borders is along the Danube. The historical heritage, the belonging of certain countries to antipodal economic and political systems during the second half of the 20th century (till the end of the 1980s), the substantial disparities in the socio-economic level of the countries (e.g. Bulgaria and Greece), the insufficiently developed transport infrastructure, the insufficient road network's density, the limited traffic capacity, and the small number of border check points (Table 3) hampered the trans-border cooperation which started too late. The countries on the Balkan Peninsula need considerable investments for infrastructure projects of regional and European significance, which each individual country cannot afford. This is possible only with the assistance of international and financial institutions – the European Union and its programs and afore-to-affiliation funds, the Stability Pact, the International Monetary Fund, the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank etc.

The development of Bulgaria's trans-border cooperation is associated with its European integration. In this sense the cooperation between Bulgaria and its neighbouring states against the background of the Eurointegration processes, is a pressing issue. „For Bulgaria the regional economic, political and military cooperation is an important element and a step forward to the integration of the country with the European and North Atlantic structures" (Monitoring..., 2001, p. 160). Therefore the establishment and extension of cooperation between local and regional authorities in the respective countries and particularly of trans-border cooperation between neighbouring nations is essential for Bulgaria's Eurointegration. The trans-border cooperation is one of the priorities in the Plan for Regional Development of the Country (1999). Joint programs for

trans-border cooperation with Greece, Romania, Serbia and Monte Negro, FYR of Macedonia and Turkey have been approved and are being implemented (Bulgaria-Romania..., 2003, INTERREG III A, Cross-border..., 2004, Neighbouring Programme..., 2004, Neighbourhood Programme..., 2004). Very important for the extension of the trans-border cooperation and for the future development of the border areas is the up-grading of the road network and the other elements of the technical infrastructure, the coordination of the joint efforts which the neighbouring countries make to attract investments and to promote business contacts. This will result in setting up Euroregions between Bulgaria and its neighbours.

Table 3. Borders of Bulgaria and number of check points with neighbouring countries

Neighbouring countries	**Length of the borders (km)**				**Number of check points on the land borders**	**Average distance between land check points (km)**[1]	**Number of check points on the Danube River**
	Total	**Land**	**Rivers**	**Black Sea**			
Total	2245	1181	686	378	15 (17, 2005)	93 (82, 2005)	
Romania	609	139	470		3	46	3+2+7[2]
Serbia and Montenegro	341	315	26		5	68	
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)	165	165			3	55	
Greece	493	429	64		2 (3, 2005)	246 (164,2005)	
Turkey	259	133	126		2 (3, 2005)	130 (86,2005)	
Black Sea				*378*			

[1] the average distance between land check points in the cases of borders of Bulgaria with Serbia and Montenegro, FYROM, Greece and Turkey (state borders pass only small rivers) is calculated on the base of total length of the borders; the average distance between land check points in the case of total borders of Bulgaria is calculated on the base of land and rivers borders, without only of the length of the Danube river's border

[2] - 3 ferries, bridge in Ruse (road and railway check points) and 7 ports

The creation and development of Euroregions is still in its initial stage – their formation started at the end of the 1990s. „The idea of the Euroregion is based upon three formulations: 1. The border areas are slower in development. 2. This fact becomes a barrier and hinders the country's further development. For that reason, these regions are labeled as „problem areas" and need to

be supported by the other ones of the country. 3. Many problems in the border areas can be solved through the cooperation of neighbouring countries at the regional and local level" (Grčić, Ratkaj, 2006, p.63). Several Euroregions of two different types have already been developed on both sides of Bulgaria's frontiers. The Euroregion „Mesta-Nestos" between Bulgaria and Greece, is from the type „Euroregions at the Schengen border of EU, whose task is to prepare the EU-candidate countries for the process of integration" (according classification in Grčić, Ratkaj, 2006, p.64). It will be financed under the INTERREG Program. Some trans-border regions from the type „Euroregions outside of EU borders" have already been created between Bulgaria and other neighbouring countries. Three of them, named „Danube-South", „Danubius" and „Lower Danube" are between Bulgaria and Romania - two future EU member-states. At the same time two tripartite Euroregions are developed – the „Middle Danube – Iron Gate", in which participate administrative units from Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia and „Eurobalkans", which incorporates parts of Bulgaria, Serbia and FYR of Macedonia (Sofia-Nish-Skopie). The newest Euroregion, called „Stara Planina", under EU Program „West Stara Planina" is on the way to be formed between Bulgaria and Serbia (June 2006).

At present, the regional cooperation among Bulgaria and the Black-Sea countries is defined as still undeveloped, with no prospects for extension although it is being performed in various spheres. The Black-Sea Economic Cooperation (BSPC) is a formal regional organization, established in 1992 by the initiative of Turkey. It is one of the 153 regional unions founded in the world during the period of 1947-1997. Its members are 11 countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Turkey, Albania, Greece, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaidjan) and Poland is an observing member country. The aims of this cooperation are the development of the cooperation in the field of transport, communications, energetics, environmental protection, etc. New opportunities for extending the regional cooperation are afforded as a result of the development of the integration processes in the south-eastern part of Europe.Bulgaria's accession to the EU will strongly affect the economic and political progress of the country. According to the prognoses, made by Bulgarian and foreign institutions, the national economy will continue to develop at stable rates which are close to those characteristic of the other countries in transition (Table 4).

Table 4. Increase of GDP (per cent of previous year)

Countries	2005 (estimate)	2006 (prognosis)	2007 (prognosis)
Estonia	8,7	6,8	6,5
Latvia	9,8	7,7	7,0
Lithuania	6,5	6,2	6,0
Poland	3,2	4,5	4,0
Slovakia	5,7	6,0	6,0
Slovenia	3,9	4,0	4,0
Czech Republic	4,9	4,4	4,1
Hungary	4,1	4,4	3,8
Bulgaria	5,5	4,5	4,5
Croatia	4,0	4,0	4,0
Romania	4,1	4,8	5,4

Source: Deutsche Bank Research

Foreign trade is one of the economic sectors, which is most markedly influenced by Bulgaria's membership in the EU. The closer is the date for the country's accession to the EU, the greater is the EU share in the import-export activities (Table 5).

Table 5. Share of EU from Bulgaria's export and import*

Year	Export to EU		Import from EU	
	Milion Levs	% from total Bulgarian export	Milion Levs	% from total Bulgarian import
1996	336203,6	39,1	313012,4	35,1
1997	3580862,4	43,2	3119337,3	37,7
1998	3756736,6	50,4	3963990,2	45,1
1999	3798,1	52,0	4861,6	48,4
2000	5249,3	51,1	6100,3	44,0
2001	6119,8	54,8	7845,2	49,3
2002	6603,7	55,7	8270,5	50,3
2003	7373,2	56,6	9115,9	58,3
2004**	9323,2	58,3	12291,4	54,1

* From 1999 - in Levs (BGN) after denomination (1000 old Levs= 1 Levs)
** After 1.05.2004 - EU-25
Sources for information: Statistical Yearbooks 1997-2003, Statistical Handbooks 2004-2005 and author's calculations.

For the recent ten years the indicator which demonstrates the level of integrity between the Bulgarian economy and the EU and which is defined as

„foreign trade turnover:GDP" ratio is steadily growing and as pointed by the „Watch Industry Bulgaria" it is almost 61% (Fig. 3). At the same time the share of the Central and East-European countries in Bulgaria's import-export is decreasing (Fig. 4). Today Bulgaria's turnover with the neighbouring five countries is estimated at 21% of its total turnover (2004); 29.4% of the national export is oriented to them and 15.4% of Bulgaria's import comes from them. Greece and Turkey are remarkable for their highest share (Fig. 5).

Fig. 3. Source for information: Industry Watch Bulgaria on the base of BNB and NSI' data



Fig. 4. Source for data: National Statistical Institute



Fig. 5. Source for information: Foreign trade of Republic of Bulgaria, 2005



The priorities and perspectives of Bulgaria's trans-border cooperation are closely related to the priorities in its socio-economic and political development, to the process of European integration and the aspirations for stability in the country and in the Balkan region.

Top priority in the trans-border cooperation with Greece is the improvement of accessibility and the rise in the number of trans-border check points. Other priorities are the development of telecommunications, environmental protection, protection and proper management of the forest in the Rhodopy Mountains (which because of their biological diversity are called „an ecological brick" of European significance), the economic development of the border areas and the cooperation in the field of employment, the joint construction of Bourgas-Alexandropoulis (Greece, Bulgaria, Russia), etc.

Among the most important priorities in the trans-border cooperation with Romania are: better transport accessibility between the two countries (by construction of a second bridge over the Danube); intensification of the regional and local cooperation by establishment and development of a cooperation network, incorporating the mid-sized towns, and by linking this network with the existing networks of European towns; cooperation in the sphere of power industry and transport; business support; improvement of the environmental quality and more efficient environmental protection policy (monitoring of the Danube waters, air protection, etc.), etc.

In 2007 when Bulgaria joins the EU, its frontiers with Turkey, FYR of Macedonia and Serbia will be the EU external borders. A top priority in the cooperation with the above mentioned countries is the development of the local cooperation. A new highway, connecting Nish and Sofia, is planned to be built

as part of the transport corridor 10c, new check points are going to be opened on the Bulgarian-Serbian frontier, etc. The cooperation between Bulgaria and FYR of Macedonia will be extended by integrating their railway systems by construction of a section several kilometers long as part of Sofia-Skopje railway, construction of transport corridor # 8, etc. The expansion of the operating border check point Kapitan Andreevo-Kapukoule on the international highway Sofia-Istanbul (a section of the future corridors # 4 and 10) in 2006 and the better access to the newly established in 2005 border check point will promote the regional and trans-border cooperation with Turkey. We hope that Bulgaria's accession to the EU will favourably affect its cooperation not only with the EU member-countries Greece and Romania but also with the other neighbouring nations.

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Streszczenie

REGIONALNA I TRANSGRANICZNA WSPÓŁPRACA BUŁGARII: SYTUACJA RZECZYWISTA I PERSPEKTYWY

Współpraca Bułgarii z sąsiednimi państwami do końca lat 80-tych realizowana była na poziomie rządowym. Początek rzeczywistej współpracy transgranicznej, z Grecją i Rumunią, obserwujemy od połowy lat 90-tych.

Rozwój regionalnej współpracy transgranicznej jest związany z integracją europejską Bułgarii. Znaczny impuls dla rozwoju współpracy transgranicznej stanowią inicjatywy i programy Unii Europejskiej. Pomoc finansowa UE jest bardzo istotna dla: rozwoju współpracy transgranicznej, budowy nowych przejść granicznych oraz nowej infrastruktury transportowej, rozwoju telekomunikacji, ochrony środowiska w regionach granicznych oraz dla rozwoju gospodarczego sąsiednich regionów przygranicznych.

Rozwój euroregionów w Bułgarii znajduje się jeszcze na początkowym etapie. Słaby jest także rozwój współpracy czarnomorskiej.

Priorytety i perspektywy rozwoju współpracy transgranicznej i regionalnej z krajami sąsiadującymi z Bułgarią określono w podpisanych dwustronnych dokumentach.

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF BULGARIA - A FACTOR FOR ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE REGIONAL COOPERATION

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Each country and each object have their own geographical location. If the geographical situation can be defined as a fact or a constant, the economic geographical and the political geographical ones are a historically dynamic category. They to a great extent determine the role of each country in the regional cooperation. That is why the attention of this paper will be focused on bulgaria's geographical situation in relation to the neighbouring countries and regions.

Situated on the continent of Europe, and on the Balkan Peninsula in particular, Bulgaria has a unique geographical position - it borders on the Danube and on the Black Sea and is close to the Mediterranean basin. It is not only the „heart" of the Balkan Peninsula but it is also a territory, lying on the border between the East and the West, between different civilizations, cultures and religions, between the prosperity of the rich West and the misery of the poor East. This specific geographical location of Bulgaria allows to define it as a peculiar bridge, which links Europe, Asia and North Africa.

A passing glance at Bulgaria's economic history shows that during different periods of its socio-economic development the Bulgarian land had brisk economic relations with some of the neighbouring and far-off countries and that Bulgaria played a significant part in the regional cooperation.

The present-day development of trans-border and regional cooperation in Bulgaria is still under the influence of the historical negativism and the historical heritage. The delineation of Bulgaria's frontiers at the Berlin Congress (July, 1878), which disregarded the ethnical principle, underlying the San Stefano treaty (concluded on March 3, 1878), together with the wars on the Balkans (1913-1918), the formation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1919), etc., still keep up a smoldering hearth of conflicts in the Balkan countries because of the infringement upon the ethnical and national interests. Bulgaria's integration with the socialist bloc for almost 50 years (1944-1989), the borderline position of the country between the existing two military blocs at that time

and between two different social and economic systems heavily restrained the relations of Bulgaria with its neighbouring countries, especially with Greece and Turkey. The state strategies and policies, carried out during this period, had and continue to have a negative impact upon the development of economic and other relations with regions from the neighbouring countries as well as upon the development of border areas and of regional cooperation. During the same period Bulgaria's frontiers with Turkey and Greece (capitalist and NATO countries) performed barrier and defensive functions. The long-lasting cool and restrained political relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia also impeded their economic and regional cooperation. Thus in fact, in the years of socialist development Bulgaria could take an advantage from its geographical location only with regard to Romania and across the Black Sea with the former USSR. The orientation of the regional cooperation of Bulgaria primarily to the CMEA member-countries prevented the state from using thoroughly its favourable regional economic geographical situation.

The significant political and economic transformations at the end of the 20th century in Bulgaria, on the Balkans, in Central and Eastern Europe resulted in changes in the geopolitical position of Bulgaria. The disintegration of Yugoslavia, the wars fought on its territory in the 1990s, the UNO-embargo, the emergence of new sovereign states and the increase in the number of frontiers, the visa regime with Greece and Turkey existing until 1993, the backwardness of the border regions, etc., or in other words, the development of processes which were an exact opposite to the processes in Western Europe, had and still have an adverse effect on the regional and trans-border cooperation. The heaps of unresolved problems from the past currently arouse conflicts and generate tension in the geopolitical situation on the Balkans, which have strongly limited the perspectives for regional cooperation.

The regional cooperation acquires other dimensions after the disintegration of the pact structures in Europe and as a result of the development of the integration processes. At the present stage "the open regionalism is within the course of the economic globalization and serves as a prerequisite or stage of the globalization" (Marinov, 2000, p.61). Simultaneous integration processes with the European Union and its extention to the east, the extention of NATO to the east and the formation and development of other regional structures have developed in the central and eastern part of the continent, at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. The geopolitical role of this region changed after Bulgaria's and Romania's acceptation in NATO at the end of 2002, when they became its eastern border. They connected the northern and the southern „wing" of NATO (Hungary, Turkey and Greece) and as a result, the security and the regional stability increased and the potential danger for conflicts in the Black-Sea and neighbouring regions decreased.

Nowadays the territorial integrity of Serbia with Kosovo and Monte Negro and the boundaries and the territorial integrity of Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia are a very delicate topic on the Balkans. Therefore, the non-formal meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from the NATO countries, held at the end of April 2006, paid considerable attention to the issue, concerning the conditions on the Balkans and the statute of Kosovo. Actually, this meeting tried to resolve, although too late, an issue related to Count Ignatiev's definition on the way towards „achieving sustainable peace on the Balkans" - a formula, changed by the Berlin Congress. The future of Kosovo and the whole region should be associated with a solution that could guarantee stability if only the international standards and norms for preserving the frontiers unchanged are observed. After the referendum in Monte Negro (May 21, 2006) two new independent states emerged on the map of Europe - Serbia and Monte Negro. According to us, Kosovo will also get its independence. By setting apart Monte Negro from Serbia, the latter changed its geographical situation. It lost its sea outlet and like Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, etc., became a land-locked country. At the same time Monte Negro was deprived of its outlet on the Danube and hence, of the possibilities to actively participate in the regional cooperation with the „Danube" countries.

A stable solution to the political and international problems will definitely be achieved when FYR of Macedonia and Albania become NATO members, when Bulgaria and Romania and later on the so called countries from the West Balkans and Turkey join the EU. The accession of the Balkan countries to the integrated European space and to the European value system will mitigate the current problems and will contribute to a more fruitful regional and European cooperation. Bulgaria needs „more seriously reformed markets, safe and predictable neighbours" (Shopov, 2006) in order to obtain sustainable development, conformable to its regional position and its role in the regional cooperation. Bulgaria has always adhered to the European principles of non-interference, of safeguarding the status quo and the established state borders, the long-lasting peace and stability in its neighbouring countries and on the Balkan region.

The accession of bulgaria and romania to the eu will change not only their statute but they will assume the role of a special barrier between the politically and economically unstable countries which have emerged in the eastern part of the black sea basin as a result of the disintegration of the ussr on the one hand, and the equally unstable states on the western balkans on the other hand. As a eu member country bulgaria together with greece and romania will become a more reliable generating and stabilizing factor for regional cooperation, for the establishment of long-lasting peace and for the consolidation of the balkan countries.

Of great significance for the development of the regional and European cooperation will be the improvement of the conditions of the transport network and the communications, the „opening" of the road network of the countries,

the construction of international transport corridors, the integration of the energy systems with the ones of the European countries etc. The Danube and Black Sea's ports developing a noble cooperation by means of competition among them have a definite role in this process, thus contributing to the strengthening of the unity of the region and its gradual affiliation to the European structures.

The specific transport-geographical location of Bulgaria has contributed a lot to its socio-economic progress through different historical periods. An important stimulating factor for the development of its transport system is the fact that the country borders on the Danube and on the Black Sea. It accentuates the significance of the country's geopolitical position and its place in the regional cooperation. In the course of history Bulgaria's involvement in the regional cooperation had an impact on its economic sectors and on the development of the national transport system. In the second half of the 20th c. (till the end of the 1980s) Bulgaria had a peripheral transport-geographical location. This enabled the neighbouring countries to implement an active transport policy throughout the above mentioned period on the grounds of which each of them now claims to have a key strategic position with regard to the Euro-Asian economic relations and insists on being developed as a regional transport center no matter that 5 out of the total 10 pan-European transport corridors run through Bulgaria (Fig. 1). The motorways „Hemus" and „Thracia" and the new motorways „Maritsa", „Cherno More", „Strouma", „Liulin" and „Nish-Sofia" which are their sections, will constitute the backbone of the road network in Bulgaria and its motorway ring.

Fig. 1. Transport corridors in South-Eastern Europe



In the future the national transport policy will give priority to the construction of new transport infrastructure projects and especially of transport corridors as sections of the trans-European ones. An important section of the transport corridor # 4 is the bridge over the Danube for combined motorway and railway traffic, which has to connect Vidin and Kalafat but whose construction is behind schedule. The financing of 240 million of Euro was approved at the Conference of the donators in Bucarest, organized by the Stability Pact, in the autumn of 2001. Along with it Bulgaria and Romania are discussing the possibility of building a third bridge, near Nikopol-Turnu Magurele. Bulgarian and foreign banks and agencies take an interest in the construction of the section Nish-Sofia as part of corridor # 10. Of no less interest is the building of the transport corridor # 8 (from Bourgas via Plovdiv-Giueshevo-Skopje to the Albanian port Douras on the Adriatic Sea). In 2005 Russia, Bulgaria and Greece signed a Memorandum for the construction of an oil pipeline between Bourgas and Alexandropoulis. In addition, another project is being worked out - the construction of an oil pipeline from Bourgas to Gueshevo and across FYR of Macedonia and Albania - to Vljora. The three-day conflict between Russia and Ukraine (2006) convinced both Bulgaria and the remaining European nations of the necessity to avoid energy dependency by seeking alternatives. A major route for Europe, alternative to the one used by the Russian gas supplies and crossing the territory of Bulgaria, is being developed under the Nabucco Project. The EU scenarios point out that towards 2025 10-15% of the gas, supplied to Europe, will come from the Caspian Sea region. In June 2006 an agreement was signed for speeding up the construction of the gas pipeline. It will pass through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria (Fig. 2). The implementation of these projects and maybe of some others in the field of transport and power industry will guarantee in the near or more distant future the integration of Bulgaria's transport and energy system with that of the EU-member countries. The construction of modern infrastructure in Bulgaria and the countries from the Black Sea region will promote the exploitation of the natural resources in Central Asia and the Near East, their transportation and utilization and will better provide Bulgaria and the other European states with energy resources, thus making them energy independent. The geographical location of Bulgaria and its accession to the EU are considered to be a reliable factor for their safe transit transportation from the Near East and Central Asia.

Fig. 2. Future pipeline „Nabucco"

Source: „Dnevnik", 27.06.2006

The border posts substantially accelerate the integration of Bulgaria's transport system with that of the EU member-countries. Today those, operating on the national frontiers of Bulgaria with its neighbouring countries, are 23 and others are planned to be opened (Fig. 3). For the past 15 years only 2 border posts have been established between Bulgaria and its neighbours although a number of inter-governmental documents have been signed, concerning projects some of which can rely on funds from European programs. One of their main goals is to activate the cooperation between 75 Bulgarian municipalities and the neighbouring municipalities across the frontiers. An effective solution in this respect is the establishment of Euro-regions between municipalities and district from the border areas, which through regional trans-border cooperation can give impetus to their economy. Most numerous are the Euro-regions, formed between Bulgaria and Romania; Bulgaria and Greece created the „Mesta-Nestos" Euro-region; Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey developed the „Thracia" Euro-region, etc. The funds obtained from PHARE - CBC facilitate Bulgaria's involvement in different bilateral projects with Romania, Serbia, Macedonia and Greece.

Bulgaria's outlet on the Black Sea favourably affects its economic development. It intensifies the links not only of Bulgaria but of all the „Black Sea" countries with the world and accelerates their relations with other regions rather than the ones among themselves. The Black-Sea ports were small (except for Istanbul), few and there were no economic, trade, cultural relations regadless of their geographic closeness, as it was, for example, with the „deeply-rooted in history, political and economic relations among the countries situated at the Baltic Sea" (Veggeland, 1997, p.48).

Fig. 3. Program of check points development and their connections with national road network (2001-2006)



1 – existing check points;
2 – existing check points in the process of modernization;
3 – future check points to be established, accprding to bilateral agreements (2005-2006);
4 – future check points, approved by the Bulgarian government (2005);
5 – roads to check points;
5 – existing motorways;
6 – projects for motorways.

Recently the Black Sea basin has assumed a new geopolitical role, which opens better perspectives for the extension of regional cooperation (Roszciszewski, 1999, 2000). The improvement of the entire economic and political situation in the countries, which are partners in the contract about the Black Sea economic cooperation will intensify the links among them, will accentuate the role of Bulgaria in South Eastern Europe as well as in the whole European continent and will promote the regional cooperation. Positive will also be the influence of the ideas for regional cooperation in the Black Sea region, the Danube region, the Baltic region and the region of the Vishegrad countries (Europe+..., 1994). This will allow to use more fully the natural, economic and demographic potential of different states and to benefit much more from their geographical location which will be useful both for the development of each of the aforesaid regions and for the extension of their links with other regions and countries. As pointed by the Consulting Agency „A.T. Curney" Bulgaria ranks 15th in the world by its good conditions for outsourcing and 2nd in Europe after the Czech Republic. The results can already be seen - in terms of foreign investments Au-

stria is the first, followed by Greece, the Czech Republic and some other countries from the region. The geographical situation of Bulgaria rouses considerable interest in gaining access to its home market, which will speed up the country's overall progress in the 21st century. This can be proved by our SWOT Analysis.

SWOT Analysis
Participation of Bulgaria in the regional trans-border cooperation

Strong points:
- favourable geographical location;
- relatively unchanged natural environment;
- abundant tourist resources which promote the development of seaside, mountain, cultural and other types of tourism as well as of balneotherapy;
- successful foreign policy, traditionally oriented towards the maintenance of long-lasting peace and stability in the region;
- availability of qualified work force;
- very good conditions for the development of environmentally sound agriculture;
- availability of renewable energy resources.

Weak points:
- poor technical shape of infrastructure;
- underdeveloped transport links with the neighbouring countries;
- insufficient number of border posts on the frontiers between Bulgaria and its neighbouring countries;
- inefficient administration;
- rather poor competitive power of some manufactures;
- unfavourable demographic trends - degraded demographic structure, emigration;
- inadequate qualification of the staff and lack of information about the requirements and criteria for elaboration of regional projects, aiming to get grants from the EU pre-accession and accession funds;
- lack of a clearly defined policy for technological innovations, carried out by firms or by institutions on a higher level.

Threats:
- greater competition between the countries in the region and those in other regions;
- inefficient use of modern high technologies;
- energy dependence and instability on the energy market;

- delayed implementation of infrastructure projects.

Perspectives for development and regional cooperation after Bulgaria's accession to the EU:
- country's access to the EU market;
- better safety and guarantees for the foreign capital in Bulgaria as a NATO and EU member country;
- increase of foreign investments;
- country's access to the capitals of the EU Cohesion Fund and the European Fund for Regional Development;
- development of competitive economy;
- better opportunities for more extensive and more effective regional trans-border cooperation with the countries from the Danubian, Black Sea and Mediterranean regions;
- more complete integration with the power resource market and the power grid of the neighbouring nations and the EU countries;
- establishment of new and improvement of the existing border posts;
- construction of certain sections and development of new transport links - railways, motorways and roads which connect Bulgaria with the countries in the region.

Conclusion

The geographical location of Bulgaria opens up splendid opportunities for its development in the 21st century and for its conversion into a regional center. The country has the advantages necessary for that purpose. The challenge is whether we shall be able to benefit from them and whether we shall become the leading coordinator in the future regional cooperation.

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Streszczenie

POŁOŻENIE GEOGRAFICZNE BUŁGARII JAKO CZYNNIK JEJ UDZIAŁU WE WSPÓŁPRACY REGIONALNEJ

Bułgaria posiada specyficzne położenie geograficzne na Półwyspie Bałkańskim oraz na kontynencie europejskim. Położenie geograficzne oraz geopolityczne w znacznym stopniu określają jej miejsce i rolę we współpracy regionalnej. Ocena rozwoju współczesnej współpracy regionalnej między Bułgarią i sąsiednimi państwami prowadzi do wniosku, że dostrzega się jeszcze negatywny wpływ przeszłości historycznej. Radykalne przemiany polityczne i gospodarcze, jakie nastąpiły w końcu XX w. korzystnie wpłynęły na położenie geopolityczne Bułgarii i innych krajów bałkańskich. Dążenie Bułgarii i Rumunii do integracji z Unią Europejską, a w dalszej kolejności Turcji i krajów Bałkanów Zachodnich, będzie sprzyjało rozwojowi współpracy regionalnej i europejskiej. Korzystne jest również położenie Bułgarii w europejskiej sieci transportowej, bowiem przez jej terytorium przebiegają trasy 5 z 10 korytarzy paneuropejskich. Efektywna drogą współpracy regionalnej będzie utworzenie euroregionów w regionach przygranicznych sąsiadujących z Bułgaria krajów. Pozytywne efekty przyniesie także realizacja idei współpracy w regionach czarnomorskim i naddunajskim oraz w grupie Wyszehradzkiej. Przeprowadzona analiza SWOT potwierdziła, że położenie geograficzne Bułgarii stanowi szanse jej rozwoju społeczno-ekonomicznego w XXI w.

INNOVATION-ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN-POLISH TRANSBORDER COLLABORATION

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The expansion of the EU has changed the character of transborder collaboration of Ukraine on her western border with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Up till now the contact function of the western border of Ukraine was realized within the framework of transborder collaboration with the countries – non-members of the EC. Now this collaboration passes on to the new qualitative level connected with the direct neighbourhood with the EU.

Due to the expansion of the EU the issue arises of adaptation of the countries – new members of the EU to transborder collaboration with their eastern neighbours on the terms defined by their membership in the EU.

Ukraine must acquire the experience of the European standards of transborder collaboration in order to avoid the possibility of being a spatial economic periphery and the increase of the barrier function of the western border.

If Ukraine intends to integrate fully in the EU, she must have not only a competitive national economy, but also highly developed borderland regions that could to full extent join in the processes of transborder collaboration having appropriate market system. Resolving such problems is directly connected with the innovation policy both, on the level of national economy and on the level of borderland regions.

Management of innovations in the countries-members of the EU requires from Ukraine close collaboration with them as the participants of the innovation market. Adaptation to the EU standards in the sphere of innovations will permit to integrate in the European system of management of innovations, increase the share of the national sphere of innovations in the programs realized on the European scale, boost the exchange of research and development experience with countries-members of the EU.

To a certain extent the innovation potential of Ukraine, that of her borderland regions corresponds to the level of the developed nations. This includes

availability of highly skilled workforce, a wide network of educational, scientific and scientific-technical establishments.

The innovation structure of first priority projects in Ukraine is adequate to the structure of innovation aims of research works carried out in the EU. Thus, perspective information technologies, instruments of comprehensive automation and communication systems occupy 22.7% in total volume of first priority research works; protection of the environment – 13.1%; manufacture, preservation and processing of farming produce – 11.7%; environmentally pure energy and resource saving technologies – 10.2%; human health – 9.8%; new substances and materials – 9.8% [1, p. 76]. This gives a reason to speak of the possibility of realization of the above mentioned first priority trends of innovation policy of Ukraine in transborder collaboration as well.

The task is to enter the common research and development space of the EU gradually through the innovation model of transborder collaboration with countries-members of the EU. Four groups of indicators should be taken into account in this process.

The first group – human resources, their quantity and quality as the principal factor determining development and dissemination of new knowledge. The main indices are shares of: university graduates in the sphere of science and technologies in total number of graduates; specialists with academic degrees and professionally qualified engineers; workers engaged in medium- and advanced technology manufactures; workers of the sector of advanced technological services. Here medium technology sector includes chemistry. Office, electric equipment, precise machine building, automotive industry and various types of transport. The advanced technology sector includes telecommunication and computer equipment, software, telecommunication services, Internet, semiconductors, electronics, medicine and biotechnologies, space engineering.

The second group – this is generation of knowledge. Indicators of this group measure efficiency in the inventive activity and patenting that is the source of profit from innovation activity. Principal indices: budget financing of the sphere of research projects (in per cents of GDP); financing of the sphere of research projects by private business (in per cents of GDP); number of patents used in technological branches of industry per one million of population.

The third group – transfer and use of knowledge. Elaboration of indicators of this group requires taking into account not only the inventive activity of the companies, but also the use of projects of other companies, monitoring of information sources and the ability to improve innovations independently or in co-operation. The important role of small and medium businesses (SMB) with the number of employees from 20 to 30 is also taken into consideration. Principal indices (in per cents): the share of SMB operating in the innovation sphere in the form of households; the share of SMB carrying out innovation

activity in co-operation; the ratio of innovation expenses in production sphere to total turnover.

The fourth group are the innovation finances, markets and the results. Indicators of this group include such spheres of innovation activity as provision with risk capital, sales of innovations, use of Internet network, investments in information and telecommunication technologies and economic activity in the progress making sectors. Principal indices: venture investment in technological companies (in per cents of GDP); capitalization of the new (parallel, secondary) markets (in per cents of GDP); share of sales of new products in the general market of production sector (%); the number of Internet users per 100 residents; volume of the market of information technologies (in per cents of GDP); the change of the share of production of advanced technology products in total volume of production of OECD [5].

This system of indices for evaluation of innovation activity in the transborder territories suggested by the european commission can serve as the basis for determination of their innovation potential and the trends of innovation activity.

According to the conclusions of european commission, the uneven development of the regions, including transborder regions, depends on the level of development of innovation system, that is attributed to the principal factors of international competition. The regional systems of innovations become an important element of the capacity for economic development and the ability to benefit from the european integration [4, p. 23].

Transborder collaboration, as the eu experience shows, produces a favorable effect on the transfer of modern technologies; introduction of new technological lines; saving materials, raw materials and energy; enhancement of quality, labor productivity resulting from introduction of new technologies. That is why transfer of modern technologies in international collaboration, including transborder collaboration, is the main goal of its development.

However, innovation development of transborder territories is a regulated process, connected directly with the regional innovation policy. Regulation of economic development of the ukrainian-polish transborder collaboration envisages carrying out a coordinated regional scientific-technical and innovation policy.

It is exactly this policy, that must ensure modern development of borderland territories on the basis of re-structurization of their economy, be aiming at determination of concrete trends and forms of transborder collaboration, enhancement of competitive ability of borderland territories, their potential, required for transborder collaboration.

One of the main trends of transborder collaboration on the internal borders of the ec is the design and introduction of new technologies in connection with re-structurization of industry. However, such trend of development re-

quires the formation of a common strategy of the development of transborder region, taking into consideration all-european, national and regional interests.

Elaboration of innovation strategy of transborder collaboration must be conducted on the basis of application of scientific-technical potential of borderland territories. Such strategy will facilitate adaptation of not only borderland territories, but of entire economy of ukraine to the eu standards in the sphere of innovations, permit to integrate in the european system of management of innovations, increase the share of national innovations in the programs implemented on the european scale, boost the exchange of research and development projects with countries-members of the eu.

Transborder collaboration on the external borders of the eu has the experience of the establishments of joint structures in the research and development sphere, scientific-technical collaboration, collaboration between educational establishments and educational centers. Of importance is also transfer of technologies for the small and medium businesses; support of innovation services; development of the programs for support of entrepreneurship; establishment of economic environment favorable for innovations. The most mobile form of exchange of scientific-technical achievements are the joint ventures.

Transborder innovation policy envisages the formation of stable joint production and financial links stimulates appearance of sufficiently localized associations on the small territories. For this reason an important trend of support of transborder collaboration in the ec is the spatial planning, realization of transborder programs on the basis of the establishment of joint innovation-design institutions, establishments. Prognostic borderland regional policy under such conditions acquires an important role.

Under the present conditions the structure of transborder regions has a bipolarity of the planning framework, determined by the formation of agglomerating pairs of city-centers on both sides of the state border of ukraine. They are located on the transborder planning axes – transport corridors, and must become the objects of first priority innovation development. Exactly these must become the innovation centers in the transborder collaboration (lviv – rzeszow, kovel – chelm, kovel – lublin).

These cities are united by transborder links and have the importance of the „growth poles", that is, of the zones of rapid economic growth ensured by the introduction of advanced technologies, dramatically changing the character of manufacture and principles of its organization.

Such organizations as the chambers of industry and commerce, business support centers, regional development agencies, etc., Must be involved in the support of innovation activity in borderland territories. Clusters, techno-poles, borderland zones of rapid economic development can serve as the organizational form of innovation development.

The formation of „technopolis" on the basis of academic organizations, departmental research and development institutes on both sides of the border is proposed, proceeding from the high scientific potential of the establishments and enterprises of the western region. The leading role in the activity of the „technopolis" along with the development of its own projects and their implementation in industry will be played by the works aiming at the use of scientific projects of other regions of the member-countries, by establishment of the banks of ideas, patents, technologies, know-how, the works to test the advanced scientific projects and technologies and their introduction in the manufacture. Implementation of the project „technopolis" will permit to achieve the up-to-date technological level in the most important scientific fields, facilitate establishment in the transborder region of manufacture of competitive product, working out the market mechanism of interaction of science and manufacture taking into account the experience acquired on both sides of the border.

Thus, of priority in the formation of innovation model of transborder collaboration are:

- Concentration of resources of borderland territories for fundamental and applied research works in fields for which these territories have scientific, technological, production potential;
- Introduction of program-target approach to innovation transborder activity;
- Expansion of participation of small and medium businesses in the innovation collaboration;
- Formation of various organizational forms of innovation development.

The main task of innovation-oriented transborder policy is the establishment of mechanisms for the effective use of scientific product. Such mechanisms must aim at the support of innovation activity by way of establishment of organizational-legal conditions stimulating economic and business activity on both sides of the border in the development and introduction of innovations, boosting creative initiative of scientists, ensuring de-centralization and democratization of regulation of this important sphere.

It is necessary to elaborate the program of development of scientific-technical potential of transborder region. Such program must attain within the outlined program period certain measurable objectives aiming at preservation and development of scientific-technical potential in the interests of development of transborder region economy. Their attainment requires resolving the following tasks:

- Establishment of favorable legal, economic and organizational conditions for the development of scientific-technical and innovation activity;
- Integration of science and industry;
- Formation of infrastructure for the support of small and medium businesses in scientific-technical sphere;
- Preparation of specialists for the needs of scientific-technical complex;

- Establishment of the system of monitoring of scientific-technical sphere; elaboration and introduction of the system of analysis of demand for scientific-technical projects on both sides of the border, possibilities and means of its satisfaction by the polish and ukrainian research and development and design organizations;
- Promotion of scientific-technical products within the framework of marketing efforts;
- Preparation and conducting of topical seminars on integration of activities of research and development and industrial enterprises;
- Targeted support of international scientific conferences, symposia, congresses;
- Support of participation of scientific establishments and innovation organizations in international exhibitions and fairs within all-ukrainian and international expositions;
- Facilitation of the development of rendering information services connected with participation of scientific organizations, enterprises and establishments in international programs of scientific and technological development;
- Expansion of inter-regional collaboration in the sphere of science, technology within the scope of the agreements between ukraine and poland; publication and dissemination of information-analytical materials;
- Design of topical section on web-site of the regional state administration;
- Measures to support telecommunication networks of scientific establishments and organizations.

The sources of financing this program can be the funds of local budgets, extra-budget sources including the established appropriate designated funds, own funds of research and development organizations and innovation firms, attraction of polish capital, first of all in the form of direct foreign investments. Implementation of the program must envisage maximal attraction of the existing research and development and educational establishments, managerial, educational and information infrastructure on both sides of the border.

In our opinion it is necessary to establish a body for the program designated management of innovation-oriented transborder collaboration, whose designation would be to ensure co-ordination of the measures to regulate scientific-technical development and collaboration of the polish and ukrainian executors of the program. Such a body can be the agencies of regional development of the eu, performing the following tasks:

- Providing information and consultations on management of enterprises, attraction of investments, transfer of new technologies;
- Providing financial resources (loans, guarantees against bank loans, grants, subsidies predominantly for the small and medium-size enterprises);

– Establishment of business infrastructure (technological parks and business-incubators, leasing out premises for offices and manufacture).

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Streszczenie

ROZWÓJ ZORIENTOWANY NA INNOWACYJNOŚĆ W UKRAIŃSKO-POLSKIEJ WSPÓŁPRACY TRANSGRANICZNEJ

Współpraca transgraniczna, jak to pokazuje doświadczenie UE, wpływa pozytywnie na przepływ nowoczesnych technologii, wprowadzanie nowych linii technologicznych, oszczędność materiałów, surowców i energii, poprawę jakości i wydajności pracy wynikającą z wdrażania nowych technologii. Dlatego przepływ nowych technologii we współpracy międzynarodowej, w tym współpracy transgranicznej, jest głównym celem jej rozwoju.

Model innowacyjności dla współpracy transgranicznej z państwami członkowskimi UE będzie wspomagać wejście Ukrainy do wspólnej przestrzeni badań i rozwoju UE. W tym procesie należy wziąć pod uwagę cztery grupy wskaźników.

Trzeba opracować modele innowacyjności oraz program rozwoju potencjału naukowo-technicznego dla polsko-ukraińskich regionów przygranicznych. Taki program musi osiągnąć, w nakreślonym w jego ramach okresie czasu, pewne wymierne cele dążące do zachowania i rozwoju potencjału naukowo-technicznego w interesie rozwoju gospodarki regionu przygranicznego.

Źródłami finansowania tego programu mogą być fundusze lokalnych budżetów, źródła pozabudżetowe, w tym utworzone fundusze celowe, fundusze własne instytucji

badawczo-rozwojowych i firm innowacyjnych, oraz przyciągnięty polski kapitał, przede wszystkim w formie bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych.

Dla wykorzystania wysokiego potencjału naukowego instytucji i przedsiębiorstw z ukraińsko-polskiego regionu przygranicznego proponuje się utworzenie „Technopolis". Główną rolę w działalności „Technopolis" oraz rozwijaniu jej własnych projektów i ich wdrażaniu w przemyśle będą odgrywały działania zmierzające do wykorzystania projektów naukowych z innych regionów państw członkowskich, poprzez stworzenie banków pomysłów, patentów, technologii i „know-how", przeprowadzenie prac testujących zaawansowane projekty naukowe i technologie oraz ich wdrożenie do produkcji.

INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF UKRAINE AND POLAND'S TRANSBORDER COOPERATION: RESULTS AND PROBLEMS

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As the result of the EU expansion Ukraine has become a neighbouring country of the European Union, having 700 km of common border. Taking into account changes in geopolitic situation and economic union of Europe, cross-regional, in particular, transborder cooperation between Ukraine and Poland became priority. It is important to evaluate the results of this process, to diagnose the related problems which hinder the effectiveness, the borderline regions are facing.

The primary result is, that not only Polish economic scientists (P. Eberhardt, J. Kitowski, T. Komornicki, T. Lijewski, Z. Makieła, M. Rościszewski, A. Stasiak, Z. Zioło), but also Ukrainian ones (B. Budkin, P. Bilen'kiy, I. Burakovskiy, M. Dolishniy, M. Mykula, A. Mokiy, M. Malskiy, S. Pysarenko, R. Fedan and others) dedicated their researches to different aspects of this problem. The objective and subjective factors of transborder cooperation development are determined, the threats are shown as for the perspectives of territory participation in transborder cooperation, including those along South-Eastern and Eastern border of Poland. With regard to Ukrainian-Polish transborder cooperation, these factors include historical (i.e. the burden of the past, World War II and its consequences, military actions of UPA in post-war period); political (allocation of two military and economic systems on the border, bordering NATO and EU; infrastructural (insufficient density of transport infrastructure, low clearance capacity); economic (certain distinctions of economic potential, different economic structure); social (different life quality, different approaches to private property estimation), demographic (different birth-rates and ageing processes); administrative (implying institutional –A.M.) (different management models, different administrative structures and levels of decision taking); financial (finance availability in state and local budgets to support local initiatives) [1, p.31-32].

Thus, transborder succeeding cooperation could be and is hindered by lack of institutional support, under-developed institutions, which after D. Nordt,

provide certain rules of a game in a society, and the latter are structuring the stimuli in the process of political, social and economic exchange [2, p.14].

While assessing institutional basis of Ukrainian- Polish transborder cooperation, it is worth taking into account some important issues.

First, in the east of Poland (the west of Ukraine) after the West European analogue there was created the Carpathian Euroregion (covering the territories of Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania), and the „Buh" Euroregion (territories of Ukraine, Poland and Belarus) which in spite of some achievements, did not come up to expectations because of inexperienced local governing bodies, deficiency of their powers and insufficient financing [3, p.93].

Second, the created in the east of Poland Euroregions are viewed by the EU as significant sales markets and opportunities to enter the Asian market, which needs a proper institutional support.

Third, different institutions promoted Ukrainian-Polish transborder cooperation in the condition of both the EU extension, and the EU's transition from the policy of resource re-distribution to mobilization of natural-resource potential of the territories and applying of the subsidiary principles, transition from cooperation to concluding individual cooperation agreements within the frames of Euroregions, improvement of the mechanisms of regional development within the EU, co-ordination of adjacent territories development by building the concept of joint transborder regions development, and the EU regional practice dissemination through western Ukrainian regions (oblasts).

Fourth, in Central and Eastern Europe cross-regional cooperation intensified in the EU countries, likewise on the adjacent territories, which will allow to increase the interaction among the EU members on horizontal level. Also the boosted cooperation can provide the sustained economic growth due to infrastructure development, research and technical, and economic cooperation, as well as due to cross-cultural communication.

Fifth, Ukraine has taken some steps to administration decentralization, delegating some of the functions in international cooperation to regions, integration in the EU, inclusion (since 1993) into the process of Euroregions creation (Ukrainian territory, making the part of Euroregions, equals 33.9% of total area with 28% of population) [4], which, as a whole, is contributing to transborder cooperation.

Economic literature regards the institutions providing transborder cooperation development to be mainly the structures of the European Union, International Associations of borderline territories, organs of local administration, and economic entities. The effectiveness of the institutions is evaluated through monitoring of indices proving succeeding (or failure) of the management object development (in this case, transborder cooperation is implied). With regard to Ukrainian-Polish cooperation, it is worth noting the following:

- foreign trade is tending to steady growth. As the official statistics shows, Lviv oblast's export to Poland in 2004 increased against 2000 by 3.1 times as much (and made 63.6 mln. US dollars), import – by 2.9 times more (138.9 mln. US dollars), foreign trade volume – by 3 times more (202.5 mln/US dollars [5,6], but the balance of trade in Ukraine still is adverse;
- border line formal and informal short-scale wholesale trade is carried on (in food –stuffs, building materials, equipment, furniture, chemicals, medicine, cosmetics, technological equipment) [7];
- joint ventures are developing. In particular, Lviv oblast numbers 375 joint ventures (out of them 90% are with Polish partners) [8];
- investment activity has intensified. In 2004 Lviv oblast economy attracted $ 66.9 mln. foreign direct investments from Poland (mainly, raw industries, i.e. wood manufacturing and wood products, chemical and oil chemical industries , pulp-and-paper industry and publishing business);
- Lviv oblast increased provision of services in education and science. Thus, in 2004 growth of information services reached 155% as against 2003, and services in higher education – 34%.
- transborder cooperation between Poland and Ukraine is carried out in the conditions of economic lag of borderline territories and scarce capital (specifically, it refers to a Ukrainian borderline);
- at the moment, Ukrainian-Polish cooperation provides an investment and trade pattern, but urgent is a creation of innovative model of cooperation which allows for organizational and institutional changes.

The institutialization quality and degree of Ukraine and Poland's transborder contacts are influenced by:

- different degree of economic structures on adjacent territories along both sides of the border;
- competence distribution rate between bodies of executive power and organs of local government (both in Poland and Ukraine);
- depth of cooperation "penetration" among local authorities;
- distribution rate of powers in the plane of "center- region";
- capacity of territorial communities (both in Poland and Ukraine);
- legal adjustment of transborder cooperation formalization system;
- information rate about the territory communities' activities within the framework of Euroregions;
- quality and efficiency of the programmes specifying strategic and operative aims, also the plans of actions within the frame of transborder region.

Comparative analysis of economic structure in borderline territories of Ukraine in terms of Podkarpackie wojewodztwo and Lviv oblast illustrates

availability of various distinctions conditioning those in institutional basis of cooperation (table 1).

Table 1. Descriptions of economic structures in borderline Ukraine and Poland's territories

Podkarpackie wojewodztwo	Lviv oblast
– Highly developed small and medium-sized businesses (90258 units). – High concentration of the 4-th technological rate production. – Branch-wise structure of industry to a considerable extent corresponds with innovative model of economic development	– Average developed small and medium-sized businesses (14759 units). – Average concentration of the 4-th technological rate production. – Branch-wise structure of industry does not correspond with innovative model of economic development

Economic infrastructure is developing asymmetrically. Thus, for example, Podkarpackie wojewodztwo numbers 7, while Lviv oblast 3 busines incubators; Podkarpackie wojewodztwo has 319 financial institutions against 119 in Lviv oblast; insurance companies – 13 and 8, respectively. Polish borderline territories have well developed networks of regional development agencies and organizations for entrepreneurship promotion, also promotion and trade institutions. In Poland Euroregional and borderline institutions have been created and are now developing (in the cities of Lublin, Zamosc, Rzeszow, Tarnobrzeg, Krosno). Nevertheless, actually there are no institutions both, in Ukraine and Poland to encourage foreign investment attraction [9, p.282], and contributing to innovative cooperation.

Along the Eastern border of Poland the transborder cooperation is formalized as a pattern of administrative- self-government system, implying that the bodies of central and regional powers take part in it (i.e. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Polish Government, administration organs of wojewodztwos, bodies of local self-government).

In Ukraine the main role in transborder cooperation development belongs to the central organs of government, and, to some extent, to state regional administrations in the context of realization of regional economic policy of the state. The institute of transborder cooperation was formed in Ukraine through legislative base building, likewise through establishment of principal and branch institutes, which was successfully provided by the central organs of government. As far as the regional policy design of transborder cooperation and the people's participation in it, specifically, participation of territorial communities is concerned, it failed to succeed. Since transborder cooperation mainly is carried out in the most simple form, that is through "direct contacts", and with no mutual obligations on this level, cooperation formalization in this case is not achieved.

Moreover, as M. Mykula [10, p. 13] notes, a community can conclude agreements on the level of settlements or district councils on promotion of transborder cooperation development or on determination of mutual obligations of the parties in case when many people are expected to be involved in the cooperation activity. The benefits of transborder cooperation between territorial communities consist in exchange of experience in different areas of activity (e.g. strategic planning, zoning, project management, anti-crisis management, municipal property management, etc.); intensified activity of the organs of local self-government; establishment of public relations; cooperation abilities for joint projects realization; intermediary activity for setting business contacts; realization of joint projects in infrastructure; exchange of information, not published by statistics bodies.

Nevertheless, these benefits can not succeed because of considerable differentiations in the conditions of potential realization of local self-administration in Poland and in Ukraine. Thus, at present administrative-territorial set up is described by shallowness and objective feebleness of lowest level territorial entities (table 2).

Table 2. Characteristic of lowest level territorial entities in Ukraine and in Poland

Index	Ukraine	Poland
Name of lowest level territorial entities	Village or the association of villages settlement, city	Gmina
Territory of the country, thousand sq. km.	603.7	312.7
Population as for 1.01.2004, mln. people	47.6	38.7
Number of territorial entities of lowest level as for 1.01.2004, units	11613	2489
Average area of lowest level territorial entities in the country, km^2	52.0	125.6
Average number of people in lowest level territorial entities, thousand	4.1	15.6

Note: Developed on the basis of information-reference base of the Supreme Council of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada).

In Ukraine the named entities are 2.4 times less in area, and 3.8 times less in population against Poland. Even if large city territorial associations were taken into account, the average number of municipal entities' population in Ukraine does not correspond to the level of at least from five to six thousand which, according to expert estimation the municipality should include [11, p. 87]. Being financially insufficient (table 3), not numerous territorial entities

are not able to realize the powers delegated to them in the process of administration decentrelization.

Table 3. Domestic Taxes and Duties Proportion in the Budget Revenues of Primary Subjects of Local Administrations in Ukraine and Poland

Country	Proportion of Domestic Taxes and Duties in Budget Revenues, %	Country	Proportion of Domestic Taxes and Duties in Budget Revenues, %
Ukraine	3	Poland	28

Note: based on the sources [12, 13].

The paternalist model sluggishness is partly traced in the realization of the municipal government functions of the local authority bodies in Ukraine. At the same time, a model of municipal self- government is realized in Poland, when the gmina, powiat and wojewodztwo are delegated clearly defined functions, which they are responsible to perform. The Polish government has devolved its functions of support to social and economic development of the territories to local authorities.

Asymmetric institutional basis in the transborder region, conditioned by the indicated differentiations, is a restraining factor of the transfrontier cooperation, and it complicates the projects' financing throughout the transborder region.

The transformation of the primary territorial communities, as well as the expansion of their opportunities in Ukraine is considered as a foremost task of the administrative and territorial reform, which supposes the reformation of the administrative and territorial organization of Ukraine, as well as making amendments in the Constitution, and adoption of laws "On the Administrative and Territorial Organization of Ukraine", "On the Territorial Community". In this context, in the framework of the transborder region, the cooperation should be regarded as a specific integration trend into the EU. From the viewpoint of Ukraine, the transborder region can be regarded as a local structure of the outrun development, where the experience of the administration will be pooled within the cooperation of the municipal formations, including the issues of general territory arrangement, improvement of the life quality of the population along both sides of the border.

In addition to the strengthening of rights and expansion of the local authorities' powers in the sphere of cooperation with the corresponding power bodies of the adjacent territories, transborder cooperation consists in a great infrastructure burden in the system of international economic relations; performs the controlling, barrier, contact and distributive functions; guarantees a normal transfborder commodities' movement in the conditions of the trade

liberalization, and adds the innovation elements into the production and management, etc.

Collation of the transfborder region's functional loading with the system of the functioning institutions, signifies a definite institutional vacuum availability.

At present, the transborder relations in Ukraine are regulated by the norms of the European Convention regarding the basic principles of the transborder cooperation between the territorial communities or the authority bodies of the Council of Europe (1980), interstate and intergovernmental agreements between Ukraine and the partner countries. The foundation of the Ukrainian legal basis has been initiated. Ukraine takes part in the Congress of the local and regional European authorities, in the Association of the European borderline regions, as well as the Assembly of the European regions. The Commission responsible for the transborder cooperation has been created on the governmental level.

The Ministry of Economy is planning to open the transborder cooperation monitoring Center. In addition, in the transborder regions there is a tendency of creation of the territorial development agencies. At the same time, the infrastructure of the innovational activity is rather feeble, that doesn't allow to make the effective exchange of innovations. The analysis shows that throughout the Ukrainian and Polish borderline areas, the innovational activity is carried out in the conditions of insufficient (or lack) of the long-termed crediting and venture financing of the innovational and investment projects. The system of structures of the transborder cooperation promotion, as well as the consulting organizations and informational centres is poorly developed (especially on the Ukrainian territory). In this respect, it is worth noting I. Babets' idea to create in the transborder Ukrainian-Polish region the Innovational Centre of Transfborder Cooperation, International Centre of Innovations and Development, International Cluster, International Centre of the Innovational Cooperation, i.e the institutions, which in joint efforts will forward the formation of transborder cooperation innovation model.

It is essential to adjust and implement the transborder cooperation duties of the following institutions:

- law-enforcement bodies (population and business security in the region);
- borderline and custom services (guarantying of the controlling and barrier functions);
- ecological and emergency services (monitoring of the river and air pollution, formation of the technogenic and collective safety, formation of the recreational fund on the participatory basis, development of recreation and tourism industry);

- Higher Educational Establishments and Administrations of Education and Science (lecturers and students' exchange, cooperation in research area, employment management);
- Administrations and Institutions of Culture (exchange of the amateur and professional collectives, delegations of the library workers, writers, artists, a joint celebration of festivals and public holidays).

At present, this cooperation is rather unsystematic. The efficiency of the transborder cooperation institutional support improvement implies a solution of two important tasks:

1. Formation of transborder statistics, because the latter being imperfect, complicates the efficiency evaluation of cooperation, likewise taking the real management decisions;
2. Creation of financial mechanism for state support of the transborder cooperation, allowing for "Expenditures on Financing of the Transborder Cooperation Projects" in the local budgets. Although, according to the Law of 2004 "On Transborder Cooperation" adopted in Ukraine the priority and fundamentally grounded projects had to be budgeted, but the State Budget 2005 and local budgets do not allow for the named activity.

The institutional basis of trasborder cooperation should be developed according to specific rules, namely, design of programme documents, specification of the participants (institutions), specification of the institutes' functions in the context of the transborder cooperation, specification of state support and that of the EU institutions, determination of the normative and legal acts, making amendments to the laws.

Analyzing the software of the Ukrainian-Polish transborder cooperation we may state the following aspects:

- the programme INTERREC' was implemented throughout the borderline territory of Poland. The Programme funded 196.1 mln. Euro for the period of 2004-2006, 35% of which was allocated for the transborder cooperation development;
- Poland and Ukraine were involved in the programme of neighborhood "Poland – Byelorussia – Ukraine" ;
- Poland elaborated the National Development Plan for 2004 – 2006, with essential accent laid on the measures on transborder cooperation financed by special EU funds;
- Sectored and integral operational programmes have been developed in Poland to realize pilot projects. The named programmes provide the base for utilization of the European structural funds, and the state and local budget allocations.
- the Strategy of economic and social development for 2004-2015 has been designed in Ukraine. This document also deals with the transborder cooperation, but unlike the plan does not include concrete actions;

- "A Strategy of the Podkarpackie wojewodztwo (Precarpathian Province)", and "A Strategy of the Lubel wojewodztwo" have been developed in Poland, while in Ukraine, correspondingly "A Strategy of Lviv Region Development", "A Strategy of Volyn' Region Development", which in principal, did not agree with the documents developed in the context of the transborder cooperation;
- "A Joint Polish-Ukrainian Strategy of the Transborder Cooperation for 2005 – 2015" has also been elaborated. Its strategic and operational goals, and action plans are to be taken into account while implementing the above named documents functioning in Ukraine and Poland.

The actual differentiations in the software of the transborder cooperation between Ukraine and Poland are the most serious obstacles to meet the challenges of the transborder cooperation. Moreover, these barriers place the borderline Ukrainian regions among the outsiders.

According to the Polish estimations, cooperation in the frameworks of small projects PHARE CBC and TACIS CBC programme funding is the most optimal variant of the joint utilization of the EU funds in the process of the transborder cooperation. On the whole, in 2004 – 2006 the EU planned to allocate 955 mln. Euro, and 700 mln. Euro within the PHARE programme, and 75 mln. Euro – within the TACIS programme , respectively [13].

The European Union and its institutions should invest in the integration projects in the Ukrainian regions neighbouring Poland, since neither Poland nor Ukraine is able to do it. These projects could be financed by the European Union structural funds, and be aimed at strengthening of the infrastructure in transport, communications, power supply service, modernization of the borderline arrangements. Only due to common efforts of the EU institutes, Euroregions, governmental and local authority bodies of Poland and Ukraine, territorial communities, institutes of the market infrastructure, and managing subjects the transborder cooperation can succeed.

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Streszczenie

INSTYTUCJONALNE ASPEKTY WSPÓŁPRACY TRANSGRANICZNEJ UKRAINY I POLSKI: WYNIKI I PROBLEMY

Artykuł podsumowuje wyniki ukraińsko-polskiej współpracy transgranicznej. Ocenia instytucjonalne aspekty ukraińsko-polskiej współpracy transgranicznej i efektywność instytucji w oparciu o monitorowanie wskaźników, które przedstawiają wyniki zarządzania rozwojem podmiotu (tj. współpracą transgraniczną).

Ponadto określa czynniki mające wpływ na jakość i stopień zinstytucjonalizowania kontaktów Ukrainy i Polski, w tym: różnice w strukturach gospodarczych na obszarach przyległych do obu stron granicy; podział kompetencji pomiędzy instytucjami władzy wykonawczej i organami samorządu terytorialnego (zarówno w Polsce jak i na Ukrainie); głębię „przeniknięcia" współpracy do władz lokalnych; rozdział władzy

w płaszczyźnie „centrum-region"; uprawnienia społeczności lokalnych (zarówno w Polsce jak i na Ukrainie); przystosowanie prawne systemu form współpracy transgranicznej; zakres poinformowania o działalności społeczności lokalnych w ramach struktury euroregionów; jakość i efektywność programów określających cele strategiczne i operacyjne, także plany działań w ramach regionu przygranicznego.

Za pomocą analizy porównawczej wskazano na wyróżniki struktur gospodarczych terytoriów przygranicznych Ukrainy i Polski, biorąc pod uwagę ich bazę instytucjonalną i dokumenty programowe. Położono akcent na funkcje współpracy transgranicznej, wymagające jasnych delegacji.

W podsumowaniu zaznaczono, że współpraca transgraniczna może odnieść sukces jedynie dzięki wspólnym wysiłkom instytucji UE, euroregionów, organów rządowych i samorządowych Polski i Ukrainy, społeczności lokalnych, instytucji infrastruktury rynkowej oraz podmiotów zarządzających.

STATISTICAL INFORMATION – EFFECTS OF THE POLISH-UKRAINIAN TRANSBORDER COOPERATION

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Introduction

Transborder cooperation is a multi-stage process which commences with sharing information on neighbouring regions, their inhabitants, economy, and the natural environment. Provision of reliable information is a prerequisite to overcoming prejudices, and revealing development opportunities. It also determines the success of subsequent stages such as consultations, cooperation, harmonisation, and integration[1].

In view of the above, the issues relating to border areas and transborder cooperation constitute a new, viable, and very promising field of statistical research, and most notably of regional statistics[2]. The scope of this research should not be limited to transfrontier zones within the European Union, but also encompass its external borderland. The exigency of such an approach is prodded by the European Union cohesion strategy laid down for the years 2007-2013. Defined as the European Territorial Cooperation, this strategy is to be understood as supporting territorial competitiveness and promoting harmonious and sustainable development of the European Union. It follows that internal and external border regions will be the main beneficiaries of relevant activities undertaken.

One of the borderlands located along the EU external border is that of Poland and Ukraine. (Fig.1). This article deals with selected issues of regional statistics and, more specifically, on the experience of Statistical Offices in Lublin and in Rzeszów gained while developing an information system for the area in question.

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[1] C. Ricq, *Handbook on Transfrontier Co-operation for Local and Regional Authorities in Europe*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1995, p. 32.

[2] J. Oleński, *Statystyka transgraniczna – zarys problemów* [in] A. Miszczuk, R. Wiśniewski (eds.): Informacyjno-infrastrukturalne uwarunkowania współpracy transgranicznej, *Euroregion Bug*, t. 2, Lublin: Norbertinum, 1996, p. 21.

1. Methodological issues in regional statistics of transborder areas

Regional statistics is usually defined as part of public statistics which presents social and economic phenomena broken down into administrative and/or statistical units of territorial organisation[3]. The ever-growing importance of regional statistics in member states of the European Union stems from regionalisation fostered, among other things, by the structural policy of the Union.

Fig. 1. Administrative division of the Polish-Ukrainian border zone

[3] Compare: S. Godowski, *Statystyka regionalna w Polsce. Harmonizacja z wymaganiami Unii Europejskiej* [in] *Polityka regionalna Unii Europejskiej a statystyka regionalna – zadania polskiej statystyki urzędowej w tym zakresie*, Warsaw: GUS, 2003 (duplicated typescript), p. 2.

Experience gained so far indicates that regional statistics should have three basic functions to perform[4]. The first function is informative and consists in providing information to national and international (EUROSTAT) databases as well as to other recipients (government and local administration, domestic and foreign entrepreneurs, universities, schools, etc.). This information comes primarily from censuses, comprehensive statistical research, representative research and vital statistics registers, which allows for geographic disaggregation.

The analytical function consists in processing basic information and, based on it, establishing a system of descriptive, analytical and efficiency indicators with a view to conducting thorough regional analyses.

The third function relates to services, and is invariably linked to efficient and effective use of EU Structural Funds by providing preliminary information, information-related services and analysing effects of executed projects.

The commonly accepted definition of the borderland is an area consisting of administrative regions, i.e. the biggest administrative units of a country, located on both sides of the national border.[5] The specific nature of the borderland depends, on the one hand, on the political systems of the two neighbouring countries, and, on the other, on the relations between them as reflected in the type of border which separates the two countries. The evolution of border interaction has, according to O. Martinez, five distinct stages[6]:

- alienation,
- coexistence,
- cooperation,
- interdependence,
- integration.

This evolution from a dividing border (closed), through filtering to integrated (open) is a long-term process which does not necessarily follows the five stages of Martinez's typology or its single direction. A return to a previous stage, usually violent and dramatic, is also possible. The stage of full integration, or the disappearance of the border, should be treated as a desirable objective.

The experience of EU members relating to transborder cooperation indicates that sharing information in borderlands appears to be the first impulse at the loosening of national borders. It can therefore be safe to say that during

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[4] I. Kudrycka, *Rola i zadania statystyki regionalnej i urzędów statystycznych* [in] Polityka regionalna... op.cit., pp.1-2.

[5] Such a definition of the borderland eliminates problems connected with lack of continuity in the areas of transborder cooperation, a phenomenon typical of Euroregions and the existence of the so called blurred borders which appear where borderlands are defined with non-administrative criteria.

[6] O. Martinez, 1994, *The Dynamics of Border Interaction: New Approaches to Border Analysis* [in:] C. H. Schofield (ed.): Global Boundaries, World Boundaries, vol. I, London: Routledge, pp. 1-15.

the initial stage the most important function of regional statistics is informative. It is the effectiveness of this function which largely determines the growing need for the two remaining functions at later stages, fostered by undertaking joint business ventures, designing common projects and development strategies, and acquiring funds from external sources, including, but not limiting to EU Structural Funds.

However, the exchange of information between borderland regions, the establishment of common databases and conduct of joint analyses are invariably connected with numerous methodological problems relating to[7]:

- data quality, their relevance, correctness, reliability, representative character (mainly with respect randomised tests), completeness, and its up-to-date character,
- availability of data with respect to the entire borderland area as well as its parts, possibility of disaggregation of various variables and the need to maintain statistical secrecy,
- comparability of data on the basis of methods and terminology used and timelines.

The third problem area appears to be the most serious one and prompts a comparative analysis of concepts and classification. In effect, the following three groups of concepts and classifications can be distinguished[8]:

- full methodological compliance,
- incomplete methodological compliance with the possibility of achieving full comparability,
- lack of methodological compliance and inability to achieve full comparability.

Most acute discrepancies can be usually found in such areas of interest as environmental protection (classification criteria of pollution and cleanness of natural resources or legal forms of protection), economy (labour market, unemployment, classification of economic activity) and social infrastructure (systems of education and health care). The presence of such discrepancies is, however, a powerful impulse to increase the dynamics of international cooperation in harmonising individual branches of statistics[9].

The manner in which data are presented is an important aspect of their comparability. In the European Union a geocode standard has been developed in the form of NUTS codes, i.e. the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics. There are three levels of NUTS codes defined (NUTS 1, 2, and 3) and

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[7] T. Borys, *Obszary transgraniczne w statystyce regionalnej*, *Statystyka w praktyce* Vol. 6, Warsaw: GUS, 1999, pp.124-136.

[8] Ibidem.

[9] Compare.: J. Witkowski, *W nowy wiek z nową statystyką*. Refleksje z 53 Sesji Międzynarodowego Instytutu Statystycznego", Wiadomości Statystyczne No. 11, 2001, pp. 9-12.

two levels of local administrative units, which are historically referred to as NUTS 4 and 5).

It follows that the discrepancies in comparing data of EU member states are significantly lower than those concerning EU borderlands, to which the Polish-Ukrainian borderland belongs.

2. Polish-Ukrainian borderland as the subject matter of the Polish regional statistics

The cooperation between Polish and Ukrainian statistical offices began with the establishment of the Carpathian and River Bug Euroregions, or, as was the case with the Lublin Statistical Office, a few months prior to the signing of an agreement establishing the transborder association. In the years 1993-1998 the cooperation within the framework of the Carpathian Euroregion was conducted by the Statistical Office in Krosno, and following the reform of the public administration it was taken over by the Statistical Office in Rzeszów. The cooperation within the terms of reference of the Bug Euroregion was led by Statistical Office in Lublin. The effects of this cooperation include numerous publications listed and briefly described in Table 1 below. Some of them were published by the said statistical offices while others relied on the data disclosed by the statistical offices to other publishers. The total of 16 publications concerning the entire borderland or its parts appeared in print in the years 1995-2005, with some of them published in various language versions. These publications presented an ever-widening scope of information broken down into voivodships/provinces as well as poviat/districts. The breakdown of data into the lowest administrative division (i.e. gmina or commune) on the Ukrainian part is not yet possible. The period of cooperation between Polish and Ukrainian statistical offices marked the beginning of adapting Ukrainian statistics to European standards and the adoption in Ukraine of the European Classification of Business Activity, a step which paved the way for the adoption of the Nomenclature of territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS).

Table 1. Publications on the Polish-Ukrainian borderland with the participation of Statistical Offices in Lublin and Krosno/Rzeszów

Title	Scope	Breakdown	Language version	Publisher	Year of publication
Euroregion Bug w liczbach [The Bug Euroregion in Figures]	social and economic characteristics	voivodships, provinces, towns	Polish and English	SO[1] Lublin	1995
Euroregion Bug - fakty i liczby [The Bug Euroregion - Facts and Figures]	social and economic characteristics	voivodships, provinces, towns, gminas	Polish and English	SO Lublin	1996
Sieć miast w Euroregionie Karpackim. Podstawowe dane statystyczne [Towns in the Carpathian Euroregion – Basic Statistics]	social and demographic structures and transformations	towns	Polish and English	SO Krosno	1997
Miasta w Euroregionie Bug [Towns in the Bug Euroregion]	social and economic characteristics of towns	towns	Polish	SO Lublin	1997
Ludność w Euroregionie Karpackim [Population in the Carpathian Euroregion]	social and demographic structures and transformations	voivodships provinces, poviats, districts	Polish and English	SO Rzeszów	1999
Pogranicze polsko-ukraińskie w liczbach [Polish-Ukrainian Borderland in Figures]	social and economic characteristics	voivodships provinces, poviats, districts	Polish and Ukrainian Polish and English	SO Lublin	1999
Euroregion Bug w liczbach [The Bug Euroregion in Figures]	social and economic characteristics	voivodships provinces, poviats, districts	Polish and Ukrainian Polish and English	SO Lublin	2000
Infrastruktura w Euroregionie Karpackim [Infrastructure in the Carpathian Euroregion]	Social and technical infrastructure	voivodships provinces	Hungarian and English	SO Debrecen	2000
Turystyka w Euroregionie Bug w 2000 roku [Tourism in the Bug Euroregion in 2000]	natural and cultural potential for the development of tourism, tourist infrastructure	voivodships provinces, poviats, districts	Polish and English, Ukrainian and Russian	SO Lublin	2001
Ludność w Euroregionie Karpackim [Population in the Carpathian Euroregion]	social and demographic structures and transformations	voivodships provinces, poviats, districts	Polish and English	SO Rzeszów	2002
Miasta w Euroregionie Karpackim w latach 1998-	social infrastructure of	towns	Slovak and English	SO Kosice	2002

Title	Scope	Breakdown	Language version	Publisher	Year of publication
2000 [Towns in the Carpathian Euroregion in the Years 1998-2000]	towns				
Obwód lwowski i województwo lubelskie w liczbach [Lviv District and Lubelskie Voivodship in Figures]	analysis of economic potential	voivodships provinces	Ukrainian and Polish	SO Lviv	2003
Ludność i warunki mieszkaniowe w Euroregionie Bug [Population and Living Conditions in the Bug Euroregion]	characteristics of population and living conditions on the basis of censuses taken (Belarus -1999, Ukraine – 2001, Poland – 2002).	voivodships provinces, poviats, districts	Polish and English	SO Lublin	2004
Obwód lwowski i województwo lubelskie w liczbach [Lviv District and Lubelskie Voivodship in Figures]	analysis of economic potential	voivodships provinces	Ukrainian and Polish	SO Lviv	2004
Obwód lwowski i województwo lubelskie w liczbach [Lviv District and Lubelskie Voivodship in Figures]	analysis of economic potential	voivodships provinces	Ukrainian and Polish	SO Lviv	2005
Pogranicze polsko-ukraińskie. Środowisko. Społeczeństwo. Gospodarka [Polish Ukrainian Borderland. Environment. Society. Economy]	social and economic characteristics	voivodships provinces, poviats, districts	Polish, Ukrainian, and English	WSZiA Zamość, SO Lublin, Lviv, and Rzeszów	2005
Ludność w Euroregionie Karpackim w latach 2001-2005 [Population in the Carpathian Euroregion in the Years 2001-2005]	social and demographic structures and transformations	voivodships provinces, poviats, districts	Polish and English	SO Rzeszów	2006
Miasta – stolice regionów w Euroregionie Bug w 2005 roku	social and economic characteristics	voivodships provinces, towns with	Polish and English	SO Lublin	2006

Title	Scope	Breakdown	Language version	Publisher	Year of publication
[Towns- Administrative Centres in the Bug Euroregion in 2005]	of Brest, Lublin, Lviv and Lutsk	the status of poviat/district			
Obwód lwowski i województwo lubelskie w liczbach [Lviv District and Lubelskie Voivodship in Figures]	analysis of economic potential	voivodships provinces	Ukrainian and Polish	SO Lviv	2006

SO – statistical office
Source: Author's analysis based on information from Statistical Offices in Lublin and in Rzeszów.

In a sense the monographic study entitled *Polish-Ukrainian Borderland. Environment. Society. Economy* is the crowning achievement of the decade of collaboration in the field of statistics. In addition to comprehensive statistical data, the book contains 11 chapters devoted to various aspects of the analysed borderland.

In 2006 more studies are scheduled for publication. The Statistical Office in Lviv in association with its counterpart in Lublin intend to issue another book in the *Lviv District and Lubelskie Voivodship in Numbers* series entitled *Towns-Administrative Centres in the Bug Euroregion in 2005* whereas the Statistical Office in Rzeszów will publish a study entitled *Population in the Carpathian Euroregion in the Years 2001-2005*.

To summarise, the publishing activity of the statistical offices heretofore relating to the Polish-Ukrainian borderland suggests the following conclusions to be made. Firstly, there is a growing interest in close cooperation of statisticians from the Bug and Carpathian Euroregions. While at the beginning the initiative to develop cooperation rested with the Polish side, Ukrainian statistical offices, and most notably the Statistical Office in Lviv, are now following suit.

Secondly, demographic issues of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland are most frequently dealt with. However, despite the fact that Ukrainian statistics is currently adopting European classifications and nomenclature, which makes relevant data more comparable, economic analyses, most frequently sought studies, continue to raise methodological problems.

Thirdly, the experience of cooperation gained so far suggests that the lowest administrative unit in the Ukraine that allows for the presentation of statistical data is a district and the town with the status of the province, which corresponds to Polish poviats and towns with the poviat status (second administrative tier). The reform of the public administration implemented in Poland in 1999 whereby large voivodships were established and poviats were revived,

increased the compatibility of Polish and Ukrainian statistical data broken down into respective territorial units.

Finally, a more consistent and regular attitude towards the publishing activity – for example, in the form of series of books linked by the same subject matter, is highly recommended in place of a rather spontaneous approach. It is also necessary to employ electronic carriers with a view to sharing information on a large scale. To this end, the establishment of a transborder databank could be established.

3. Transborder databank as a target model of cooperation in regional statistics

Apparently, the cooperation among statisticians from the Polish-Ukrainian borderland has been progressing well, as numerous publications seem to indicate, reaching a point where the establishment of a transborder databank could give it an additional boost. Such a databank is also prompted by the ever-growing demand for information on the borderlands of the European Union, and since 1 May 2004 the Polish-Ukrainian border zone. Such a proposal carry with itself preparation work, monitoring and evaluation of projects executed within the framework of INTERREG IIIA, a Community initiative conducted, among others, in the Lubelskie and Podkarpackie Voivodships in the years 2004-2006. The initiative comprises activities falling within the terms of reference of the following:

- modernisation and development of the existing transport and communication networks to increase accessibility of transborder regions,
- development of transborder system of environmental protection,
- development of tourism,
- increasing human and institutional potential for transborder cooperation,
- supporting local community initiatives.

The Ukrainian provinces including Lviv, Wolhynia, and Zakarpattia receive foreign aid from the EU within the framework of TACIS CBC program aimed to undertake joint transborder ventures with Polish border regions.

Within the terms of reference of the Neighbourhood Programme, work on *The Joint Polish-Ukrainian Cross-border Cooperation Strategy for the Years 2005-2015* is already underway.[10] The outline of the document was prepared in 2005, and relevant work will continue throughout 2006. The preparation and execution of the document has generated a substantial demand for statistical information which can be satisfied by the proposed databank. Establishing such

[10] *Wspólna polsko-ukraińska strategia współpracy transgranicznej, Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Wołyńskie, Lwowskie 2005-2015*, Lublin: Europejskie Centrum Integracji i Współpracy Samorządowej „Dom Europy", 2005.

a databank for the Polish-Ukrainian borderland, relevant authorities may capitalise on the experience of the Neisse Euroregion[11]. The proposed objectives of the Polish-Ukrainian databank could include:

- the establishment of an international and freely accessible Internet database,
- support of the EU enlargement processes by means of compatible statistical data,
- removal of language barriers for users of the database by the provision of data in various language versions,
- harmonisation of statistical data.

The scope of the proposed databank could include the following areas relating to the polish-Ukrainian borderland:

- regional and local administrative divisions,
- the natural environment – its use and protection,
- demographic processes and structures,
- national accounts in regional and sub-regional aspects,
- entrepreneurship and labour market,
- technical infrastructure and housing resources,
- social infrastructure (education, heath care, culture, and tourism),
- local and regional finances.

The date should be presented on NUTS 2, 3 and 4 levels so that NUTS 3 type units are also covered.

The proposed Polish-Ukrainian databank can be finance from the funds of the European Union, i.e. INTERREG IIIA and TACIS CBC programmes. The inclusion of the proposed databank to the Regional Databank established by the Main Statistical Office (GUS) or EUROSTAT's *REGIO* may also be considered[12].

Conclusions

In Europe where integration processes are well underway, regional statistics is increasingly interested in its borderlands. Transborder exchange of statistical information is an important tool with which to overcome the "hostility" of national borders. Regional statistics of borderlands constitutes an invaluable source of information on which to build more advanced forms of cross-border

[11] Compare. G. Kostner, *Wskaźniki statystyczne jako podstawa decyzji w Unii Europejskiej*, Saxony Statistical Office, GUS, Radom 2004, pp. 75-77 (duplicated typescript).

[12] For more information on regional databases see M. Markowska, *Ogólna informacja o europejskich bazach danych o regionach* [in] D. Strahl (ed.): *Metody oceny rozwoju regionalnego*, Wrocław: AE, 2006, pp. 49-65.

cooperation such as, for instance, preparation and execution of joint projects or drafting joint development strategies.

For regional statistics, borderlands are a challenge in terms of methodologies and terminology used. This, in turn, fosters the promotion and uniformity of nomenclatures and classifications used in national statistics.

The experience of Polish-Ukrainian regional statistics clearly shows that when the stage of fairly unstructured cooperation in publishing statistical materials, largely for the needs of the Bug and Carpathian Euroregions, is exhausted, it is expedient to implement more systematic activities exemplified by the establishment of an on-line transborder databank linked with other national and international databases of local and regional statistics. Such a database should be targeted at a broad spectrum of other users besides Poles and Ukrainians.

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Streszczenie

INFORMACJA STATYSTYCZNA JAKO EFEKT POLSKO-UKRAIŃSKIEJ WSPÓŁPRACY TRANSGRANICZNEJ

Współpraca transgraniczna jest procesem wieloetapowym. Rozpoczyna ją wymiana informacji o sąsiadujących ze sobą regionach. Dostarczenie wiarygodnej informacji pozwala na przełamanie wzajemnych uprzedzeń, służy ukazaniu szans rozwojowych obszarów przygranicznych oraz warunkuje podniesienie współpracy transgranicznej na nowe, wyższe jakościowo, jej etapy.

W tej sytuacji problematyka obszarów przygranicznych i współpracy transgranicznej jest nowym, bardzo obiecującym, o dużym znaczeniu aplikacyjnym polem badawczym statystyki, zwłaszcza statystyki regionalnej. Nie może ona jednak poprzestać na analizach dotyczących jedynie pograniczy wewnątrzunijnych, ale włączyć w krąg swoich zainteresowań także zewnętrzne pogranicza UE. Potrzeba ta jest tym pilniejsza, że trzeci cel polityki spójności Unii Europejskiej na lata 2007-2013 został sformułowany jako europejska współpraca terytorialna, przez co należy rozumieć wspieranie terytorialnej konkurencyjności oraz promowanie harmonijnego i zrównoważonego rozwoju terytorium Unii. Głównymi beneficjentami działań w zakresie tego celu będą wewnętrzne i zewnętrzne regiony graniczne.

Jednym z pograniczy, położonych wzdłuż zewnętrznej granicy UE jest pogranicze polsko-ukraińskie. Doświadczenia Urzędów Statystycznych w Lublinie i Rzeszowie, związane z tworzeniem systemu informacyjnego na obszarze tego pogranicza, poprzedzone ogólnymi rozważaniami na temat zakresu, funkcji oraz głównych problemów metodologicznych statystyki regionalnej obszarów transgranicznych, składają się na treść prezentowanego artykułu.

CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA, UKRAINE AND MOLDAVIA

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The Geopolitical Context of the Republic of Romania and Its Neighbours

Cross-border co-operation is one of the most important processes of European integration. At the moment, when stable, institutional forms of co-operation, such as euroregional authorities, associations, secretariats, etc., are being formed, cross-border co-operation increasingly takes the shape of euroregional co-operation. A „euroregion" is a formalised structure of cross-border co-operation among regional or local government bodies. It is an area crossing at least one national border, comprising at least two socio-political areas, which are co-operating with each other. The euroregion establishes institutions on the basis of agreements between national, local and governmental organisations. The goal of this article is to provide detailed descriptions of the individual euroregions of Romania, as well as to highlight the need to create a new euroregion that would stimulate stronger European bonds. The existence of euroregions provides opportunities for economic growth in the country border areas, thanks to the need to improve border infrastructure. Euroregions also tend to reduce the negative impacts of international borders.

Romania neighbours five countries: Bulgaria to the south, Serbia and Montenegro to the south-west, Hungary to the west, Ukraine to the north, and Moldavia to the north-east. The south-eastern coast of the Black Sea also belongs to Romania. After gaining sovereignty in 1991, Romania faced the need to adjust the relationships with its old neighbours, Hungary and Bulgaria, and to establish relations with the new ones, Ukraine and Moldavia. This became very important due to the fact that until 2001 the XIV Russian Army stationed in Moldavia, and this strongly influenced the political and economic scene of the country. Furthermore, Ukraine was economically dependent on Russian energy resources, and Russia also uses its Black Sea naval bases to exert control over Ukraine (Wendt, 2006).

Romania's current problems with entering into political relations are caused by its complicated history. In Moldavia, which was previously part of Romania, the majority of citizens are of Romanian origin, although the origin is officially called Moldavian. To the Moldavian government, this suggests that Romanian authorities are wishing to join the two countries. As a result of this fear, Moldavia accused Romania in 1993 of training terrorists as an effort to instigate a revolution. Additionally, Ukraine is concerned over Romanian territorial claims to Northern Bukovina, Hertza region, and Snake Island. All three regions were part of Romania until 1947. Snake Island, with the area of 17 ha, is located to the east of the Danube delta. It was occupied by the Soviet Union after the Second World War. It can no longer be returned to Romania, because of the major military surveillance station located there. This station is reaching as far as Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Middle East, and Northern Africa to Libya. Finally, Romania continues to ineffectively claim the right to the treasures of Romanian culture and art that were stolen by Russia during the First World War (Wendt, 2004).

Despite the difficulties that were complicating the process of enhancing its foreign relations, Romania has achieved a lot. Following a resolution of the Minister's Committee, on 4 October, 1993, Romania was admitted to the European Council structures. Later on, an agreement on co-operation with the European Economic Community (EEC) was signed [Nouzille 1997]. The United States granted the so-called Most Favoured Nation status to Romania, and another sign was the agreement on military co-operation. At the end of 1993, the countries belonging to the Organization of Black Sea Economic Co-operation created the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB), modelled on the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). In February 1995, an agreement between Romania and the European Union came into force that establishes January 2007 as the date of Romania's and Bulgaria's accession to EU structures. In March 2004, Romania, together with Bulgaria, became members of NATO, and from May 2004 Romania now borders the European Union. At the moment, the primary goal of Romania is to become a member of European Union in 2007. Popular support for accession exceeds 90 per cent. According to some politicians, this may be result of Romanian citizens' unawareness and enormous expectations of every day life improvement. In order to adjust the regulations in Romania to match European Union standards, many laws have been changed and many new bills have been passed. Due to the inefficient preparation for accession to the European Union, Romania may be delayed in entering until 2008. The most relevant reforms that need to be undertaken are: border control reinforcement, fight against corruption, and crack-down on smuggling. Furthermore, it is necessary to introduce new legislation on environmental protection; provide better health care to the handicapped; and speed up the process of returning the property that was confiscated

by the communists. However, Romania's greatest achievement after 1990, was the creation of ten euroregions: „Carpatica", „Dunăre-Criş-Tisa-Mureş", „Prutul Superior" or „Prutul de Sus", „Dunărea de Jos", „Siret-Prut-Nistru", „Dunăre-Dobrogea", „Giurgiu-Ruse", „Danubius", „Dunărea de Sud", „Bihor-Hajdú Bihar", and one region defined as the association of cross-border co-operation, „Dunărea 21". Moreover, on the historical grounds of Maramureşului, negotiations are being held to create a new euroregion in this area.

Euroregion „Carpatica"

The „Carpatica" euroregion includes the border regions of five countries: Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and Hungary. It is situated within the area of the Carpathian Mountains and their vicinity, and, consequently, mountains make up a large part of this euroregion. The Carpatica euroregion was created in 1993 – independently of the European Union – and became the first one in south-eastern Europe. The creation was preceded by several years of dialogues and vivid co-operation between the Polish Podkarpacie Voivodship, Slovakian border districts, Ukrainian Zakarpattia, and north-eastern regions of Hungary. In February 1992, in Jaslo, Poland, a seminar named "Possibilities and Perspectives of the Sub-regional Co-operation between Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine" was held. Diplomats and representatives of central governments of interested countries participated. During the meeting, a declaration was signed, and as a result the Podkarpacie Interregional Co-operation Council was formed. This accelerated the implementation of the common objective of creating a wider forum for co-operation in form of a euroregion (Borys, Panasiewicz, 1998).

On 14 February, 1993, in Debrecen, Hungary, this euroregion was created. On this day representatives of Polish, Slovakian, Hungarian and Ukrainian territorial governments signed an agreement to create the so-called Interregional Carpatica Euroregion Association. Foreign affairs ministers of Poland, Hungary, and Ukraine also signed the „Declaration of Co-operation", thus giving the initiative political momentum and validity. In 1994, the Fund for the Development of the Carpathian Euroregion was created, the purpose of which is to support non-governmental activities in this euroregion by providing financial and technical assistance. Romania became a member of the euroregion during a conference on 29-30 April, 1997, when the Association Council considered the application from Romania, and granted it the status of Ordinary Member.

mountainous Carpatica euroregion, one recognises a number of common features, present in all areas of the region:

- Unpolluted natural environment,
- Great potential for tourism
- Significant role of agriculture and food processing
- Significant industrial potential

In Ukraine, the Carpatica euroregion comprises oblats located in the western and south-eastern parts of the country. The most important natural resources include crude oil, petroleum gas, lignite, non-ferrous metal ore, rock salt, building aggregates, and timber. Primarily, the industry focus on means of transport, medical equipment, agricultural machinery, light industry, sugar, milk and meat processing, and also timber processing. Agriculture is also very important, as well as vineyards, stock-breeding and the cultivation of vegetables. Within this region the communication routes running east-west and north-south cross each other. The biggest city in this part of the euroregion is Lvov. Numerous scientific and cultural institutions are also located here.

Table 1. Basic statistic dates in the euroregion Carpatica in 1997

Specification	Totality	Side				
		Polish	Slovakian	Rumanian	Hungarian	Ukrainian
Surface in km^2	141 485	18 683	10 459	27 104	28 639	56 600
Whole population in thousand	14793	2370	1111	2274	2609	6429
Population per 1 km^2	105	127	107	84	91	113

Source: Self study based on (Borys, Panasiewicz, 1998).

The existence of the Carpatica euroregion has had a major influence on the situation of the region. Fairs of all sorts, focused on promoting the economic potential of the euroregion, are organised more frequently. They help local companies to establish connections with foreign companies. Among the most popular fairs held periodically are the following: Krosno Euroregional Fairs „Kontakt", and fairs in Rzeszów, Miskolc and Nyiregyhaza. During those fairs, seminars and training sessions dedicated to economic co-operation are often organised together with cultural and sport events. The most popular cultural events are e.g. the folkloric festival Eurofolk, and the Festival of Carpathian Mountain Culture. Within this region there are many forms of cross-border co-operation: organisations of entrepreneurs come into direct contact; teachers meet regularly during the Pedagogic and Educational Seminar of Carpatica Euroregion; and in secondary schools clubs are being organised through which young people will be able to expand their knowledge about euroregional co-operation; in 1994, the Carpatica Euroregion Universities Association was cre-

ated; and the countries also try to reduce the effort involved in crossing their borders. From 1995, the euroregion is managing its own budget. The majority of receipts originate from money collected from the members of the euroregion. Contributions can be made both in monetary and non-monetary form. In 1995, the euroregional budget was supported by grants from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and from the Institute for East-West Studies resources.

One of the more serious problems that the euroregion has to face is the varying levels of development of each member country, due to the different speed and extent of political system transformation. Often, resolutions made at the regional level are inefficient, so the decisions would need to be taken by central authorities. This raises a serious barrier for cross-border co-operation. Other problems with euroregion activity are the results of differences in levels of infrastructural development, i.e., roads, railways, border crossings and telecommunication. Fundamental differences in customs, foreign currency exchange and tax regulations may pose a problem as well. However, it is important to stress that despite the inconveniences that cross-border co-operation within the euroregion struggles with, there are still attempts to tighten the co-operation.

Euroregion „Prutul Superior" or „Prutul de Sus"

The „Prutul Superior" euroregion was created to comprise the border districts of Romania, Moldavia and Ukraine (Figure 2). This region is chiefly mountainous and homogeneous with respect to the landscape. In the western part, the land raises above 1,000 m above mean sea level (AMSL), in the central part 500–700 m, while in the eastern part it reaches about 300 m AMSL. The euroregion is also connected hydrographically. It includes two districts of each country. On the Romanian side the euroregion embraces judets Botoşani and Suceava. On the Moldavian side the districts are called Bălti and Edinet, and the Ukrainian side comprises Ivano-Frankivsk, including fifteen regions, and Cernăuti, including ten regions. The creation of the euroregion was preceded by a longer period of extensive negotiations and co-operation between Romania and Ukraine. The initial talks regarding the creation of the euroregion took place on 2 June, 1997. The following days, 3-4 June 1997, the cross-border co-operation was extended by the signing of two documents in Izmail, in the Odessa region of Ukraine: the „Declaration of Presidents of Romania, Moldavia, Ukraine Foreseeing Cross-border Co-operation" and the „Report on Cross-border Co-operation of the Romanian, Moldavian and Ukrainian Governments". The Prutul Superior euroregion was formed in two stages: it was created on 22 September, 2000, in judet Botoşani, Romania. Initially the euroregion consisted of two judets on the Romanian side, two districts on the Moldavian side, and one oblat, Cernăuti, on the Ukraine side. During the second phase, on 12 De-

cember, 2002, the euroregion was extended to also include Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine (Ilieş, 2004).

Fig. 2. Euroregion „Prutul Superior"



Source: Self study

The most important authority of the Prutul Superior euroregion is the Council of the Euroregion. Its duty is to conduct and coordinate the activities of the euroregion. The Secretariat of the Council forms its executive authority. In addition, the operation of the euroregional structures are supervised by four commissions, appointed to define and organise the work of the euroregion, and these tasks are then implemented by groups of experts, and various action groups.

The following larger towns form the industrial and cultural centres of the euroregion: Botoşani (115,344 citizens), Suceava (106,138), Dorohoi (31,073), Fălticeni (29,899), Rădăuti (27,759) and Câmpulung Moldovenesc (20,153). Smaller towns are: Vatra Dornei (16,465) Gura Humorului (15,837), Dărăbani (11,867), Siret (9,371), Săveni (8,177), and Solca (4,462). In this euroregion there are 158 communes and 735 villages. Basic statistical data on the euroregion are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Basic statistic dates in the euroregion „Prutul Superior" in 2004

Regions	Surface [km^2]	Proportial participation the area in the euroregion	Number of population in 2004	Proportial participation in the euroregion	Density of population	The capitol of the euroregion Number of population
ROMANIAN SIDE						
Botoșani	4 986	11,6	454 023	10,7	91,1	Botoșani 115 344
Suceava	8 553	20,0	690 941	16,3	80,8	Suceava 106 138
Total	13 541	31,6	1 144 964	27,0	84,5	x
Romanian participation	5,7%	x	5,3%	x	x	x
MOLDAVIAN SIDE						
Bălți	4 081	9,5	500 900	11,8	122,7	Bălți 176 500
Edinet	3 187	7,4	279 100	6,6	87,6	Edinet 18 300
Total	7 268	16,9	780 000	18,4	107,3	x
Moldavian participation	21,5%	x	18,5%	x	x	x
UKRAINIAN SIDE						
Cernăuți	8 100	18,9	923 900	21,8	114,1	Cernăuți 227 000
Iwano-Frankowsk	13 900	32,4	1 380 000	32,6	99,3	Iwano Frankowsk 203 600
Total	22 000	51,3	2 309 900	54,5	107,9	x
Ukrainian participation	3,6%	x	4,8%	x	x	x
Total	**42 809**	**100**	**4 234 864**	**100**	**x**	**x**

Source: Self study

A major communication route – road E85 connecting the Baltic Sea with the Black Sea – runs through the territory of the euroregion, while the only air-

port within this region is Suceava airport. Along the Romanian–Ukrainian border there are seven border crossings, the Romanian-Moldavian border has two, and there are five along the Ukrainian-Moldavian border. To summarise, the Prutul Superior euroregion is a region of cross-border co-operation between three countries at different levels of economic development. In 2007, Romania is likely to become a part of the European Union, 0and thus the Romanian borders will become the external borders of the EU. Hence, it is vital for Romania to establish and maintain international relationships with its neighbors countries.

Euroregion „Dunărea de Jos"

The territory of the Dunărea de Jos (Lower Danube) euroregion incorporates the border areas of three countries: the north-western part of Romania, the southern part of Moldavia, and the south-western part of Ukraine. The existence as well as the activities of this euroregion is strongly influenced by the presence of the Danube delta and its Black Sea estuary. The territory of the euroregion is presented in Figure 3.

Fig. 3. Euroregion „Dunărea de Jos"



Source: Self study

The first efforts towards the creation of the euroregion were taken in Romania in 1997. Furthermore, on 3–4 July, 1997, in Izmail, Ukraine, a meeting took place between representatives from the countries of Romania, Moldavia, and Ukraine, during which the „Declaration of Cross-border Co-operation" was signed. The decision to create the „Dunărea de Jos" euroregion was finally

taken on 22 February, 1998, during the Izmail conference, when the „Declaration of Cross-border Co-operation" was signed by the concerned regions of Romania, Moldavia and Ukraine. On the Romanian side, three judets are included in the euroregion: Galati, Braila and Tulcea. On the Moldavian side the euroregion embraces parts of the Cahul district, i.e., the regions of Cahul, Centemir and Vulcăneşti. On the Ukrainian side the euroregion encompasses the Odessa region. Officially, the euroregion came into being on 14 August, 1998, after the „Agreement on the Creation of the 'Dunărea de Jos' euroregion" was signed by representatives of the three member countries, in Galati, Romania. On this day, the Statutes of the Euroregion were accepted. This document contains the regulations, specifies the organisation and the functions of the euroregion (Ilieş, 2004).

The most important authority in the euroregion is the Council of the Euroregion. It is the main authority making decisions on the territory of the three countries being part of the euroregion. The President and Vice President are leading the council, and the presidency lasts for two years. From 18 March, 2003, the headquarter of the council is located in Cahul district of Moldavia. The Centre of Coordination is the authority that supervises projects of all sorts within the euroregion. There are also nine commissions, whose duty it is to organise and coordinate mutual activities.

Table 3 shows that the „Dunărea de Jos" euroregion is characterised by a large discrepancy between the sizes of the areas held by each country. Romania occupies 33.16% of the area of the euroregion, Moldavia 4.56%, and Ukraine 62.27%. The consequence of that inequality is a major difference in the share of the population that each member country holds within the region. Ukrainian citizens make up 63.18% of the entire euroregional population, while Romania reaches 31.94%, but only 4.88% of the inhabitants originate from Moldavia.

If Romania manages to adhere to the EU in 2007, the border between Moldavia and Ukraine, running along the rivers Prut and Danube, will become the external border of the EU. Due to that fact, one of the preconditions of Romanian accession to the EU is to provide better security along this border. This may have a negative impact on the relationships between Romania and its eastern neighbours, and those political borders may also cause economic and social ties to weaken.

Table 3. Basic statistic dates in the euroregion „Dunărea de Jos" in 2004

Regions	Surface [km^2]	Proportial participation the area in the euroregion	Number of population in 2004	Proportial participa-tion in the euroregion	Density of population
ROMANIAN SIDE					
Brăila	4 766	8,91	373 174	9,54	78,30
Galați	4 466	8,35	619 556	15,84	138,70
Tulcea	8 499	15,89	256 492	6,56	30,18
Total	17 131	33,16	1 249 222	31,94	70,45
Romanian participation	7,45%	x	5,76%	x	x
MOLDAVIAN SIDE					
Cahul	2 438	4,56	190 800	4,88	78,26
Moldavian participation	7,2%	x	4,47%	x	x
UKRAINIAN SIDE					
Region Odessa	33 300	62,27	2 469 000	63,18	74,14
Ukrainian participation	5,5 %	x	5,09%	x	x
Total	**53 469**	**100,0**	**3 909 022**	**100,0**	**73,11**

Source: Self study

An important factor influencing the euroregional development is the existence of an as large as possible number of border crossings. In the "Dunărea de Jos" euroregion a big disproportion in border crossing spread between particular countries can be observed: between Romania and Moldavia, there are two crossings (Oancea–Cahul and Galati–Giurgiulești), while along the Romanian–Ukrainian border there are three border crossings (Galati–Reni, Chilia veche–Gilia, and Tulcea–Izmail). The most frequented crossing is Tulcea–Izmail, and in order to remove this bottleneck there are plans to modernise it, as well as to establish a new crossing at Isaccea–Cartal.

Crossing the Romanian–Moldavian and Romanian–Ukrainian border is difficult due to the different railway track gauges: Moldavia and Ukraine, which used to be part of USSR until 1989, have a wider track gauge (1520 mm) than the one used in Western Europe (1435 mm). Hence, when crossing the border, time

consuming and labour intensive work has to be done to adjust the wheel spans. To cut the time required to cross the border, modernisation of railway tracks is required. Another factor influencing the euroregional activity is the numbers of ports and airports present. This euroregion is strategically situated thanks to the Romanian and Ukrainian access to the Black Sea. Apart from the three major airports of the „Dunărea de Jos" euroregion – Odessa, Tulcea, and Mihail Kogalniceanu – there are also nine sea ports and ports along the river Danube: Galati, Brăila, Tulcea, Sulina, Reni, Izmail, Giurgiulesti, Chilia and Chilia veche. The biggest port, and one of international importance, is the sea port in Odessa.

Additionally, the Danube delta is part of the euroregion. This is a swampy wetland, divided by numerous waterways, and within its area there are over 1,200 species of plants. It is also the breeding ground for over 300 species of birds from Europe, Asia and Africa. As a result of its environmental values, the Danube delta was listed as a World Heritage site by UNESCO. To summarise, after 2007 Romania is likely to be member of the European Union, and its borders along rivers Prut and Danube will become the external border of the EU. The fact may have a negative influence on social and economic relations. In order to extend cross-border co-operation within the euroregion, a document was signed on 5 May, 1999, which outlined the implementation of shared river transport routes between the ports of Reni, Ukraine, and Galati, Romania. Furthermore, there exists a mutual plan for environmental protection of the Danube delta, and on 14 December, 2001, connections between Tulcea–Reni and Galati–Reni were established. One of the planned projects is the modernisation of Tulcea–Izmail and Isaccea–Cartal border crossings, and the creation of a free economic zone within the region of Galati – Giurgiuleşti – Reni.

Euroregion „Siret–Prut–Nistru"

The establishment of the „Prutul Superior" and „Dunărea de Jos" euroregions formed the starting point for the creation of cross-border structures between Romania, Moldavia and Ukraine. At the same time as the negotiations on the Romanian accession to the European Union were conducted in 2002, the Romanian–Moldavian euroregion „Siret–Prut–Nistru" was created, and this was a result of an initiative by the Judet Council in Romania, and Moldavia. The first official „Report on Cross-border Co-operation" was published in October 2002 in Iaşi judet. Then, on 4 December, 2002, in the Ungheni district, Moldavia, the document „Statutes of the Functions of the Euroregion" was signed and the Presidents' Council was formed, in which all the administrative units of the euroregion are represented.

The Siret–Prut–Nistru euroregion is a territorial-administrative body, in which the judets „play" the main role. Currently, the co-operation is evolving on the cultural, social and economic levels, based of a uniform political system.

The most fundamental principle during the creation of this euroregion, was the extension of co-operation on the level of local administration, taking into consideration economic, cultural and educational co-operation. The name of the euroregion Siret–Prut–Nistru originates from the rivers flowing through its territory: Seret, Prut, and Dniester. The start of the euroregion can be divided into two phases: first, in October 2002, three judets on the Romanian side (Iaşi, Neamt, and Vaslui) together with three judets on the Moldavian side (Kiszyniow, Ungheni, and Lăpuşna) formed the euroregion. During the second stage, in December 2002, another two judets on the Moldavian side, Orhei and Soroca, were allowed to join.

Fig. 4. Euroregion „Siret-Prut-Nistru"



Source: Self study

Before the Second World War, the territory now partly occupied by the Moldavian side of the Siret–Prut–Nistru euroregion was situated in Romania. In June 1940, Romania was forced cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, fifteen new countries were formed. One of those was Moldavia, which includes Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina with the result that a part of Moldavia is being inhabited by a population of mainly Romanian origin. The border between Romania and Moldavia is the external border of NATO since 2004.

Table 4. Basic statistic dates in the euroregion „Siret-Prut-Nistru" in 2004

Regions	Surface [km^2]	Proportial participation the area in the euroregion	Number of population in 2004	Proportial participation in the euroregion	Density of population	The capitol of the euroregion Number of population
ROMANIAN SIDE						
Iaşi	5 476	17,1	819 044	19,9	149,6	Iaşi 321 580
Neamţ	5 896	18,5	557 084	13,5	94,5	Piatra Neamţ 105 499
Vaslui	5 318	16,6	455 550	11,1	85,7	Vaslui 70 267
Total	16 690	53,8	1 831 678	63,6	.	x
Romanian participation	7,00%	x	8,44%	x	x	x
MOLDAVIAN SIDE						
Kiszyniów	2 780	8,7	382 400	9,3	137,5	Kiszyniów 662 400
Lăpuşna	3 436	10,8	276 300	6,7	80,4	Hânceşti 19 000
Orhei	2 850	8,9	300 400	7,3	105,4	Orhei 37 000
Soroca	3 162	9,9	274 600	6,7	86,8	Soroca 38 900
Ungheni	2 516	7,9	260 300	6,3	103,4	Ungheni 40 000
Total	14 744	46,2	1 494 322	36,4	.	x
Moldavian participation	45,01%	x	53,97%	x	x	x
TOTAL	**31 434**	**100**	**3 326 000**	**100**	**128,5**	
Chisinou	**490**	**1,5**	**779 400**	**19,0**	**1 590,6**	Kiszyniów 662 400

Source: Self study

When looking at the statistical data given in Table 4, we note that the Romanian part occupies 53.8% of the area of the euroregion, whereas 46.2% belongs to Moldavia. Similar ratios are can be euroregion inhabitants. There are 63.6%

citizens of Romania and 36.4% citizens of Moldavia. An important factor affecting these proportions is the location of the Moldavian capital, Kiszyniow, within the euroregion. There are large differences between the numbers of people living in major cities in the various parts of the euroregion: on the Moldavian side, the number of people in the biggest towns is on average 30 000 inhabitants. The only exception is the capital Kiszyniow, which has 662 400 inhabitants. On the Romanian side, the average number of people living in regional capitals is about 150 000. The two most significant cities in euroregion are Kiszyniow and Iaşi. On the Romanian side, 238 administrative units are found (12 towns and 226 communes). However, on the Moldavian side there are 29 towns and 333 communes. Together it makes 41 towns and 558 communes. Kiszyniow and Iaşi are the most densely populated areas of the euroregion, and together they sum up to about a million inhabitants. The average population density is 128.5 persons/km^2. This is value a higher than the European average. The highest population density is being observed in Iaşi, Kiszyniow and Orhei judets, while the lowest values are found in Vaslui and Lăpuşna.

The border between Romania and Moldavia measures 681.3 km, and is defined by the Prut and Danube river. Seventy per cent of this border lies in the Siret–Prut–Nistru euroregion. In this area there are three border crossings: Sculeni–Sculeni, Iaşi-Socola–Ungheni and Abita–Leuşeni. Additionally, within the euroregion there are also two international airports, one in Iaşi and one in Kiszyniow (Figure 4.9). The international airport of Bacău is located in the vicinity of the euroregion. To summarise, the existence of the euroregion has a significant impact on the development of cross-border co-operation. Cultural and economic exchange is taking place within the area of the Siret–Prut–Nistru euroregion. After Romania has entered the EU this balance will be lost, because Moldavia has no possibility of entering the EU during the next few years, but it is difficult to assess how this situation will influence the current co-operation.

The Perspective of the Establishment of New Euroregions

Co-operation within the historical area of Maramureşului started unofficially in1993, and has existed officially since 1997, through the creation of the Carpatica euroregion. Activities promoting the development of cross-border co-operation are supported by the euroregion, hoping that this will lead to cultural and economic exchange. However, the problem is whether cross-border co-operation should be subject to Maramureşului or the Transcarpatia region. There are also a number of different proposals on how to define the euroregion. The first is to create a new region called „Maramureşului", which would cover the historical area of Maramureşului. On the Ukrainian side, the Rahău, Teceu, Hust, Mijghiria would become part of the euroregion, whereas on the Romanian side towns and communities from the Maramureşului Lowlands would participate.

The next proposal suggest that a „Maramureş–Transcarpatia" euroregion should be created, thereby joining the two regions Maramureş District of Romania, and the Ukrainian Transcarpatia. If this euroregion would be established, it would be characterised by a large differences with respect to the size of joined areas, and also the number of people living there. There is also the proposal to form a „Maramureş–Satu Mare–Transcarpatia" euroregion, recommending to connect the Romanian Satu Mare District, Maramureş and Transcarpatia. Joining these three regions would enhance better intra-regional communication, and would also show a more proportional size of connected areas, and the number of people inhabiting them. A common history, as well as very similar environmental conditions due to the geographical location would be the characteristics of this conveniently placed euroregion. The borders between Romania and Ukraine (i.e., the former USSR) were established in 1920 along the river Tisza, dividing the Maramureşului region in two parts. Thirty per cent of the region was part of Romania, while the rest was under Soviet control. In 2001, there were 1,254,600 people living in the regions of Transcarpatia and the historical region of Maramureşului, Ukraine (32,100 Romanians, 1 010 100 Ukrainians and 151 500 Hungarians). The Romanian minority is concentrated mainly to towns like Apşitei, Apşa de Jos and Apşa de Mijloc. On the other side of the Tisza river, within the Romanian part of historical Maramureşului region, there is a population of 36,653 Ukrainians. Towns, such as, Poienile de sub Munte, Ruscova, Repedea, Bistra, and Valea Viseului are inhabited by Ukrainians. People of Ukrainian, Romanian, Hungarian origin live in Slatina, Biserica Albă and Sighetu Mamatei, located in the valley of the Tisza river. There are two railway border crossings: Câmpulung la Tisa–Teresva and Valea Vişeului–Dilove, and one road passage via a bridge connecting the two towns Sighetu Marmatiei and Slatina. The construction of a combined road and railway bridge connecting the towns Sighetu Marmatiei and Biserica Albă is financed through EU funds. In summary, the region is inhabited by people of Ukrainian, Romanian and Hungarian origin. This makes it possible to create a new euroregion, because thanks to this fact cross-border co-operation would develop faster and more efficiently. The main problems of region are the limited number of border crossings, and poor communication in general. A decision on the creation of a new euroregion would have a positive impact on this situation (Ilieş, 2004).

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Streszczenie

WSPÓŁPRACA TRANSGRANICZNA POMIĘDZY REPUBLIKĄ RUMUNII, UKRAINĄ I MOŁDAWIĄ

Współpraca transgraniczna jest jednym z najważniejszych procesów integracji europejskiej. Celem pracy jest szczegółowa charakterystyka wybranych euroregionów na pograniczu Rumunii oraz ukazanie potrzeby tworzenia nowych obszarów transgranicznych, co sprzyja procesom integracji europejskiej. Dodatkowo istnienie euroregionów daje szansę rozwoju gospodarczego obszarom przygranicznym, ze względu na konieczność rozbudowy infrastruktury granicznej, rozwój współpracy transgranicznej oraz zmniejsza negatywne skutki istnienia samej granicy. Rumunia granicząca z pięcioma państwami, ze względu na swoją historię, strukturę ludności i położenie geopolityczne stanowi wyjątkowy obszar dla rozwoju współpracy przygranicznej. Do jej najważniejszych osiągnięć po 1990 r. należy utworzenie dziesięciu euroregionów, z których leżące na pograniczu z Ukrainą i Mołdawią stwarzają nowe możliwości rozwoju współpracy pomiędzy Unią Europejską, po przystąpieniu do niej Rumunii, a państwami powstałymi po rozpadzie dawnego Związku Radzieckiego.

COOPERATION BETWEEN SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS ON THE MARKET IN THE CARPATHIAN EUROREGION

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Preface

Smal and medium-sized enterprises (sme)- according to the new micro classification, small and medium- sized enterprises are the significant economic sector, that has immense influence on economic growth and level of staffing in the region – generate large part of gdp and provide for their residents living. There are different kinds of enterprises among them, from those dealing with simple and less technically advanced activities, to innovating enterprises using the latest achievements of science and requiring highly skilled workers.

The enterprise units taking the opportunity that market economy gives them, run a business and fill a gap on the market by their activity. Newly created enterprises are a result of many related factors. Among others one can indicate needs coming from the market, financial possibilities of the owners and ability to act in new economical conditions.

The aim of this article is to describe the sme sector in the podkarpackie voivodship and some forms of its cooperation with other participants in the carpathian euroregion.

Entrepreneurs representing the sme sector repeatedly take into consideration the possibility of action on the market in the conditions provided by the integration of poland with the european union. Although this situation is a difficult challenge – competition, high standards – it also brings new possibilities, e.g. Technology transfer, co-operation, capital raising and new sales markets. Certainly not all enterprises are capable of adapting to this new situation but the success is in the ability to change, flexibility and resourcefulness[1].

[1] *Polish economy competitiveness in European Union membership* red. P. Bożyka, The High School of Economy and Information", Warsaw 2004, s. 121.

1. MSE Sector in south-eastern of Poland

The situation of the sme sector in the economy of every european union member country draws attention of not only economists but also politicians as it's influence on creating new workplaces, innovation, economical growth or the process of rising the level of life for residents is widely known[2].

It is necessary to reject the myth of smes being the basic power of economic growth in the region. Such situation doesn't take place in any country due to the fact that continuous technical and technological innovations are the effect of activity of huge enterprises that have the most modern laboratories and employ famous specialists in each scientific area. Only small group smes (ca. 10%) can take up this challenge mostly by cooperating with large concerns. This is not to question the significance of smes for the economy, but they are not responsible for technical or economical progress[3].

Small and medium sized enterprises play an important role often forming an environment for larger ones. Their activity enhances the image of the region that encourages potential invetors. The development of smes causes economic and social differences to level[4].

Each region has special conditionings that make or stop the social and economic progress and also the sme progress of development. These special conditionings mentioned above are: economical, infrastructural and institutional conditionings that undergo constant changes but the dynamics of these changes depends on the social, economic situation in the particular province.[5]

The podkarpackie region – like the most west side border areas – are characterized by low index of industry level, low wealth of its residents and low population density.

It is noticed that this indices are among the lowest in poland but the activity of small businessmen is directed to local market, village and agriculture needs.

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[2] H. Mizgalska *Innovation activity of small and middle sized enterprises in process of integration with European Union,* AE in Poznań, Poznań 2003, s. 9.

[3] *Polish economy competitiveness in European Union membership* red. P. Bożyka, The High School of Economy and Information", Warsaw 2004, s. 115.

[4] R. Marks-Bielska, *Develop enterprise conditionings in rural areas* [in] „Enterprise conditionings" PWSZ in Tarnobrzeg, Tarnobrzeg 2004, s. 2004 [as per:] R. Kisiel, R. Białobrzeska *Small and middle sized enterprises sector in Poland* [as per:] „Enterprises functioning in the market economy. Chosen problems". Publishing house of the High School of Economy and Information in Olsztyn, 2003, s. 26-33.

[5] R. Marks-Bielska, *Develop enterprise conditionings in rural areas* s. 156, [as per:] M. Grzybek, *Development enterprise destimulant in podkarpackie agrobusiness* [in: „Regional economy development conditionings in agriculture and rural areas", red. A. Czudca, Publishing House in Resovia University, 2003, t. 2, s. 175-182.

At the end of 2005 the regon register has 139 thous. Transactors from the podkarpackie region (excluding farmers) that is 10,8% more than in 1999 and they were the part of 3,9% all registered economic entities.

The most of economic units are in the private sector.

There was over 133,5 thous. Economic entities in 2004 which was 95,7% in general of registered units in province[6].

Fig. 1. (The unit of national economic At the end of year)



(Source) http://www.stat.gov.pl

In comparison with 1999 the number of private sector has increased 13,8 thous. That is 11,8% but the private sector gathered 6,0 thus. Economic entities that is 1,8 thous. (44,3% more than in 1999).

This diagram is dominated by the private sector that at the end of 2005 gathered 95,6 % of all economic entities[7].

It was registered 108, 4 thus enterprises conducting individual economic activity at the end of 2005 in REGON register for the podkarpackie voivodship[8].

The SME participation in selling products and goods in the whole province economy has increased but the increase was still under the national average of the last years.

It is caused by the structure of existing economy enterprises in domain where the advantage has small family businesses with low level of selling,

[6] http://www.gus.gov.pl
[7] www.stat.gov.pl/urzedy/rzesz
[8] There .

competition and innovations. It has negative influence on SME share in global export of goods and services. It is necessary to emphasize the largest - near 50% - income share from selling in province that came from enterprises employing not more than 49 people[9].

The SME conducting business activity on Carpathian Euroregion area has still unused growing potential; the SME share in selling net income is less than its share in total number of employed that mean less efficiency.

Serious complication for small and medium sized enterprises developing from south east of Poland is lack of satisfactory nominal value.

As a result it is necessary to point out:[10]

- the high cost of credit for this group of enterprises due to the risk of bankruptcy
- problems with guarantee of bank credit, especially for people who start to contribute the business activity

SME are elastic in active, making surrounding for huge enterprises, are favorable for economical development of the region so that they are called as" the salt of the economy".

From the point of view the level of employment and unemployment restrictions have the beneficial property but making new work positions require less capital than that is in huge enterprises.

There is a need to underline that in connection with the low dynamic of employment increasing in SME analyzing sector is not able to take over surplus of work forces from restructuring enterprises, agriculture and other sectors of economy (the National Health Service, Education) of Podkarpackie region.

2. The Organizations and projects operating for economy development

2.1. The Small Project Fund of Carpathian Euroregion (chosen projects)

„The strategy of developing the Podkarpackie voivodship in years 2000-2006" as a way of local government policy supporting evolution processes in this region indicating the euroregional cooperation as a important element for economy evolution in voivodship and due this fact improving the standard of life for each resident in that region.

Developing potentials of the polish side of Carpathian Euroregion are used by organizations supported regional development.

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[9] „The strategy of Podkarpackie Voivodship development in 2007-2020" *(Project)* The Podkarpackie Voivodship management, Rzeszów, April 2006, s.25.

[10] „The strategy of Podkarpackie Voivodship development in 2007-2020" *(Project)* The Podkarpackie Voivodship management, Rzeszów, April 2006 s.25.

The Small Projects Fund of Carpathian Euroregion was the second program – after CREDO program-in European Union supporting transborder cooperation on Carpathian Euroregion area[11].

According to assumption the aim of the found is to support small projects made by f.e. transborder SME in sphere like economy and tourism development.

Nowadays the programs made by polish side of Carpathian Euroregion has the significant role for region develop but their implementation and results are treated as important element for Podkarpacie develop.

The executor of the project „Cooperation between krośnienskie district and Borysławski area" is Starost District in Krosno – which in 1999 decided to make collaboration with Borysławski area that was initiated by Municipal Office in Krosno.

This collaboration was based on the Project that was realized in two stages[12].

The foundation of that meetings was starting the local administration, economy, promotional and spa collaboration.

The executor of the next project titled „Promotion of Podkarpackie and Carphatian Euroregion tourists product" was The Regional Development Agencpy „Karpaty" SA in Krosno. Its main target was to simplify polish and foreign tourists offices and individual clients the get access for tourist offer of transborder areas from Carpathian Euroregion[13].

The implementation of this project is very important because the tourism in the euroregion is not developed although all value that region has can give evidence prove about different things.

Because of the fact that Bieszczady are not the frequently visited region by the tourists this part of economy is very serious problem for region developing.

The Regional Development Agency „Karpaty" SA must have persuaded regional journalists and people involved in tourism to make partnership collaboration toward easy flow of information.

We can safely assume that this project was infusion for tourism in the region that show the information influence what has the desired effect in 2003 when Bieszczady was visited by so many tourist like any time before[14].

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[11] There.

[12] Data from The Small Project Fund in PHARE Program structure „Cross - Border Collaboration in *1999-2000*.

[13] Materials from Regional Development Agency „Carpathy" P.C. in Krosno

[14] There.

2.2. The Carpathian Fund

The Carpathian Fund is a private, unprofitable organization that deal with the good neighborhood relationships, social stabilization and stimulating economical development in Carpathian Euroregion.

According to the status the organizations take the action to stimulate the economic and social develop in euroregion[15].

The Carpathian Fund courage to collaboration and facilitate collaboration as:[16]

- organizer - unite public and private institutions interests and physical persons from the region
- adviser - help the local governments and non - governmental organizations to establish and keep the mutual partnership in order to improve situation the member of micro community
- originator - point out and informing about new method of regional and social development
- benefactor- support local and regional initiatives to raise the standard of life in Carpathian Euroregion

Moreover the Fund financing projects and other activities that support cross- border co-operation for SME.

Besides the financial help the Fund is organizing training and economic expertise's for special group of businessmen to improve their activity in the region.

The Carpathian Fund is going to improve the efficiency of getting grants and establish new communication as a cross –border collaboration[17].

The Carpathian Fund realizing the economy development mission by:[18]

- The Cross - Border Collaboration Program
- The Local Initiative Program

In 2003 The Carpathian Fund and Lwowskie Center of Business Support (CWB) decided to animate the euroregion economy by establishing economic collaboration between enterprises neighboring countries.

In April 2003 The CWB was the host of polish – Ukrainian economy mission in Lwów.

The goal of the polish side was to prepare the list of enterprises that are interested in cooperation but the CWB had to find Ukrainian enterprises wanted to collaborate with Poland[19].

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[15] www.carpathianfoundation.org
[16] There.
[17] www.carapthionfoudation.org
[18] There.
[19] Data from Starost Powiat in Sanoku.

The surveys findings tells[20], that only small part of SME cooperates with Ukraine (17%) – this situation regard to middle – sized enterprises but small enterprise units didn't have make any cooperation with Ukrainian[21] partners.

The important master are negotiations with Ukrainian businessmen without the share of Carpathian Found[22].

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[20] Own analyzing in chosen small and middle sized enterprises in Podkarpackie Voivodship in term V-VII 2004

[21] Based on the own reaserch

[22] Based on the own reaserch

Streszczenie

WSPÓŁPRACA MSP Z INNYMI UCZESTNIKAMI RYNKU W RAMACH EUROREGIONU KARPACKIEGO

Małe i średnie przedsiębiorstwa (MSP) - zgodnie z nową klasyfikacją mikro, małe i średnie przedsiębiorstwa - to jeden z wiodących sektorów gospodarki, w dużym stopniu wpływający na wzrost gospodarczy oraz poziom zatrudnienia w regionie - wytwarzają znaczną część PKB i zapewniają byt jego mieszkańcom.

Wśród nich są różnorodne rodzaje przedsiębiorstw, od zajmujących się bardzo prostymi i mało zaawansowanymi technicznie czynnościami, do przedsiębiorstw innowacyjnych, korzystających z najnowszych osiągnięć nauki i oraz potrzebujących wysoko wykwalifikowanych pracowników.

Podmioty gospodarcze, korzystając z szansy jaką stwarza gospodarka rynkowa, podejmują działalność gospodarczą przyczyniając się tym samym do wypełniania luk rynkowych.

Nowo powstające przedsiębiorstwa są wynikiem wielu czynników silnie ze sobą powiązanych. Można tu wskazać na potrzeby wynikające z rynku, możliwości finansowych właścicieli oraz umiejętności działania w nowych warunkach gospodarczych.

Treść niniejszego artykułu ma na celu prezentację wybranych form współpracy MSP z innymi uczestnikami rynku w ramach Euroregionu Karpackiego.

Wielokrotnie bowiem właściciele przedsiębiorstw reprezentujących sektor MSP zadają sobie pytanie czy są w stanie działać na rynku w warunkach integracji Polski z Unią Europejską.

Taka sytuacja stanowi bowiem trudne wyzwanie - konkurencja, wyższe standardy, ale niesie również ze sobą nowe możliwości np. transferu technologii, kooperacji, pozyskania kapitału oraz nowych rynków zbytu. Z pewnością nie wszystkie przedsiębiorstwa są w stanie dostosować się do nowej sytuacji, ale ich sukces tkwi w zdolności do zmian, elastyczności oraz pomysłowości itp.[23]

[23] *Konkurencyjność gospodarki polskiej w warunkach członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej,* pod red. P. Bożyka, Wyższa Szkoła Ekonomiczno-Informatyczna, Warszawa 2004, s. 121.

PART II

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IN THE FACE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESSES

RELATIONSHIPS OF UKRAINE AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE STATES: POLITICAL SCIENTISTS VISION

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Present Ukraine is one of the youngest European states. Alongside with other former Soviet republics it began forming its foreign and domestic policy, which was in its turn influenced by the same internal and external factors. Correlation and interaction of these factors is able to promote or slow down the development of public relations as well as its advancement or failures at the international arena. It is worth mentioning that the search for scientific argumentation of different points of view on the ways of the internal society development foreign policy orientation has been lasted since proclamation of Ukraine's independence.

Before specifying the essence of the topic under discussion I would like to express a few own interpretations of the Ukrainian society needs and hopes after the USSR disintegration, and what was going on the squares of towns and cities of Ukraine during the Orange revolution, and what are the present-day realities. Generally speaking we are eager to gain fast and immediate success. But it does not work properly. In other words, society demands are ahead of its possibilities. It also looks like the same at the international arena. Till now or at least till the Presidential election of 2004 Ukraine had not specified the directories of its foreign policy and its place both in Europe and the world. Ukraine's foreign partners behaved the same way.

On the whole, 2004 marked the end of certain stage of the post-communist states development. They achieved their goals after revolutions of the late 1980s - the EU and NATO membership. Ukraine also made a certain step to rethinking its priorities the vagueness of which in a previous period stood on the way of the national interests' protection. For Ukraine past was the time of the lost possibilities. At the same time this the time of working out the outcomes and starting point of hopes for the positive use of obtained experience. We must generalize our vision of achievements and mistakes in the relationships of Ukraine with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-2004.

The Ukrainian foreign policy began to obtain a special value for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) after establishing *Vyshe-Grady* union and especially after the revival of its contacts with NATO in 1993. The end of 1993 was also marked by a turn in Russia's policy. President Boris Yeltsyn declared the possibilities of protecting the former socialist countries of Europe and, that Russia would be against expansion of NATO eastward. That's why the *Vyshe-Grady* union members had obstacles on the way to NATO, because the West that period, as a rule, took into account Russian position and was inclined to receive Russia's '*YES*' to NATO expansion.

In that situation Ukraine, as most serious analysts thought, would play more important role in establishing European security system. Its more active position concerning big powers and *Vyshe-Grady* group countries in theory was able to accelerate development of the proper processes. However during the first years of independence the situation developed to the extent, that Ukraine was spoken at official level about a real threat of international isolation before 1993. It seemed that establishing of maximal number of embassies abroad had been a major purpose of the Ukrainian foreign policy. Euphoria in Ukraine, like euphoria of 1989 in Eastern Europe, delayed, resulting in the inconsistent actions, hasty decisions, inconsiderate break of old connections which were perceived as «inheritance of difficult past». Foreign-policy strategy had not been developed; the objectives and priorities of the Ukrainian state had not been defined.

The only positive outcome of the mentioned period in the relationships of Ukraine and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) had become the signing of agreements on the principles of neighborliness and cooperation.

The analysis of agreements of Ukraine with the countries of CEE gives grounds to speak about their characteristic features. Agreements with the countries of South-East Europe were signed later; bilateral collaboration was strictly subordinated to the principles of international organizations, such as the UNO and OSCE. Agreements with Hungary and Poland were more detailed; their comparative description enabled to notice the starting point of truly new Ukrainian policy.

One should pay attention to several articles in the agreement with Hungary, signed in December 1991. Firstly, both sides declared «their will to choose means of ensuring security». It's also necessary to take into account that the agreement was signed immediately after the statement of three members of Vyshe-Grady group about their desire to enter NATO; thus, the Ukrainian side showed that time it wouldn't hinder their membership in the Alliance. The parties even declared their mutual assistance in case of aggression of the third party. Secondly, it was stressed in the agreement, that the «Hungarian Republic supports aspiration of Ukraine to become a competent participant of the OSCE process and other structures, and also would promote

it». There is no similar formulation in any other agreement. Finally, special attention was paid to the problem of ethnic minorities which must use «mutual protection and for its providing must be created all necessary conditions». It seemed the Hungarian side took the lead in introduction of this position into the agreement, and was seriously concerned of fate of the Hungarians in other countries (15 million Hungarians live in 6 countries today). The agreement with Ukraine is unique for Hungary. It was highly estimated by the Hungarian politicians, position of the Hungarians of Transcarpathian region was the best comparing with the position of the Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia and Serbia. As for the Polish-Ukrainian contacts, they remarkably accelerated in autumn 1989, when the group of members of Poland parliament took part in the 1st Convention of the People Movement of Ukraine. Since proclamation of Ukraine independence the parliamentary contacts have become traditional.

In October, 1990 our countries signed the declaration on principles and basic directions of the Ukrainian-Polish relations development; in May of 1992 a mutual agreement was signed. However it is impossible not to notice that complicated relations between our peoples, whom had developed for a few centuries, yet influenced situation. It is stressed, that both parties do not have territorial claims to each other, but an actual problem of overcoming of prejudices and negative stereotypes has remained. Creation of the program of support of Poles in Ukraine as well as Ukrainians in Poland, development of their contacts, study of languages, culture and religion of both peoples was foreseen. The role of sub-regional programs was underlined, for example, in ecological collaboration in the districts of common border, in basins of the Bug and San Rivers.

Strategic positions of partners were developed in detail in the agreement, which pointed at special geopolitical importance of Ukraine for Poland's security: «Each party will not allow that the third state did the act of the armed aggression from its territory against its partner». The Polish partners many times expressed anxiety at indefinite status of Ukraine which declared «intention» to become a neutral state in 1991, but this possibility was not realized at diplomatic level. Thus, the proclaimed «neutrality» of Ukraine was not acknowledged by the world community, unlike neutral status of Switzerland or Austria.

In the next 3-4 years of slowing down economic reforms in Ukraine, orientation of Leonid Kravchuk administration on the collaboration with the USA and countries of West Europe, appearance in Polish mass-media anti-Ukrainian materials had shortened possibilities of bilateral cooperation of our countries, not speaking of Ukraine's membership in Vyshe-Grady group. However for a past decade there had been accumulated certain positive experience of collaboration between Ukraine and countries of CEE within the framework of regional and sub-regional organizations: 1) in creation of the Carpathian European region which objective was to revive mountain ecosystem of Carpathians; 2) within the

framework of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and its institutions; 3) in preparation of the integration program of Trans-Danube states; 4) within the «Partnership for Peace» Program, participation in which became one of major foreign policy steps of Ukraine.

Signing the Agreement on partnership and cooperation between Ukraine and the EU on June 14, 1994 that foresaw creation of the General Committee of «Three» of the European Union and Ukraine became another considerable event. However, according to the Ukrainian analysts, this variant of agreement greatly differed from the similar agreements between the EU and the countries of CEE, being more «facilitated».

Besides, Ukraine since 1992 has taken part in the UN peacekeeping operations in Angola, Transdniester Region and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Today we can add Macedonia, Croatia and Kosovo. About 12,000 Ukrainian troops visited the «hot spots» of the world; qualification of Ukraine Air Force was highly estimated by the partners. However participation in economic sanctions against Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia «cost» Ukraine at least $2 billion, and a question about economic or political value of such actions remains problematic.

According to Boris Tarasiuk, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, our country is in a situation when relations of Ukraine with West Europe and the USA are considerably broader than with the neighbouring countries. But it did not improve geopolitical conditions in any way. Ukraine could offer very little to the West concerning economic cooperation, and on the other hand, which is not less important, our country was not considered as civilization close partner, comparing with the Baltic States. The Russian factor still remained problematic in the 1990s; the West continued to take into account a special personal interest of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, therefore the behavior of the USA and Western Europe in a region was extremely careful. Neither in 1995 nor in 1996 radical changes of the West attitude toward our country was not observed, although Russia had already begun to pursue more active policy in Europe, while from the territory of Ukraine on June, 1, 1996 the last nuclear weapons were taken out. Nuclear-free status opened a new page in the history of Ukraine. The analysts considered Ukraine's foreign policy possibilities to be multiplied in theory. But were they properly used?

In summer of 1996 the administration of Kuchma – Udovenko presented its new foreign policy program (the previous was adopted in 1993). An attempt to line up the priority directions of the Ukrainian foreign policy was done for the first time. They were: 1) the EU, 2) NATO, 3) Western Europe Union, 4) Central and Eastern Europe, especially Poland, 5) Black Sea Economic Cooperation, where Bulgaria appeared to be a chief partner of Ukraine.

For the next several years certain success was gained in realization of this program. Ukraine became a full-fledged member of the Central European Initiative in 1996; in 1997 the Charter on Special Partnership with NATO

was signed; in 1996 the Charter of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization was adopted and, thus, its structuring as an international organization had been completed. However, when Ukraine applied to become the associated member of the EU, in October of 1998 our country received the answer that the EU was ready for cooperation, but was not ready to include Ukraine into the list of candidate states and in December, 1999 a document «Strategy of the EU concerning Ukraine» was adopted, which read, that the EU did not consider Ukraine a «strategic partner». The influential Ukrainian politicians even at the beginning of the 21st century asserted that Kyiv considered the EU, Russia and the USA its strategic partners at the same time. It was called a «multivector» principle of foreign policy. In reality adding vectors with opposite direction always gave a zero result.

To understand sources of the Ukrainian policy dilemmas better in the late 20th – early 21st centuries, it is necessary to analyze internal scientific thought of that time. Ukraine's foreign policy concepts can be easily divided into three directions. Serhiy Shergin, specifying characteristic to Ukrainian mentality «Hamletism», formulated the main problem as following: «Who to be with – the East or the West?». Comparison with inclined Danish prince prompts that hesitation and fight of reasons delayed and time to make decision has already come, and then to act. Ukrainian foreign policy opinion of the 1990s, giving the proper arguments, offered any answer to that question: 1) with the West, 2) with the East, 3) both with the West and with the East. One of the most representative discussions with a topic «Ukraine in the geopolitical interior in late 20th century» took place in May, 1994 in the Kyiv International Club «Political idea». Yuriy Pavlenko (Institute of World Economy and International Relations of National Academy of Science of Ukraine) accented attention on the fight in Ukrainian public consciousness of «post-Byzantine» and «European» ways. He called a hope for wide support of Ukraine by the West «naive and unavailing», as well as stake „on integration into economic and military and political system of Europe". Countries of Central and Eastern Europe in economic, cultural and strategic senses («sanitary frontier») are considered friends by the West, but Ukraine does not have any chance to be treated like that. That is why he came to the following conclusions: 1) it is impossible to consider the CIS as a temporary group; 2) it is impossible to break bilateral connections with the former Soviet republics to avoid Russia's domination in the CIS; 3) the fate of Ukraine will be connected with the Eastern-Christian and Eurasian space in the next 100 years. In the future the terms „Byzantine" and „European" ways will be used to determine basic directions of the Ukrainian political science.

Former Yu. Pavlenko's colleague Volodymyr Sidenko could also say he didn't see alternatives to the eastern direction of the Ukrainian policy. Ukraine, dependent on Russia, was gradually stopped being the subject of world policy,

especially after the loss of nuclear status. The author concluded that the passivity of the Ukrainian elite multiplied gloomy prospects of the Ukrainian state system development.

However in general the «Byzantines» offered no broad program, they limited to criticism of the existed state of affairs. In addition, they did not take into account the peculiarities of the Ukrainian state that connects two cultures: the western and eastern Ukrainian ones, which presence was not only the basis of many domestic problems, but could also play an important role in solution of all foreign policy tasks. A lot of authors, for example, Olexandr Dergachov (Kyiv Mohyla Academy) just declared so-called „mutually complemented" orientation to Russia, and the West. But the variant, when a conflict could break between two directions, was not examined. Volodymyr Brus (Ukrainian Institute of International Relations) considered that avoiding this danger is possible only due to creation of the European structure of collective security with participation of all interested parties, including Russia. Naming good-neighborhood relationships with Russia as priorities for Ukraine, he called to leave open doors to NATO.

S. Shergin (Institute of International Relations of Kyiv University) underlined that having European mentality Ukrainians will not be able in the nearest future to enter the EU through the «Asian» socio-economic order. Consequently, Ukraine has to use the Eurasian economic model and develop Eurasian contacts.

However, the group of the Ukrainian historians and political scientists most numerous in the 1990s was sure of vital necessity for existence of our state more active work in movement westward.

In the discussion mentioned above in 1994 Markiyan Bilyns'kyy (Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy) presented the similar concept: «Ukraine must confidently go the road that leads to unity with the West, but not with the rachitic CIS». Unlike political scientists – «Byzantines» or «moderate», he interpreted the concept of the West extraordinarily widely. Japan for Ukraine was the same «West», as in this context only a general model of development was important Ukraine has to be oriented on. According to M.Bilyns'kyy this model includes two basic characteristics: democracy and market. It's worth mentioning, that his predictions were vague and pessimistic. Especially, not arguing the position, he predicted the threat to fate of the Ukrainian people from the hostile external force, however, not directly specified.

The representatives of the Ukrainian Center for Research of International Security Problems Leonid Bilousov and Olexandr Levchenko can be considered as «Europeans». In 1994 they offered a concrete program of foreign policy strategy for Ukraine, which was based on creation of a new regional structure of the European security that did not include Russia. The so-called „principle of three" was fixed in basis of project: Security Council of Central

Europe is to be created; it includes 3 regions (the Baltic States – Poland – Belarus, Poland – Belarus, Czech Republic – Slovakia – Hungary – Ukraine, Ukraine – Hungary – Moldova – Romania – Bulgaria). According to the project the Security Council of Central Europe is subordinated to the OSCE and the OSCE should become a regional structure of the UNO. NATO becomes unnecessary and passes troops to new structures. Although next events did prove unreality of such reforms, the idea was rather symptomatic (one of the numerous variants of creation of «Europe for the Europeans» without Russia and the USA).

More representative group of „Europeans" was presented in the 1990s at the National Institute of Strategic Research. Three interdependent assertions in the work by Serhiy Pyrozhkov and Volodymyr Chumak provoked a special interest: 1) expansion of NATO to the east did not contradict strategic interests of Ukraine; 2) Ukraine had a right to expect a special treat from NATO; 3) the countries of CEE must support Ukraine, as they were interested in its political weight growth.

S. Pyrozhkov and O. Kramarevs'kyy in their later article stressed again on the importance of independent Ukraine to be a «natural shield from imperial ambitions of the Russian Federation» for Central Europe. Political scientists called Ukrainian politicians to formulate their own position which would meet national interests. In their opinion, Ukraine must become a competent participant of creation of the European security structure. For this purpose a mighty and stable strategic partner is necessary; there is no such partner today, but tomorrow NATO can become it. It was agreed, however, that Ukraine will enter only the political structures of NATO, and then all interested parties will be satisfied.

Soon O. Kramarevs'kyy offered a certain revision of this program; a road to NATO can put Ukraine «between hammer and anvil», if it will find itself on the border of spheres of influence of both NATO and Russia. At that case it unavoidably becomes the object of international relations. It appeared that a function of «bridge» between the East and the West goes with real national interests of Ukraine, in this status it will help to settle their contradictions and will not try to play on them.

However such evolution of looks from radicalism to moderation is rather an exception. In Ukraine existed and still exists a numerous and very active group of politicians and political scientists who continues to defend the point of view, that foreign policy interests of Ukraine and Russia are incompatible and contradict each other. The Association of Young Political Scientists of Ukraine can be an example. R. Pavlenko in his editorial called the policy of the Russian elite cynical, because Russia includes Ukraine in the «area of special interests»; so the Russian Federation considers our state a younger brother. In author's opinion, Ukraine must extend contacts with NATO, «then Eastern

Europe takes our country a serious partner, and Russia will become more complaisant in a dialog with NATO».

B. Parakhnovs'kyy (National Institute of the Ukrainian-Russian Relations) criticizes both positions of Moscow in relation to Ukraine and short-sighted West which does not understand: without Ukraine their chances to form a «powerful European space» will be considerably fewer. As for the USA which has always supported Ukraine's aspiration to integration with the EU, the author says, that the USA «has historic and moral right to behave that way».

V. Tkachenko and V. Kremin' declared: «The Russian ruling elite for legitimating of the actions in the eyes of lumpen population connects liberal-democratic actions with an appeal to traditional (pre-communist) identity, to the revival of Russian imperial traditions and values... In such terms nothing but drifting toward dissociation from the Russian cultural tradition remains to Ukrainian establishment». In other words, by such actions Russia pushes Ukraine to NATO. The authors realize that Ukrainian problems do not bother the West very much, just the USA secured the victory in «cold war». However, they consider Ukraine must be more active striving for NATO to enter it in 2005-2010.

The study of the Ukrainian political science works, to our opinion, demonstrates that the absence of logical pattern understanding of choosing strategic partner is its basic conceptual shortcomings. It also mentioned in V. Lytvyn's work devoted to foreign policy of Ukraine for a past decade. The EU, Russia and the USA are called Ukraine's strategic partners.

V. Kyrychenko considers the USA, France, Germany, Great Britain, Poland, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, China, Japan, India, Nigeria, Egypt, Canada, Brazil, Mexico and Russia strategic partners of Ukraine. Explaining his position the author notes: «As for the priority partner, Ukraine can choose the partner depending on the political situation and tactical considerations».

We consider we can't abuse the concepts of strategic partnership; it is based on common national interests of the partners. Thus, it seems the big powers with their global ambitions can not be strategic partners of Ukraine. Our partners are and will be in the future our neighbours in Eastern, Central and South-East Europe, new and potential members of the EU.

Ukraine must line up its priorities more clearly. For example, CES (Common Economic Space) can exist as a regional structure, but there is no need for Ukraine to take part in creation of the customs union and introduction of single currency, that would contradict a proclaimed long ago goal to join the EU. The European Union is the main trade partner of Ukraine today; it is the same reality, as our dependence on the energy supply from the Russian Federation. Consequently, Ukraine should use the experience of CEE countries to solve this problem?

Concepts of Ukraine's presence in the CEE countries to certain extent were different since the beginning, that is, from the moment of coming to power the first noncommunist governments. In Czech Republic the relations with independent Ukraine most subordinated to the western orientation. The Czech political elite planned cooperation within international organizations, mainly „Partnership for Peace", which had been a successful example of compromise between the East and the West in 1990s rather than on the bilateral terms.

The Hungarian point of view was based on three major foundations: 1) fears of the Soviet Union revival led to the necessity of support independent Ukraine at any cost; 2) Ukraine was considered as an ally concerning interests of ethnic minorities; 3) Ukraine could be Hungary's ally in integration to Europe. In the 1990s Hungary tried to involve Ukraine as a mediator into Germany and Russia rapprochement. It was explained by peculiarities of geostrategic position of Hungary and Ukraine, their lack of political initiative, and non-nuclear status. The situation has changed when Hungary joined NATO; this fact narrowed the possibilities of political cooperation of our countries. In addition, in Hungary the opponents of Ukraine and Russia rapprochement were traditionally strong, and according to Pala Dunay, «economically weak Ukraine revives the prospect of credible complete consolidation with Russia».

The Polish concepts of relationships with Ukraine in 1990s were the most detailed. And it is not coincidence: if in Ukraine Poland was considered as main partner among the former socialist countries of Europe, the Ambassador of Poland to Ukraine Jerzy Bar could note with a good reason: «Poland at once «staked» on independent Ukraine. We are interested in strengthening the biggest in Europe after Russia state which we know perfectly well». Estimating the prospects of bilateral collaboration, Jerzy Bar asserted: «It must be more than neighborliness. It must be an element of the European security structure».

The above-mentioned point of view reflects those looks of Polish society, which are called „pro-European" and liberal. These views in political life of the 1990s were supported by such organizations, as Democratic Unia, Mutual Understanding Centre, Liberal and Democratic Congress. When their representatives were at power, they offered Ukraine a detailed program of both bi- and multilateral military collaboration within the framework of «Partnership for Peace» Program.

«Anti-Europeans» and conservatives in Poland also supported independent Ukraine. Their main idea, a Leshek Mochulsky idea of «between two seas» concept, foresees maximal rapprochement of former socialist countries of Europe, not to be swallowed by the West or Russia.

Of course, these two most influential political flows did not exhaust the entire spectrum of opinions on Ukraine. There is a traditional direction that defends the «special» interests of Poland in relation to Ukraine, up to territorial claims. But the articles published in press by «Kresuviaky», «amateurs

of L'viv» and others could make much harm to development of bilateral relations, comparing with uncertainty of the Ukrainian policy stability.

Many voices in Poland in 1990s warned about inability of the CEE countries to provide their security themselves. One of such works belongs to the political scientist F. Golembsky who examined the situation where the region became a boundary again, a barrier between the West and the East. To move away the border eastward at Ukraine's expense meant, thus, to strengthen the security of Poland. However, long-term prospects, in Golembsky opinion, were not bright. But the dream of Eastern Europe about return in the bosom of the western civilization threatens them by the «loss of identity»: Central and Eastern Europe would cease its existence as a centre of cultural and civilization values.

The similar reasoning rare enough in the 1990s began to sound more frequent after Poland entering the EU in 2004. Celebration was over and hard working days began. Regardless of all contradictions of interests of Poland with the «old» members of the EU, which mostly related to the economic problems, in modern Poland there is a consensus both in relation to the European way and necessity to continue expansion of the EU eastward. Poland officially declared about its willingness to pursue the EU policy to the east, President A. Kwasnievski declared a «new eastern policy of Rzech Pospolita»; first of all lobbying a problem of Ukrainian interests regarding entering the EU. This policy is continued by Lech Kachinski, present President of Poland.

Thus, the opinions of the Eastern Europe specialists confirm that contemporary problems of bilateral relations can not be solved separately from the global problems of changing the system of international relations, establishing of a new power centre – the EU, and the CEE countries are a part of it, and hopefully Ukraine would join it too.

But successful solution of foreign policy tasks in the first turn depends on successful motion of internal reforms, both economic and political, as well as conceptual. Only after substantial changes in all these branches Ukraine can bid for a role of a really independent actor in modern system of international relations, which is characterized by greater interdependence of domestic policy and foreign.

The vagueness of basic Ukrainian political features has bothered the CEE countries for the recent 15 years of country. Most Eastern Europe research workers were inclined to consider Ukraine as a country, which made choice not in favor of western type reforms. While discussions how to join the EU went on in the CEE countries, the foundations of society based on «kleptocrathy» were established in Ukraine. First of all «due to» the former Ukraine's elite, our country lost a few major years, while CEE took the plunge to comprehensive modernization, acquired the features of the indissoluble part of the European civilization.

What does Ukraine lack most? Our country lacks understanding itself and where its future is. Time will show whether Ukraine has lost possibility to change the modern state of affairs or not. Obviously, present efficiency of foreign policy depends on creation of democratic principles in the Ukrainian society, achievement of greater stability and foresight. Our new government declared the Euro-Atlantic course to be the greatest priority and its ultimate goal.

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Streszczenie

STOSUNKI UKRAINY Z PAŃSTWAMI EUROPY ŚRODKOWO-WSCHODNIEJ W UJĘCIU POLITOLOGÓW

W artykule podjęto próbę zbadania procesów formowania się stosunków niepodległej Ukrainy z sąsiednimi państwami byłego obozu socjalistycznego, jako bazy wyjściowej na drodze poszukiwania własnego stanowiska w Europie i świecie.

Autor przeprowadził analizę opinii naukowców Ukrainy i innych państw, w zakresie podjętej problematyki, formułowanych w dyskusji toczącej się od lat 90-tych ubiegłego wieku do czasów współczesnych.

MODERN UKRAINIAN-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

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Last decades, which were characterized by swift and cardinal transformations in the modern world resulted in creating totally new geopolitical map, changed domestic and foreign-policy orientations of a number of countries, values and ideals system. Contradictions which by years were appeased and eventually aggravated, in different times the new vision and estimation of the past emerged. As a come out of the mentioned processes today we have completely new situation which utmost differs from that in the early 90's. And this situation requires, accordingly, new approaches to realization including our foreign policy interests. It should be mentioned, that the Ukrainian-Bulgarian relations are not the exception.

Ukraine and Bulgaria are traditional partners, taking into account their having in common the Black sea, the greatest Bulgarian minority, dwelling in Ukraine, Cyrillic alphabet given by the brothers Cyril and Mathew, etc., It is properly reflected on bilateral dialogue development between them nowadays.

We excessively pleased to state, that throughout recent years these relations certify a proof tendency to contacts expansion both on high and expert levels, commodity turnover growth, increase of direct connections between regions and enterprises.

At present a new contractual-legal basis has been established which facilitates expanding bilateral collaboration in all industries. At the same time a tier of new documents are at the stage of signing.

2004 was abundant in bilateral top-summits - in February V. Lytvyn the Chairman of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine paid an official visit to Bulgaria, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine K. Hryschenko visited Bulgaria in April, and in May the Prime-Minister of Bulgaria S. Saksko-Burggotskyi visited Ukraine. 2005 was not less intensive and hectic. It started with January visit of delegation of the Republic Bulgaria to Ukraine. The delegation was headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria S.Pasi. The purpose of their visit was their participation in the ceremony of Ukraine President's Inauguration. At the end of January within the framework of 60th – anniversary celebrating of liberation of fascist concentration camp „Auschwitz Birk-

enau" in Polish **Oświęcim** there was held the summit of the Presidents of Ukraine and Bulgaria V.Yuschenko and G. Pyrvanov, during which they agreed about the visit of Ukrainian country's leader to Bulgaria, the date will be appointed later.

The Vice-President of Bulgaria A.Maryn visited Ukraine thrice throughout the last year. Moreover, in December 2005; he presented Bulgaria on Forum of democratic choice association in Kiev. Within the framework of 60th session of GA UNO in September last year the Chairman of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine V.Lytvyn met the Chairman of Public Assembly of Bulgaria G.Pyrynskyi and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine B.Tarasyuk held the meeting with the Vice-Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria I.Kalfin.

On November, 29-30 the Vice-Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria I.Kalfin paid an official visit to Ukraine. This event can be regarded as the crucial moment in last years' bilateral political contacts. The intergovernmental Memorandum on partnership and collaboration on European and Euro Atlantic integration issues, signed during this visit became an important step on the way to the Ukrainian-Bulgarian relations development in the new terms of membership of Bulgaria in NATO and approaching to its entry in EU. Bulgaria's willingness is clearly fixed in the Memorandum and testifies to its ample support of the European choice and Ukraine aspiration to membership in NATO and in European Union became an important political sign appealing to Kyiv from Sofia's side.

In December 2005 new perspectives for the collaboration in the security sphere were drafted after Ukraine's totally authorized membership in the Council of Ministers of Defense of the South-East Europe. Bulgaria has ardently supported Ukraine. Co-operation between Ukraine and Bulgaria is still ongoing within the framework of Black Sea Force. Both states participate dynamically in the row of peacemaking operations both in the region of SEE and in other hot spots of planet. Since January, 29, 2005 amendments and changes concerning Agreement between Ukraine and Bulgaria came to power. They presuppose mutual journeys of citizens including liberalization of the visa mode allowing the Ukrainians and Bulgarians getting frequent visas for 5-year term on the basis of mutuality; abolition of invitations for the receipt of visas; minimization of tariffs for delivery of tourist and business visas; simplification of procedure of receipt of visas for people, transporting commodities and passengers. Visa mode with Ukraine is the most liberal from those, existing between Bulgaria and the countries of CIS.

At the same time Ukraine believes that in future this mode will be liberalized in the context of present negotiations between Ukraine and EU concerning this question. Kiev expects Bulgaria- after its totally authorized membership in the EU to stand for simplification, and later for abolitions of the

visa mode between Ukraine and European Union at all. Virtually free contacts are not only the necessity, but one of key pre-conditions of economic collaboration development, cultural ties extending and strengthening of international connections.

In 2005 Honored Consulate of Ukraine was established in Burgos. No doubt, it will favorably influence on the development of our bilateral relations. Consular office of Ukraine and Ukrainian-Bulgarian center of business at Pleven were advancing their activities.

Trade, tourism, culture, information are the very walks of life, in which development of co-operation is the real index of progressive achievement in political relations between the states, signed agreements and declarations. It should be noted, this development must concern both central and regional levels, involving a greater audience and constantly extending it. In this context the previous year can be definitely considered as successful one.

In 2005 the increase of mutual trade volumes of goods and services took place between Ukraine and Republic of Bulgaria. For 9 months general commodity turnover made more than $470 mln, it is 5% more than for the similar period last year. The volumes of the Ukrainian export exceeded $370 mln. The import from Bulgaria to Ukraine attained almost $80 mln. As well as before, the top place in the Ukrainian export to Bulgaria belonged to the products of metallurgical, mining, machine-building industries.

In June 2005 the exhibition of the Bulgarian commodity producers named „Bulgaria is again in Ukraine" took place in Kyiv. The exhibition proved to be an efficient instrument of assistance to establish direct connections between the enterprises. Later in March the agreement on collaboration between cities Mykolaiv and Pleven was signed. The establishing and restoring of sister-cities relations between other Ukrainian and Bulgarian cities is still going on.

The collaboration was dynamically developing. Education and science are the components of modern society, which make its basis. Under the conditions of globalization and accelerating rates of development of informative society the proper level of education, science can be attributed to strategic directions of providing of national security. Consequently, the state is unable to be full member, meeting all modern requirements of international community.

The important source of development of science and education is taking into consideration existing international experience, exchange of the experience, mutual assistance and promotion. Ukraine and Bulgaria have potential for development of such collaboration. Agreements made during the last year on collaboration between Kyiv State Trade and Economic University and Sofia University of National and World Economy, between National Academy of State Tax Administration of Ukraine and Varnen Free University „Chornoryzets Khrabr" (VU), between Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University and Neophyte Ryl'skyi South-West University in Blagoevgrad, between the

Dragomanov Kiev National Pedagogical University and K. Okhrydskyi Sofia University will facilitate its development. Relations between the Balkan Center Business „University" and the Bulgarian Academy of Inform Sociology and a tier of leading establishments of similar direction, in particular Institute of Cybernetics of NAS of Ukraine are established.

Subsequent development of scientific collaboration and realization of general scientific projects is perspective in such important spheres, as physics of semiconductors, astronomy, research of the Black Sea, information technologies. Some research projects are presently being carried out and internship of specialists is being carried out on bilateral basis. On the background of priority attention to the political dimension of bilateral relations and trade, economic, scientific and technical collaboration the humanitarian aspect of the Ukrainian-Bulgarian mutual relations is an important component.

Our two nations, being of Slavonic background, have rich cultural traditions, each of which deserves being known in other state. The Ukrainian and Bulgarian cultures have inexhaustible originality, cognizing which we have a great opportunity to enrich each other and to discover familiar, but at the same time in a great deal unknown world. In the modern terms of pragmatism prevailing, culture, its development, getting to know cultural heritage is an integral part of maintenance of spiritual constituent of human life. No wonder that from this point of view attention is paid to humanitarian direction in bilateral Ukrainian-Bulgarian relations.

During the last year there were quite a bit measures which allowed to Bulgarian public nearer familiarizing with the modern Ukrainian art. The exhibition of pictures of the Ukrainian artist of the Bulgarian origin O. Kara took place. The Vinnytsa band „Vinnytcanka" took part in a folk-lore festival in Burgos, Lesia Ukrainka Ukrainian Drama Theater – in a theatrical festival „Autumn Theatrical Meetings" at Pazardzhyk. Within the framework of the International Film Festival of „Euro Film Fest" the week of Ukrainian cinema with participation of the known Ukrainian producer Yu. Illenko was held in Sofia. This year the direction of bilateral relations was preserved in a spotlight and in February the exhibition of pictures of the well-known Ukrainian artist A.Tartakovskyi took place in Sofia and in Sofia Philharmonic Society concert with participation of the Ukrainian bandleader M. Dyadyura took place.

In 2005 we commemorated 110th anniversary of the prominent Ukrainian thinker, research worker, writer M. Dragomanov's death, last years lives of which were related to Sofia, where he was buried. On occasion of this date collection of the articles in Bulgarian by M. Dragomanov is published. In March, 2006, 145 years pass since the day of death of great T. Shevchenko, the name of which is associated with literary Ukrainian language establishing. His name is of the same value for Ukrainians as well as the name of I. Basov

for Bulgarians. Within the framework of these dates commemorating by the Embassy jointly with the branch of the Ukrainian Studies of Klyment Okhrydskyi Sofia University and the periodical "Ukrainian-Bulgarian News" organized contest on the best work about T. Shevchenko.

For Ukrainian culture promotion and spiritual heritage at Embassy of Ukraine in Republic of Bulgaria the Ukrainian club was founded in March, 2005. His doors are opened for those, who Ukraine, its culture, art, modern life, interests. To more wide informing of population of Bulgaria about political economic and cultural life of Ukraine, and also in relation to consular questions promotes set on adjoining to Diplomatic Corps territory informative stand.

In December, 13, 2006 Ukraine and Bulgaria will mark the 15th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations, and this, naturally, forces to be thoughtful both above the results of development of our collaboration for this period and above subsequent guidelines in development of our mutual relations.

This date falls on rather crucial year for both nation-states. For Ukraine it was the year of parliamentary elections which later became another indispensable link in the initiated reforms proceeding after the presidential elections in 2004. This year we will celebrate the 15th anniversary of our state's Independence. The Independence gained by the thorny way of fratricidal wars, great efforts to win freedom, Stalin's genocide and holodomor (great famine), not losing faith that we are descendants of Large Kyiv Russ, Saint Volodymyr and Yaroslav the Wise – are sure to be free.

This year we will remember painful dates of our history – in April 20 years pass since the day of a nuclear disaster in Chornobyl. This event came into the history of civilization as a distressing and tragic landmark of scientific and technical progress in the 20th century Humanity has never known such technological and ecological disaster before. Ukraine became the epicenter of nuclear disaster. Disaster consequences eliminating forced state bodies to involve considerable human forces and financial aid. However, a tier of issues related to it and presently remains extraordinarily wide; help of international community is required for their solution. For Bulgaria this year will turn key one from the point of view of acquisition of EU full-fledged member. Alongside with the entry in NATO this step will define subsequent development of country for a long period of time.

In 2006 the visit of Ukraine President V.Yuschenko is expected to Bulgaria, as well as his participation in the summit of countries' leaders of Central and East Europe, held in Bulgaria at the end of spring. In April of Ukraine Minister's of Foreign Affairs arrival is planned to Bulgaria for participation in the summit of Commission Ukraine - NATO within the framework of the summit of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Alliance member-states in Sofia.

These and other bilateral and multilateral measures must provide subsequent development of the Ukrainian-Bulgarian dialogue in accordance with the modern requirements and taking into account the changes and prospects opened for deepening of bilateral relations.

The same foreign-policy guiding lines, such as European and Euro Atlantic integration, common democratic values shared by Ukraine and Bulgaria, as well as traditional partners' mutual relations, create grounds for that, celebrating the 15th anniversary of their friendly relations our countries, countries reached new, yet higher level of bilateral collaboration. No doubt, awareness of that in present terms will promote Ukrainian-Bulgarian partnership enriching not only our two states but also will be considered as an achievement of the Black Sea region and South-East Europe. The extent, to which these favorable pre-conditions will be used, depends only on us.

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Streszczenie

WSPÓŁCZESNE STOSUNKI UKRAIŃSKO-BUŁGARSKIE

Autor podjął się trudu przeprowadzenia analizy stosunków ukraińsko-bułgarskich od czasu powstania niepodległej Ukrainy, po rozpadnięciu się ZSRR, po rok 2006.

W artykule omówiono zarówno stosunki ogólnopolityczne, jak również w konkretnych dziedzinach, takich jak handel, turystyka, kultura, informacja, czyli w tych sferach wzajemnych kontaktów, w których rozwój współpracy jest realnym wskaźnikiem oceny funkcjonowania stosunków międzynarodowych.

EUROPEAN VECTOR IN SOCIAL POLICY IN UKRAINE

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The willingness of Ukrainian citizens to live in European way has first of all social reasons. We aspire to join the European Union mainly to achieve higher standards of living. But in practice our overviews about main social signs of real europeizm are still quite blurred. In Ukraine a status of social factors in integration models that are used by different political forces of the country and a place of these factors in key directions and mechanisms of cooperation with EU are not defined on professional level. It concerns poverty problem to a great extent. To achieve the European level of welfare we should first achieve the European level of poverty. The reality of eurointegration is that social gap divides nations firmly then any „iron curtain" or Berlin wall.

In the process of state-constructive process it is always quite difficult to realize a common truth that wealthy people are the same all over the world, and civilization difference between countries and states is defined by comparison of main poverty characteristics. One cannot forget that though EU is an international community with traditionally deep understanding of social equity, this understanding stands first of all on perception of own national interests. And the main idea of EU enlargement to the East is not a dissemination of noble European model, but a pragmatic realization of huge perspectives of development of domestic market and overall resource potential, that is a comprehension of a need for substantial raise of competitiveness of European region in circumstances of sharp global competition. Consequently, a true europeizm is not altruism and sacrifice but a deliberate and purposeful harmonization of robust national egoism and heightened civil social responsibility.

Noticeable positive results in fight against poverty are not attained yet in Ukraine. The relationship between aggregate expenditures of 10% of the richest and the poorest citizens is about 7.1 and still growing. And with consideration of grey economy the level of this differentiation is even higher. The experience of social policy of last years is evidence that it is impossible to change the situation radically by means of current mechanisms of social policy. Ukrainian scientists S. Sjomin and V.Ostrouhov has noticed that starting from

2000 the tendencies in standards of living and poverty didn't change notwithstanding to expectations concerned with positive shifts in the economy. On the contrary, poverty is still rising by 1-1.5% per year. Experts say that 27.8% of Ukrainians are poor and 14.2% are poverty-stricken today. Mainly they live in big industrial cities regional centers. It is striking but about 78% of poor families have one working person [1].

Apparently, it is necessary to strictly define whether our genuine goal a formal membership or a real European maturity at the beginning of every qualitatively new stage in realization of eurointegration strategy.

Sincere belief in right European choice not always guarantees adequacy of perception of the meaning of this idea. Sociality of integration is mainly treated as the open access to EU pocket because of considerable spending on regional policy in the expenditure pattern of aggregate EU budget. But it is not correctly even from the economical point of view as such a vision didn't take into consideration neither modern approaches to formation of this budget, nor new problems of enlargement phase, nor difficult dialectics of forces in EU and perspective impact of Ukraine on these processes.

Main social advantage of integration to EU is thought, for example, an expected joining to Charter of Main Social Rights of Employees that stipulates for right of free job placement, adequate wage and guarantees of social security improvement of living standards, health protection and industrial safety. But specialists should understand that: first, The Charter is applied only to employees; second, it cannot solve all possible sharp social problems of inevitable deep restructuring of key sectors of Ukrainian economy in the period of direct adaptation to harsh environment of rivalry at internal European market; and the third, The Charter is quite declaratory as it is not obligatory.

The fact of being a member of EU doesn't solve existing in these countries social problems. Hope on that means to postpone their solving at indefinite time, and to mislead the citizens. Especially since there inevitably will be adaptation difficulties that now are unknown for people. Accordingly to „Copenhagen criteria" EU doesn't take upon itself direct social responsibilities but limits itself to general strict requirements that concern to: stability of institutions that guarantee democracy, leadership of law, assurance of human rights, respect and protection of minorities' rights (political criteria); existence of active market (I.K. – but not socially oriented) economy and possibility to stand the pressure of competition and market forces within EU (economical criteria); possibility to take upon oneself responsibilities driven by EU membership, including recognition of goals of political, economical and currency unions (so called „membership criteria").

A vice-president of Parliament of Greece Republic K. Vrettos, being an honour guest in Ukraine at Parliament hearings in 2002, had reminded that assurance of human rights, social justice, liquidation of terrorism, freedom

of speech, elimination of tension and preservation of environment are among common principles that are inviolable and belong to collective European consciousness [2]. It means that for a normal European citizen a notion of „social justice" is among other traditional symbols of Europe for a long time.

It is impossible to achieve firm and at the same time social stability that exists at principles of freedom without social partnership. But in current era a real social partnership cannot be built exclusively on national parvis. Even more, the hope for European parvis is vain. It is known that international solidarity of work people ceases just after „working people of other nations" appear at national labor market. Violent discussions about „social dumping" start immediately. Not taking this into account means that in theory a democratic capitalism is a unique last possibility to built communism in one particular family.

A rich world always tends to absolute freedom, not taking into consideration extraeconomic managerial decisions. In adverse, a poor world gladly inclines to use extraeconomic levers to escape from humiliating economic unfreedom. That is why a political management of poverty in conditions of free market was always such a difficult question. Besides, it is obvious that such management is and will be a key factor in formation of middle class. Why, power and consequence of middle class is first of all a real result of nation-wide resistance to expansion of poverty, non-poor population development and constructive changes at the level of national life style.

A German researcher V.Becher, the author of interesting work „The History of Modern Life Style" (1990), pays in particular a special attention to the necessity of investigation of a character of interrelation and interference of categories „life style" and „consumer behavior" [3]. A category of those prosperous Estern European citizens that in stunning jump of their consumer tastes are far ahead of even bulk of „old" European unfortunately doesn't define the grand total of multiaspect international comparisons. There is even a notion of „emphatic consumption" in pan-European scientific discussion of these questions. It is meant that acquiring of very expensive goods can serve not only to satisfaction of needs, but turn to an element of prestige and public reputation for representative of certain social group. It becomes really noticeable in those cases when an economically active person cannot totally reach a real "higher caste" of market postcommunizm in his or her overall complex of social-economic features. A fixation of public opinion on maximization of welfare and accumulation of consumer goods simultaneously with refusal of main spiritual demands is thought by many researches as one of consequences of such deformation of value guiding line. This is quite spread model of public legitimating of new economic elite for postsoviet society.

Should a collective moral face of permanent market revolution in conditions of progressive desocialisation wander us a lot? Especially when the most competent prophets of freedom and democracy convince of the social justice is

a dangerous illusion. As, for example, F.Hayek explains: „As long as the trust in „social justice" will govern political activity, this process inevitably and more closer will approximate to totalitarian system. In a free society, where positions of different people and groups are not a consequence of any intention, a difference in reward just cannot be soundly characterized as a fair or unfair one"[4].

Although national systems of social guarantees have essential specificity, there is a considerable commonness in understanding of such critical problems as, for example, unemployment, structural economic crisis, consequences of dynamic shifts in general employment conditions and conditions of public functioning of European families. Substantial efforts are applied to increase „social performance" of Europe. European community closely deals with the problem of poverty from the mid 70-th. The first (1975-1980) and the second (1984-1988) programs of poverty control were devoted mainly to poverty definitions and comparative analysis of political measures aimed against it. The priority is the process of poverty analysis was usually given to indicators of income level, although at that time a definition of poverty based on pluralistic wording had obtained the recognition. Persons, families and groups of people were considered as poor if „they have at their disposal so small means of living (financial, cultural and social) that they are excluded from that mode of life, which meets the requirements of a member-country they live in" [3]. But only the third program of poverty control (1989-1994) made it possible to thoroughly consider both many-dimensional character of the poverty and functional deficits of European integration process in the result of definite mitigation of strict budget restrictions.

A scantiness of possibilities of correct empirical investigation of social stratification is still a difficult problem. Impartial European experts and most of executive European politicians are convinced of the fact that common cultural ideas and, in particular, social-political traditions will influence the political course in the scale of the whole continent more and more with EU enlargement. The problems of social differentiation won't yet have a possibility to be solved in the frame of a definite transborder strategy at that. In adverse, they will further be in a close connection with national specific of strategies for increase of welfare of EU members and will mainly depend on common life standards in any country and on possibilities of national systems of social security.

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Streszczenie

KIERUNEK EUROPEJSKI POLITYKI SPOŁECZNEJ UKRAINY

W artykule przeprowadzono wszechstronną analizę podejścia do problemu polityki społecznej na Ukrainie, rozpatrzono treść pojęcia sprawiedliwości społecznej oraz wyznaczono kierunki rozwoju polityki społecznej Ukrainy w kontekście integracji z Europą.

CARTOGRAPHIC MODELS OF UKRAINIAN NATURAL REGIONS' NATURE RESOURCES POTENTIAL PRODUCTIVITY EVALUATION

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Cartographic models of nature resources potential (NRP) of Ukrainian natural (physic-geographical) regions, that are characterized by and proceed from the results of its (NRP) quantitative analysis, were for the first time published in 2001 [1]. NRP economic productivity is calculated as its value per inhabitant (average index is 100 for Ukraine); NRP territorial productivity – its value – per square unit (average index for Ukraine is 100).

Among the important regularities, disclosed in the process of study of the integral NRP economic productivity we can not but note the exceedingly clear strips of lowered values of evaluation indices on the borders of natural countries and zones, and even some provinces. As a rule, the integral NRP economic productivity increases from the periphery to the center (nucleus) of physic-geographical countries and zones, including separate provinces. This territorial peculiarity is vividly expressed on the borderline between East-European plain and the Ukrainian Carpathians, East-European plain and the Crimean mountains, the zone of Mixed forest and Forest-steppe zone, between Forest-steppe and Steppe zones, Dnistrovsko-Dniprovska forest-steppe and Livoberezhno-Dniprovska forest-steppe, Dnistrovsko-Dniprovska northern steppe and Livoberezhno-Dniprovsko-Pryazovska northern steppe provinces.

The following observations prove the fact: the lowered values of the integral NRP economic productivity indices are fixed, in the zone between the Ukrainian Carpathians and the East-European plain, in 9/10 of all physic-geographical regions; between the East-European plain and the Crimean mountains – in ½ of all regions; the zone of Mixed forest and Forest-steppe zone – in 2/3 of the regions; Forest-steppe and Steppe zones – in 3/5 regions, between Dnistrovsko-Dniprovska forest-steppe and Livoberezhno-Dniprovska forest-steppe, Dnistrovsko-Dniprovska northern steppe and Livoberezhno-Dniprovsko-Pryazovska northern steppe provinces – in 3/5 and nearly 9/10 out of all adjoining physic-geographical regions correspondingly. The trend has

proved to be characteristic for almost 70% of regions of stated physic-geographical countries, zones and provinces.

Significant increase of evaluation indices of the integral NRP economic productivity in central parts of physic-geographical regions is especially vivid in the Ukrainian Carpathians, Poliska province, Livoberezhno-Dniprovska forest-steppe, Livoberezhno-Dniprovsko-Pryazovska northern steppe and Prychorno-morsko-Pryazovska dry steppe provinces.

Judging on the whole, mountainous regions – Ukrainian Carpathians and the Crimean mountains – possess significantly bigger territorial productivity of the integral nature resources potential than that of the whole East-European plain. The zone of Mixed forest is, on the contrary, the region of low territorial productivity (density) of the total NRP. The following geographical peculiarities are here clearly expressed:

1. High territorial productivity of the integral NRP in mountainous regions is the result of combined performance of highly efficient, in the first place, water, forest and natural recreational resources. For instance, only 6% out of 36 physic-geographical regions within Ukrainian Carpathians are characterized with NRP productivity below the average NRP productivity; 36% - with the average productivity, and 3/5 (58%) of all these regions possess high NRP productivity (index - over 100). 4/5 of the regions within the Crimean mountains comprise the regions with average NRP productivity. At the same time, nearly 50% of all regions of East-European plain are characterized with low and below the average NRP productivity, whereas only 1/5 of them possess high (over 100) nature resources potential productivity.
2. Beside the Ukrainian Carpathians and the Crimean mountains, we can on the whole clearly outline several more regions of increased NRP territorial productivity: a) West-Ukrainian forest-steppe province (9/10 of all regions are highly- and average-productive); b) Dnistrovsko-Dniprovska forest-steppe province (2/3 of the regions possess high and average productivity); c) Livoberezhno-Dniprovsko-Pryazovska northern steppe, and d) Donetsk northern steppe provinces, where only one (3,6%) out of 28 physic-geographical regions is distinguished for NRP productivity, that is lower than the average, 1/5 of these are characterized with the average productivity, whereas the rest of the regions – ¾ out of 28 regions – possess high productivity (absolute maximum for Ukrainian provinces). The main reason for this is the interaction of powerful land and mineral resources. And, at last,
3. Low territorial NRP density within Poliska province, in particular, in Volynske, Zhytomyrske and Novgorod-Siverske Polissia, as well as in Dnistrovsko-Dniprovska northern steppe and Livoberezhno-Dniprovska forest-steppe provinces. 60 (i.e., ¾) out its 80 physic-geographical regions can be characterized as possessing low and below the average integral NRP productivity. This is in the first place connected with the absence (Pivdenno-

Prydniprovska declivity-hill *oblast* (region) is a small exception) of significant fossil deposits, as well as lower soil fertility (see Figures 1 and 2).

Fig. 1.



Fig. 2.



The following peculiarities can be observed within the most important types of regional nature resources:

When Ukrainian population provision with **mineral resources** in physic-geographical countries is compared, it is clearly vivid that East-European plain 4 times exceeds the Crimean mountains and the Ukrainian Carpathians. Similar

geographical regularity is also characteristic for distribution of mineral potential by the indices of its territorial productivity, though, their contrast between separate regions is even higher. The maximal territorial productivity of mineral potential is observed in Donetsk northern steppe province, whereas minimal – in Prychornomorsko-Pryazovska dry steppe province.

The influence of much more even distribution of population density indices if compared to allocation of fossil deposits results in somewhat smoothened levels of mineral potential economic productivity between separate physic-geographical provinces. This dependence is explained by the fact that appearance of these or those settlements was in the historical aspect connected with assimilation of the whole scope of regional natural resources, this having a continual nature of the development.

Unlike mineral potential, that possesses clearly expressed discrete nature of allocation, cartographic analysis shows that the influence of three basic factors is characteristic for **water resources potential** of Ukrainian physic-geographical regions, the potential being distinguished for its continual indices of distribution of both economic and territorial productivity of water wealth. First, the use of transitional Dnieper flow in southern regions of the state, which are poor in water, is defining. Paradoxically enough, for the first glance, but in this connection exactly the Crimean steppe province, Dry steppe sub-zone and Prychornomorsko-Pryazovska dry steppe province, which suffer the deficit of local water resources, are the Ukrainian leaders in both economic and territorial productivity of water potential.

The influence of high-altitude zoning is the second weighty factor of water potential productivity differentiation. Thus, mountainous systems – the Ukrainian Carpathians and the Crimean mountains – take the first and the fifth places among physic-geographical regions as far as territorial productivity is concerned, and the fourth and the twentieth places correspondingly when population provision with water potential is analyzed (see map schemes).

And, at last, the third powerful factor, that defines the indices of Ukrainian water potential productivity is, undoubtedly, the width zoning. The zone of Mixed forest (Poliska province), West-Ukrainian forest-steppe province, Forest-steppe zone, Mid-Russian forest-steppe and Zadonetsko-Donska forest-steppe provinces are the bright examples. It is to a much greater extent revealed on the level of physic-geographical regions and districts.

Cartographic models of **land potential,** that deal with the analysis of its economic and territorial productivity, disclose the leadership of, first of all, Dnistrovsko-Dniprovska forest-steppe, Livoberezhno-Dniprovska forest-steppe and the Crimean steppe provinces, Forest-steppe zone, Dry steppe sub-zone, Prychornomorsko-Pryazovska dry steppe and Livoberezhno-Dniprovsko-Pryazovska provinces. The lowest indices of land potential return is observed in the Ukrainian Carpathians, Donetsk northern steppe and Poliska provinces, the

zone of Mixed forest, Northern steppe sub-zone, Zadonetsko-Donska northern steppe and Mid-Russian forest-steppe provinces.

Undoubtedly, the present state of land potential development bases in the first place upon the best natural-climatic and economic conditions, which formed for the given type of nature resources in the regions of Forest-steppe. The heightened indices of land potential return in Dry steppe sub-zone and the Crimean steppe province are the effect of systematic irrigation measures.

The analysis of map schemes of **forest potential** economic and territorial productivity evaluation in the aspect of Ukrainian physic-geographical regions affords grounds to state that they have very much in common with those of land potential. Except for such regions as the Ukrainian Carpathians, the Crimean mountains, the zone of Mixed forest (Poliska province), which are the leaders in forest potential return, the following regions come close as far as higher indices of economic and territorial forest potential productivity are concerned: Dnistrovsko-Dniprovska forest-steppe, Livoberezhno-Dniprovska forest-steppe provinces, Forest-steppe zone, West-Ukrainian forest-steppe province and the East-European plain on the whole. Like in the case of land potential, the lower indices of forest potential economic and territorial productivity for Ukrainian physic-geographical regions are characteristic for Prychornomorska mid-steppe, Dnistrovsko-Dniprovska northern steppe and Zadonetsko-Donska northern steppe sub-zones, and Steppe zone.

Cartographic evaluation of Ukrainian **natural recreational potential** is a vivid example of, by the indices of its economic and territorial productivity, the leadership such physic-geographical regions as the Crimean mountains, the Ukrainian Carpathians, the Crimean steppe province, Dry steppe sub-zone, Zadonetsko-Donska northern steppe, Mid-Russian forest-steppe, Prychornomorsko-Pryazovska dry steppe, Livoberezhno-Dniprovsko-Pryazovska dry steppe provinces, and Steppe zone.

This is first of all connected, on the one hand, with much higher richness with recreational objects within these regions, i.e., medicinal mud, mineral water, natural recreational lands, and, on the other hand, with more intensive nature of recreational assimilation of suburban territories, which are located within the zone of the so called „routes of the off day".

To summarize all stated above, we can conclude that Ukrainian natural regions' NRP cartographic evaluation serves as an instrument of scientific analysis of natural productive forces, possessing at the same time an important applied significance.

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Streszczenie

MODELE KARTOGRAFICZNE DLA OCENY WYDAJNOŚCI POTENCJAŁU ZASOBÓW NATURALNYCH UKRAIŃSKICH REGIONÓW PRZYRODNICZYCH

Przedstawiono wyniki oceny kartograficznej wydajności gospodarczej i terytorialnej całości potencjału zasobów naturalnych ukraińskich regionów przyrodniczych. Potencjał obejmuje minerały, wody, ziemie, lasy, faunę i przyrodnicze zasoby rekreacyjne. Przeprowadzono analizę (ocenę), biorąc pod uwagę 274 regiony fizjograficzne, 56 regionów, prowincji, podstref i stref znajdujących się na Ukrainie.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN UKRAINE – CURRENT SITUATION AND LONG-TERM OUTLOOK

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According to the Ukrainian law foreign investment is the inflow of foreign capital with the aim of profit-making or achieving social goals.

Foreign investment can have different forms: foreign currency (if it's one of National Bank of Ukraine's convertible currencies); Ukrainian hryvnya; any movables, real estate or other rights related to them; shares of equity, bonds and other and other rights expressed in convertible currency. FDI in Ukraine can come from foreign legal entities, individuals, foreign countries, international government and non-government organizations.

In 2005 Ukraine attracted USD 7.32 billion in foreign direct investment, over 225% more than in 2004. One of the key factors which contributed to the growth is privatization. Accumulated FDI reached 16,37 billion USD in 2005 (see Chart 1).

The bulk of FDI in Ukraine comes from the members of the European Union which invested until the end of 2005 over 11.7 billion USD, or 72% of all FDI. EU investors first appeared in Ukraine in 1993, however it was not until 2001 that their number started to grow rapidly. The largest share of FDI – 47%, or 5.5 billion USD – came from Germany with companies such as Deutsche Telecom, Kraft Jacobs Suchard, Siemens, Knauff, Henkel Bautechnik and RWE-DEA being the biggest contributors. Corporations from other countries also invested a lot, eg: Austria – 1.43 billion USD, USA – 1.37 billion USD (AT&T, Coca-Cola, ABB, AES Corporation, Best International, Petroleum Corporation etc.), Great Britain – 1.16 billion USD, the Netherlands – 0.72 billion USD (PTT Telecom) and, quite surprisingly, Cyprus – 1.56 billion USD. It is worth mentioning that many multinationals direct their investment through subsidiaries located in different countries (than the headquarters), often in 'tax havens' such as Cyprus or Virgin Islands[1].

Sectors which benefited the most from FDI from the above mentioned countries include metallurgical industry (5.0 billion USD), financial services

[1] Tax havens are often used for money laundering.

(0.73 billion USD), wholesale trade (0.75 billion USD) and food processing (0.61 billion USD).

Fig. 1. FDI in Ukraine in 1994 – 2005 (cumulative in USD bn)



Source of data: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.

Other countries which appear in the ranking of largest investors in Ukraine include Poland (0.22 billion USD), Hungary (0.19 billion USD), Sweden (0.13 billion USD), Denmark (0.13 billion USD), Italy (0.11 billion USD), Slovakia (0.09 billion USD), France (0.08 billion USD), Luxembourg (0.07 billion USD), the Czech Republic (0.04 billion USD), Ireland (0.04 billion USD), Belgium (0.04 billion USD) and Spain (0.04 billion USD).

Among the largest investors from outside the EU are USA (1.37 billion USD), Russia (0.79 billion USD), Virgin Islands (0.68 billion USD) and Switzerland (0.45 billion USD). Chart 2 presents FDI in Ukraine by country of origin.

Russian companies (ie Lukoil, TNK) shows great interest in Ukrainian market, especially in petroleum, gas and chemical sectors. The pro-investment climate results partly from bilateral agreements on cooperation especially in the area of joint ventures. One of them is the construction of Bohorodczany - Uzhorod pipeline, carrying natural gas westwards through Ukraine and Slovakia. All refineries, apart from Haliczyna, have been taken over by Russian companies.

Fig. 2. FDI in Ukraine by country of origin – as of 1 January 2006



Source of data: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.

Moreover, in 2002 Russia's Mobile Telesystems acquired a 57,7% stake of a Ukrainian telecom company UMC (Ukrainian Mobile Systems) from Ukrtelekom (25%), Deutsche Telekom (16,33%) and KPN (16,33%).

The value of Polish companies' direct investment in Ukraine reached 224 million USD in 2005. This accounts for only 1.4% of all FDI in Ukraine which places Poland in 9th position in the ranking of foreign investors. Despite the fast pace of increase in capital invested in Ukraine, Poland still plays a far more significant role as trading partner than the source of investment.

Polish capital is located mainly in industry (58.1%), but also in financial services (25%) and in trade (10.5%). Main industrial destinations of Polish investment are chemical sector (17.8%), metallurgical industry (14.1%) and food-processing industry (3.2%).

Polish financial services sector is represented in Ukraine by Kredyt Bank Ukraina[2], Pekao S.A. Ukraina and Polish-Re (insurance). Investors from other branches include:

- CanPack in Wyzgorod (can manufacturer),

[2] This is Poland's largest single investment in Ukraine and Ukraine's second largest bank with foreign capital in terms of equity. Currently Kredyt Bank Ukraina is owned by PKO BP .

- Bella in Jaworow (bandage manufacturer),
- Forte in Donieck (furniture),
- Nowy Styl in Charkov (chair and furniture manufacturer),
- Peri Polska in Kiev (sale and lease of boarding structures),
- VIKO in Lugansk (office furniture).

Main geographical destinations of Polish investment are Kiev, Uzhorod and Kiev and Charkov provinces. Moreover, some 40 Polish companies have invested in Yavoriv Special Economic near Lvov, among others Bella, Cyfral (manufacturer of phone sets), Polfarmex, Terpol (pharmaceuticals), Marbet (interior decoration), Lamella (plastics), Śnieżka-Ukraina, Top 2000, Fakro, Rermobud, Budomex Ukraina, Farma, Perfekt. Polish capital is also abundant in Novovolynsk Economic Area (ie Romet) and Lugansk.

FDI of Ukrainian capital amounted to 218.2 million USD in 2005 (up 19.6 million USD on last year). Main destinations were Russia (102.5 million USD) and Poland (20.3 million USD – acquisitions of Czestochowa Steelworks by Donbas Union and of FSO in Warsaw Avto ZAZ Zaporoże). Other destinations were Panama (18.9 million USD), Vietnam (15.9 million USD), USA, Spain, Great Britain, Hongkong and Austria. Chart 3 presents Ukrainian FDI.

Fig. 3. Ukrainian FDI in 1994-2005 (cumulative in USD mln)



Source of data: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.

One of the obstacles to attracting more foreign capital is lack of sufficient information on Ukrainian regions, enabling proper risk assessment. One of weekly magazines 'Biznes' was the first to assess investment attractiveness of each province in terms of investment potential risk and on the basis of the

most important indicators and ratios as well as expert opinion. This allowed to produce a ranking which is presented in Table 1.

Research showed absolute dominance of Kiev as investment destination in Ukraine. Among other regions to rank high in terms of investment potential were: Zaporizhzhya, Donetsk and Dniepropetrovsk. Provinces with poor results include: Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskiy and Chernivtsi.

Table 1. Investment attractiveness ranking of Ukraine's provinces

Rank	Investment attractiveness	
1	Kyiv city	1 Aa
2	Dnipropetrovsk province	3 Ca
3	Zaporizhzhya province	3 Ca
4	Donetsk province	3 Cb
5	Odessa province	5 Ac
6	Kharkiv province	5 Bc
7	Poltava province	5 Ca
8	Kyiv province	5 Cb
9	Zakarpattya province	6 Ac
10	Mykolayiv province	6 Bb
11	Cherkasy province	6 Bc
12	Chernihiv province	6 Bc
13	Luhansk province	6 Ca
14	Sumy province	6 Cb
15	Autonomus Republic of Crimea	7 Bb
16	Ivano-Frankivsk province	7 Bb
17	Lviv province	7 Bb
18	Kirovograd province	7 Bc
19	Vinnitsya province	7 Ca
20	Khersov province	7 Ca
21	Volyn province	7 Db
22	Zhytomyr province	7 Db
23	Chernivtsi province	8 Bb
24	Khmelnitskiy province	8 Ca
25	Ternopil province	8 Da
26	Rivne province	8 Db

Grading explanation:
1) investment potential evaluation:
1 – largest potential; 10 – no potential
2) risk assessment:
primary grading: A – low, B – medium, C – high, D – very high
secondary grading: a – negative outlook, b – stable, c – positive outlook.

Source: *Ukraina. Przewodnik dla przedsiębiorców*, Wydawnictwo UNIDO ITPO, Warszawa 2005 r.

In terms of risk Kiev was followed by Odessa and Zakarpattya provinces. Grade B provinces include Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the following provinces: Ivano-Frankivsk, Kirovograd, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy and Chernivtsi. Grade C and D provinces are: Volyn, Zhytomyr, Ternopil and Rivne.

The ranking fully reflects current state of affairs. In 2004 Kiev and Kiev province attracted the most FDI (1.85 billion USD and 0.42 billion USD, respectively). Also popular among foreign investors are Donetsk (0.39 billion USD), Dnipropotrovsk (0.36 billion USD) and Zaporizhzhia (0.36 billion USD) followed by Odessa (0.29 billion USD), Lviv (0.22 billion USD), Autonomous Republic of Crimea (0.21 billion USD), Kharkiv (0.16 billion USD), Zakarpattia (0.13 billion USD) and Sumy (0.13 billion USD). The least attractive provinces were: Sevastopol and Chernivtsi.

In EuromoneyMagazine's country investment attractiveness ranking Ukraine took 82nd out of 157 places. Countries from the region which appeared higher in the ranking included the Czech Republic (36th place), Estonia (42), Poland (45), Lithuania (50), Latvia (56), Kazakhstan (61) and Russia (63). Poorer results were achieved by Azerbaijan (100), Moldova (130), Belarus (143) and Georgia (145). The result could be better considering the relative position of Ukraine among former Soviet republics.

Similar conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2005. Ukraine took 107th position with a score of 2.6[3]. Less corrupt countries, according to the Index, are Estonia (27), Lithuania (44), Slovakia (47), Latvia (51), Poland (70), Armenia (88), Moldova (88), Kazakhstan (107) and Belarus (107).

Also, the analysis of Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index 2006 yields interesting results. Ukraine ranked 99th among 157 countries and its economic freedom was declared 'very limited'.

Conclusions

Ukrainian economy is fraught with problems, lack of focus on reforms being the most significant. Other weaknesses include unstable and far-from-transparent law-making, unfavourable investment climate and flagging agriculture.

New Ukrainian authorities who took over power in the wake of the 'Orange Revolution' are aware of the condition Ukrainian economy is in and arouse hope of improvement. They declared war on corruption, smuggling, speak loudly about improving economic environment and promoting fair competition. One of the first actions taken was the reduction in import duties on

[3] Grading: 10 (no corruption) to 1 (highest level of corruption).

industrial and then on agricultural goods. However, Ukrainian government ha failed to develop an effective policy for the attraction of foreign capital. This can, of course, be to some extent remedied by privatization of large state-owned enterprises. Such solution was chosen by Ukrainian authorities which was reflected in a significant increase in FDI in 2005. Still, this seems to be the only tool Ukrainian government uses to attract FDI.

Moreover, investors are discouraged by sluggish economic growth. The years 2000-2004 saw a fast pace of economic growth. GDP increased in 2002 by 4.6%, in 2003 by 9.4% and ii 2004 by 12.1%. However, in 2005 the pace fell rapidly to 2.6%. The CPI rate for 2004 and 2005 was 12.3% and 10.3% respectively and the PPI rate for the same period – 24.1% and 9.5%.

One has to know that main exports of Ukraine are metallurgical products, machinery, foodstuffs and minerals. Ukrainian budget derives ca. 70% of its revenue from the export of raw materials and low processed metallurgical products. Current global economic trends are not favourable for Ukrainian exports with the detriment to domestic production. This does not help attract foreign investment.

Economic experts call for reduction of VAT rate from 20% to at least 17% which would help potential investors (exporters) bring down transaction costs.

Another setback to foreign investment is the liquidation of special economic areas. The main reason for it were fraudulent tax practices[4]. Ukrainian authorities promised to special compensations to the companies which abided by the law, but this only slightly reduced their losses.

In view of the above Ukrainian economy seems to have a lot of potential. However in order to exploit it fully it needs large investment and market-based reform. It could be one of Europe's biggest investment destinations. Time will tell whether this becomes a reality.

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Streszczenie

BEZPOŚREDNIE INWESTYCJE ZAGRANICZNE NA UKRAINIE – STAN OBECNY I PERSPEKTYWY NA PRZYSZŁOŚĆ

Artykuł podejmuje problematykę zagranicznych inwestycji bezpośrednich na Ukrainie, ich stan obecny oraz perspektywy na przyszłość. Ukraina ma szansę stać się jednym z największych rynków inwestycyjnych w Europie, a gospodarka ukraińska posiada duży potencjał. Wymaga jednak przemian rynkowych oraz ogromnych inwestycji. Nowe władze ukraińskie, wyłonione w wyniku „pomarańczowej rewolucji" świadome są słabości gospodarki ukraińskiej i stwarzają nadzieje na zmiany tej sytuacji. Wypowiedziały wojnę korupcji i przemytowi. Zdecydowanie chcą poprawić warunki działania biznesu, równe traktowanie i uczciwą konkurencję. Jednak ukraiński rząd jak do tej pory nie opracował skutecznej polityki przyciągania inwestorów zagranicznych. Czy więc Ukraina wykorzysta swoją szansę pokaże najbliższa przyszłość.

INTERNATIONAL FACTORING IN TRADE EXCHANGE IN A MORE INTEGRATED EUROPE

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Transacting in business with deferred payment is a standard practice in international economies. The absence of such options often results in difficult negotiations with new customers especially in international trade. Factoring as an ideal instrument of modern economies is gaining in popularity in new, absorptive markets, especially in cross-border co-operations through the maintenance or increment of its contribution to the GDP in areas where it is already long-standing.

The global economy together with increasing market competitiveness have led to a situation where entrepreneurs no more compete on price and quality but more commonly it is about deferring payments. Polish exporters have of late been proposing its trading partners prolonged conditions of payments as means of enhancing their market penetration and remaining in such markets for longer periods. These measures are however risk involving for exporters, especially small and medium-scaled companies or those undertaking such transactions for the first time. Granting of mercantile credits involves the need to finance one's own activities from various sources available to the seller, who are often threatened with cash flows that most often influences continuity of business[1]. Moreover the exporter is never sure if the importer will honour the terms of payment having received the supplies or after services have been realized. Factoring has become an efficient instrument for minimizing such inherent risks. It involves buying up a company's un-prescribed debts owed them by customers for goods supplied or services rendered them. In economic terms factoring is a more favorable way of guaranteeing companies finances for current expenditures and also an insurance against unrecoverable debts than bank loans. Basically, it involves a financial institution (assignee) buying up a seller's (factored) short-term commercial debts before the date they are due. (figure 1).

Factoring has several key functions in developed economies:

- Activity Financing Function. Primarily, it entails financing a cycle of reconciled transactions by the assignee. This means that the bank or institution (factor) credits the amount due paying the cost price less the interest, com-

mission, including trade margin being the fee chargeable for other services rendered;

- Administrative (Service) Function. This does occur whenever a factor renders the entrepreneur additional services apart from buying up his debts. More often these are technical services connected with book-keeping, settling non-cash transactions, preparing bank statements of accounts, preparing balance sheets etc. This enhances the reduction of costs as well as increase in profits. The administrative function need not cover servicing company's debts alone but also could result in efficient corporate management both in the aspects of production and sales. Business practices have shown a correlation between management efficiency and effective debt monitoring and settlement;
- The Warranty Function. This involves buying up a company's debts by a factor excluding regress against the debt disposer irrespective of eventual difficulties in recovering debts from debtors. The factor therefore agrees to pay his client assumed debts at a stated time. He however exercises the right of regress whenever the value of assumed debts decreases as a result of justified complaints from customers or of goods returned.

Fig. 1.



Source: Author's presentation.

The primary products offered by assignees include factoring with right to regress (incomplete, unreal), factoring with regress (complete, real), mixed factoring as well as export (international) factoring.

Factoring with right to regress (incomplete, unreal)

Put in historical perspectives, unreal factoring has been in use much earlier than real factoring. Factoring banks and companies were for a long time of the opinion that accepting liability del credere yields far reaching dangers to the economic position of the assignee. Unreal factoring was moreover cheaper since the assignee would charge lower commission in case he does not accept liability with del credere.

Incomplete factoring with regress is the cession of a debt without accepting liability for the debtor's inability to pay the assignee. This risk lies with the factored (seller) who becomes liable for non-payment of the amount due on time. The assignee enjoys the right of regress against the factored in case the debtor fails to settle the debts when due. In such cases the factored shall pay the assignee the whole sum and personally try to redeem the amount due from his debtor.

Factoring companies however try their possible best to minimize risks of non-payment of debts as at when due by continuously monitoring all amounts due.

Incomplete factoring de facto is taking short-term loans by the factored since he must pay back the assignee if payment is not made by his debtor.

Factoring with no regress (complete, real)

With respect to complete factoring parties to the debt transfer agree that the risk for non-payment by the debtor rests on the assignee. He, apart from the financing and service functions also plays the role of del credere. The essence of this is that from the moment of entering into a factoring agreement, the assignee also assumes responsibility for ensuring that the customer pays all receivable debts. This risk had until the commencement of the agreement rested on the seller or service provider. Henceforth this now rest on the factoring institution. Thus the assignee protects the entrepreneur, who sold or delivered certain goods to a customer or delivered given services from non-payment by the debtor.

Real factoring is more expensive than unreal since in calculating his commission the assignee adds costs of risks resulting from liability for del credere. Entering into such agreement as a matter of fact takes place only when the assignee has checked on the debtors assets and he is sure of his solvency.

This form of factoring is beneficial to those transferring debts as the factored company receives money soon after the sales transaction has been reached with a customer and does away with eventual responsibility fro the debtor's insolvency.

Mixed factoring

Mixed factoring is a composition of both complete and incomplete factoring. Such is the situation when the assignee buys up the factored debts without right of regress in case of the debtor's insolvency but only to a given amount. The seller bears any risk of the debtor's insolvency for any amount beyond the agreed. This is spreading the risk on both the factored and the assignee.

Due to the complicated processes of analysis and terms agreement, this type of factoring is rarely practiced.

Exports Factoring

This involves buying up an entrepreneur's receivable debts for exports made, servicing them and making part payments to the tune covered in the agreement.

On receiving a positive opinion of the assignee and signing the relevant contract the exporter on the basis of invoices, customs clearance documents and bill of lading gets financing up to 80% value of the exports.

Export factoring services are offered to companies whose customers are based in developed countries. Factoring companies currently offer services to almost 80 countries world-wide.

Thanks to exports factoring the Polish exporter can before the sales transaction check on his potential customer's solvency thereby eliminating unreliable or insolvent partners and avoid losses. This definitely is helpful to new entrants into international co-operation. Export factoring therefore enables companies find new and reliable foreign customers as well as obtain import guarantees.

Complete export factoring insures against risks of non-payment by importers. The assignee partners in foreign countries become very usual in such situations. The assignee together with its partner in the importer's country run a clearing account, recover the amount due while monitoring the importer. A seller's trading partners are therefore checked on abroad, providing the supplier all necessary information about their financial status and what steps have been taken.

In the case of incomplete factoring receivable debts of foreign debtors are financed including their administration but without accepting risks of the foreign importer's insolvency.

Factoring is applicable both for local and international transactions. Local factoring is applicable only when both the supplier of goods and services and their receivers are based in the same country. If on the other hand the supplier transfers export related debts onto the assignee then we get involved in international factoring. International factoring can be classified into the following:

– Indirect factoring,

- Direct factoring.

Usually two factoring institutions take part in indirect factoring transactions. One of them, the export assignee is based in the exporter's country while the other import assignee is based in the debtor's country.

In case of export direct factoring the factoring institution servicing the transaction is based in the country of the exporter. Export assignees do not always accept direct factoring contracts except they are sufficiently equipped with knowledge of legal provisions prevailing in the importer's country, more so as it affects recovering of debts. Import direct factoring is the most important commonly applied form of international factoring. The exporter in this case transfers his receivables for given foreign transactions directly to assignee based in the importer's country[1].

Benefits accruing to factoring include the following:

- Improvement in flow of circulating capital which is very crucial as the company functions in a sub-sector plagued with high seasonal fluctuations;
- A speedy cash-flow;
- Company's current running costs are smaller;
- A company attains the capacity to prolong payment deadlines without threatening its financial status;
- Possibilities of prolonging payment deadlines lead to increased volume of trade since future receivables are available soon after;
- As a company is able to settle its debts its offers become more attractive to customers thus enhancing its ability to negotiate better contract terms and beat the competition;
- It becomes possible for the company to obtain discounts from its suppliers;
- Regularity of payment by customers is enhanced due to debt controls conducted by the assignee;
- Recurrent replenishing of circulating capital from cash inflows become expendable which offers the company more opportunities to invest in development;
- Since crediting risks are taken on by the assignee, it becomes possible to increase the number of customers;
- Factoring is an opportunity to maintain favourable commercial contacts with customers;
- Export factoring enables company secure new and credible export partners;
- Companies are in position to secure import guarantees;
- The assignee can on behalf of its client undertake additional services such as account settlements, preparing financial statements, monitoring and managing receivables and whenever the need arises undertake debt vindication. In

this way companies take benefit of the assignee's equipment, knowledge and experience;
- Debt management costs are smaller;
- The company maintains direct contacts with only one assignee who handles all of the company's debts from all its customers for which receives a commission;
- Simplified forms of collaterals applicable in factoring enables companies which hitherto would not obtain lending for lack of sufficient collaterals take advantage of such financing;
- Factoring is more flexible than using crediting methods of financing business activities.

Disadvantages of factoring
- Factoring is a more expensive service than crediting but banks, in asking for additional collaterals, limit access to loans. Factoring on the other hand is not dependent on credit availability while companies enjoy additional benefits such as professional management of receivables;
- Hindrances towards signing factoring agreements could be the need to achieve certain level of sales as well as having steady customers;
- There exists the risk of a debtor breaking off from further co-operation with a given supplier realizing that a factoring agreement has been entered into. He may be scared of not meeting payment deadlines for invoices and it may be more difficult renegotiating payment dates with a professional assignee;
- Factoring agreements are often intricate and lacking in detailed legislative regulations applicable to factoring. This is why it is important when choosing an offer to enquire if it is a real or unreal factoring or if it is profiting with respect to costs or collaterals sought by the assignee;
- Assignees, in trying to minimize risks, are not enthusiastic in buying up short-term debts. Instead, they are more willing buying up long-term debts;
- Entering into a factoring agreement demands that debtors be informed;
- Retail customers are usually covered in factoring.

Factoring is a more beneficial way of managing a company's financial resources. It is especially more useful when:
- A company needs quick access to financing
- The company experiences periodic cash deficits due to a customer's non-acceptance of commercial credits
- Customers demand longer payment terms but the company prefers sales in large volumes and quick cash return for goods and services

- A company is initiating co-operation with a new customer without knowing his market position or his ability for timely settlements or if the company has steady customers,
- The company wants to commit its debtors to timely settlement of debts,
- Applications for loans are not granted due to lack of suitable collaterals,
- A company shows irregularity in spacing out its cash needs,
- It is desirous for accurate planning of incomes and expenditures by the company,
- Administrative costs of acquired commercial loans are high.

Only part payment, 70-90% of the amount due less commission and interests, of debts can be made at the beginning depending on the type of agreement. The rest is paid after a full settlement of debts by the customer. The procedure is however faster than when bank loans are granted as the benefactor gets its money within 2-3 days[1].

Factoring cannot be regarded as a loan since a factoring agreement does not result in indebtedness but it is simply the transfer (cession) of confirmed invoices of the seller's receivables to the assignee. The assignee's fee is a percentage collected up front in form of a discount depending on payment terms and sometimes a commission (table 1).

Table 1. Factoring compared with bank loans

FACTORING	BANK LOANS
Procedure for signing factoring agreements is simpler both from the formal view point and preparation time.	The decision by banks to grant a loan involves a formalized long-lasting period of accessing a company's credit worthiness.
Collaterals include commercial debts, in-blanco promissory notes, a letter of attorney to the account.	Material collaterals or civil warranty.
Absence of indebtedness as factoring costs like commission and interests levied on your company are paid by your customer.	The company is saddled with credit costs ie., payment by installment and interests.
It is directed at companies with huge demand for capital.	Designed for companies with strong financial standing.
The company is privileged to decide when to offer debts for purchase and within what period to receive money.	Loan is repayable in installments which involves additional demands for finance.
Factoring improves indices of financial buoyancy shortening the period of debt collection.	It increases liabilities as external financing is higher.
Financing of increasing needs made possible.	Dangers of worsening brought-up capital : loans ratio.

Source: Author's presentation.

Factoring services market started in Poland in mid-nineties when banks introduced factoring as a new service to enhance their offers. Not long after, specialized institutions broke away from the banking structure and had during the years 2001-2004 influenced the overall picture of factoring services in Poland. According to data supplied by The Conference of Factoring Institutions, set up in 2001, 9 financial institutions with good financial standing offered factoring services on the Polish market including: arvato services Poland, Bibby Factors Poland Sp. z o.o., Eurofactor S.A., BZ WBK Faktor Sp. z o.o., Bank Millenium S.A., Handlowy-Heller Sp. z o.o., Pekao Factoring Sp. z o.o., Polfaktor S.A. oraz Raiffeisen Factoring Polska Sp. z o.o. It is worth mentioning that GMAC Commercial Finance Company began services in later years.

Data from The Conference of Factoring Institutions (KIF) show that annual market turnovers are growing at higher than 10% levels[1]. The value of transferred debts accepted by companies belonging to KIF reached 8,033.9 million Zlotys during the first three quarters of 2005. The total for the year 2005 was 14,000 million Zlotys out of which 10,500 million Zlotys were generated by companies under KIF. (Figure 1)

Fig. 1. Turnovers of factoring companies (in bilion zlotys)



* Forecasts of the Polish Society of Factors

The noticeable growing popularity of factoring in Poland is not accidental. In 2005, according to Factors Chain International (FCI) the global market of factoring services announced turnovers of 1,016,547 m Euro. The 18% growth in turnovers was mainly due to activities in new markets. In the following years several new markets opened their doors to factoring, especially in Eastern Europe. Factoring services are currently gaining in popularity in the Ukraine, Egypt, Vietnam and in the UAE. It can be assumed we are witnessing a stable growth of the factoring market. International factoring turnovers make up only a small part of overall factoring turnovers in Poland, for example only

5% of total turnovers in 2003. Most leading factoring institutions operating in the Polish market have international factoring on offer. Its percentage participation in the turnovers of given institution however varies (Figure 2).

Fig. 2. Market participation by Factors I-V 2006



Source: www.polfaktor.pl

The services of factoring companies are most contracted by firms in the grocery, electro-mechanics, textile-clothing, wood / paper, energetic, furniture, building construction as well as hardware sub sector. Small and medium-scaled companies are the main customers of factoring companies the world over since they are most handicapped by cash insufficiency while having little or no chance obtaining bank loans. Factoring yields good results with companies characterized by high seasonality in sales. Accumulation of turnovers within a short period of time but with the possibility of obtaining payments at a later date leads to quick depletion of circulating capital. Such overstretching of the company's financial position can be improved by introducing factoring financed sales.

In summing up it can be said that demand for factoring will without doubt increase in the doming years since the awareness of Polish companies about the accruing benefits is growing. The increasing role of factoring will, to a large extent, hinge on supply levels. The reason being that only few institutions offer factoring services in Poland and to make matters worse their services are not directed at small firms, which apart from medium and large-scaled companies ought to be their potential customers.

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Streszczenie

ROLA FAKTORINGU MIĘDZYNARODOWEGO W WYMIANIE HANDLOWEJ W INTEGRUJĄCEJ SIĘ EUROPIE

Faktoring stanowi ciekawą alternatywę finansowania bieżącej działalności firm w porównaniu do popularnego kredytu bankowego. W warunkach rozwijającej się wymiany handlowej w integrującej się Europie jego rola jest szczególna z uwagi na znacznie łagodniejsze wymagania od przedsiębiorcy w stosunku do zabezpieczeń, ponieważ instytucja faktoringowa zwraca uwagę głównie na jego odbiorców, stan bieżących należności oraz ogólnie na działalność firmy. Mniej istotna jest natomiast ocena tzw. zdolności kredytowej, czy posiadanie trwałych zabezpieczeń. Faktoring ułatwia również przedsiębiorcom współpracę z kontrahentami zagranicznymi oraz pozwala na przejęcie od klienta ryzyka wypłacalności. W najbliższych latach można oczekiwać wzrostu konkurencji na rynku usług faktoringowych, bowiem na rynek wchodzić będą spółki zagraniczne, przyczyniając się do jego dalszego rozwoju i ekspansji szczególnie na rynki wschodnie.

ROLE OF BANKING SYSTEM IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION PROCESSES

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There is no exaggeration in the statement that the 1990s were a specific period in the economic history not only of Europe but also of the whole world. From the viewpoint of countries belonging to Central and Eastern Europe, it is the daring initiation of deep systemic transformations that stands out against exceptional events. In the west of the continent equally visible is a tendency initiated earlier than in the 1990s and related to implementation of comprehensive integration processes within the European Union. Concerning the worldwide economy, the 1990s are the period of both successes, such as advancing globalization of the economy, and a high pace of economic growth, and unsolved old problems, including e.g. limitation of natural resources and advancing disproportion in development of various parts of the world.

In the 1990s in the pecuniary sphere of the economy, there appeared additionally some transformations in operation of financial systems. Such transformations include deregulation and liberalization of financial markets (lifting of operational limitations for them), globalization of financial markets (gradual unification and transformation of national financial markets into the single world market), but also the revolution in technology (application of informatics and telecommunication).

It is possible to find more interesting tendencies in the past decades. From the viewpoint of the conference subject, however, it is worth pointing out that the problem of regional integration or transborder co-operation in countries of Central and Eastern Europe may be analyzed in the context of financial markets and banking systems. Simplifying it a little, a statement may be risked that the basic question for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the context of the on-going transformations in the sphere of finances is not „whether to integrate", but „how to integrate". Even a cursory reflection on complexity of these evidently international integration processes shows that this problem is fairly complex, but at the same time dynamic.

1. Banking system in processes of transformation and integration

The common feature of Central and East European countries is an evolution from the centrally planned economy to the market economy. Because of it, economic development in these countries may show substantial similarities. Such analogies will be bigger if the strategic goal of the countries is the full integration with the European Union. Disregarding here the actual stage of socio-economic transformations in individual countries of Central and Eastern Europe, an attempt may be made to lay out technical stages or areas of the banking system evolution from the command economy to the market economy:

- separation of the banking sector from the state administration apparatus,
- sanctioning of the two-level structure of the banking system, where the central bank plays the role of the issuing bank, the bank of banks and the bank of the national economy[1],
- granting the banking sector independence concerning decisions,
- creation of independent institutions supervising operation of the banking sector concerning safety of deposits and observation of banking law regulations,
- granting relations between banks and businesses a substantial degree of freedom concerning allowing credits and provision of other banking services,
- commercialization of banking activity – subjecting banks to the rules of self-financing,
- introduction of inter-bank competition through going away from sector and territorial specialization and securing free entering the banking sector by newly established banks,
- specification of independence degree concerning formulation and implementation of activity goals for the central bank (1. stabilization of the national currency; 2. economic growth and unemployment fall),
- establishing the range of banking activities that can be carried out exclusively by banks[2].

On the other hand, concerning integration processes within the European Union it is possible to indicate several successive areas of activities related directly or indirectly to activity of national central banks. Some of them result directly from the so-called convergence criteria specified for countries joining the economic and currency union, thus also the Euro area. For the banking sys-

[1] The central bank is a regulator of money circulation inside the country, a regulator of equilibrium in balance of payments, a bank of the State in relation to servicing of State debts and cash servicing of the budget.

[2] Cf. W.L. Jaworski, *Bank i system bankowy*, in: W.L. Jaworski (ed.), *Bankowość*, Poltext, Warszawa 2005, pp. 54-56

tems specifically important in this respect are criteria concerning stability of prices, stability of currency exchange rates, and levels of interest rates.

In the sphere of regulations, the European integration process also enforces adaptation activities for the banking system. Countries aspiring to the European Union adapt their banking law to the EU directives that are binding in this respect. Regulatory changes concern two related areas: (1) adaptation of the central bank to its operation within the European System of Central Banks; (2) harmonization of national regulations of the banking law with the EU law. The final goal of such changes is to create the common and highly effective single financial market enabling free flow of services and capitals.

An important stage of the European economic integration is establishment of EU structures of central banking and introduction of the single currency. It is creation of the currency union that is one of undoubted successes of the European Union. As a result of the currency union the single currency – the Euro is the official currency on the single economic area of 12 states. Hence the area is referred to as "Euroland" or "the Euro zone." Because of the economic potential of the countries forming Euroland, the Euro has fast become the second mostly used currency in the world, after the US dollar[3]. The long way to introduce the single currency was not easy and it consisted of several long-term enterprises, where the banking system played an important role[4].

Another very important area of the European integration process are works aiming at combining national payment systems into one pan-European payment system that enables safe, low-cost and fast settlements in the common currency - the Euro. One of the main functions of the banking system is assuring possibility to make cashless payments. That is why national central banks are responsible for efficient operation of national payment systems – the so-called RTGS (*Real Time Gross Settlement*) systems. Creation of the currency union required harmonization of national RTGS systems that were built quite independently.

The most important enterprise concerning payment systems faced by countries aspiring to the Euro zone is access to the TARGET (*Trans-European Automated Real Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System*) system. After accession to the European Union the new members may voluntarily join the TARGET system. On the other hand, accession to the currency union is synonymous to accession to the TARGET system. TARGET enables making transfers in the Euro between any banks in the EU countries. TARGET may be

[3] Z. Zawadzka, *Zmiany w bankowości światowej*, in: W.L. Jaworski (ed.), *Bankowość*, Poltext, Warszawa 2005, p. 74. It is even suspected that the single currency would become the first currency in the world, if export and import of crude oil and gas were settled in the Euro, and not mainly in US dollars as so far.

[4] Cf. W. Baka, *Bankowość europejska*, PWN, Warszawa 2005, p. 38

called „the system of payment systems," consisting of sixteen national RTGS inter-bank settling systems and the payment mechanism of the European Central Bank[5]. Operation of the TARGET system contributes to dynamization of integration processes in the Euro zone, due to safe making of transborder payments, shortening of their time and lowering of their costs. Additionally, the TARGET system contributes to creation of the single inter-bank money market in the European Union. On the other hand, linking the national RTGS systems with the European central banking supplies the EU with an instrument to carry out the single monetary policy.

2. International banking in Central and Eastern Europe

Only over a dozen years ago the banking systems in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were adapted to the conditions of the centrally planned economy. The initiated process of the economic transformation required from the banking sector specific abilities that are essential from the viewpoint of banking activity in the conditions of the decentralized economy. They included, e.g., ability to control effectively the allowed credits and ability to manage banking risk. Lack of experience in this respect encouraged political elites in countries of Central and Eastern Europe to wide privatization of the banking sector with substantial participation of foreign financial institutions that were vitally interested in the banking sector of rising economies. A very important role was played by global banks, such as Citigroup, ING, ABN Amro, Société Générale, although their involvement in countries of Central and Eastern Europe is not the top priority for them. For bank groups from neighbouring Germany (Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, and HVB), Austria (Bank Austria Creditanstalt), and Sweden (Swedbank) investing in banking sector of Central and Eastern Europe was seen as natural widening of their activity carried out on their home markets. Bank groups from more distant EU countries, such as Italy (Unicredito), Belgium (KBC), Ireland (Allied Irish Banks), Portugal (Banco Commercial Portuges), also got involved in Central and Eastern Europe, because they decided that development strategies implemented on their home markets might be successfully duplicated on those rising markets. Investors from outside Europe and from the United States were present infrequently in countries of Central and Eastern Europe – Japan's Nomura bank took a temporary control over a large Czech bank (Investicni a Postovni Bank), but such an attempt was unsuccessful and the investor withdrew[6].

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[5] EBC, *Yearly report 2005*, EBC, Frankfurt am Main, p. 104

[6] K. Hofman, *Uwarunkowania strategiczne banków zagranicznych w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej*, in: H. Żukowska (ed.), *Ewolucja systemów bankowych w Europie środkowej i wschodniej*, UMCS, Lublin 2003, p. 81

For foreign banks countries of Central and Eastern Europe have thus become an attractive market of aquisition[7]. The latter had relatively strong economies thanks to initiated economic reforms, and their aspirations to join the EU secured their political stabilization. As the result of it, in the new member-countries of the European Union the structure of foreign capital investment in the banking sector was the following in 2005: Estonia 97.3%, the Czech Republic 96.0%, Slovakia 96.3%, Lithuania 95.6%, Hungary 83.3%, Poland 67.6%, Malta 67.6%, Latvia 47.2%, Slovenia 36.0%, Cyprus 12,3%[8]. Objective laws of free market operation sanction the right of the largest entities to draw largest profits, and thus to reinforce their dominant position. This privileging of the foreign capital in the banking sector of Central and East European countries should be very likely considered a long-lasting phenomenon in the perspective of coming decades.

A positive aspect of transborder banking development in Central and Eastern Europe is transfer of banking know-how. This was accompanied by international flow of banking personnel. The transfer of know-how undoubtedly enhances not only activity effectiveness of banking structures themselves, but also indirectly effectiveness of the whole economy. Unfortunately, negative aspects of such large involvement of foreign capital into the banking sector can also be indicated. After all, banks are a strategic operational element of national economies. Negative results of high involvement of foreign capital into the banking sector are first of all:

- ability to block financing enterprises that are contrary to the interest of foreign businesses that are linked by capital,
- orientation at the corporate client instead of local small and medium businesses,
- transfer of means from the generated profit to headquarters of bank corporations,
- ability to transfer effects of financial crises to „satellite" countries.

Due to culture barriers, further expansion of bank corporations eastwards will take place with support of personnel, and maybe capital, of banks already operating on the areas of new members of the European Union. It is

[7] M. Buszko, *Fuzje i przejęcia w sektorach bankowych krajów rozwijających się – tendencje i perspektywy rozwoju*, in: H. Żukowska (ed.), *Ewolucja systemów bankowych w Europie środkowej i wschodniej*, UMCS, Lublin 2003, p. 44

[8] Christopher Walkner, Jean Pierre Raes, *Integration and consolidation in EU banking – an unfinished business*, „European Commission Economic Papers", No. 226, April 2005, p. 18

very likely that expansion of western banks into the territory of, e.g., Ukraine will be carried out through banks under control in Poland[9].

3. Transborder banking operations

As early as in mediaeval Italy, bankers supported merchants with their services in relation to foreign trade. Formation of customs related to bills of exchange was connected with exchange of foreign currencies coming from foreign transactions and making payments outside traders' residences. In contemporary times, despite many changes both to banking and in the sphere of international exchange, banks still render several services supporting foreign trade. This is one of vital roles of banking system that contributes to increase in trade turnover between economies of different countries, and at the same time to reinforcement of economic relations between businesses coming from different countries.

Banks offer many banking services that facilitate efficient and safe financial settlings between partners from different countries. The basic services in this respect is holding currency accounts for businesses and executing payment orders to the bank account of a foreign contractor. Within the European Union, it can be done through the said TARGET system. The remaining foreign payments can be executed through the global SWIFT (*Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication*) system.

A specific problem concerning transborder payments are banking services in relation to securing settlings of foreign trade transactions. Parties to the international transaction act in different legal orders, which make execution of rights more difficult and costly at the same time. There is often a culture and language barrier between the contractors. It is also more difficult to get information on a foreign business concerning its reliability. Generally speaking, an importer is interested whether the shipped goods comply with an order specification. From an exporter's viewpoint, the main problem is whether the importer will pay for the goods. The exporter himself may totally secure himself against risk of non-payment, suggesting prepayment. In case of long-lasting commercial relations, the exporter may secure himself partially using limits of mercantile credit. Co-operation with the bank in this case enlarges substantially a range of potential securities.

A payment order is a payment form in foreign trade transactions made through banks of the exporter and the importer in conditions of sufficient trust between contractors. If such trust is missing, other forms of transaction settling

[9] Cf. E. Przechodzki, *Ukraiński sektor bankowy przełomu XX i XXI wieku wobec problemów globalizacji (na przykładzie fuzji i przejęć)*, in: H. Żukowska (ed.), *Ewolucja systemów bankowych w Europie środkowej i wschodniej*, UMCS, Lublin 2003, pp. 237-251

may be used. A letter of credit is a very safe form of foreign trade transaction settling. It consists in blocking on the importer's bank account a money amount allocated to settling a specific transaction in foreign trade. The blocked amount will be transferred to the exporter's account if the importer's bank has been supplied in due time with documents evidencing execution of specified responsibilities.

A documentary collection is a form of foreign trade transaction settling, where the exporter's bank issues commercial documents concerning the exported goods to the importer if payment for the goods has been received (free disposal of the goods without the documents is difficult). The documentary collection is a simple and cheap method of partial limitation of commercial risk[10].

Banks not only participate in settling foreign trade transactions, but they also may participate in financing of them (the so-called credit payments). A need to finance foreign trade transactions appears when the importer wants to prolong the time limit of payment for the goods beyond the time that the exporter can accept. The offer of banks in this respect is wide. If a bank participates in international transactions as a warrantor or creditor, it is a bill of exchange that is universally used. Law on bills of exchange in most countries has been patterned on the Convention of Geneva[11] of 1930, and that is why the bill of exchange is willingly used by banks as a security against risk of foreign trade transaction settling. A bank warranty is a written security of the bank for its client that the latter will meet his obligations towards a third party. In case of foreign trade transaction, the bank usually guarantees for the importer before the exporter.

A relatively new banking service, used in foreign trade is forfaiting. It is selling a bank export transaction dues by the exporter. The bank purchases claims in a form of discounting a bill of exchange, letter of credit, or warranty, disclaiming its right of recourse towards the exporter, thus taking over the risk of payment by the importer.

Banks also play an important role in the international turnover concerning currency exchange and security against exchange risk. The exchange rate is the price at which one currency is bought or sold in return of another currency. Exchange rates are announced as an equivalent of a foreign currency in terms of the national currency. Businesses making transactions with a foreign contractor must often get used to the fact that their dues or liabilities are expressed in foreign currencies.

Business entities from Central and Eastern Europe, exporting to the Euro zone are rather unable to negotiate terms of transaction settling in their national currencies. Currency risk is a danger of deterioration of the financial situation

[10] K. Białecki, *Operacje handlu zagranicznego*, PWE, Warszawa 2002, pp. 94-98
[11] P. Machnikowski, *Weksel własny in blanco*, C.H. Beck, Warszawa 2002, p. 15

of the economic entity making foreign settlings, due to an adverse change to a currency exchange rate. The basic reason for currency risk is inability to foresee changes to currency exchange rates. Moreover, making settlings in foreign currencies slightly complicates the economic account.

Both for the exporter and the importer it would be the least risky to settle a contract in their respective national currencies. Of course, only one party to the contract may use this privilege. Granting mercantile credits in foreign trade causes the situation that the time limit of arising export dues is ahead of the payment time limit. The currency exchange rate may change during that time. If the exporter agrees to specify his dues in terms of a foreign currency, depreciation of the national currency in relation to the contract currency would be favourable for him. On the other hand, appreciation of the national currency in relation to the contract currency would be unfavourable. It should be remembered that the basic unit of expressing value in the accountancy system of a business unit is the national currency irrespective of the currency denomination of the dues or liabilities. In accountancy, dues and liabilities are recorded after calculation into the national currency. Depreciation of the national currency will result in positive exchange rate deviations in book records, whereas appreciation of the national currency will result in negative exchange rate deviations. Positive exchange rate deviations increase the financial result, whereas negative deviations decrease the financial result.

The role of banking sector in settling transactions denominated in foreign currencies is not only holding foreign currency accounts, but also providing services allowing minimising currency risk. A foreign currency term transaction facilitates effective management of exchange rate risk. The object of such a transaction is buying or selling of foreign currency on a term, i.e. on the date of settling the foreign exchange transaction, at a given amount of the national currency at the term exchange rate established on the date of the transaction conclusion. Settling of the transaction takes place at the term exchange rate despite the fact that the current market exchange rate of the currency may be higher or lower than the term exchange rate. The term exchange rate is established on the current date for transactions to be executed in future periods on the so-called term market.

A similar service provided by banks is a foreign currency option. The foreign currency option is the right to conclude a foreign currency transaction in the future. A bank, i.e. the issuer of the option, takes an obligation to buy or sell a given foreign currency in return of another one at the established exchange rate of the option realization at a future term. It is the buyer of the option that decides on the option realization, comparing the current market price of the foreign currency with the price of the option execution. Thus, the option gives the right to make a foreign currency transaction, and is not the option buyer's

obligation to use the term foreign currency transaction. The seller (issuer) of the right is paid a premium for granting this right[12].

The range of banking activities that are used in international turnover is obviously much wider. Here we should additionally list factoring, cash management of international capital groups or countertrade. Such a superficial review of banking services supporting international commercial contacts already indicates that banks play an important role in shaping contemporary economic relations. Concerning countries of Central and Eastern Europe, it should also be indicated that future probable accession to Euroland would partially limit interest of businesses from those countries in services related to foreign currency exchange and exchange rate risk.

Streszczenie

ROLA SYSTEMU BANKOWEGO W PROCESACH INTEGRACJI REGIONALNEJ

Artykuł podejmuje kwestię roli systemów bankowych w procesach integracji regionalnej. Ponieważ jest to zagadnienie złożone, analizę przeprowadzono wyodrębniając kilka obszarów problemowych. W pierwszym punkcie artykułu zarysowano zakres przeobrażeń systemowych bankowości w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej związanych z procesami transformacji systemowej oraz integracji europejskiej. W drugiej części omówiono wpływ działań banków zachodnich na obecny kształt funkcjonowania sektorów bankowych w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej. Trzeci punkt poświęcono przedstawieniu usług bankowych ułatwiających międzynarodową wymianę handlową, a więc integrację gospodarczą.

[12] K. Jajuga, T. Jajuga, *Inwestycje*, PWN, Warszawa 1996, p. 181

COOPERATIVE BANKING IN POLAND AND OTHER EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES
(comparative analysis in view of European integrational processes)

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1. The abstract

There has been many significant changes within cooperative banking since 1990 therefore this sector has become more mature and more aware of its role in the banking system[1]. European integrational processes have recently become a very essential stimulus for these changes. They have been focusing on requirements concerning the banking UE directives on adapting the Polish banking system on the one hand and on the other hand on competition growth and fast technological progress in the banking system. The effect of these influences was an advance in the processes of capital and organizational consolidation in cooperative banking and also an increase in scale and range of cooperative bank activity, management professionalisation or introducing product and informatics innovations.

The aim of this study is the evaluation of the effects of these processes by describing the current position of cooperative banking on the banking service market in Poland as well as its comparing to other European Union countries. Such comparison is aimed at characterizing the gap, in economic potential and market position, which is about to be filled between cooperative banking in Poland and cooperative banking groups in Europe.

The comparison between cooperative banking in Poland and different cooperative groups in European Union countries has been limited to the biggest and the oldest ones, which determine the development of cooperative banking and are also good examples to be followed.

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[1] Smoleń M., 2005, *Spółdzielczość bankowa w lokalnym środowisku gospodarczym*, Bank Spółdzielczy 10/2005, 12-23.

2. The influence of European integration on cooperative banking transformations in Poland

Integrational processes connected with joining Poland in the United Europe structures are the most essential determinants of changes in the social and economic fields of our country. The changes are still in progress because the European integration is itself a continuous process and the broadening of the European Union, 1 May 2004, was one of its formal act.

Inegrational processes influence on adapting and changes in Polish banking system through actions on the legal and market ground. The transformations in cooperative banking are the results of three fundamental processes:

- adapting to requirements controlling the UE especially concerning equity capital of banks,
- growth of competition and fast technological progress in banking (caused by foreign banks entering the market),
- integrating the cooperative banking sector with the domestic and international banking system.

The process of financial market globalization is firmly connected with integration that is with the process of "pouring together" domestic financial markets into a global market.[2]. Capital and organizational consolidation as well as fusions and domestic or supranational takeovers are essential elements of the globalization. Consequently, it should be mentioned that banks have to take into consideration not only the state or preventive supervision agencies as market regulators but also huge capital groups[3].

The influence of these integrational interactions on cooperative banking transformations showed mostly the acceleration of consolidation processes in the sector. We can identify two independent, firmly connected trends of consolidation processes:

1) joining processes (fusions and takeovers) of cooperative banks which are the examples of capital consolidation,
2) organizational consolidation processes of the whole cooperative banking sector on a national scale.

The main determinant of joining processes of cooperative banks, since 1998, has been the necessity of meeting the capital needs described in the resolution numbered 9/98 on 5 august 2000 [4] and being made by Banking Inspection concerning functioning cooperative banks, and their associations[5]. The men-

[2] Jaworski W. L., 1999, *Kierunki reformy sektora bankowego w Polsce,* [w:] Banki polskie u progu XXI wieku, (red.) W.L. Jaworski, Poltext, Warszawa, 79-94.

[3] Solarz J. K., 2001, *Uwarunkowania współczesnej bankowości,* [w:] Bankowość na świecie i w Polsce, (red.) L. Oreziak i B. Pietrzak, Olympus, Warszawa, 15-36.

[4] Dz. Urz. NBP, nr 19, poz.44.

[5] Dz. U. 2000, Nr 119, poz. 1252.

tioned legal resolutions obliged banks to increase equity capital up to 300 thousand euro – at the end of 2001, 500 thousand euro – at the end of 2005 and 1 million euro at the end of 2010. The associated banks have been obliged to have equity capital at the level of 20 million euro at the end of 2006. The resolutions are the elements of adapting Polish banking system to the European Union one and having been described by European Banking Committee in 1989[6].

Between 1998 and 2004 the number of self-functioning cooperative banks decreased in 699 units, from 1295 units (in 1998) to 596 (table 1). Only twelve banks were liquidated because of the bad economic situation. The rest of the banks lost their independence by means of fusions and takeovers. The intensification of joining processes in years 1998-2001 when the number of cooperative banks was yearly decreasing in 96, 408 and 101 units.

The consolidation of regional banks with the other associated banks was visible in 2001-2002. As a result, the banking organization was consolidated in three independent associations of 9 regional banks and 2 associated ones (table 1).

It is worth mentioning that economic circumstances such as increasing in banks' effectiveness and position of financial service market were also consolidating determinants In the case of associated banks, it was the willingness of creating a firm cooperative banking group.

Between 1998-2004 slightly but systematically the potential of cooperative banking sector increased in the number of bank subsidiaries. The decline of the number of independent banking units as a result of joining processes influenced the increase in cooperative bank subsidiaries which later on transformed into the taken over companies. Successively, the number of checkouts and franchises has been growing. At the end of 2004, there were 3385 agencies of cooperative banks what was 28,8% out of the overall number in Poland. The number of employed exceed the level of 27,5 thousand posts what was 18,4% out of the overall number in Poland in banking sector[7].

[6] Directive of 17 April 1989 in matter of own funds of credit institution 89/229/EEC L124. At present the matter of own funds of banks is regulated by Directive 2000/12/EEC of 20 March 2000.

[7] *Banki spółdzielcze w Polsce,* (red.) D. Strumiński, D. Twardowski, KNB, Warszawa 2006.

Table 1. Number of cooperative banks according to associations in 1998 and 2004

Regional or associated bank	Number of associate CB on 31.12.1998	Cooperative banking group	Number of associate CB on 31.12.2004	Share in balance sum of sector (%)
Gospodarczy Bank Wielkopolski S.A.	125	Spółdzielcza Grupa Bankowa S.A	157	28,8
Kujawsko-Pomorski Bank Regionalny S.A.	78			
Bałtycki Bank Regionalny S.A.	60			
Mazowiecki Bank Regionalny S.A.	132	Mazowiecki Regionalny Bank S.A	80	13,0
Gospodarczy Bank Południowo-Zachodni S.A.	125	Bank Polskiej Spółd-zielczości S.A	358	56,0
Lubelski Bank Regionalny S.A.	167			
Małopolski Bank Regionalny S.A.	167			
Warmińsko-Mazurski Bank Regionalny S.A.	112			
Bank Unii Gospodarczej S.A.	93			
Dolnośląski Bank Regionalny S.A.	50			
Rzeszowski Bank Regionalny S.A.	49			
Banki niezrzeszone	1	Krakowski BS	1	2,2
Ogółem*	1189	-	596	100,0

* plus Spółdzielczy Bank Rozwoju „Samopomoc Chłopska" in Warsaw, which operate outside of structures of cooperative sector.

Source: analytic data of National Bank of Poland

The financial results of cooperative banks have improved in almost every field (tab. 2). In the given period the profitability of cooperative banks (gross profitability, ROA and ROE) as well as the coefficient of solvency increased from 11% to 14,2%, the activity costs decreased, labour efficiency doubled. The quality of bank credit portfolio has deteriorated as the share of receivables in credits, available to customers increased from 3,5% do 5,5%. It should be emphasized that this share of commercial banks amounted to 15,5% and that is why the quality of cooperative bank credit portfolio is rather favourable. During

the given period, cooperative banks noted better in every parameter of profitability and the activity costs[8].

Table 2. Chosen parameters of economic-financial situation of cooperative banks in 1996-2004 compared to commercial banks

Parameter	Sektor	Year				
		1996	1998	2000	2002	2004
1. Gross profitability; gross financial result/total costs (in %)	CB	16,2	12,2	15,5	15,7	20,7
	ComB	24,1	9,8	8,0	4,0	10,6
2. Share of irregular receivables in receivables from non-financial sector (in %)	CB	5,3	3,5	4,5	7,3	5,5
	ComB	13,2	10,9	15,5	22,0	15,5
3. ROA (net financial result/average net assets in %)	CB	2,0	1,4	1,8	1,6	1,8
	ComB	2,1	0,7	1,1	0,5	1,4
4. ROE (net financial result /average basic funds in %)	CB	30,8	17,9	22,4	18,2	18,3
	ComB	37,0	9,2	14,5	5,2	17,6
5. Average coefficient of solvency (in %)	CB	8,8	11,8	12,8	13,4	14,2
	ComB	17,5	15,0	12,9	13,8	15,6

Source: analytic data of National Bank of Poland from 1996-2004 and own calculations.

The share in credits of non-financial agents such as individuals, enterprises and farmers until 2000 was at the level of 52%-57%, and clients' deposits 70-74%. These shares proved a higher level in cooperative banks than in commercial banks (in 2004 in 16,4% and 13,9%), what shows that the activity results of cooperative banks depends more significantly on the cooperation between these agents. It proves simultaneously, that cooperative banks have strong relationship with local economic environment.

Improvement in the economic and financial situation of cooperative banks and their market position are the effects of introducing new technologies, informatics and the broadening banking service offers or the development of subsidiary chains. Good results in 1998-2004 should be attributed to consolidating processes. The technological modernization of many cooperative banks would not be possible without these processes as well as their dynamic entering new areas of banking market or else, where their position would be less significant (e.g. corporate banking, financial service of public sector).

[8] Kata R., 2005: *Banki spółdzielcze jako lokalne instytucje finansowe na tle sektora bankowego w Polsce,* Prace Naukowe AE we Wrocławiu, nr 1070, Wrocław, 412-419.

3. The sector of cooperative banking in Poland and the given European Union countries

In United Europe countries, cooperative banks act in the form of associations or bank groups in the confines of two or three level organizational structure. The growth in competitiveness on the bank service market as well as increasing needs of clients have made cooperative banks associate in regional and national structures. Such an organizational form results from characteristic features of this sector that is small bank subsidiaries that are incapable of providing financial services[9].

Globalizational tendencies in the economy cause that in the majority of banking systems in the European Union consolidating process are intensifying at a local and regional level[10]. As a result of the consolidating processes the decrease in the number of banks and their subsidiaries is observed but the thick chain of posts is a strong point of these organizations[11]. Furthermore, as a result of fusions and takeovers the size of cooperative banks is increasing and their capital or assets. The strong points of cooperative banks in Western Europe are taking care of quality and innovativeness of provided services as well as offered bank products.

The biggest cooperative banking groups in Europe such as: Credit Auricle, Raiffeisen Bank, Rabobank Nederland, DZ Bank and other having been associated since 1977 in the organization named Unico Banking Group. These groups are not only consisted of cooperative banks and associated banks but also of insurance and leasing institutions, mortgage factoring banks, investing funds, brokerage houses, consulting firms etc. Such development of a cooperative sector is characteristic for all of these groups that is why it is supposed that the development of a cooperative banking sector in Poland should aim at the same direction.

Currently, the cooperative groups in European Union countries are:

- 44 million shareholders
- 126 million customers,
- 674 thousand employed,
- 59 thousand posts,
- 3,7 billion euro assets,

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[9] Policha B., 2004: *Bankowość spółdzielcza w drodze do Unii Europejskiej* [w:] Rynek usług finansowych w Unii Europejskiej - szanse i wyzwania dla Polski, Wyd. WSB w Poznaniu, 95-106.

[10] Alińska A., 2002: *Bankowość spółdzielcza w krajach Unii Europejskiej,* Twigger, Warszawa.

[11] Gniewek J., 2003: *Zarządzanie strategiczne w sektorze banków spółdzielczych w Polsce w okresie transformacji,* ZN AR w Krakowie, nr 401, Rozprawy, z. 294, Kraków.

– around 20% share in the banking market[12].

Almost all big cooperative banking groups in Europe have started their activity with agriculture and rural areas servicing as well as minor trade and craft. They are still the major bank organizations acting in this field of economy[13]. The broadening of their activity into the other fields of financial services was connected to strengthening their economic and market position. Currently, cooperative banks are becoming common and universal banks. They offer to their customers a rich and various package of financial services, however, unavailable services are transferred to associated banks.

Table 3. The biggest cooperative groups in European Union countries *(according to state on the end of 2004)*

Cooperative banking group	Regional /local banks	Other bank agency	Number of staff (thousand)	Share-holder (mln)	Number of customers (mln)
Credit Agricole/ France	43	9.057	135,5	5,5	21
Banco Cooperativo Español/ Spain	74	4.100	14,5	1,4	7,5
Austrian Raiffeisen Banking Group/ Austria	581	1.712	39,2	1,7	2,7
ICCREA Banca Spa/ Italy	339	3.478	26,2	-	4
Rabobank Group/ the Netherlands	288	1.587	57,1	0,8	9
DZ Bank and BVR/ Germany	1.335	14.554	189,7	15,1	30
OKO Bank /Finland	241	677	9,1	1,0	3,1
Cooperative banking sector in Poland	596	2.789	27,6	2,6	10

Source: Financial report of Unico Banking Group, www.unico.nl, 2004 and analytic data of NBP, Warsaw 2005.

In European Union countries, cooperative banks successfully compete with commercial banks on the financial markets not only at a local level but also, as a member of cooperative group at a regional or domestic level. Some of the biggest cooperative groups transformed into international financial institutions and are highly placed among worldwide banking institutions.

The Polish sector of cooperative banking has around 10 million customers and is the third powerful in the European Union. (table 3). The top positions in the European Union are held by Germany (30 million customers) France where Credit Agricole Group has around 21 million customers and the follow-

[12] Data of European Association of Cooperative Banks.

[13] Klank L., 2000: *Organizacja systemu bankowego w krajach UE*, Wieś i Doradztwo, nr 4/00, 29-41.

ing two groups (Credit Mutuel and Banques Populaires) provides services to 20 million customers.

The important measure indicating the position of a cooperative banking sector on the financial market is its share in the overall volume of credit and deposit services (graph 1). Among the analyzed European Union countries in 2004, the lowest share in both of these financial market segments had the Spanish and Italian cooperative banking sector. The share of the Polish sector (three cooperative groups) amounted to: 8,8% on the credit market and 9,4% on the deposit market. This share after the decline in 5,5 % in 1998, has started increasing and is a positive phenomenon, especially in terms of growing competition on the banking market and entering foreign capital. It should be added that the biggest share (15%) in credit and deposit market has Hungary among the newly admitted countries to the United Europe. However, in the former European Union fifteen this share was strongly higher than in Poland extending form 17 to 39%. The biggest shares in credit and deposit market have cooperative banking sectors in Holland, Finland and France.

Fig. 1. Participation of cooperative bank sector on financial market in 2004 (%)



Source: Financial report of Unico Banking Group, www.unico.nl, 2004 and analytic data of NBP, Warsaw 2005.

In 2000-2004 the balance sum for the cooperative banking sector in Poland, increased in nominally 59,2%, credits of individuals increased in 64,7%, and deposits of individuals increased in 58,1%, and finally ownership funds increased in 82,1% (table 4). In all the mentioned balance parameters, cooperative banks achieved in the given period a better dynamic than commercial banks. However, the comparison to the biggest cooperative groups shows that the domestic cooperative sector develops at the similar pace. It needs to be remembered that the gap between the biggest European cooperative groups is

enormous. Making up for at least a bit this gap requires higher growth dynamism than is noticeable by western European partners.

Table 4. Dynamics of chosen balance parameters in 2000 – 2004 (%)

Specification	Dynamics 2004/2000 (%)				
	Balance sum	Credits for clients	Clients' deposits	Own funds	Total profit
Credit Agricole/ France	170,4	161,5	71,9	177,9	234,0
Banco Cooperativo Español/Spain	181,0	188,7	166,5	169,6	160,5
Austrian Raiffeisen Banking Group/ Austria	149,2	167,4	208,1	146,9	222,0
ICCREA Banca Spa/ Italy	155,8	175,6	165,9	129,5	92,9
Rabobank Group/ the Netherlands	138,6	141,3	130,9	147,8	208,8
DZ Bank and BVR/ Germany	94,4	75,6	80,7	159,9	200,2
OKO Bank/Finland	141,0	152,7	133,3	169,6	100,0
Cooperative banking sector in Poland	159,2	164,7	158,1	182,1	157,1

Source: Financial report of Unico Banking Group, www.unico.nl, 2004 and analytic data of NBP, Warsaw 2005.

Balance parameters per capita can show the popularity and economic power of cooperative banking sectors in given countries. (table 5). The data shows how far Polish cooperative sector is behind the economic and market potential of such countries as Holland or Germany.

Table 5. Chosen economic parameters of cooperative bank sectors in European Union per capita (euro)

EU member	Balance sum		Deposits		Credits		Own funds	
	2000	2004	2000	2004	2000	2004	2000	2004
Austria	11.870	17.744	6.958	14.488	7.775	13.024	597,2	878,0
Finland	5.233	7.490	3.304	4.471	3.922	6.078	444,4	764,7
France	9.097	15.494	8.925	6.418	4.310	6.961	475,5	846,5
Spain	727	1.252	628	873	518	937	57,8	88,4
the Netherlands	21.622	29.881	9.250	12.082	11.295	15.912	11.33,5	1.673,0
Germany	11.423	10.790	7.753	6.259	7.635	5.776	417,8	667,1
Italy	1.304	2.031	993	1.647	760	1.333	165,8	214,7
Poland*	165	249	77	127	78	119	11,9	22,0

*1 EUR = 4,04 PLN

Source: Calculation on basis of financial report of Unico Banking Group, 2004 and data of NBP, Warsaw 2000-2004.

4. Conclusions

1. In the recent years the cooperative sector in Poland has undergone the transformation connected with the organizational and regulating changes. One of the most essential transformations were the consolidating processes when the number of cooperative banks decreased by half and associated banks from 11 to 3. The result of these transformations of the cooperative sector is the improvement of its economic efficiency and gradual regaining the lost position and the increase in competitiveness.
2. Rebuilding the cooperative banking market position ensues in totally different conditions than it was in the first half of the 90s, especially considering the competition of the commercial banks what indicates the developing potential of the sector.
3. The position of cooperative banking in Polish banking system, shows not only the number of customers served or the number of assets but also the contribution to the local development, agriculture and rural areas.
4. Integrational tendencies in cooperative banking are visible so in the countries of the former European Union as in Poland. It is shown in cooperative bank consolidations and cooperative banking sector reorganizations. Each of the leading cooperative banking groups aims at creating the uniform and coherent system of mutually completing companies to be seen as a whole unit.
5. Due to the economic potential, the Polish cooperative banking sector in a long-term period will not be able to achieve that what the other system have been building for many decades. The basis of success in cooperative banking systems in Germany, Holland, France and other countries were the organizational solutions allowing them not only to protect their traditional local markets but also expand their interests on the other areas where compete effectively with commercial banks. Skillful use of their experiences can considerably accelerate the development of the Polish cooperative bank sector.

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Streszczenie

BANKOWOŚĆ SPÓŁDZIELCZA W POLSCE I INNYCH KRAJACH UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ
(Analiza porównawcza w aspekcie europejskich procesów integracyjnych)

Od roku 1990 w bankowości spółdzielczej nastąpiło wiele znaczących zmian, które sprawiły, że sektor ten stał się dojrzalszy i bardziej świadomy swojej roli w systemie bankowym. Bardzo istotnym stymulatorem tych przekształceń stały się w ostatnich latach europejskie procesy integracyjne. Przejawiały się one z jednej strony wymogami regulacyjnymi, dostosowującymi polski systemu bankowy do bankowych dyrektyw UE, z drugiej zaś wzrostem konkurencji i szybkim postępem technologicznym w sektorze bankowym. Celem opracowania jest ocena efektów tych procesów poprzez określenie obecnej pozycji spółdzielczego sektora bankowego na rynku usług finansowych w Polsce, oraz porównanie jej z innymi krajami Unii Europejskiej.

THE EURO AFTER FIVE YEARS – CHOSEN ASPECTS

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The gradual extension of the Economic and Monetary Union shall contribute to the strengthening of the Euro currency importance in the world and acceleration of the economic growth rate. The participation of the Polish enterprises in this process is a huge development chance for them, on condition that the micro- and macroeconomic pre-conditions of the Euro zone accession are appropriately met.

The idea of Economic and Monetary Union establishing appeared at the Hague Summit in 1969. The three-stage plan of introduction the common currency was presented in the Werner report in 1970. The failure of that plan resulted, among others, form the economic situation in the first half of the 1970s (crisis, failure of the Bretton Woods system). The conception of a monetary union and common currency was restored at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. The Delors Commission report played a significant role, but no exact realization dates were specified.

The EMU establishing process consists of three stages:

- First stage - from 1st July 1990 to 31st December 1993, creation of a uniform interior market, based on the so-called four freedoms: freedom of free flow of goods, services, person and capital within the EU. The special stress was put on the elimination of restrictions of capital flows within the Community as well as the relations.
- Second stage - from 1st January 1994 to 31st December 1998. Fulfillment the EMU accession convergence criteria as well as establishment of the European Monetary Institute - the predecessor of the European Central Bank. were the most important task of the countries in this stage.
- Third stage - from 1st January 1999 to 31st December 2001 - gradual introduction of the common currency into the circulation.

Within the aforesaid periods, more detailed stages can be sorted out. Here the most important ones:

- preparatory period (from 1st May 1998 to 31st December 1998) - definition of the Euro zone composition, irrevocable exchange rates as well as establishment of the EBS.

- interim period (from 1st January 1999 to 31st December 2001) - introduction of Euro in cashless form and beginning of the activity by EBC and ESBS.
- final period (from 28th February 1998 to 1st January 2002) - period with double currency circulation after which the Euro shall become the only currency.

In order to become a member of the economic and monetary union the candidate countries must fulfil the following convergence criteria, which have been agreed on the strength of the treaty of Maastricht.

1. The inflation rate may not exceed the average inflation rate of three EU countries with the lowest inflation by more than 1,5 percent point.
2. The long-term interest rates may not exceed the average interest rate of three EU countries with the lowest inflation by more than 2 percent points,
3. Budget deficit may not exceed 3 % of the GNP,
4. Public debt may not exceed 60 % of the GNP,
5. Stable currency exchange rates during the last 2 years.

The EMU consisted of 11 countries and on the 1. January 2001 Greece joined this group. The following EU countries are not member of the monetary union: Sweden, Great Britain and Denmark, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden and Great Britain are EU members which have not introduced the common currency yet. The EU members: Denmark, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia participate in the ERM II exchange rate mechanism, that means, that their currencies: Lats, Lithuanian Litas, Danish Krone, Cyprus Pound, Estonian Kroon, Maltese Lira, Slovenian Tolar and Slovak Coruna are connected with the Euro exchange rate.

Fig. 1. First 12 Member States of the European Union

- Belgium
- Germany
- Greece
- Spain
- France
- Ireland
- Italy
- Luxembourg
- The Netherlands
- Austria
- Portugal
- Finland

Source: European Central Bank: www.ecb.int

The importance and size of the operation shall be pointed out: as consequence of the establishing of the Economic and Monetary Union new banknotes and coins were introduced on 1st January 2002 in twelve countries with a total number of inhabitants of 307 million. It was the final stage of the greatest monetary exchange in the history. The numbers and values of the Euro banknotes and coins are shown in tables 1 and 2 (state as for 31.12.2005).

Table 1. Circulation of euro banknotes (31.12.2005)

Denomination	Circulation	
	(in million of banknots)	(euro millions)
500	397	198.686
200	149	29.760
100	1.045	104.537
50	3.712	185.598
20	2.156	43.122
10	1.743	17.426
5	1.278	6.389
TOTAL	**10.480**	**585.519**

Source: www.ecb.int

According to the data of the European Central Bank, 10,5 billion banknotes with a total value of 565 billion Euro, that is 7,06% of the GNP of the Economic and Monetary Union member countries, were in rotation at the end of December 2005. The coins with a total value of almost 17,5 billion Euro made 0,21% of the Euro zone GNP.

In average, 33 banknotes with a total value of 1815 Euro and 202,3 coins with a total value of 53,5 Euro fell to one person.

Table. 2. Circulation of euro coins (31.12.2005)

Denomination	Circulation of coins	
	(in million of coins)	(in million of euro)
2	3.399	6.798
1	5.160	5.160
50 cent	4.386	2.193
20 cent	7.164	1.433
10 cent	8.914	891
5 cent	10.836	542
2 cent	12.454	249
1 cent	15.069	151
TOTAL	**67.382**	**17.417**

Source: www.ecb.int

The 50 Euro banknote was the most frequently used banknote of the Euro zone (35,0%).

In order to become a member of the Euro zone union, the EU members countries must fulfill the convergence criteria defined in the treaty of Maastricht. The state of the convergence criteria fulfillment by the new European Union member countries is presented in table No. 3 (accession on 01.05.2004).

Table 3. The state of the convergence criteria fullfillment by the new EU member countries (XII 2005)

	interest rates		inflation		deficit		debt		MR2
Czech Republic	3,35	yes	1,6	yes	-2,6	no	30,5	yes	-
Estonia	3,94	yes	4,1	no	1,6	yes	4,8	yes	-
Cyprus	5,16	yes	2,0	yes	-2,4	no	70,3	no	-
Latvia	3,53	yes	6,9	no	0,2	yes	11,9	yes	-
Lithuania	3,73	yes	2,7	no	-0,5	yes	18,7	yes	yes
Hungary	6,6	no	3,5	no	-6,1	no	58,4	yes	-
Malta	4,57	yes	2,5	yes	-3,3	no	74,7	no	-
Poland	5,23	yes	2,2	yes	-2,5	yes	42,5	yes	-
Slovenia	3,81	yes	2,5	yes	-1,8	yes	29,1	yes	yes
Slovakia	3,52	yes	2,8	no	-2,9	no	34,5	yes	-
convergence criteria	5,42		2,6		3%		60%		

Source: own elaboration

For comparison, in table No. 4 the scope of the convergence criteria fulfillment by the European Union member countries before the accession of the new members in 2004 is presented.

Table 4. The scope of the convergence criteria fulfillment by the EU member countries (15)

	Inflation		Deficit and debt		ERM		Interest rates	
	1997	2005	1997	2005	1997	2005	1997	2005
Belgium	yes	yes	yes(1)	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Denmark	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Germany	yes	yes	yes(1)	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Greece	no	no	no	no	no(2)	yes	no	yes
Spain	yes	no	yes(1)	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
France	yes	yes	yes(1)	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Ireland	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Italy	yes	yes	yes(1)	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Luxembourg	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
The Netherlands	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Austria	yes	yes	yes(1)	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Portugal	yes	yes	yes(1)	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Finland	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Sweden	yes	yes	yes(1)	yes	no	yes	yes	yes
Great Britain	yes	yes	yes(1)	no	no	yes	yes	yes

1 Abrogation of the Council Decision on the existence of an excessive deficit is recommended by the Commission.

2 On the March 1998 Greece joined the MR2

Source: own elaboration

When analyzing the convergence criteria fulfillment by the candidate countries, the attention shall be paid to some lack of consistence of the European Central Bank.

On the one hand, the situation of Lithuania: the negative decision of the European Central Bank in respect of the Euro zone accession based on the excessive inflation rate. The inflation rate in Lithuania exceeded the convergence criterion by 0,1%. But the inflation rate as convergence criterion is calculated on the base of the inflation rates of all European Union and not only of the Euro zone member countries. Finally, the low inflation rate in Poland and Sweden decided about the low price criterion and the aforesaid two countries are no members of the Economic and Monetary Union. In spite of the small difference, the European Central Bank representatives showed no flexibility and Lithuania couldn't accede to the Euro zone. This decision was very painful for Lithuania for two reasons: if only the Euro zone member countries had been considered at the calculation of the inflation rate, Lithuania would be a new member thereof now. And: the inflation rate forecast in Lithuania are not especially optimistic, that means, that it is possible that the Euroland accession will not take place in the next future.

On the other hand, problems with the convergence criteria by the Economic and Monetary Union now and in the future can be identified. It is commonly known that Italy sold out the national property on a large scale in order to reduce the budget deficit and Greece manipulated the financial data. Now, some EMU member countries don't meet the fiscal convergence conditions.

The common currency is also destabilized by the individual Monetary Union member countries which increase their budget expenditures over the allowed limits. The allowed budget deficit limit amounting to 3% of the GNP is not respected by the largest European Monetary Union member countries. Therefore, the macroeconomic balance is deteriorated.

The observance of the convergence criteria shall be guaranteed by huge penalties for the countries don't observe these rules. For example, Germany should pay even 100 billion USD for the infringement of the stabilization pact rules in 2002-2003. But, in fact, nobody can enforce these penalties.

Table 5. The level of deficit (%GDP) – chosen countries of EU

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Euro zone	-1.9	-2.5	-3.0	-2.8	-2.4
UE (15)	-1.2	-2.2	-2.9	-2.6	-2.3
UE (25)	-1.3	-2.3	-3.0	-2.6	-2.3
Germany	-2.9	-3.7	-4.0	-3,7	-3.3
France	-1.6	-3.2	-4.2	-3.7	-2.9
Italy	-3.2	-2.9	-3.4	-3.4	-4.1
Greece	-6.1	-4.9	-5.8	-6.9	-4.5
Lithuania	-2.0	-1.4	-1.2	-1.5	-0.5
Hungary	-3.5	-8.4	-6.4	-5.4	-6.1
Poland	-3.7	-3.2	-4.7	-3.9	-2.5

Source: own elaboration

I would like to put our attention to the budget deficit of Poland. According to the Eurostat data, the budget deficit of Poland amounted at the end of 2005 to 2,5% of the GNP. According to the data of the Ministry of Finances, it amounted to ca. 4,7% of GNP. The difference results from the deduction of some pension system reform costs from the budget deficit by the new EU member countries in the years 2005-2009. An editioral operation caused that Poland has been classified as one of the countries, which meet the convergence criteria. But there is the question of the real fulfillment of the convergence conditions, that is, if the so-called real convergence exists.

Also the public debt in relation to the GNP of nine European Union members (as for December 2005) doesn't comply with the Monetary Union pre-accession requirements. However, the high relation of the public debt to the

GNP results in the most cases from the public finance policy from the second half of the XX century which was characterized by a liberal fiscal policy and high budget deficit. As consequence, the public debt level considerably exceeds the allowed level in many countries.

In table No. 6, the countries classified to the lower category in respect o the public debt level compared to 2003 are marked with green color. The countries classified to the higher public debt category are market with red color.

Table 6. The level of public debt (% GDP - 2005)

PD/GDP	< 10	10-20	20-30	30-40	40-50	50-60	> 60
New countries of EU	Estonia	Latvia, Lithuania	Slovenia	Czech Republic, Slovakia	Poland	Hungary	Cyprus, Malta
EU countries (15)	Luxembourg		Ireland	Denmark	Finland, Spain Great Britain	The Netherlands, Sweden	Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Greece, Portugal

Source: own elaboration

The analysis of the convergence criterion fulfillment by the countries with monetary union accession aspirations shows, that Poland meets all criteria except for the participation in the monetary corridor for two years.

Let's assume hypothetically, that the quotations of the Polish currency within the monetary corridor started on 28.04.2004. Then, the quotation fluctuations exceed the valid limits (+/- 15%):

- 28.04.2004 - 4,78 PLN/EURO
- 28.04.2006 - 3,75 PLN/EURO
- **Change: 21,55%.**

In opinion presented by the European Central Bank in the report on Euro zone accession preparations of Poland, Poland is properly integrated with the zone in respect of the economic and financial factors. At the same time, the representatives of the Bank admit, that Poland must apply a more ambitious fiscal consolidation plan and solve the its-term problem: unemployment.

On the base of the analysis of the convergence condition fulfillment by Poland, we can say that the delay of the Euro introduction determination results rather from the missing political will and not from the present political reasons comprised in the criteria of Maastrich. At the beginning of February, Zyta Gi-

lowska declared that we will be ready for serious negotiations on the Euro zone accession in "about three years".

The standpoint of the Euro zone representatives is not explicit. In February 2006 the Bundesbank presented a report in which it warned against a premature accession of new member countries to the Euro zone. According to the Bundesbank, the premature accession of new countries at economic instability and liberal treatment of the forma criteria can result, for example, in improper calculation of the relation of the national currency to Euro at the moment of the new currency introduction. The improper parity can cause a current account deficit increasing and, therefore, significant costs for the national economic systems in the whole Euro zone.

Note, that the current account state doesn't belong to the official convergence criteria.

Among the European commentators the more and more popular opinion occurs that because of the fact that the Euro zone member countries are not supporters of the Euro zone extension in general, they will explain their standpoint using less important, technical aspects of the convergence.

Some of them say, that the convergence conditions valid on the base of the treaty of Maastrich are of nominal nature. The questions of the real economy, such as work output, unemployment rate or rates of pay, are omitted.

But at present, the real differences between the Euro zone member countries are treated as one of the most important factors hindering EU development dynamics as a whole.

Table 7. GDP per capita of EU countries 2003 (%, UE = 100)

Dziesięć najbogatszych regionów			Dziesięć najbiedniejszych regionów		
1	Inner London (UK)	278	1	Lubelskie (PL)	33
2	Bruxelles-Capitale (BE)	238	2	Podkarpackie (PL)	33
3	Luxembourg	234	3	Podlaskie (PL)	36
4	Hamburg (DE)	184	4	Świętokrzystkie (PL)	37
5	Ile de France (FR)	173	5	Warmińsko-Mazurskie (PL)	37
6	Wien (AT)	171	6	Opolskie (PL)	37
7	Berkshire, Buckinghamshire & Oxfordshire (UK)	165	7	Eszak Magyaroszag (HU)	38
8	Provincia Autonoma Bolzano (IT)	160	8	Vychodne Slovensko (SK)	39
9	Oberbayern (DE)	158	9	Eszag-Alfold (HU)	39
10	Stockholm (SE)	158	10	Del-Alfold (HU)	40

Source: Eurostat News Release No 63/2006, 18 May 2006

The „real economic system convergence" (i.e., balanced real economic development level of the countries) becomes an important matter of the classification of the countries which can become the new members of the European Monetary Union. There are more and more unofficial opinions, that the fulfillment of the Maastrich criteria is not the only and sufficient condition of the Euro zone accession. The opinion, that „the monetary union is not for poor countries", was presented in on of the Financial Times publications.

In the background of the above deliberations, the question of the future of the European Monetary Union appears. Milion Friedman stated in 1999, in the initial time of the Euro, that the „common European currency will meet its end in 10 years, at latest", based on the assumption, that Euro is a political and not economic project. At the end of April this year Prof. Paul de Grauwe, one of the authors of the Euro, said, that the European Monetary Union will be withdrawn within 10-20 years. In the past, no monetary union survived, when it wasn't followed by a political union. And a political union between the Euro zone member countries is rather not to be expected".

In the poll organized by Eurobarometr in 10 European Union countries, which acceded to the EU on 1st May 2004, there were the following answers to the question: when shall Euro be introduced:[1]

- EU-10: as prompt as possible: 17, after some time: 32, as late as possible: 46
- Slovenia: as prompt as possible: 32, after some time: 29, as late as possible: 32
- Poland: as prompt as possible: 15, after some time: 32, as late as possible: 50
- Latvia: as prompt as possible: 12, after some time: 27, as late as possible: 52

As we can see on the base of the results of this poll, the European Monetary Union accession of new countries still arouses anxiety among the inhabitants of these countries.

For an average citizen, the price rise in the beginning period after the accession is the most important danger. This phenomenon took place in the most Euro zone members. From the economic point of view, the end of the independent monetary policy of the member countries is the most important minus.

The likely time schedule of Euro zone extension:

- on 1st January 2007 Slovenia shall accede to the European Monetary Union - this country has already the acceptation of the European Commission.
- in 2008 the following countries shall accede to the Euro zone: Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, Lithuania,
- in 2009: Slovakia,
- an finally: Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland.

The end of the independent monetary policy is the most important minus of the Euro zone accession in the macro scale. The European Monetary Union

[1] comp. T. Barzdo, W elitarnym klubie tylko z solidnym dorobkiem, in: Gazeta Prawna, 17th May 2006, pg 6.

strengthens the independence of the decisive center in the scope of the monetary policy and this fact is advantageous from the entrepreneurs' point of view. At the same time, due to the inertia of the phenomena and trends of the Union economy, the reactions of the central bank will be delayed. It is easier to diagnose and control the monetary market in the scale of the individual countries on condition, that it is made by autonomic centers on the base of the proper identification of phenomena and selection of decisive tools.

The extension of the European Union and, as consequence, of the Economic and Monetary Union, shall contribute to the worldwide strengthening of Euro importance and acceleration of the economic growth rate. The participation of the Polish enterprises in that process is an enormously big chance for them provided that the micro- and macroenconomic conditions of the Euro zone accession are properly prepared.

At the present discussions, the stress is put on the nominal convergence conditions assuming, that the Euro zone accession automatically causes that the real convergence, that is, a balancing of the real economic development between the member countries, takes place. This situation is desirable without any doubts, but if it doesn't take place, the consequences for enterprises can be difficult to foresee. The activities of Poland shall focus on possibly prompt fulfillment of the formal conditions enabling it to accede to the Euro zone, but it must be, first of all, safe and advantageous for the economy itself.

Among the European commentators the opinion occurs more and more frequently that the Euro zone countries don't support extension of the Euro zone owing to the bad preparation of the possible accession participants. At present, the opinion prevails, that the differentiation of the economic development level between the Euro zone member countries is the basic factor hindering the development dynamics of the European Union as a whole. Due to this fact, the decision about the accession of a candidate country to the European Monetary Union shall be taken on the base of the achievement of the real convergence between the economic systems respecting both the conditions of the nominal nature valid on the base of the treaty of Maastrich as well as the ones of real nature, such as, for example, unemployment rate, rates of pay, work output. Unofficially the opinion prevails that fulfillment of both the real and nominal convergence conditions by the candidate countries is the necessary condition for the Euro zone accession.

According to the report prepared by the European Central Bank, Poland is properly integrated with the Euro zone in respect of the nominal convergence criteria of Maastrich. But the high unemployment rate and missing fiscal consolidation plan are big problems. At determination of the accession date of the Economic and Monetary Union by Poland one must note, that the participation in the Union is a tool for the improvement of the economic situation and not an

autonomic goal. And the analysis shall comprise not only the advantages but also restrictions and costs resulting from the Euro zone accession.

Streszczenie

EURO PO PIĘCIU LATACH – WYBRANE ZAGADNIENIA

Przedmiotem referatu jest analiza stopnia wypełnienia warunków konwergencji przez Polskę oraz wybrane kraje Unii Europejskiej.

Rozszerzenie Unii Europejskiej, a w konsekwencji Unii Gospodarczej i Walutowej, winno przyczynić się do wzrostu znaczenia euro na świecie oraz przyspieszenia tempa wzrostu gospodarczego. Udział polskich przedsiębiorstw w tym procesie stanowi dla nich olbrzymią szansę rozwoju, pod warunkiem właściwego przygotowania warunków mikro- i makroekonomicznych wejścia do strefy euro.

Obecnie w dyskusjach kładzie się nacisk na konieczność spełnienia nominalnych warunków konwergencji, uznając, że wejście do strefy euro automatycznie spowoduje realizację procesu konwergencji realnej, która oznacza wyrównanie realnego poziomu rozwoju gospodarczego krajów członkowskich. Jest to sytuacja ze wszech miar pożądana, jeśli jednak to nie nastąpi, konsekwencje dla podmiotów gospodarczych mogą być trudne do przewidzenia. Działania ze strony Polski powinny skupiać się na tym, aby możliwie szybko zaistniały okoliczności niezbędne do tego, żeby wejście euro stało się formalnie możliwie, ale przede wszystkim bezpieczne i korzystne dla samej gospodarki.

Wśród europejskich komentatorów coraz częściej pojawia się opinia, że kraje eurostrefy nie są zwolennikami poszerzania zasięgu euro ze względu na słabe przygotowanie potencjalnych uczestników do akcesji. Dominuje obecnie pogląd, że podstawowym czynnikiem hamującym dynamikę rozwoju Unii Europejskiej jako całości jest zróżnicowanie poziomu rozwoju gospodarczego pomiędzy członkami strefy euro. W związku z powyższym podstawą podjęcia decyzji o przystąpieniu kraju kandydującego do Europejskiej Unii Walutowej jest osiągnięcie realnej konwergencji gospodarek uwzględniającej zarówno warunki o charakterze nominalnym, obowiązujące na podstawie traktatu z Maastricht, jak i warunki o charakterze realnym, do których można zaliczyć na przykład poziom bezrobocia, stawki płac, wydajność pracy. Nieoficjalnie coraz częściej pojawia się pogląd, że wypełnienie zarówno warunków realnych jak i nominalnych konwergencji przez kraje kandydujące jest warunkiem koniecznym przystąpienia do strefy euro.

THE CONDITION AND PECULIARITY OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN POLAND AND OTHER UNITED EUROPE COUNTRIES

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1. Introduction

Unemployment poses one of the most difficult socio-economic problems. Recession is claimed to be the reason for a very rapid increase in unemployment.

The enforcement of saving time modern technologies, job searcher's qualification unsuitability for the technologies and also replacing manual work with machines and computers have had a great impact on unemployment.

Unemployment has been a plague on capitalism since the industrial revolution times, however, the understanding of its causes and costs is possible only after establishing modern macroeconomic theory. It is clearly visible that nowadays recessions, and connected with them, high unemployment are extremely costly for an economy. The periods of a serious stagnation, in the 80s, cost the country two fifths of annual Gross Domestic Product[1].

The beginning of the 90s brought further changes, which were caused by rebuilding of the economy. Much more often there had been visible a great increase in the number of jobless people which meant that unemployment became the most significant problem in a reforming country. Rapidly rocketing unemployment became a phenomenon on a large scale what drove to a bad situation on the national labour market.

The aim of these considerations in the following article is evaluation of the unemployment condition and peculiarity in Poland and other United Europe countries.

2. The situation on the labour market in Poland

There was no unemployment till 1989 in Poland. The problem was, not the excess of workers but their shortage. The transformation in the economy which started in 1990 drove to drastic changes on the labour market. The de-

[1] P.A. Samuelson, W.D. Nordhaus, *Ekonomia I*, PWN, Warszawa 1995 r. p. 351.

cline in working people was determined by the processes of privatization the national economy, restructuring of some managing fields, organizational changes in enterprises and changes in applying technics and technology. Cycle factors such as export breakdown to the Central and Eastern Europe countries, mistakes in economic policy are said to be the reasons for unemployment creation in 1990.

As a consequence of these processes there was the increase in jobless people and the decline in the working for the state-owned sector. In the following years the decreasing tendency of the number of the unemployed was rather stable and the unemployment rate was also decreasing. The bar chart 1 presents how the unemployment rate was running in Poland in the given period covering years 1996-2005, (in %).

Fig. 1. The unemployment rate in Poland in 1996-2005, (in %)



	1996	1998	1999	2001	2003	2004
unemployment rate	13,2	10,4	13	17,5	18	19,1

%

Source: self-study based on Central Office of Statistics data

On the basis of the data, it can be claimed that the highest unemployment rate occurred in 2004. In 1996, it was at the level of 13,2% with the decreasing

tendency up to the year 1999. In 2000 there was an increase up to 15%. Following years showed a growing tendency until the year 2004. In 2005, there was a decrease up to the level of 17,3%.

It ought to be also emphasized that during the first two years of transformation (1990-1991) the number of the unemployed was increasing at a steady pace of exceeding 1 million people per year and achieving, at the end of 1991, the level of 2,2 million people. The unemployment rate was 11,8% then.

Fig. 2. The professional activity of women and men (1996-2005)



	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005
men	66,5	65,9	65,5	64,9	64,3	63,4	62,6	62,4	62,5
women	51,1	50,6	50	50	49,7	48,8	48	47,9	48,1

Source: self-study based on Central Office of Statistics data.

The nature of Polish unemployment cannot be unambiguously described. To a large extent, it is cyclical - as a result of workplace shortage and its structural features, such as qualification kinds or levels of job searchers. It can be claimed that the scale of unemployment does not decide on its peculiarity. Social categories are the important factors which are affected by unemployment. The research of Central Office of Statistics shows that the main features

of Polish unemployment are growth in women among the unemployed and the lack of work for the youth. The data concerning this issue are presented in the chart 2.

The analysis of the data presented on the chart concludes that the professional activity of women is greatly lower than the activity of men. The highest number of professionally active men was noted in 1996 and constituting 66,5%. Later on, it was declining, and ended with the activity of men at 62,5% in 2005.

Next, the professional activity of women was at 51,1% in 1996. Within the years it was also declining and finished with the level of 48,1% in 2005.

It must be added that the highest percentage of the unemployed, so women as men, is of a primary education and the lowest of a higher education.

3. The condition of unemployment in United Europe countries

The problem of unemployment is also familiar to many prosperous countries of the United Europe. In some countries of the United Europe, the unemployment rate has been higher than in Poland, however, thanks to well-functioning governments this process desisted. The level of unemployment in the UE is presented on the chart 3.

On the basis of the data presented on the chart, the highest unemployment occurs in Poland at the level of over 18% whereas the lowest in Ireland, at 4,3%. On the basis of the data it can be claimed that Polish market is not sufficiently conformed to the requirements and the European level.

As showed in the research done by Central Office of Statistics in Poland, women are characterized by the lower employment rate than women in majority of United Europe countries. Such countries are: Great Britain, Finland, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands. There are also United Europe countries where the women's employment rate is higher than in Poland, such as: Italy, Spain and Greece. It should be emphasized that the women's unemployment rate in the United Europe is lower than in Poland. The data concerning the professional activity in United Europe countries are presented on the table 1.

Fig. 3. The unemployment rate in the UE (February 2005)



Source: self-study based on publication: Eurostat „New Release" 6/2005.

Table 1. The women's professional activity rate in United Europe countries in 2005

Countries	Employment rate	Women's professional activity rate
Austria	69,0	48,7
Belgium	59,9	41,0
Cyprus	68,5	60,2
the Czech Republic	65,5	56,2
Denmark	75,9	71,0
Estonia	62,0	59,0
Finland	68,1	63.9
France	62,9	56,2
Greece	56,7	43,2
Spain	58,4	46,7
the Netherlands	74,4	65,6
Ireland	65,0	54,7
Lithuania	59,9	58,1
Luxembourg	63,6	42,1
Latvia	60,4	58,2
Malta	53,7	36,3
Germany	65,4	59,2
Poland	51,5	47,8
Portugal	68,2	61,4
Slovakia	56,8	52,8
Slovenia	63,4	58,7
Sweden	73,6	71,6
Hungary	56,6	51,1
Great Britain	71,7	63,2
Italy	55,5	41,8
the United Europe	64,2	56,1

Source: self-study based on Eurostatu Yearbook 2005 data, European Commission Luxemburg 2005, p. 40.

As a result of presented findings, the women's unemployment rate so in Poland as in the rest of the United Europe is higher than the men's unemployment rate. The difference is that Polish women, more frequently than men, are threatened by the long-lasting unemployment whereas in United Europe countries the long-lasting unemployment period mainly affects men.

4. Conclusion

The problem of unemployment has been one of the most important problems since the beginning of system changes in our country. Unemployment appeared in Poland after a fifty year break. This occurrence has been memorized by the old, going back in their mind to the period before the second world

war. During that period many families were wrestling with threat against livelihood. Contemporary society remembers other times, when work, often badly paid, was available for everybody.

Current unemployment, which has been growing very fast, became a phenomenon on a mass scale which drove to a bad situation on the labour market.

One of the most significant features of unemployment is its variety under regional review. The most difficult situation is in regions of former state-owned farms. The dwellers of the regions are at the lowest level of education and professional qualifications. Unemployment affected also provinces which dealt with only one branch (e.g. mining, shipbuilding, textile industry).

The time length of being jobless has a significant meaning for the unemployed because it decides not only on their economic situation but also on social attitude towards job searching. Prolonging awaitness for employment can drive to the lack of willingness to work, that is professional passiveness.

Easing the results of unemployment requires using various policies depending on the unemployed group.

The primary actions should be based on employment agencies following the penetrating into the local market, establishing and maintaining the best contacts with employers.

Employment service, trainings and retrainings, public works, business activity loans, the elicitation of graduates and special programmes, like BEST-aimed at technical academy students and the Youth for Europe or foreign apprenticeships are numbered among the forms of counteracting unemployment and easing its results.

It should be stated that an employment promoting programme in the United Europe is the European White Book – the try of the new strategy. The main aim was to create 15 million of new workplaces and the decline in unemployment by half. The thesis of this programme has been presented in the White Book titled "Growth, Competitiveness, Employment". Employment determines the integral element of three mainstays concerning the UE strategy: economic growth, competitiveness improvement and creating new workplaces. The condition for employment and unemployment decline is achieving the appropriate economic growth, improvement in competitiveness of United Europe countries' economy.

In order to achieve this goal, the economic growth must be aimed at creating new workplaces.

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Streszczenie

STAN I SPECYFIKA BEZROBOCIA W POLSCE I W KRAJACH UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

Bezrobocie stanowi jeden z najtrudniejszych problemów społeczno-gospodarczych. W Polsce do roku 1989 nie występowało zjawisko bezrobocia. Problem stanowił nie nadmiar chętnych do pracy, lecz ich niedobór. Transformacja gospodarki, która rozpoczęła się w 1990 roku doprowadziła do drastycznych zmian na rynku pracy. O zmniejszeniu liczby pracujących w gospodarce narodowej zadecydowały przede wszystkim procesy zmian własnościowych, restrukturyzacja niektórych dziedzin gospodarowania, przeobrażenia organizacyjne w przedsiębiorstwach oraz zmiany w stosowanej technice i technologii.

Problem bezrobocia nie jest także obcym zjawiskiem wielu dobrze prosperującym krajom Unii Europejskiej. W niektórych państwach Unii Europejskiej stopa bezrobocia była wyższa niż u nas, jednak dzięki sprawnie funkcjonującym rządom została obniżona.

Łagodzenie skutków bezrobocia wymaga stosowania różnorodnych programów w zależności od grupy bezrobotnych i rodzaju bezrobocia.

RESTRUCTARIZATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL IN THE ASPECT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS

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Introduction

National healthcare systems all over the world are facing difficulties connected with vocational training and maintenance of medical staff. Leading motive of the International Health Day in 2006 was the crisis of human resources in the health service. In developed countries the need for healthcare employees is constantly increasing which is caused by the process of ageing of societies and higher and higher number of lingering diseases. Recruiting qualified workers from developing countries appeases this need, to a higher and higher extent. The World Health Organisation estimates that currently medical personnel in the world amounts to ca 59 mln people, in that number 39.5 mln is higher and middle medical personnel, and 19.5 mln is managing and auxiliary personnel. World's lacks of staff in the healthcare sector amount to 4 mln people. The situation is additionally made worse by irregular set of medical personnel in particular countries and regions[1].

The basic problem affecting the state of healthcare system, and the situation of medical personnel in Poland is many years of poor financing. Expenses on health care in 2004 at the level of 677 USD per capita are one of the lowest in Europe. Countries of similar economic and social development devote much higher amounts of money to health care, e.g.: Slovakia – 777 USD per capita, Hungary – 1105 USD per capita, the Czech Republic – 1298 USD per capita. A similarly big distance separates Poland from other countries, if we take into consideration the ratio of expenses on health care to Gross National Income. In Poland in 2004 general expenses made 6% of GNI, in the Czech Republic – 7.5 % of GNI, and in Hungary – 7.8% of GNI. With generally low level of general costs of health care, expenses from public sources make less than 75%

[1] *Working for Health. An Introduction to the World Health Organization*, World Health Organization 2006, s. 6

of these expenses (ca 4% of GNI), undercoming a descent in the period of system transformation form the level of 92% in 1990[2].

The biggest share in budgetary expenses on health care (38%) belongs to training of medical staff, i.e. 1.5 bln PLN. These sources are devoted to undergraduate education at medical universities as well as to postgraduate education – in the form of obligatory practice and specializing education, also in the resident system[3].

According to the Bologne Strategy, in the recent few years medical universities have been changing from single MA studies to two-level education. An exception are the following faculties: doctor, dentist and pharmaceutical, which are led as single MA studies. The limits of admission to medical studies are yearly set by the Minister of Health in the form of a resolution[4]. The general number of students, full time as well as part time, financed by the state budget, in the universities supervised by the Minister of Health, is systematically increasing during last years. This increase is caused by incresaes at faculties: nursing, obstetric, doctor and physiotherapic. The biggest increases in the number stating the limit of admission – over 5% yearly in comparioson to the past year – take place at the faculty of nursing in the form of full time studies of the first degree. In the last two years universities established for nurses adn midwives so called bridge studies, led in the form of part time studies, with the purpose of completing the eudcation to BA degree. These studies last from 1 year to 2.5 years. In the 2005/2006 academic year more than 2.5 thousand people were clasped by this form of education.

The financing of postgraduate education of medical staff takes place mainly through financing residential posts for doctors to let them get their specialization. The number of residential posts is set on the base of vacant training places in training units and of the request for evidences of given special services in particular regions of the country, announced by provincial and national consultants. The biggest number of residential posts is given in fields recognized as priorities: GP, clinic oncology, pathomorphology, medical rehabilitation, geriatrics and epidemiology[5].

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[2] *Informacja dla Sejmu RP o sytuacji w ochronie zdrowia*, Rada Ministrów, Warszawa, 23 maja 2006r., s. 21

[3] Ustawa Budżetowa na rok 2006 z dnia 17 lutego 2006r. (Dz.U. Nr 35, poz. 244)

[4] Ustawa z dnia 27 lipca 2005r. – Prawo o szkolnictwie wyższym, art. 6 ust. 3. (Dz.U. Nr 164, poz. 1365 z późn. zm.), rozporządzenie Ministra Zdrowia z dnia 22 czerwca 2006r. *w sprawie limitów przyjęć na studia medyczne* (Dz.U. Nr 114, poz. 779)

[5] *Informacja dla Sejmu RP o sytuacji w ochronie zdrowia*, Rada Ministrów, Warszawa, 23 maja 2006r., s. 56

The structure of employment

The situation of medical personnel in Poland is a result of the model of financing of the health care sector. Processes of employment restructurization in the health care sector, that began in the 1990's, were connected with the reform of the system and the shift form a budgetary model into an insurance model and then entering the EU. System changes and the European integration process coerced the reform of education, caused the development of particular specializations, the decrease in employment in others and appearance of new specializations, e.g. GP.

The basic indicator characterizing the health care resources is the number of doctors out of the number of citizens. In Poland in 2003 general number of doctors with the right to do their job was 122429, i.e. 3,21 per 1000 inhabitants. In most of comparable countries this indicator was somewhat higher: the Czech Republic – 3.5, Germany and France – 3.4. A lower indicator is shown in Great Britain – 2.2.

Table 1. The number of employed doctors – indicator per 1000 inhabitants in chosen EU countries 1995 – 2002

Country	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
The Czech Republic	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.4	3.4	3.5
France	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3
Germany	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.3
Hungary	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.1	-	-	3.2
Poland	**2.3**	**2.4**	**2.4**	**2.3**	**2.3**	**2.2**	**2.2**	**2.3**
Spain	2.5	2.8	2.9	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.0	2.9
Sweden	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.0	-	-
Great Britain	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.1

Source: elaboration of CSIOZ on the basis of OECD Health Data 2004

The number of nurses and midwives in Poland is distinctively lower than the average for EU countries. In 2003 the number of nurses with the right to do their job was 265200, and midwives – 32276, i.e. 6.94 and 8.5 per 1000 inhabitants. In the space of 1 year (from 2003 to 2004) ca 3800 nurses and midwives net left the health care system. There are many reasons for that state of things, most of all: retirement (60% of nurses are over 40 y.o. and 20% are over 50 y.o.), migration, taking up jobs outside the health care sector. According to Government's Centre for Strategic Studies the lack of nurses in the health care

system will estimate ca 61 thousand[6]. Simultaneously, the changes going on in the demographic structure (ageing of the society) are increasing the need for nursing, rehabilitation evidences and long term care.

Table 2. The number of employed nurses – indicator per 1000 inhabitants in chosen EU countries 1995 – 2002

Country	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
The Czech Republic	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.9	9.2	9.4
France	6.1	6.2	6.2	6.4	6.5	6.7	7.0	7.2
Germany	-	-	9.2	9.4	9.5	9.6	9.7	9.9
Hungary	8.0	8.0	7.9	8.1	7.9	8.0	8.3	8.5
Poland	**5.5**	**5.6**	**5.6**	**5.5**	**5.1**	**4.9**	**4.8**	**4.8**
Spain	5.8	6.3	6.3	6.2	6.5	6.4	6.5	7.1
Sweden	8.5	8.4	8.2	8.3	8.4	8.8	-	-
Great Britain	7.9	8.2	8.1	8.4	8.8	8.8	9.0	9.2

Source: elaboration by CSIOZ on the basis of OECD Health Data 2004

Additional burden for the Polish health system may be directive 93/104/EEC, which states basic daily dimension of working time for medical personnel as 8 hours, and maximum weekly time as 48 hours, including duties[7]. The need for staff connected with implementing this directive and the necessity of shortening the working time of doctors are considerable in some countries, e.g. Germany – 25 thousand, the Netherlands – 10 thousand, Great Britain – 3.7 thousand[8].

The working time of medical personnel in Poland is regulated by a law act of June 26, 1974 – *Kodeks pracy* and a law act of August 30, 1991 *o zakładach opieki zdrowotnej*[9]. According to these regulations the working time of workers employed in the health care unit in a given turnover period cannot exceed 7 hours and 35 minutes per day and, on average 40 hours per week. Besides doctors and others with certificates of higher education, employed in the health care units dedicated to people whose state of health demands giving them

[6] *Informacja dla Sejmu RP o sytuacji w ochronie zdrowia*, Rada Ministrów, Warszawa, 23 maja 2006 r., s. 63; *Biuletyn Statystyczny Ministerstwa Zdrowia*, CSIOZ, Warszawa 2005 r.

[7] Dyrektywa 93/104/EWG z dnia 23 listopada 1993 r. dotycząca niektórych aspektów organizacji czasu pracy (Dz. Urz. WE L 307 z 13.12.1993, z późn. zm.)

[8] *Praca profesjonalistów medycznych w krajach UE*, [w] *Służba Zdrowia*, nr 31-34/2004r., s.34

[9] Ustawa z dnia 26 czerwca 1974r. – *Kodeks pracy* (Dz.U. z 1998r. Nr 21, poz. 94, z późn. zm.), ustawa z dnia 30 sierpnia 1991r. *o zakładach opieki zdrowotnej* (Dz.U. Nr 91, poz. 408, z późn. zm.)

all day attention, may be obliged to do their medical duty in that unit. The number of duties cannot exceed 2 of them weekly and 8 of them monthly, but the time on duty is not included in the working time, which is not agreeable with the directive 93/104/EEC. Till now there has not been carried out any analysis concerning the consequences of implementing that directive.

The level of payment

The level of payment for medical personnel in particular countries is the result of the economic development level, the way of organizing the health care, the role and size of private and public sector and the power of influence of medical community. The Ministry of Health and The National Health Fund do not have a direct influence on the level of payment of medical personnel, which is the result of individual negotiations with the managers of the unit.

The survey of payments in the health care and in chosen economic fields made by GUS indicates the fact that payments in the health care shape at a lower level than payments in other spheres. Average monthly gross salary of health care employees in 2004 (i.e. regular payment and payment for duties and working overtime) was 1850 PLN (GUS data), whereas in the other sectors of national economy was 2368 PLN and in the budgetary sphere 2455 PLN. It means that health care employees receive income that is lower by 25% than in the budgetary sphere and in the whole national economy.

Fig. 1. The payment of employees working full time in October 1998, 2001, 2002, 2004



Source: own elaboration on the basis of *Raport – Finansowanie ochrony zdrowia w Polsce – Zielona Księga*, Ministerstwo Zdrowia, Warszawa, 21grudnia 2004 r., *Informacja dla Sejmu RP o sytuacji w ochronie zdrowia*, Rada Ministrów, Warszawa, 23 maja 2006 r.

Payments in particular groups of medical jobs are varied. The doctors' and pharmacists' payments are higher by 30% than the average salary. Average monthly gross payment for doctors in October 2004 was 3120 PLN, which stated 132% of the average payment in the economy. The level of rewards varies because of an unsteady location of medical staff in particular provinces and in urban and rural areas. The biggest average payment is given to doctors in Lubuskie province (4516 PLN) and the lowest – in Podlaskie province (2385 PLN).

Average monthly gross payment for nurses in October 2004 was 1662 PLN and was lower by 30% than the average payment in the national economy. The distance between the payments of nurses and the average gross payment in the national economy is getting bigger year by year; in 1998 it was only 6%[10]. In particular provinces the nurses' salary varies not so much, as in the case of doctors (the range is about 300 PLN)[11].

Fig. 2. The salary of full time job groups in October 1998, 2001, 2002, 2004



Source: own elaboration on the basis of *Raport – Finansowanie ochrony zdrowia w Polsce – Zielona Księga*, Ministerstwo Zdrowia, Warszawa, 21grudnia 2004 r., *Informacja dla Sejmu RP o sytuacji w ochronie zdrowia*, Rada Ministrów, Warszawa, 23 maja 2006 r.

[10] *Raport – Finansowanie ochrony zdrowia w Polsce – Zielona Księga*, Ministerstwo Zdrowia, Warszawa, 21 grudnia 2004 r., s. 93

[11] *Informacja dla Sejmu RP o sytuacji w ochronie zdrowia*, Rada Ministrów, Warszawa, 23 maja 2006 r., s. 90

Underpaying of the work place results in multi post of work of medical personnel. 8% of nurses, 14% of midwives, 20% of analysts and pharmacists own more than one work place and 85% of doctors have on average 2 work places. Obligatory law regulations allow different forms of employment of medical personnel. Besides a full time contract there are also civil-legal contracts. This tendency is caused by the aspiration to decrease the personal costs in health care units. Payments of medical personnel state a very important position on cost accounting – on average 30% – 40% of general costs of a given health care unit. It is becoming more and more common to do the job in the form of self-employment. Currently there are registered 65 thousands of doctors' practices and 21 thousands of dentists' practices[12].

Medical professional organizations for a few years have been attracting attention to urgent need of increasing the payments in the health care. The first trial of introduction of a system solution in this case was a law act of December 16, 1994 *o negocjacyjnym systemie kształtowania przyrostu przeciętnych wynagrodzeń u przedsiębiorców oraz o zmianie niektórych ustaw,* called *ustawa 203*[13]. This law act states that the employees of independent health care units are given the opportunity to have a rise in their monthly salaries, not lower than 203 PLN monthly since January 1, 2003 and 313 PLN in 2002 counting to the full time employment time. As the National Chamber of Control stated, the resolutions of *ustawa 203* were realized to a very low extent. 7.9% of the general amount of liabilities of independent health care units, which on December 31, 2005 was 5027 mln PLN concerns obligations towards employees (395 mln PLN), in this 163 mln PLN as the result of *ustawa 203*[14].

In the announcement on January 6, 2006 the 8th National Doctors' Congress indicated the decrease in the youth's interest in studying medicine and more and more common facts of leaving a job amongst doctors and increasing occurrence of emigration motivated economically. Simultaneously doctors appealed to the government for immediate planning of the real path of considerable rise of expenses on health care and accepting all the costs of doctors' training as the costs of gaining their income[15].

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[12] *Raport – Finansowanie ochrony zdrowia w Polsce – Zielona Księga*, Ministerstwo Zdrowia, Warszawa, 21 grudnia 2004 r., s. 88

[13] Ustawa z dnia 16 grudnia 1994 r. *o negocjacyjnym systemie kształtowania przyrostu przeciętnych wynagrodzeń u przedsiębiorców oraz zmianie niektórych ustaw* (Dz.U. Nr 1, poz. 2, z późn. zm.)

[14] *Informacja dla Sejmu RP o sytuacji w ochronie zdrowia*, Rada Ministrów, Warszawa, 23 maja 2006 r., s. 72

[15] Apel Nr 1 VIII Krajowego Zjazdu Lekarzy z dnia 6 stycznia 2006 r. *w sprawie wynagrodzeń za pracę lekarzy i lekarzy dentystów,* [w] *Biuletyn Naczelnej Rady Lekarskiej*, nr 1(96) Rok XVII, Warszawa, II 2006, s. 11

By the Act 12/06/V from March 17, 2006 National Doctors' Council demanded qualifying the payments of doctors as the multiplicity of an average monthly gross payment in the sector of enterprises: at least twice as much for the doctor without specialization, at least twice and a half as much for the doctor with the first grade specialization and three times as much for the doctor with the second grade specialization. Simultaneously NDC indicated the need for qualifying a transparent way of evaluation of medical evidences, counting in this its personal costs[16].

In reply to protests of medical community, on July 13, 2006 the Seym of Polish Republic accepted a law act *o przekazaniu środków finansowych świadczeniodawcom na wzrost wynagrodzeń*. The law act states 30% increase of payments in the units supplying medical services financed from the collections paid to obligatory health insurance. The basis of counting the financial resources are defined by the appendix to the law act, indicators of the share of work costs of particular kinds of health care evidences in the size of obligations resulting from contracts with National Health Fund. The increase of payments is to assume all employees, no matter of their form of employment. The amount of individual rises will be set by managers of units but will vary according to current salaries of employees. There will be also set legal guarantees that additional financial resources will not be used for other purposes[17].

The European system of professional qualifications acceptance

Joining the EU by Poland changes the social and economic situation of medical personnel. The basis of integration processes is the rule of free persons flow and freedom of services, through The European System of Recognizing Professional Qualifications. This system is based on directives describing general system of recognizing qualifications and so called sector directives, which regulate recognizing qualifications in medical professions (doctor, dentist, nurse, midwife, pharmacist)[18]. Sector directives state that all the Member Countries of the EU introduce the principle of an automatic recognizing of basic

[16] Uchwała Nr 12/06/V Naczelnej Rady Lekarskiej z dnia 17 marca 2006 r. *w sprawie realizacji uchwały Nr 14 Krajowego Zjazdu Lekarzy z dnia 7 stycznia 2006r. w sprawie uregulowania minimalnej płacy dla lekarzy i lekarzy dentystów*,[w] *Biuletyn Naczelnej Rady Lekarskiej*, nr 3(98) Rok XVII, Warszawa, IV 2006, s. 3

[17] *Sprawozdanie Komisji Zdrowia o rządowym projekcie ustawy o przekazaniu środków finansowych publicznym zakładom opieki zdrowotnej na wzrost wynagrodzeń osób zatrudnionych w tych zakładach (druk nr 671) oraz poselskim projekcie ustawy o przekazaniu środków finansowych świadczeniodawcom na wzrost wynagrodzeń (druk 673)*, Druk nr 753, Warszawa 11 lipca 2006 r.

[18] Directives No 77/452/EEC, 77/453/EEC, 78/686/EEC, 78/687/EEC, 80/154/EEC, 80/155/EEC, 93/16/EEC

qualifications, i.e. recognizing of diplomas, certificates and other documents confirming formal qualifications in the field of medicine. In the case of doctor and dentist there is additionally a principle of automatic recognizing of specialization qualifications.

Automatic recognizing of graduate diplomas and owned professional qualifications is possible thanks to regulations included in the directives of the EU which harmonize education, through detailed stating of programmes of studies, kinds of specialization and scientific degrees. These directives state demands, which are to be fulfilled by professionalists in member countries. People performing medical professions are obliged to show documents confirming their qualifications (diploma, the right to do the job, a confirmation of specialization gaining), statement about the state of health, positive ethic behavior and statement about the knowledge of language assuring right performing of the profession. Besides in most of the EU countries there is required an obligatory registration in the adequate professional organization.

The condition on which the qualifications in the profession of a nurse are given owns higher education with MA title or BA title with at least 3 years of professional practice or secondary education with at least 5 years of professional practice. In the EU there is a tendency to educate nurses solely at the university level. It is caused by the necessity for proper professional preparation. The role of nurses in the health care system is increasing year by year. This state of things results from undergoing demographic changes (ageing of the European society) and wider and wider use of modern medical technologies.

Poland achieves only 50% of the European level of nurse employment. In the years 1994 – 2000 the number of graduates of nursing schools decreased by 7 times from the level of 14 thousand to 2 thousand persons. The deficit in the nursing staff may become one of the biggest threats for the quality of health care in Poland[19].

The basis for estimating the scale of potential migration of medical personnel is the analysis of the number of issued statements that enable to recognize professional qualifications in other European countries. Since May 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005 there were issued 4.2 thousand statements to doctors which constitute 3.6% of the number of active doctors in Poland and 2.4 thousand to dentists which constitute 4.6% of the number of active dentists. The number of issued statements is biggest in the specializations: anesthesiology and intensive therapy and surgery. The lowest interest of undertaking the job in other European community countries is indicating doctors with specializations: neonatology, pediatric neurology, diabetology, septic diseases, and clinical oncology. Due to the data of Nurses and Midwives Primal Board,

[19] S. Golinowska, *Pożądane kierunki zmian systemu ochrony zdrowia w Polsce. Między racjonowaniem i racjonalizacją*, CASE, Warszawa 2004 r., s. 24

in the period since May 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005 nurses and midwives were given 4.5 thousand statements allowing to go after employment in EU countries which states 1.4% of all registered nurses and midwives[20].

Table 3. The amount of statements issued to doctors for the purposes of qualifications acceptance in the doctor profession in other EU countries during the period May 1, 2004 – June 30, 2005

Specialization	The number of practicing doctors	The number of issued statements	Issued statements to the number of doctors [in %]
Anesthesiology and intensive care	3723	436	11.71
Plastic surgery	140	13	9.28
Thoracic surgery	213	19	8.92
Stomatology surgery	25	2	8.00
Vessel surgery	223	15	6.72
Rescue medicine	413	26	6.29
Radiology and graphic diagnostics	1799	108	6.00
Hematology	220	11	5.00
Orthopedy and motion organ traumatology	2150	105	4.88
General surgery	5229	216	4.13

Source: *Informacja o wynikach kontroli funkcjonowania systemu przygotowania kandydatów do zawodu lekarza,* The Highest Controlling House; Work, Social Issues and Health Department, KPZ-41008-2005, No 10/2006/P/05/KPZ, Warsaw, February 2006

The analysis of the number of statements issued for the need of recognizing qualifications shows that the outflow of specialists does not have a massive character. However there are specializations in which the migration is considerable and may be a threat for functioning of the health care system. The problem of lack of medical staff has already appeared in western provinces (emigration to Germany) and southern provinces (emigration to Slovakia and the Czech Republic).

Conclusions

The SWOT Analysis of the health care system, carried out by the Ministry of Health, indicates strong sides of the system, i.e. first of all well – qualified medical staff and good scientific – didactic base (80% of doctors with specialization, in this 50% – with the second grade specialization). The weak side of the system is not suiting the way of health care and human recourses functioning to

[20] *Informacja dla Sejmu RP o sytuacji w ochronie zdrowia*, Rada Ministrów, Warszawa, 23 maja 2006 r., s. 96

the changes in social, demographic, epidemiological and economic conditions; low payments of medical personnel and corruption. The chance of Polish health care system is not fully used potential of human resources however one of the biggest threats is more attractive abroad financial offer for the medical staff[21].

Recognizing of professional qualifications of citizens of particular EU countries in other EU countries means a full freedom of moving and work practicing. Persons looking for work can practice in the country that they have the biggest development opportunities and most profitable finance conditions. In the EU countries the costs of living and taxes are usually high, however doctors belongs there to the society of high salaries and the doctor profession is socially ennobling.

The economic state of health care system and the European integration process demand the necessity for transfer the reforms of health system. It is necessary to prepare regulations concerning the policy in the area of education and human resources management in health care system concerning work time norms and other organizational norms, rules of medical staff payments and the mechanism of motivation and ways of professional promotion. The reform of education and personal policy in health care should go in the direction of raising the professional and economic position of medical staff, otherwise European integration (the rule of free person flow and freedom of providing services and qualifications recognizing) and competition from other economy sectors will in the nearest time cause outflow of medical staff from the profession and abroad.

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[21] *Strategia rozwoju ochrony zdrowia w Polsce na lata 2007 – 2013*, Ministerstwo Zdrowia, Warszawa, 21 czerwiec 2005 r., s. 36

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Streszczenie

RESTRUKTURYZACJA ZATRUDNIENIA PERSONELU MEDYCZNEGO W ASPEKCIE PROCESU INTEGRACJI EUROPEJSKIEJ

Artykuł jest próbą analizy aktualnej sytuacji prawno – ekonomicznej personelu medycznego w Polsce, w aspekcie procesu integracji europejskiej. Autor zestawia przyjęte w Polsce rozwiązania prawne z uregulowaniami unijnymi, przedstawia aktualną strukturę zatrudnienia wraz z czynnikami, które ją warunkują. W świetle analizy czynników warunkujących – charakter i poziom finansowania sektora ochrony zdrowia, system kształcenia kadr medycznych, możliwości zatrudnienia oraz realny poziom wynagrodzeń – podjęta jest próba oceny szans i zagrożeń sektora zdrowotnego wynikających z procesu integracji europejskiej.

Narodowe systemy ochrony zdrowia na całym świecie borykają się z trudnościami związanymi ze szkoleniem zawodowym oraz utrzymaniem swojej kadry medycznej. W krajach rozwiniętych stale wzrasta zapotrzebowanie na pracowników ochrony zdrowia spowodowane postępującym procesem starzenia się społeczeństw i coraz wyższą liczbą zachorowań na choroby przewlekłe. Zapotrzebowanie to, w coraz wyższym stopniu, zaspokajane jest w drodze rekrutacji wykwalifikowanych pracowników z krajów rozwijających się.

Niekorzystna sytuacja personelu medycznego w Polsce jest konsekwencją modelu finansowania sektora ochrony zdrowia. Zapoczątkowane w latach 90-tych procesy restrukturyzacji zatrudnienia w sektorze ochrony zdrowia związane były z reformą systemu i przejściem z modelu budżetowego do modelu ubezpieczeniowego. Zmiany systemowe oraz proces integracji europejskiej wymusiły reformę kształcenia, spowodowały rozwój określonych specjalizacji, zmniejszenie zatrudnienia w innych oraz pojawienie się nowych specjalizacji, np. medycyna rodzinna. Uznawanie kwalifikacji zawodowych obywateli poszczególnych krajów Unii Europejskiej w innych krajach członkowskich UE oznacza pełną swobodę przemieszczania się oraz wykonywania zawodu. Osoby poszukujące pracy mogą wykonywać zawód w tym kraju, w którym mają największe możliwości rozwoju i najkorzystniejsze warunki finansowe. Polityka personalna w ochronie zdrowia powinna iść w kierunku podniesienia pozycji zawodowej i ekonomicznej personelu medycznego, w przeciwnym wypadku integracja europejska (zasada swobodnego przepływu osób i swoboda świadczenia usług oraz uznawalność kwafilikacji) oraz konkurencja ze strony innych sektorów gospodarki, spowodują w niedługim czasie odpływ kadry medycznej z zawodu i z kraju.

ASPECTS OF LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION IN THE PROCESS OF GLOBALIZATION OF SOCIETY

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The overwhelming majority of scholars assert that globalization is "not a new phenomenon" (Zemlyanova,1999:59), as it was manifested at different stages of history: in Ancient World (during the reign of the Roman Empire), in Middle Ages, in the period of geographical discoveries when the „colonial globalization" set in.

Yosyp Los (Los, 1997:105), for example, considers that informative society has always existed though the information content was not always the same. The term „globalization" has been used since the end of the 60s of the XXth century. It is a common knowledge that it was introduced by the scholars who were the members of the so-called Roman Club (E. Laslo, D. Meadows, Mesarovic, A. Pechchei). They are considered to be the founders of the conception of globalization which today has turned out to be a metatheory. American researcher D. Maclean was the first who put this term in the center of conceptual constructions in 1981. In 1983 R. Robertson entitled one of his articles using this term and gives the detailed analysis of the notion of „globalization" and in 1992 he lays out the basic ideas of the conception in his special research (Zernetska, 1999:4). It was at that time when M. Waters remarked: „Likewise postmodernism was the basic concept of the 80s, the globalization under which implies the transition of humanity into the third millennium" can become the key idea of the 90s (Fukuyama, 1990:9). Thus, we can assume that the globalization is determined not only taking into account the functional potential, its scale, but also as the ideological, world view phenomenon. It was in the 90s of the 20th century that it acquired a universal character and via informational disproportion of the world may result in homogenization of earlier localized unique cultures whose weak communication channels do not guarantee either the adequate answer or information parity under the conditions of unilateral proliferation of communication streams.

Ch. Breterton (Los,1997:34) distinguishes four constituents underlying the process of globalization: the-so called „globalization of ideas", development of world economy, technological changes, political globalization. As we see, the

character of globalization combines both technological, and ideological properties. The principal reason of speeding-up globalization process consists in rapid development of communication technologies, namely, the invention of such a system of communication which works instantaneously and globally. No doubt, technologically conditioned possibilities of globalization are immense and considerable, though informative revolution has not made some considerable changes in the „complex of interdependence" (Shklyar, 1997:23). It has sharply multiplied the number of contact channels between communities, strengthened the transnational penetrating of information.

Despite the fact that the discussion on globalization is mainly waged in economic sense, recently it has appeared that globalization can touch the basic aspects of our culture and different aspects of our life generally. The transferring of theoretical possibilities of globalization on the real plane needs the agreement and indicates to the danger of simplification of multiplicity of world globalization, - „it is the world of clear-cut and ever more uneven distributing of wealth and vital chances, blurred and at the same time very unstable correlations of forces and authority, it is the world of antagonism and ideological differences which matter very much in the process of the search of identity" (Fukuyama,1990:76).

The system of global mass-media entailed the acceleration of cultural exchange. The traditional forms of life and ways of thinking can vanish in the process of these contacts. Let's try to determine the basic characteristics of globalization as we see them.

1. The world becomes more homogeneous. Differences between people disappear.

2. Time and space factors are getting pressed. Our ideas of geographical space and chronologic time are refuted by speed of modern communication technologies and mass-media.

3. The global policy with transnational movements of social and political character has come into being where plenary powers of subjects of the union are displaced from the national states to the superstates, transnational and international institutions.

4. The language world view is changing. Numeous new concepts which arise as a result of globalization require to be named and are represented by neologisms in language.

For the past ten years globalization has been considered as the phenomenon that is treated in a very broad sense: „world trade, all-embracing communication space, world competition, uncontrolled moving of capital and labour force activity of transnational companies, possible world changes in the environment protection and so on" (Yakovleva,1994:9).

Manuel Castels in the trilogy „Informative Age: Economy, Society, Culture" (Mirus, 1999:34) proves that the real technological pre-conditions

of a new socium (the scientist consciously uses the term „the informational society" so that at the morphological level to show its heredity in relation to post-industrial society) is informational globalizing capitalism" the guarantee of which is the cosmopolitan elite who owns an informative capital and lives by interests of this globalization.

Cosmopolitanism of this elite is intensified by the fact that under its control the knots of informative streams of network can occupy transborder position, while ordinary people live locally - in towns and their countries.

The multitude of communication systems that expose self-sufficient mobility, is the evidence of plurality of the world informative space, its polyphony. The more various in the informative dimension the world is, the richer it becomes, the more chances for its development it has, the more effectively it uses the spiritual inheritance, exposes a positive dynamics toward knowledge which is inseparable from the aspiration to trespass the borders of one nation, one ideology.

Modern tendencies of globalization may be considered, at least in two planes. The first is related to actually objective influences of globalization on different levels of reality. The second one concerns the cognitive dimension of the process under consideration when the society creates its own identification systems and with their help determinate the content of globalization. While studying this problem the two planes should be taken into account, regardless of the degree of their similarity.

In the identification process it is not only the readiness (ability) of public organism to expose informative mobility, but also the context (conditions) of its realization that matter, that is geoinformational situation of the world, the direction of informative streams, their character and intensity, in particular.

For any man the problem of preserving the individuality and at the same time not to be isolated from the world in informative space is especially important. It is proved that under modern conditions the identification is not only a notion denoting "the system of ideas but also the corresponding feelings of the people as for their language in its ethnic, cultural and political dimensions" (Potcheptsov, 2000:98), but also the bilateral process of self-consciousness and self-realization (the status of presence) of languages in the world and awarenesses by the world community of its uniqueness. That is, the process of search for identity is directed to the internal, and to the outer world. An individual is looking for identity, on the one hand, through equation with social culture, on the other hand, through preserving his separate „ego".

Often the development of information technologies is associated with the tendency of creating of communication space in which the communication subjectivism is lost and technological development faces ever greater contradiction with traditional mechanisms and values which can lose their ability to react adequately to global tendencies.

The role of information is growing nowadays, communication industry has become the most dynamic industry of modern economy and is one of the basic sources of investments, the access to front-rank technology of communication is increasing. As a result today it is possible to observe not only polarization of the world material income, but also informative income which makes impossible even starting possibilities for each of the informative systems.

Global information technologies having come into being require the revision of concept of informative streams, the systems of communication on the whole taking into account how important is a national language, the spirit of the nation, traditions and its role in future for the society, i.e. informative mobility of the people.

At a certain stage the mobility of information is provided by a man, but in its genesis a human organism is not informatively self-sufficient, unlike some animals the genetic program of which foresees the transferrence of necessary information to survive and continue the gene. „Probably, a new-born child has some disposition for the language of parents, however it inherits only respiratory and sucking reflexes" (Rizun, 2000:34).

The informative program of language is not encoded at the genetic level of man. A person needs an information environment in order not to lose the language, the culture, to be able to identify himself in the world context. It is not by chance that living organisms have the ability to accumulate and concentrate in space around themselves the necessary information for their self development.

At the first identification stage by means of informative channels the feeling of „I" and „not I" is formed. At the second stage the psychological construction „I - We" is established. The first stage determines the individuality, the second one is the pre-condition of community, social integration. At the third stage a person identifies himself on the principle „We - They", that is there is the psychological model of interethnic relations. Thus, a man can be named homo communicans („a communication creature". „Actually high spirituality, national consciousness, morality, a person obtains through information, through educational and enlightenment process, i.e. by means of mastering a vertical stream of information (knowledge) - from parents, teachers, educators, leaders and so on, i.e.s at the level of family, collective, nation, state" (Rizun, 2000:43).

The localization of informative communications is traced at the level of family, small collective, to put it differently, at the level of subsystems, that make up the public system. Taking this into account, it is possible to admit that ontologically important place of realization of informative mobility (at least on a vertical line) is the communication system and its subsystems (domestic, family circle, etc.) within the limits of which information gets the status of „intellectual framework and spiritual potential of the nation" (Los,1997:97).

The threats to separate linguistic systems which arise from globalization of informative environment have become the subject of the detailed analysis in non -English scientific and political world. It is because of the fact what Internet can do with a language that French president Jacque Chirac called the global network of computer communications the „most risky for humanity" (Rizun, 2000:13).

However the scientists assert that globalization of communication space will not destroy the identity of the people only because the „main system forming factor of the nation is preserved: sociable community of language" (Petriv, Slisarenko, 1998:145]. The thing is that in the epoch of informative globalization the most stable is only a language and its comounicative possibilities to support in people national identity even under the conditions when they have not the outlined territory of residence, i.e. when geodeterministic principles of identification fail.

A language, especially the developed one, remains an important attribute of self-assertion and determinant of invisible national borders. „In the world which is subjected to cultural homogenization by means of the ideology of modernization and the power of global media a language as direct expression of culture becomes the means of defence of cultural survival, the last bastion of self-control, a depository for the identification value" (Zernetska, 1999:39). In this case the nation is incarnated in common images of language where the first category is „we", the second - „us", the third - „they".

The Johann Gotfrid von Herder considered that a language helped a man to perceive internal „I" and simultaneously served the means of linking with its people. Collective experience of every people passes to the future generations remaining at the level of the unconscious and realized in individual independence. To be perceived by individual consciousness, the „ethnic archetypes should be verbalized, i.e. expressed" (Los, 1997:102).

From the linguistic point of view the assimilation potential of virtual reality can be determined, if one resorts to the etymology of this term. The notion „virtual reality" contains a paradox, as already etymology of this word (from Lat. virtus - „truth") conflicts with its meaning, which for the bearer of ordinary consciousness is a synonym to „imaginary one, fictitious, illusive".

The essence of the paradox consists in that since the beginning of the XXth century under the influence of philosophy of absolute idealism the classic philosophical dilemma: „what is primary: the matter or the consciousness" has tested substantial losses. The questions about the matter and the consciousness were substituted for other contrasting pair: language/reality. The fundamental difference of the first position from the second one consists in that it carries not metaphysical but semiotic character. Thus, reality is contrasted now not to consciousness or spirit but language which is also a part of reality, as besides the semantic plan (meaning and sense) it possesses the plan of expression.

The peculiriaty of the philosophy of the XX-th century that to the question „What can one rely on: reality or language?", it answered as follows: a language is more fundamental, because it is simpler arranged, than reality. In addition, reality is unthinkable beyond the scope of language, the very word „reality" is a part of language. That is why artificial illusive reality was called virtual: it is nearer to language, than to „reality", consequently - more real than reality.

A language not only nominates reality, but also gives it certain meanings, identifies it. „Beyond the language it is impossible to perceive a real life, to understand the real ties among realia, the way to reality lies through language and its adequate (Rizun:18).

The linguists W. Humboldt and O. Potebnya understood the language as an intermediate means with a help of which a man cognizes and creates the world. If the former scientist considered that appearance of the fixed language was explained by influencing of national spirit which pierces consciousness of the man by means of the language, the latter determined the interdependence of spirit and language: „spirit is impossible beyond the language, as it is created by it and speech is an initial event" for it (Inozemtsev, 2000: 28). O. Potebnya asserts that non-linguistic reality does not exist. A language creates unique links between a man and reality.

It was still in the 20s – 40s of the XXth century when American linguists E. Sapir and B. Whorf (Pocheptsov,1999:39] developed the hypothesis of linguistic relativity according to which no language is determined by reality, and reality is determined by language. In other words, every language divides reality in its own way. The relations between the language and the world or between the utterance and the state of affairs are transformed into the relations between the subject and the object.

The nature of many phenomena is of linguistic origin. Language reality is much accelerated with a help of linguistic means. Once a language is lost the people lose other identification signs: customs, traditions, mentality, perception of the world. Borrowing alien linguistic constructions it simultaneously borrows the alien world outlook.

In a general this theory was expressed by E.Sapir as follows: „People live not only in the world of things and not only in the world of public activity; they are found to be under the influence of that language which is the means of intercourse for the given society.

In fact „the real world" to a great extent is unconsciously built on the basis of linguistic norms of a definite group. We see, we hear and we perceive in any case those or other phenomena mainly due to the linguistic norms of our society which foresee the given form of manifestation" (Petriv, Slisarenko, 1998:143).

We should admit that the social essence of language consists in the existence of social and individual consciousness. Accordingly, a language collective, on the one hand, and an individual, on the other hand, are beares of culture in language. A collective as an ethnos or a nation and an individual are extreme points on the conditional scale of language consciousness.

The bearer of the language consciousness is a language personality, which means that a man exists in the language, in the language space, in the act of the communication, in the stereotypes of behaviour fixed in language, in the meaning of the language units. The study of the language personality in Russian linguistics is associated with the name pf Y.N.Karaulov, who understands the language personality as „a combination of the abilities and characteristics of the man, which condition the creation of the texts for them" (Karaulov, 1987). We may broaden this statement by asserting that this combination can also contribute to the development and enrichment of vocabulary, which serves the labeling of objects in the outside world with words.

Language is the product of culture, and its use in society reflects people's cultural level. The human factor research got a new impact due to the study of the world view. The emergence of this paradigm in linguistics is aimed at the linguistic expression of the basic categories of the worldview, and the notion of change in particular.

Human thought is able to adequately reflect objective laws of world cognition and retain them in consciousness, in the conceptual sphere. But onle language is the means of wording the world cognition.

The concept 'worldview' has been in an extensive use by representatives of different sciences: philosophy, psychology, cultural sciences, gnoseology, cognitive science, linguistics. The term *worldview* was actually put forward within the framework of physics at the end of the XX century. It is assumed that it was H. Hertz who was the first to introduce this term, treating it as aset of internal images of external subjects, from which it is logically possible to receive the items of information about the behavoiur of these subjects (Postovalova, 1988). This term belongs to a number of fundamental concepts which express peculiarities of man's life, mutual relationships of man with the world, as well as major conditions of existence in the world.

Worldview is a complete, global image of the world, the result of man's whole spiritual activity. This image of the world arises as a result of a human activity, of na's cognition of the world. Possible 'worldview' may be viewed as a hidden (abstract thinking) and visible (form of a semiotic embodiment such as texts).

Worldview cannot be treated as a mirror display of the world, but only as its interpretation. The contacts of man with the world are always unique and individual. Worldviews are created through embodiment, judgment of images of the world, which underlie various abilities of man's existence, through

the creation of new images of the world owing to human reflections. Worldview is a synthetic unity of the subjective and the objective in the outlook of the man, the synthesis of the spiritual and individual with the cultural and historical. Human life experience is finite, and the world, the image of which is formed by man in the process of this experience, is infinite (Kardashchuk, 1997:207).

The world can be regarded, in general, as worldview, i.e. it can be described as a worldview on the whole (philosophy, religion, mythology) or a fragment of the world, its 'local' worldview (chemical, economic, lingual, mathematical, etc.). The growth of scientific worldviews resulting in the devaluation of the concept causes the washing out of its borders. Man cannot overcome the variety of worldviews, no matter what efforts are undertaken to reduce all world images to their invariants. The activity of man in different spheres of life provides a variety of worldviews. In our opinion, their quantity and monotony is not something menacing, but only induces and provides deep research of a certain area of human thinking.

Worldview is manifested in the consciousness of man; it is the secondary existence of the objective world. It is fixed and realized in the original material form. This material form is language which performs the function of the objectivity of individual human consciousness. The introduction of the concept of 'worldview' in linguistics is a symptom of the formation of gnoseology as a branch of linguistics. The concept of 'worldview' allows us to investigate the problem of the correlation between language and reality (Sukalenko, 1999:197) which is so topical in the epoch of globalization.

As O. Kornilov states, the emergence of the concept 'worldview is caused, at least, by two factors, which he names imperatives: cultural and linguistic. Wile the cultural imperative deals with extralinguistic and cultural factors of the development of the language, the liguistic imperative is associated with the interpretation of the results of practical work on the external structuring of the semantic fields, the establishment and systematization of the relations between then, with the practice of compiling ideographic dictioniries (Kornilov, 2003).

Different interpretations of worldview can be found in the works of already mentioned linguists such as W. Humboldt, B. Whorf and also L. Weisgerber. E. Coseriu, J. Trier and others.

There are no doubts as for the assertion that experience of language is a view on this world. As world is reflected in the consciousness of man, its experience is fixed in language. Therefore, direct (beyond the language) cognition of the world is impossible. But here is the problem of the relation of language to thinking is important.

Thinking, which is adequately capable of displaying laws of knowledge of the world and of keeping it in the consciousness, in the conceptual sphere, is a means of cognition of the world. But language acts as a means of reflecting

the thinking process. To separate language or the word from the action, from the sensual and practical relation of every personality to reality means to consider it a closed and an absolutely separate unit. Nevertheless, the individual always uses linguistic signs in a real situation. So, the statement about the relationship 'the world – language –consciousness' is not absolutely valid, as language is not placed between the world and thinking. Language cannot open the truth of life only through the form, through the matter of the sign. The laws of the world are displayed and are learnt only in the conceptual system of man. Language, first of all, is connected directly with thinking, and in the gnoseological aspect the relation 'language – thinking – world' is not correct; only the relation 'language and thinking – world' is valid. Obviously there is a need to consider the process of display of the world as a uniform language and thinking process. Therefore, it is necessary to understand a language picture of the world as 'a language and thinking picture of the world' (Boychuk, 1996:134).

It is necessary to note the conventionality of 'worldview'. This concept should mean a language embodiment of the world, the objective world, which includes also man as its essential constituent. Through verbal images and language models a complementary vision of the world takes shape. These models act as an additional source of cognition, judgment of reality and supplement to our general picture of knowledge, correcting it and being fixed in it. Thus, public consciousness is fixed in language, and texts, as results of thinking, are characterized by certain conceptual volume.

At the same time, language is characterized by the limitation of cognition, the system of 'matrices' of national identity. The conceptual mastering of the world both in terms of social individual experience are displayed in language. It is thus possible to specify that the understanding an consideration of the individual worldview of a certain man or a group of people should occur in the context of some general 'worldview' of people (Postovalova, 1988).

A language determines the models of national-cultural perception and conduct, provides their heredity. Similar problems are observed in the process of translation of texts. There is always some part which is not translated in the process of coding/decoding of the message.

Consequently, it is possible to assert that in the process of total globalization of society takes place both assimilation (community of conceptual base for the speakers of different languages) and the differentiation of linguistic conduct of a socium, conditioned by his national and cultural code take place. And only in symbiosis of contradictions, as they may seem at first glance, successful linguistic communication which presents heterogeneity of homogeneous world of globalization is achieved.

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Streszczenie

ASPEKTY KOMUNIKACJI LINGWISTYCZNEJ W PROCESIE GLOBALIZACJI SPOŁECZNEJ

Artykuł zawiera wyniki badań nad problemami komunikacji językowej w warunkach globalizacji społecznej. Globalizacja rozpatrywana jest jako ważny czynnik wpływający na rozwój społeczeństwa oraz komunikacji językowej. Komunikacja językowa w warunkach globalizacji posiada charakterystyczne cechy asymilacyjne i dyferencjalne, które są ważne dla reprodukcji kodu narodowo-kulturowego. Aspekty komunikacji językowej obejmują zarówno problem ogólnego obrazu świata oraz językowego obrazu świata w szczególności, o ile procesy globalizacji odzwierciedlają się w werbalizacji językowej otaczającej rzeczywistości.

PART III

DIRECTIONS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN NEW GEOPOLITICAL CONDITIONS

QUITE OPENLY ABOUT SYSTEMIC TRANSFORMATION

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The post-war economic history of our country has been full of flights and elation on the one hand, and breakdowns and bitterness on the other. Thus it is a process of visibly waving character. From the viewpoint of development harmoniousness and stability, this picture is not a positive one. Additionally, it concerns both macro- and microscale, and at the same time – in a different cross section – both real sphere and financial and monetary sphere. Why does it happen like that? I cannot answer this question in a satisfying way! Anyhow, this question relates not only to economists. A comprehensive analysis of the problem must be also joined by sociologists, historians, social psychologists, economic politicians, etc. I can only remind the main turning points that have shaped our history during the last decades (of course, within my knowledge and specialty).

Some history

Let us start from activities of the Central Office for Planning (Centralny Urząd Planowania) that was set up – under direction of Cz. Bobrowski – in the early second half of the 1940s! The Three-Year Plan of Economic Reconstruction of Poland was prepared within it. This was the only successfully implemented plan! It was accompanied by a universal conviction that in our country the so-called three-sector model was being created, including the state sector, the co-operative sector and the private sector, and that this would be the basis for operation of our economy. Unfortunately, the end of it was that during the ideological discussion between the Polish Worker's Party (PPR) and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) occurring in 1948, the whole solution was brutally criticised and rejected. As the consequence followed "the period of errors and perversions (as it was later referred to), based on the centralised system of orders and commands. Such a situation lasted until the mid-1950s.

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Harmfulness of the all-embracing centralisation of the economy underwent a total and at the same time comprehensive critical analysis during the

Second Convention of Economists in 1956. It was expressed by formulation – e.g. by E. Lipiński and W. Brus – of postulates to use widely the law of value, decentralisation of economic decisions, and independence of enterprises. Then M. Kalecki also presented fundamentals of his theory of growth. Moreover, the Economic Council under direction of O. Lange came into life and it published Theses on Some Directions for Model Changes and Draft Theses on Principles of Price Shaping. We felt happy and jubilant.

Yet, our happiness was not long-lasting! In the course of time the mutual relations between economists and the authorities were becoming tenser and tenser until the latter decided to solve the problem in an abrupt and radical way. Namely, using accusations of revisionism, they led to the situation that in 1968 – during the so-called „March events" all „unruly" scholars were removed from universities, not only economists, but also sociologists and philosophers. Some of them, unable to stand the terror, left Poland. Repressions were also suffered by some representatives of literature and art. It may have been the most shameful episode in the history of our country...

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The revenge of fate (if this can be described like that), however, came pretty soon. At the turn of 1970, following the so-called „December events", a general change to the authority circles took place. The team of E. Gierek took the floor. Each man and each nation have the right of hope of and faith in a better future. Thus our community has such a right as well. Hence, when the first secretary asked the famous question: „Will you help?", a univocal choir responded: „We will help!". People were hopeful.

Anyhow, at the very beginning all seemed to go successfully. And although the new authorities did not condemn, unfortunately, the results of „the March vendetta", changes to the operational mechanism of the economy, however, were accepted with trust – firstly, introduction of the WOG system (**W**ielkie **O**rganizacje **G**ospodarcze – Large Economic Organizations) – especially that a visible growth of living standard took place. The pace of economic growth increased as well. That was the picture of the first half of the decade.

A fairly unexpected breakthrough occurred when the Government decided in 1976 to increase prices of meat. The community reacted so abruptly that they had to withdraw from the price increase. That event, however, was, as it turned out, the beginning of manifestation of several contradictions inherent in the economy. It became evident that WOGs were unable during their activity either to sort out the price system, or to unify the planning system, and this obviously adversely affected balance and stability of the economy. This was accompanied by State indebtedness, enormous for the time (disclosed slightly later by the Finance Minister – M. Krzak). As it was stated by M. Mieszczankowski, almost full decomposition of the WOGs took place.

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The turn of 1980 was the beginning of the period when there were subsequent attempts to revive the socialist economy and to put it into the right rails. This was initiated by the Fourth Convention of Economists under the slogan: „The reform cannot fail". Scientific circles prepared projects concerning reconstruction of the economic system, basing, e.g. on socialisation of planning, independence of enterprises, consolidation of the market, multiplicity of economic sectors and democratisation of socio-political relations. The problems of structural choices got also involved, and within them – such presentation and selection of investments to enable removing the so-called narrow cross-sections. This was accompanied by an officially prepared programme of balancing the economy by means of stimulating the supply increase, and consolidation of money, reconstruction of price and income structure, as well as introduction of important changes to the range of local self-government role and that related to operation of enterprises. However ...

However, the projects and plans listed here failed to be implemented. For public feelings were increasingly deteriorating and the overwhelming majority of the community lost their faith in socialist order and were fed up with everything. It was only one step away from the Round Table, from entering into specific agreements within it and as the final consequence – from **the systemic transformation.**

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And thus we have passed to the proper subject of our deliberations, i.e. to description of the said systemic transformation. It started on 1st January 1990 with proclamation of L. Balcerowicz's Programme. Its essence consists in construction of market capitalistic economy, i.e. based on private ownership, spontaneously shaping prices, and competence.

As it has been stressed by Z. Sadowski, in such a country like Poland, i.e. with a low level of national income per capita, where it is necessary to liquidate the economic underdevelopment and to overcome the distance separating us from developed countries of Western Europe; **fast and sustainable growth** should be considered as the goal of economic policy. Only such growth determines a growth of employment, and remunerations and profits – and in this way also tax revenues – and in consequence possibility to finance the budget sphere (M. Nasiłowski)

Concerning dynamism of growth, as observed in our economy, very different periods may be noted here.

Thus, in the years 1990-1991 there was a decrease in the national income by 17.8% in comparison with the level of 1989, i.e. the last year of the socialist economy. In the next period – the years 1992-1995 – there was an increase

in income by 19.9% in comparison with 1991, i.e. the lowest level. On the other hand, it was in 1996 when for the first time the income of 1989 was exceeded by 4.8%. At the same time it must be stressed that two years of the highest until now average pace of growth – 6.5% - were 1996 and 1997. Unfortunately, a decrease followed until the growth pace reached ca. 1%!! in 2001, and 2% in 2002. The average of the subsequent three years, i.e. 2003-2005 – was 4.1%.

As it is seen, the pace of economic growth was substantially waving, and this is not a favourable phenomenon for stability of economy. Additionally, such waviness had nothing to do with economic cycles that feature capitalism.

The most fundamental issue, and all others, or almost all others, depend on it, is an answer to a question what the average yearly pace of growth was like in our country during the 16 years, i.e. the long-term pace of growth (measured, of course, not with simple percentage but component percentage)!?!. So it was ca. 2.3% ! This is undoubtedly – considering backwardness of Poland – the pace that is too low, giving us no chances in international competition.

Justifying this statement, we wish to refer to the concept of **minimal** pace of growth, undoubtedly very important from the viewpoint of economic policy and once formulated by M. Ostrowski and Z. Sadowski, mentioned above. Well, according to them, this is the pace below which we should not go due to social expectations and consequences. It depends on the population growth rate, minimal growth rate of consumption per capita, and its income conditions. The second element has been conventionally established in many countries at the level of 2% yearly, and the third element, expressing relations between growth paces of national income and consumption is ca. 1.09 in long terms. This means that a minimal pace of economic growth equals 2.18% (i.e. 2 x 1.09). Thus, as it results from this, our real long-term pace is very close to the minimal one!

And – such is the final conclusion - this is the fact that decidedly determines the character and picture of our transformation.

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The above is, however, supplemented by several other closely related elements. The most important one is the issue of **mass unemployment**, i.e. probably the greatest disaster that may occur in functioning of the community. Additionally, this phenomenon cannot be mixed up with obscured employment occurring during communist Poland – undoubtedly negative as well!

Thus the unemployment rate in our country was – according to Z. Dach – as follows: in 1990 – 1,126,000 persons, i.e. 6.3% of all capable of work; in 1993 – 2,890,000, i.e. 16.4%; in 1997 – 1,826,000, i.e. 10.5%; in 2003 – 3,176,000, i.e. 20% (it was the apogee). At the same time, it should be noted that a visible decrease in unemployment in 1997 was connected (similarly as the above mentioned pace of growth) with implementation of the Programme „Strategy for Poland" by G. Kołodko. It is also worth comparing here that

in 2003 the highest unemployment rate in Europe (outside Poland) of 11.4% was in Spain.

Especially dramatic and fraught with consequences is a high unemployment rate among youth, including also graduates from higher schools. It is said that in the last group as many as 42% of diploma holders cannot find employment.

One must be also aware (and B. Dallago once tried to turn attention to this) that privatisation process – so indispensable during the systemic transformation may contribute to decrease in employment! Privatisation process causes an increase in effectiveness of management within an enterprise. What is more, an increase in effectiveness is accompanied by, and connected with it into one entity, an increase in work output – undoubtedly positive in itself - that also contributes to reduction of demand for workforce. At the same time, if the phenomenon achieves a proper level – and it happens like that in our country – symptoms of **economic growth without employment** may occur. It is calculated that in order to avoid it the long-term economic growth must achieve the level higher than 4.2% yearly.

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In our country unemployment is associated with a **relatively low_level of living**. As E. Tarkowska reports, referring to the data of the Main Statistical Office (Główny Urząd Statystyczny – GUS), more than half of Poles live below the social minimum, and there is even a substantial sphere of extreme poverty, including persons living below the minimum of existence. This sphere was as follows during the last years: in 1994 – 6.4%; in 1996 – 4.3%; in 1998 – 5.6%; in 2000 – 11.1%; in 2004 – 11.8%. (The decrease after 1994 was associated with the previously mentioned Programme „Strategy for Poland"). At the same time the most difficult is the situation of families with many children. It is impossible not to mention the phenomenon of giving meals to children at schools, occurring in our country at a large scale. At the same time it is reported (e.g. by I. Jepkiewicz) that teachers earn extra money at hypermarkets (which is especially resounding!)...

The same problem in relation to the international plane has been referred to in the ranking of the EU Statistical Office Eurostat. In the analyses of the poorest regions of the European Union, carried out by it, there were as many as six our provinces (!) among the last ten, and the Land of Lublin held the last position. Other provinces: Podkarpackie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Opolskie were placed only slightly higher. The Mazowieckie Province was noted on the highest position among the Polish provinces and its GNP per capita amounted to 72.8% of the EU average (to compare – the richest region turned out to be London with 64,087 euro per capita).

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Since 1991 we have had a **budget deficit** (G. Kołodko). Also in this context it should be reminded that according to Maastricht Agreements, such a deficit should not exceed 3% of GNP. Unfortunately, it is much higher in our country, as it remains at the level of ca. 4.3%. It was expected that the deficit could be reduced to the size required by the Maastricht Treaty as early as in 2007, but unfortunately nothing has come out of it. At present the Government (including Deputy Prime Minister Z. Gilowska) takes the stand that in 2007 we will achieve 4.1% of GNP, in 2008 – 3.7%, and 3% only in 2010. The European Commission has some objections to such a solution – threatening with sanctions.

A vital question arises how such a situation could happen!?! Well, the question consists in the fact that in the twelfth year of the implemented systemic transformation, i.e. in 2001 there was an event carrying with it vital and long-lasting consequences. Namely, towards the end of the first decade of August there appeared a „budget hole" (as it was called then) of the amount that could – according to Minister J. Bauc – reach as many as 88b zł at the end of the year. In such conditions, due to dangers that the economy could face, the Government appointed a group of experts (W. Orłowski, A. Wernik, M. Misiąg and S. Kawalec), in order to make evaluation of the situation and to formulate proper conclusions. The analysis confirmed the threats and the commission expressed an opinion that rough treatment applied to the budget would be unavoidable, so that the deficit would not exceed 40b zł. All that cast an ominous shadow over activity freedom of future ministers of finances. A direct effect of it was dismissal of Minister J. Bauc and replacement of him by M. Wasilewska-Trenkner.

The above should be supplemented – as it was stressed by J. Lipiński – that balancing of the budget with expenditure cuts (and it happened like that!) must adversely affect the level of economic performance, and as a consequence the dynamism of GNP. Thus it is an action threatening with complications. Concerning the present situation, the Government plans to reduce the budget deficit to the level of 30b zł in 2007 (J. Jankowiak).

There is here, however, one more problem of great importance! Concerning budget expenditures, one should especially stress the role played by that part of them that is treated as **fixed expenditures**. Namely, they are expenditures that must be settled under the threat of losing financial credibility. The following are meant here: servicing costs of the public indebtedness; subsidies to social insurance; and payments of debts to banks (e.g. for housing credits) (A. Wernik). In the 1990s the share of them in the budget expenditures was steadily growing until it reached the level of ca. 68% in 2003 (A. Nowakowska). This means that they are much higher than expenditures on basic functions of the State, causing that this part of expenditures that are to affect favourably prosperity in the economy, or enhancement of favourable economic processes is, unfortunately, rather small (H. Goryszewski). In other words, it must be sta-

ted that possibilities of shaping budget expenditures are limited by fixed expenditures (J. Małecki). And that is why construction of the budget must obligatorily be started with meeting the last ones (M. Belka).

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Another problem is connected with **ownership of banks**. First of all attention was turned to the fact that concerning the share of foreign capital in our banks, which as early as in 1993 was less than 3%, increased as much as until 81% (A. Czekaj). It caused serious worries of some (although not all!) economists. Namely, they referred to an opinion that foreign capital in Polish banks should not exceed the level of 30-35%. At the same time they stressed that banks belonging to foreign capital follow their own interests and own criteria, hardly the same as the needs of the Polish economy. Such banks are interested in not only receiving dividend but primarily in their influence upon our economy, foreign trade, sales market, etc. That kind of sales – as it was emphatically called – of the banking sector to foreigners bereaves practically the Polish entrepreneurship of financial support. What is worse, decisions concerning operation of our banks are taken abroad. All that – as it is stressed – is contrary to our reason of state, because it means dependence of our country on foreign capital, and as a result inability to carry independent monetary policy by us, and - by the same – limitation of our sovereignty in this policy. At the same time – what is not less important – it may in some circumstances occur that some spheres of economic life, as well as regions, are bereft of credit (W. Jaworski).

And in this very context it is stressed with anxiety (S. Nieckarz) that Polish banks engage more and more often means of their deposit makers in securities (practically risk-free) rather than in credits for economic entities (risky). Thus a situation arises that banks do not want to take risk of granting credit despite their overfluidity, and businesses are less and less willing to take them due to their high price. And that is why, unfortunately – what is alarming! – Polish companies started to take credits abroad, and their debts for this have already amounted to over USD 24b (A. Mackiewicz, S. Nieckarz).

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And finally – last but not least – the issue of **investments**! This issue is fundamental for the economy, as not only the pace of economic growth, but also its character depend on proper solution of it. This concerns, of course, both private investments and State investments, in the material and non-material sphere. The matter consists in liquidation of technological and income gap between us and the West, and reconstructing the economic structure of the country. At the same time, however, difficulty is expressed in the fact that due to high unemployment and scarcity of means at disposal, the investment path – as it is stressed by W. Sadowski and W. Herer – must run two-way, i.e. in such a way that both an increase in jobs and an increase in work output should be

provided. Thus it is necessary on the one hand to create relatively cheap and simple much labour-intensive technologies, and on the other hand – and in connection with this – to implement technologies that are modern, highly efficient and substantially based on two-way (import and export) economic relations with abroad. The former facilitate solution of employment problems, whereas the latter provide premises for growth of work output and remunerations.

A very important, almost irreplaceable role is played in our country – and not only in ours! – by Direct Foreign Investments (DFI) that – as it is believed – is the most welcome form of capital influx into the economy (A. Liberska, M. Gorynia). We must be, however, aware that such investments affect our economy not only favourably but also unfavourably. On the one hand, they increase our capital resources and introduce modern technologies. On the other hand, however, they contribute to increase in import consumption of production, they transfer abroad substantial part of profits prior to taxation and they often liquidate more jobs than they create new ones (J. Kotowicz-Jawor); what is more, they play the key role in the process of multiplying deficit on the current turnover account (M. Belka). One cannot abstract either from the fact that the influx of direct foreign investments omits, unfortunately, regions and sectors that are often in the greatest need for supply with foreign capital (G. Garlińska).

During the 15 years (i.e. 1990-2004) the total influx of DFI to Poland amounted to ca. USD 71.3b, meaning that average yearly ones equalled to USD 4.75b (with some major deviations!). Whereas according to evaluation by specialists, the need of the Polish economy for foreign capital is estimated at USD 5-10b yearly (B. Liberska). In this context, however, one must answer the most basic question what Poland's picture is in this respect against the background of other countries!?

Well, in 2000 (and this was the top year!) USD 9.3b of DFI flew to Poland. In the same year, for example, USD 68.9b flew to Germany, USD 80.1b – to China, USD 82.5b – to UK, and USD 236.2b – to USA. We omit here, of course, means coming from internal accumulation in those countries. Thus it may be stated that capital primarily likes the great and the rich ...

For the total picture, it should be stressed that a very important role is played in operation and growth of our economy by this specific form of capital influx that is related to structural funds and funds of cohesiveness launched by the European Union. Various departments may have access to disposal of such funds – reminds M. Belka – of course on condition that they are able to formulate proper programmes of using them and that they will allocate sufficient amounts of own means for that purpose. Unfortunately – as it turned out – we are often unable to use effectively the means that flow to us (A. Chmielewska). And thus, e.g. in 1999 we received 303m euro from Phare funds, and out of them we used only 130m; in 2000 the data were 484m euro and 31m euro

respectively! Additionally, it is worth remembering that unused means are simply lost means.

We cannot forget either – what is strictly related to the above and what was noted by Minister M. Seweryński – that concerning the issue of our expenditures on R&D, conditioning our place in the international division of labour, in 2005, for example, we spent from the budget for that purpose only 0.33% of GNP, and adding to this all non-public means – 0.6% of GNP!!! And at the same time – as, e.g. say B. Snowdon and H.R.Vane – expenditures of that type oscillated in individual years in the United States from 2.32% to 2.74%, and in Japan – from 2.13% to 2.85%. What can be said here!?!

And to supplement the above I wish to add that the European Commission has recently published a Report on Summary Innovation Index (SII) concerning European and non-European countries. It results from it that within the former the leading positions are held by Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Switzerland, and concerning Poland it was placed, unfortunately, on 21 position (that is the fourth last position) in the European Union. We were overcome by Hungary (15 position), the Czech Republic, Slovenia and also Cyprus ...

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I am leaving for Readers to draw conclusions from and make reflections on the above presentations.

Streszczenie

O TRANSFORMACJI SYSTEMOWEJ BEZ OSŁONEK

W artykule dokonano, na tle szerokiego wprowadzenia historycznego, syntetycznej oceny uwarunkowań i barier transformacji systemowej w Polsce. Scharakteryzowano, eksponując przy tym wątki polemiczne i kontrowersyjne, koncepcje dążenia do osiągnięcia szybkiego i trwałego wzrostu gospodarczego, tendencje kształtowania się masowego bezrobocia, na tle stosunkowo niskiego poziomu życia, deficyt budżetowy, przekształcenia własnościowe banków, kwestię inwestycji, w tym zwłaszcza napływ bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych oraz wyeksponowano barierę niskiego udziału nakładów na B+R (zaledwie 0,6% PKB w 2005 r.). Jak wynika z opublikowanego ostatnio przez Komisję Europejską raportu nt. „Łącznego Indeksu Innowacyjnego" Polska uplasowała się, niestety, na 21 miejscu (czyli czwartym od końca) w Unii Europejskiej.

CURRENT OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS OF SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN POLAND

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Special economic zones in Poland were to soften social costs of structural unemployment and to ensure: development of specified fields of economic performance, of new technical and technological solutions and use of them in the national economy, development of export, competitiveness enhancement of manufactured goods and rendered services, development of the existing industrial property and economic infrastructure, creation of new jobs, and exploitation of unused natural resources with maintaining the rules of ecological balance.

Establishment of special economic zones may also result in unplanned **adverse effects** in the form of **substitution and displacement effects**[1]. The substitution effect occurs when an entrepreneur starts business in the zone at the cost of liquidation (or limitation) of his performance in another region, which certainly leads to reduction of his economic performance and demand for labour. The displacement effect, on the other hand, occurs when the system of reliefs and preferences granted to entrepreneurs in the zones ensures, thanks to reduction of their economic performance costs, their substantial competitive dominance over entrepreneurs performing outside the zone, leading to displacement of them from the market, which is of course followed by a loss of jobs for persons employed there. One must agree with an opinion that real operational effects of special economic zones can be neither forecast nor precisely described.

The paper tries to verify truthfulness of a hypothesis that the special economic zones in Poland have become to a larger extent an instrument of industry restructuring in regions suffering from unemployment than an instrument of the regional policy, aiming at creation of foundations for a long-term socio-economic development of least developed regions[2].

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[1] E. Kryńska: *Łódzka Specjalna Strefa Ekonomiczna. Szansa dla trudnego rynku pracy?* Rynek Pracy 2001, No. ¾, pp. 57-58.

[2] A.Cieślik, *Geografia inwestycji zagranicznych. Przyczyny i skutki lokalizacji spółek z udziałem kapitału zagranicznego w Polsce.* Warszawa 2005, p.104.

Until 30 May 2004 the total territory of the special economic zones could not exceed the area specified as of 31 December 2000, i.e. 6,325 ha; since 31 May 2004 there was a possibility to increase the total area of the zones by 1,675 ha, i.e. up to 8,000 ha, with a reservation that such an increase might be exclusively appropriated for realisation of large investments with outlays not smaller than 40 m Euro, or creating at least 500 new jobs. Whereas since 30 September 2006 it has been possible to increase the area of special economic zones up to 12,000 ha. As of 31 December 2005 25.7 bn zl were invested in the special economic zones (constituting an increase by 29% in relation to 2004), and 112,168 jobs were created (or maintained) (a respective increase by 50.5%). The development index for the special economic zones in Poland is 54.5%. The current zones cover the area of 8,012.88 ha (fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Special economic zones as per area in 2006
(As of 30 Apr.)



An important **barrier** for investment attractiveness of the special economic zones in Poland is a low level of investments on infrastructure. Such investments as calculated per 1 ha of the zone areas were only 0.15 m zl. In this respect only three zones are favourably distinguishable: the Legnicka Zone and the Wałbrzyska Zone (0.25 m zl each) and the Katowicka Zone (0.24 m zl). In the every second economic zone individual investments on infrastructure have not exceeded the level of 0.11 m zl: including 0.02 m zl each in the Starachowicka Zone and the Warmińsko-Mazurska Zone, 0.07 m zl in the Kamiennogórska Zone, and 0.09 m zl in the Krakowska Zone.

A characteristic feature of the Polish special economic zones is a high **degree of their dispersion,** as they lie (as of the end of October 2006) on the

territories of 174 administrative units, including 96 towns and 78 communes (table 1). For example, the Łódzka Special Economic Zone lies on the territories of 16 towns, the Katowicka Zone - 12, and the Warmińsko-Mazurska Zone – on 10. On the other hand, the Tarnobrzeska Zone includes 15 communes, and the Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka Zone – 12. Eleven special economic zones have their sub-zones on the territory of several provinces: the Tarnobrzeska Zone – of five (the Podkarpackie Province, the Dolnośląskie Province, the Lubelskie Province, the Mazowieckie Province and the Świętokrzyskie Province), the Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka Zone, the Łódzka Zone, the Starachowicka Zone and the Wałbrzyska Zone – of three, and the Krakowska Zone, the Mielecka Zone, the Pomorska Zone, the Słupska Zone, the Suwalska Zone and the Warmińsko-Mazurska Zone – of two. Dispersion of the zones in the system of provinces can be explained only to some extent by the change to the administrative division of the country (the Suwalska Zone and the Tarnobrzeska Zone). In case of the Tarnobrzeska Zone, reaching to sub-zones in Ożarów, Pionki and Radom (the Mazowieckie Province) and in Poniatowa (the Lubelskie Province) finds additional justification in experience of the company managing the zone (Agencja Rozwoju Przemysłu S.A. – Industry Development Agency Joint Stock Company) in restructuring of bankrupting companies. It may be concluded that there are at least two reasons for the high level of the zone dispersion:

a) Economic ones, as creation of a new zone would incur high costs of establishment of a new managing company,
b) The European Commission was advised of establishment of 14 economic zones (which was recorded both in the Accession Treaty and in the notified aid programmes), and that is why new investment areas are included, as a rule, into the nearest zone.

The spontaneous process of boundary formation for the special economic zones has led to many paradoxical situations, constituting and important **barrier** in management efficiency. For example, within the boundaries of the Mazowieckie Province there are sub-zones of the four zones: the Łódzka Zone, the Starachowicka Zone, the Tarnobrzeska Zone, and the Warmińsko-Mazurska Zone. Wrocław has sub-zones of the two zones: the Tarnobrzeska Zone and the Wałbrzyska Zone (compare table 2). Activity of the special economic zones in Poland is regulated by as many as 300 legal acts (table 3), including 63 passed in 2001, 53 in 2004 and 52 in 2005. Three special economic zones (the Katowicka Zone, the Łódzka Zone and the Wałbrzyska Zone) act pursuant to 24 legal acts, 23 orders were issued concerning the Tarnobrzeska Zone, and 22 acts regulate activity of the Warmińsko-Mazurska Zone. Exceptional instability of legal regulations is evidenced by the number of 5 orders issued within one year (in 2004 and 2005), changing the operational rules in the Wałbrzyska Zone and the Warmińsko-Mazurska Zone (in 2004). An odd "mess" in the said legal acts is best

proved by the fact that most orders concerning a development plan for a given special economic zone are already outdated on the date when they are issued.

Table 1. Location of the special economic zones in 2006.[a]

Item.	Zone **Province**	Zone area in ha	Including area for large investments	Zone location
1.	**Kamiennogórska** Dolnośląskie	240.80	0	**Towns:** Jawor, Kamienna Góra, Lubań and Piechowice **Communes:** Janowice Wielkie, Kamienna Góra, Lubawka and Nowogrodziec
2.	**Katowicka** Śląskie	1155.39	30.32	**Towns:** Bielsko-Biała, Częstochowa, Dąbrowa Górnicza, Gliwice, Jastrzębie-Zdrój, Katowice, Rybnik, Siemianowice Śląskie, Sosnowiec, Tychy, Zabrze, Żory **Communes:** Bieruń, Czechowice-Dziedzice, Czerwionka-Leszczyny, Godów, Pawłowice, Siewierz and Sławków,
3.	**Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka** Lubuskie, Wielkopolskie, Zachodniopomorskie.	806.89	284.46	**Towns:** Gorzów Wielkopolski, Gubin, Kostrzyn nad Odra, Nowa Sól, Poznań, Zielona Góra **Communes:** Barlinek, Bytom Odrzański, Chodzież, Czerwieńsk, Goleniów, Gubin, Karlino, Międzyrzecz, Police, Słubice, Swarzędz, Zielona Góra
4.	**Krakowska** Małopolskie, Podkarpackie	264.48	140.21	**Towns:** Kraków, Krosno and Tarnów **Communes:** Niepołomice and Zabierzów
5.	**Legnicka** Dolnośląskie	416.80	0	**Towns:** Chojnów, Legnica, Lubin, Polkowice, Środa Śląska and Złotoryja **Communes:** Gromadka and Legnickie Pole
6.	**Łódzka** Łódzkie, Mazowieckie, Wielkopolskie	511.64	51.28	**Towns:** Bełchatów, Koło, Kutno, Łęczyca, Łódź, Ozorków, Piotrków Trybunalski, Radomsko, Rawa Mazowiecka, Sieradz, Stryków, Tomaszów Mazowiecki Warszawa, Wieluń, Zduńska Wola and Zgierz, **Communes:** Ksawerów, Nowe Skalmierzyce, Sławno, Tomaszów Mazowiecki, Widawa, Wolbórz and Wróblew
7.	**Mielecka** Podkarpackie, Małopolskie	707.12	0	**Towns:** Dębica, Gorlice, Jarosław, Leżajsk, Mielec, Sanok and Zagórz **Communes:** Dębica and Laszki

8.	**Pomorska** Pomorskie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie	534.35	151.53	**Towns:** Gdańsk, Kwidzyn, Malbork, Starogard Gdański and Tczew **Communes:** Chojnice, Człuchów, Gniewino, Krokowa, Łysomice, Sztum and Tczew
9.	**Słupska** Pomorskie, Zachodniopomorskie	219.12	42.13	**Towns:** Koszalin, Słupsk and Szczecinek **Communes:** Debrzno and Słupsk
10.	**Starachowicka** Świętokrzyskie, Mazowieckie, Opolskie	329.74	0	**Towns:** Iłża, Końskie, Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski, Skarżysko-Kamienna, Starachowice, Suchedniów and Szydłowiec **Communes:** Mniszków, Morawica and Tułowice
11.	**Suwalska** Podlaskie, Warmińsko – Mazurskie	288.94	10.93	**Towns:** Ełk, Grajewo and Suwałki **Communes:** Gołdap and Suwałki
12.	**Tarnobrzeska** Podkarpackie, Świętokrzyskie, Dolnośląskie, Mazowieckie, Lubelskie	1074.11	296.99	**Towns:** Jasło, Pionki, Przeworsk, Radom, Stalowa Wola and Tarnobrzeg, **Communes:** Baranów Sandomierski, Gorzyce, Jasło, Jedlicze, Kobierzyce, Majdan Królewski, Nowa Dęba, Nisko, Ożarów Mazowiecki, Poniatowa, Połaniec, Rymanów, Staszów, Tuczępy and Wyszków
13.	**Wałbrzyska** Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Wielkopolskie	939.43	340.57	**Towns:** Dzierżoniów, Kłodzko, Kudowa-Zdrój, Nowa Ruda, Oława, Świdnica, Wałbrzych, Wrocław **Communes:** Brzeg Dolny, Jelcz-Laskowice, Krotoszyn, Nysa, Oława, Skarbimierz, Strzegom, Strzelin and Żarów,
14.	**Warmińsko-Mazurska** Warmińsko – Mazurskie, Mazowieckie	524.07	216.64	**Towns:** Bartoszyce, Elbląg, Lidzbark Warmiński, Mława, Morąg, Mrągowo, Nowe Miasto Lubawskie, Olsztyn, Ostróda and Pasłęk **Communes:** Bartoszyce, Dobre Miasto, Olecko and Szczytno
	In total	**8012.88**	**1565.06**	

a) As of 31 October. The list also considers changes introduced by the Order *by the Ministers' Council of 27 October 2006 on the Łódzka Special Economic Zone.* Dziennik Ustaw – Journal of Law No. 200, item 1473.
Source: Own work.

Table 2. The area of the special economic zones as per provinces (as of 31.10.2006)

Province	Total area of special economic zones on territory of a given province	Area of special economic zones with board seat located in a given province	Area of sub-zone / area of special economic zones with board seat located in another province
	In hectares		
Dolnośląskie	1775.16	Wałbrzyska – 835.60 Legnicka – 416.80 Kamiennogórska – 240.80	**Starachowicka:** ▪ Kobierzyce – 281.96
Podkarpackie	1283.60	Mielecka – 677.72 Tarnobrzeska- 602.50	**Krakowska:** Krosno – 3.38
Śląskie	1155.39	Katowicka – 1155.39	
Warmińsko – Mazurskie	646.96	Warmińsko-Mazurska: 485.16	**Suwalska:** ▪ Ełk –104.65 ▪ Gołdap – 57.16
Pomorskie	545.24	Pomorska – 399.40 Słupska – 145.84	
Lubuskie	526.95	Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka – 526.95	
Łódzkie	456.81	Łódzka – 452.78	**Starachowicka;** Mniszków 4.03
Świętokrzyskie	383.02	Starachowicka – 286.02	**Tarnobrzeska:** Staszów – 97.00
Małopolskie	290.50	Krakowska – 261.00	**Mielecka:** Gorlice –29.40
Zachodniopomorskie	213.28		**Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka:** Karlino –50.00 Barlinek – 43.56 Goleniów – 33.61 Police – 12.00 **Słupska:** Koszalin – 31.15 Szczecinek – 42.13
Wielkopolskie	210.30		**Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka** Poznań – 47.76 Swarzędz – 79.91 Chodzież – 16.27 **Wałbrzyska:** Krotoszyn – 36.32 **Łódzka:** Nowe Skalmierzyce – 28.88 Koło – 5.16
Mazowieckie	177.16		**Tarnobrzeska:** Radom – 90.65 **Warmińsko-Mazurska:** Mława – 38.91 **Łódzka:** Warszawa – 24.82 **Starachowicka:** Szydłowiec – 13.50 Iłża – 9.27

Kujawsko-Pomorskie	134.95		**Pomorska:** Łysomice –134.95
Podlaskie	127.14	Suwalska – 127.14	
Opolskie	84.42		**Wałbrzyska:** Skarbimierz – 62.74 Nysa – 4.77 **Starachowicka:** Tułowice – 16.91
Lubelskie	2.00		**Tarnobrzeska:** Poniatowa 2.00
In total	**8 012.88**	**6 613.00**	**1 399.78**

Source: Own work.

Table 3. Number of elementary[a] legal acts regulating operational rules in the special economic zones in Poland in the years 1994 – 2006

Zones	In total	Including in years:												
		1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Mielecka	21	0	3	1	2	0	0	0	4	1	2	4	4	0
Katowicka	24	0	0	2	2	1	0	2	4	3	1	4	3	2
Suwalska	19	0	0	2	3	0	0	1	3	1	0	4	5	0
Legnicka	18	0	0	0	4	0	0	1	4	1	1	4	1	2
Łódzka	24	0	0	0	4	1	0	1	4	1	2	4	4	3
Wałbrzyska	24	0	0	0	4	0	1	1	4	1	1	5	5	2
Częstochowska	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka	20	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	4	1	1	4	5	1
Słupska	16	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	4	1	1	3	2	1
Tarnobrzeska	23	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	4	1	3	4	5	1
Warmińsko-Mazurska	22	0	0	0	4	0	1	1	4	1	1	5	5	0
Kamiennogórska	16	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	4	1	0	3	4	1
Starachowicka	15	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	4	1	0	3	2	1
Tczew	8	0	0	0	1	3	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0
Żarnowiec	8	0	0	0	1	3	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0
Mazowiecka	4	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Krakowska	16	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	4	1	0	3	3	1
Pomorska	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	2	3	3	1
SEZ	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	1	1
SEZ in total	**300**	**1**	**3**	**5**	**33**	**24**	**5**	**12**	**63**	**16**	**16**	**53**	**52**	**17**

a) Statutes and orders including in their names the term"special economic zones".
Source: Own work.

In the examined period of time 103 corrections of boundaries and areas of the special zones were made, including 20 cases of balanced changes to the zone boundaries (without changing its area), and in the next 12 cases such a correction did not exceed +/- 1 ha. The highest (over 100 ha) increases in areas occurred in the zones: the Tarnobrzeska Zone (282 ha) in 2005, the Legnicka Zone (218.4 ha) in 2001, the Starachowicka Zone (174.2 ha) in 2001,

the Katowicka Zone (154.3 ha) in 2001, the Krakowska Zone (140.9 ha) in 2005, the Mielecka Zone (122.1 ha) in 2001, and in the Warmińsko-Mazurska Zone (105.1 ha) in 2004. On the other hand, the highest single area loss occurred in 2000 in the Suwalska Zone (100.5 ha).

Three zones had their boundaries corrected as often as three times during one year: in the Tarnobrzeska Zone (in 2003) and in the Warmińsko-Mazurska Zone in 2004 (for example in January the zone area was reduced by 39.5 ha, in April by next 25.2 ha, whereas in October the area was increased by 105.1 ha) and 2005, and in the Łódzka Zone (in 2006). In 11 next zones the boundaries were corrected at least twice during a year: in the Mielecka Zone (in 2003 and 2004), the Katowicka Zone (in 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2006), the Suwalska Zone (in 2004 and 2005), the Legnicka Zone (2004 and 2006), the Wałbrzyska Zone (2004, 2005 and 2006), the Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka Zone (2004 and 2005), the Tarnobrzeska Zone (2004 and 2005), the Starachowicka Zone (2005), the Krakowska Zone (2005) and in the Pomorska Zone (in 2004). An interesting example in the said context is provided by the Tarnobrzeska Zone, where in 2005 a correction of the area was made after only one month (an increase by 12.4 ha since 23 September and a new increase by 282 ha since 28 October).

In 2006 16 changes to the area of the special economic zones were made (their area increased by 454.6 ha in total), including the zones: the Łódzka Zone (three times), the Legnicka Zone, the Wałbrzyska Zone (an area increase by 193.53 ha), the Katowicka Zone (twice), the Kamiennogórska Zone, the Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka Zone, the Krakowska Zone, the Pomorska Zone, the Słupska Zone, the Starachowicka Zone, and the Tarnobrzeska Zone (reduction of the area by 310.8 ha).

According to the rules of the European Union, aid may be directed exclusively to the zones that are to stimulate development of regions. Moreover, the EU criteria ascribe a special importance to the requirement of the **uniformly specified and compact area of the special economic zone.** They exclude in practice directing aid to a specific place – point-wise, in separation from a complex programme for development of a given region. Also from the viewpoint of the World Trade Organization creation of dispersed zones is not allowed.

The research leads to a paradoxical conclusion that it is not special economic zones that attract foreign investments, but on the contrary – **it is foreign investments that determine the area of economic zones.** This is evidenced by a tendency observed for two years to establish sub-zones of the special economic zones in cities with the lowest maximal intensity of public aid in Poland: in Warsaw and Poznań (with intensity of 30%), and Krakow, Wrocław and Gdańsk (40% respectively), whereas the maximal intensity of aid in poland is 50%.

As of the end of 2005 in the special economic zones a total of 767 valid licences were given, including 175 in 2005. The highest number of licences was

given in the zones: the Katowicka Zone (118), the Tarnobrzeska Zone (81), the Mielecka Zone (73), the Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka Zone (70, including 25 in 2005), and the Suwalska Zone (62). On the other hand, the smallest number of licences was given in the zones: the Krakowska Zone (21), the Kamiennogórska Zone (26) and the Słupska Zone (27). In 2005 175 licences were given (to compare - 98 a year before), including 71 in three zones: the Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka Zone (25), the Katowicka Zone (24) and the Wałbrzyska Zone (22).

As it results from the data quoted in table 4, almost 60% of investment outlays were concentrated in the three zones: the Katowicka Zone (30%), the Wałbrzyska Zone (17.9%) and the Legnicka Zone (10.8%). For over half of the zones the said share is lower than 5%: in the Słupska Zone (0.5%), the Starachowicka Zone (1.4%), the Krakowska Zone (1.8%), the Suwalska Zone (1.9%), the Warmińsko-Mazurska Zone (2.3%), the Kamiennogórska Zone (2.4%), the Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka Zone (4.0%) and the Tarnobrzeska Zone (4.2%).

Table 4. Investment outlays in the special economic zones in the years 2001 -2005[a]

Item	Zones	Years						Dynamism	
		2001	2002	2003	2004	2005		2004/2003	2005/2004
		In m zl					Share in %	In %	
1.	Kamiennogórska	17.8	39.3	84.0	318.8	606.0	2.4	379.5	190.1
2	Katowicka	3 406.1	5 648.2	6 113.1	6 631.9	7 713.9	30.0	108.5	116.3
3	Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka	392.8	424.5	622.8	784.3	1 039.3	4.0	125.9	132.5
4	Krakowska	158.4	233.0	311.0	395.4	463.1	1.8	127.1	117.1
5	Legnicka	1 157.5	1 658.2	2 011.6	2 346.5	2 780.5	10.8	116.6	118.5
6	Łódzka	576.0	637.7	740.5	1 191.7	2 061.8	8.0	160.9	173.0
7	Mielecka	1 779.1	1 978.4	2 093.8	2 240.5	2 363.2	9.2	107.0	105.5
8	Pomorska	396.2	546.4	666.4	1 126.5	1 428.8	5.6	169.0	126.8
9	Słupska	33.6	73.1	81.7	108.1	135.6	0.5	132.3	125.4
10	Starachowicka	82.1	114.2	152.8	292.0	372.5	1.4	191.1	127.6
11	Suwalska	289.0	325.0	355.5	399.9	478.1	1.9	112.5	119.6
12	Tarnobrzeska	276.5	353.6	499.0	708.3	1 070.5	4.2	141.9	151.1
13	Wałbrzyska	675.9	987.9	1 434.0	3 263.3	4 596.5	17.9	227.6	140.9
14	Warmińsko-Mazurska	45.8	66.8	102.7	120.0	597.2	2.3	116.8	497.7
	In total	**9 286.8**	**13 086.3**	**15 268.9**	**19 927.2**	**25 707.0**	**100.0**	**130.5**	**129.0**

a) Increasingly, as of 31 December.

Sources: *Specjalne strefy ekonomiczne. Stan na 31 grudnia 2004 r.* Ministerstwo Gospodarki i Pracy, Warszawa 2005, p. 15. *Specjalne strefy ekonomiczne na koniec 2005 r.*

The highest dynamism of investment outlays, in relation to 2004, was in the zones: the Warmińsko-Mazurska Zone (497.7%), the Kamiennogórska Zone (190.1%), the Łódzka Zone (173.0%) and the Tarnobrzeska Zone (151.1%) – cf. fig. 2.

Fig. 2. Structure of investment outlays in 2005



In the special economic zones there were investments by investors coming from 25 countries, including almost ¾ of investments of investors from four countries: USA (21.3%), Poland (20.7%), Germany (16.3%) and Japan (14.4%).

Almost 85% of all investment outlays in the special economic zones were concentrated in seven branches: of transport equipment (as many as 37%), of paper and paper products (11.7%), rubber and plastic products (9.3%), products from remaining non-metallic raw materials (8.2%), electrical and optical equipment (7%), metal and metal products (5.8%), and wood and wood products (5.8%). The sector of transport equipment has the dominant position in the branch structure of the zones: the Legnicka Zone[3] (76.3%), the Katowicka Zone[4] (67%), the Wałbrzyska Zone[5] (51.5%) and the Tarnobrzeska Zone[6] (36.3%). Investment outlays, as per branches, incurred in 2005 are illustrated by fig. 3.

[3] Volkswagen Motor Polska Sp. z o.o. (1, 060.3 m zl) and Sitech Sp. z o.o. (472.3 m zl).

[4] Opel Polska Sp. z o.o. (1,630.1 m zl), FIAT-GM POWERTRAIN POLSKA (1,448.4 m zl), "Isuzu Motors Polska" Sp. z o.o. (524.4 m zl), Delphi Polska Automotive System (220.4 m zl) and TENNECO Automotive Eastern Europe (143.8 m zl)

[5] Toyota Manufacturing Poland Sp. z o.o. (1,326.0 m zl) and Toyota Motor Industries Poland (365.4 m zl).

[6] Stahlschmidt & Maiworm Sp. z o.o. (190.8 m zl).

Fig. 3. Structure of investment outlays in 2005 as per branches



The highest investment intensity (investment outlays in m zl per 1 ha) distinguishes the zones: the Legnicka Zone (15.9, against the average for all zones of 5.6), the Katowicka Zone (10.8), the Wałbrzyska Zone (7.7), the Łódzka Zone (7.6) and the Pomorska Zone (5.6).

In the special economic zones, as of the end of 2005, there were 112,200 jobs (including 73.4% of the created jobs), meaning an increase by 50.45% in relation to 2004 (table 5). Almost 2/3 of the jobs fall to five zones: the Katowicka Zone (19.3%), the Wałbrzyska Zone (16. %), the Mielecka Zone (9.8%), the Tarnobrzeska Zone (9.2%) and the Pomorska Zone (9.1%). To compare, 21,700 jobs in the Katowicka Zone (or as it has been noticed 19.3%) correspond to the sum of jobs in six special economic zones: the Słupska Zone (1.4%), the Kamiennogórska Zone (2.1%), the Suwalska Zone (3.3%), the Krakowska Zone (3.4%), the Starachowicka Zone (4.3%) and the Legnicka Zone (4.8%). The highest dynamism of employment, in relation to the previous year, was in the zones: the Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka Zone (413.1%), the Warmińsko-Mazurska Zone (371.6%), the Krakowska Zone (258.5%), the Starachowicka Zone (210.9%), the Łódzka Zone (175.8%), the Wałbrzyska Zone (174.2%) and the Słupska Zone (158.4% - also cf. Fig. 4).

Fig. 4. Structure of jobs created in 2005



Table 5. Jobs in the special economic zones in 2005[a]

Item	Zones	2005			Share in % in number of jobs		Dynamism in % 2005/2004
		In total	maintained	new	In total	New	
1.	Kamiennogórska	2 329	73	2 256	2.1	2.7	120.7
2	Katowicka	21 690	495	21 195	19.3	25.5	124.8
3	Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka	7 241	4 648	2 593	6.4	3.1	413.1
4	Krakowska	3 823	1 481	2 342	3.4	2.8	258.5
5	Legnicka	5 385	216	5 169	4.8	6.2	111.2
6	Łódzka	5 380	838	4 542	4.8	6.5	175.8
7	Mielecka	11 003	967	10 036	9.8	12.1	120.0
8	Pomorska	10 152	3 651	6 501	9.1	7.8	122.4
9	Słupska	1 541	333	1 208	1.4	1.5	158.4
10	Starachowicka	4 830	1 844	2 986	4.3	3.6	210.9
11	Suwalska	3 739	0	3 739	3.3	4.5	115.6
12	Tarnobrzeska	10 306	4 213	6 093	9.2	7.3	132.7
13	Wałbrzyska	18 789	7 485	11 304	16.8	13.6	174.2
14	Warmińsko-Mazurska	5 960	3 631	2 329	5.3	2.8	371.6
	In total	**112 168**	**29 875**	**82 293**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**150.5**

a) Increasingly, as of 31 December.

Sources: *specjalne strefy ekonomiczne. Stan na 31 grudnia 2004 r.* Ministerstwo Gospodarki i Pracy, Warszawa 2005, p. 16. *Specjalne strefy ekonomiczne na koniec 2005 r.*

In the special economic zones 82,300 new jobs were created, and out of them half fell to three zones: the Katowicka Zone (25.5%), the Wałbrzyska Zone (13.6%) and the Mielecka Zone (12.1%). On the other hand, the highest share of the maintained job number (in the general number of jobs in a given zone) is in the following zones: the Warmińsko-Mazurska Zone (60.9%), the Tarnobrzeska Zone (40.9%), the Wałbrzyska Zone (39.8%), the Starachowicka Zone (38.2%) and the Pomorska Zone (36%).

On average 24 jobs fall per 1 ha of the special economic zone area. The following zones are distinguished by indexes higher than the average: the Pomorska Zone (40), the Wałbrzyska Zone (32), the Legnicka Zone (31), the Katowicka Zone (30), and the Tarnobrzeska Zone (27). To compare, in the Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka zone 16 jobs fall per 1 ha. Average investment outlays on creation, or maintaining, of one job are illustrated in fig. 5.

Fig. 5. Average cumulated investment outlays per creation or maintaining one job (In m zlotys, as of 31 Dec. 2005)



The Polish special economic zones violate some criteria set in international agreements and act contrary to the rules of the European Union, as:

- Tax reliefs cover not only expenditures on purchase of fixed assets, but also expenditures on purchase of materials and components used in the current production,
- The period of reliefs and exemptions is too long, lasting for 20 years (i.e. until 2017),

- The zones in Poland do not cover compact areas, but in majority they are dispersed; moreover they are often established arbitrarily, outside the region gravitation area,
- Existence of the zones means indirect subsidies and export promotion, which violates the rule of equal competition in the European Union.

The European Union requires that in the special economic zones there should not be any firms from the so-called sensitive sectors: steel, textile, plastic and automobile (where there are high surpluses of production capacity).

In line with the rules binding in the European Union such aid may be directed exclusively to the zones that are to stimulate development of regions. As a condition for the aid serves a criterion of the Gross National Product per capita in the region not exceeding the level of 75% of the EU index for the last three years and the unemployment rate of at least 110% of the EU average. Moreover, the EU criteria ascribe a special importance to the requirement of the uniformly specified and compact area of the special economic zone. They practically exclude directing aid into concrete places – point-wise, abstracting from a complex programme for development of a given region. Also from the viewpoint of the World Trade Organization (WTO) it is not allowed to establish dispersed zones. According to the *Agreement* with the WTO, signed by Poland, special economic zones may be treated as subsidies. Subsidising is only allowed in the regions that meet specific requirements. They must constitute a compact geographical area and have a specific economic and administrative identity. Moreover, income per capita (or income of a household per one person), or GNP per capita may not exceed 85% of the average for Poland, or unemployment rate must be at least 110% of the average for Poland, measured in the period of three years.

In March 1999 during accession negotiations the Polish side, expecting from the European Commission an agreement to maintain fully investors' acquired rights in the special economic zones until 2017 roku, took an obligation, as it has already been noticed, not to increase the total area of the zones over the size as of 31 December 2000, i.e. 6,325 ha. At present Poland, from the viewpoint of the Accession Treaty provisions, is not obliged to limit the areas of the zones. As it is provided for by the amended S*tatute on Amendment to the Statute on Special Economic Zones and Some Other Statutes* (Art. 5a par 1)[7], the total area of all the zones may not exceed the area of **12,000 ha**. Increasing the area of zones from 8,000 to 12,000 ha is to ensure, **until the end of 2017,** 105,600 **jobs** and 31.6 bn zl of **investments**. The forecast **public aid** will amount to 18.96 bn zl, and the revenue to the budget of 79.339 bn zl, including revenues to the State Treasury of 74.407 bn zl (out of which VAT of 71.396 bn

[7] Statute of 23 June 2006 on amendment to the statute on special economic zones and some other statutes Dz. U. – Journal of Law No. 141, item 997.

zl and personal income tax of 3.011 bn zl); whereas it is assumed that revenues to local government units will amount to 4.932 bn zl (including PIT of 2.732 bn zl and real property tax of 2.2 bn zl[8].

It is also worth stressing that the Ministers' Council, in order to create new jobs, have taken a decision to widen the catalogue of activities that require licences by a sector of modern services of *Business Process Offshoring* (BPO), including services concerning finances, accountancy, human resources management, administration, teleinformatic technologies (*shared services centres*) and those related directly to servicing of outer clients (*call centres, contact centres*). It is assumed that the said support should contribute to unemployment fall among higher school graduates.

The research has also confirmed the thesis that the special economic zones in Poland are not, as so far, an effective instrument of attracting foreign investors to selected regions of the country, because in their areas less than 6% of direct foreign investments have been invested. The tendency observed in 2005 is, however, reassuring that the share of the special economic zones was almost 20% of the yearly flow of direct foreign investment influx to Poland.

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[8] The said estimates have been specified taking the following assumptions:

a) The amount of investment layouts has been specified based on the average results of the zones as of the end of September 2005, i. e. 7.9 m zl per 1 ha,
b) The number of new jobs has been specified based on the average results of the zones as of the end of September 2005, i. e. 26.4 jobs per 1 ha,
c) The amount of VAT has been estimated based on business plans for several last zone investments,
d) Personal income tax (PIT) has been estimated based on the forecast employment, taking the average remuneration from the 4th quarter of 2005 of 2,670 zl, with the effective tax rate of 19%,
e) Assuming the maximal 10-year activity period of the special economic zones and the average profitability of companies operating in the zones; revenues from corporate income tax (CIT) have not been considered in this estimate,
f) To estimate the amounts of public aid the intensity index of 60% has been assumed.

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Streszczenie

AKTUALNE PROBLEMY FUNKCJONOWANIA SPECJALNYCH STREF EKONOMICZNYCH W POLSCE

W artykule podjęto próbę zweryfikowania słuszności hipotezy, że specjalne strefy ekonomiczne w Polsce stały się w większej mierze instrumentem restrukturyzacji przemysłu w regionach dotkniętych bezrobociem, niż instrumentem polityki regional-

nej, mającej na celu stworzenie podstaw długookresowego rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego regionów najsłabiej rozwiniętych.

Według stanu na 31 grudnia 2005 r. w specjalnych strefach ekonomicznych zainwestowano 25,7 mld zł, (co stanowi wzrost w stosunku do 2004 r. o 29%) oraz utworzono (bądź zachowano) 112168. miejsc pracy, (co stanowi odpowiednio wzrost o 50,5%). Aktualnie strefy zajmują powierzchnię 8 012,88 ha.

Istotną **barierą** atrakcyjności inwestycyjnej specjalnych stref ekonomicznych w Polsce jest niski poziomi nakładów na infrastrukturę. Charakterystyczną cechą polskich specjalnych stref ekonomicznych jest ich wysoki **stopień rozproszenia,** bowiem leżą (stan na koniec października 2006 r.) na terenach 174 jednostek administracyjnych, w tym 96 miast i 78 gmin.

Żywiołowy proces kształtowania granic specjalnych stref ekonomicznych doprowadził do wielu paradoksalnych sytuacji, stanowiących istotną **barierę** w sprawności zarządzania. Na przykład w granicach województwa mazowieckiego znajdują się podstrefy czterech stref: łódzkiej, starachowickiej, tarnobrzeskiej i warmińsko-mazurskiej, Wrocław posiada podstrefy dwóch stref: tarnobrzeskiej i wałbrzyskiej itp. Działalność specjalnych stref ekonomicznych w Polsce reguluje aż 300 aktów prawnych. O wyjątkowej niestabilności regulacji prawnych świadczy liczba uchwalonych w ciągu roku 5 rozporządzeń zmieniających zasady funkcjonowania strefy wałbrzyskiej (w 2004 i 2005 r.) oraz warmińsko-mazurskiej (w 2004 r.).

W badanym okresie dokonano 103 korekty granic i powierzchni specjalnych stref. Najwyższe (ponad 100 ha) przyrosty powierzchni wystąpiły w strefach: tarnobrzeskiej, legnickiej, starachowickiej, katowickiej, krakowskiej, mieleckiej oraz w warmińsko-mazurskiej. Z kolei największy jednorazowy ubytek powierzchni nastąpił w 2000 r. w strefie suwalskiej (100,5 ha). W 2006 r. dokonano 16 zmian w powierzchni specjalnych stref ekonomicznych (powierzchnia ich wzrosła w sumie o 454,6 ha), w tym w strefie łódzkiej (trzykrotnie) oraz legnickiej, wałbrzyskiej i katowickiej (dwukrotnie).

W myśl zasad obowiązujących w Unii Europejskiej pomoc może być wyłącznie skierowana do tych stref, które mają pobudzać rozwój regionów. Ponadto kryteria unijne szczególną wagę przypisują do wymogu **jednolicie określonego i zwartego obszaru specjalnej strefy ekonomicznej.** Wykluczają one praktycznie kierowanie pomocy w konkretne miejsca – punktowo, w oderwaniu od kompleksowego programu rozwoju danego regionu. Również z punktu widzenia Światowej Organizacji Handlu (WTO) nie jest dopuszczalne tworzenie stref rozproszonych.

Zwiększenie obszaru stref do 12 tys. hektarów ma zapewnić, **do końca 2017 r.,** 105,6 tys. **miejsc pracy** i 31,6 mld zł **inwestycji.** Przewidywana pomoc publiczna wyniesie19 mld zł, a wpływy do budżetu 79,3 mld zł.

Przeprowadzone badania prowadzą do paradoksalnego wniosku, że to nie specjalne strefy ekonomiczne przyciągają inwestycje zagraniczne, lecz odwrotnie – **to inwestycje zagraniczne determinują obszar stref ekonomicznych.** Świadczy o tym obserwowana od dwóch lat tendencja do powstawania podstref specjalnych stref ekonomicznych w miastach o najniższej maksymalnej intensywności pomocy publicznej w polsce: warszawie i poznaniu, (dla których intensywność wynosi 30%) oraz krakowie, wrocławiu i gdańsku (odpowiednio 40%), podczas gdy maksymalna intensywność pomocy w polsce wynosi 50%.

Przeprowadzone badania potwierdziły także tezę, że specjalne strefy ekonomiczne w Polsce nie są, jak dotychczas, skutecznym instrumentem przyciągania inwestorów zagranicznych do wybranych regionów kraju, bowiem na ich obszarze zainwestowano niespełna 6% bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych. Pocieszająca jest natomiast tendencja zaobserwowana w 2005 r., w której udział specjalnych stref stanowił blisko 20% rocznego strumienia napływu bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych do Polski.

ALLOCATION OF STATE AID AND COMPETITIVENESS OF POLISH ECONOMY

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Financial aid granted to businesses (state aid) is an important instrument of economic policy and a form of State intervention to protect certain fields of economic performance. It is used to implement both long-term and current targets of such a policy. It enables enhancement of positive trends in the economy and thereby achievement of vital economic targets. Its effect is, however, favouring some businesses to detriment of others, which may distort the rule of free competition on the market.

The solutions which are in force in the European Union allow granting of such aid only exceptionally, in strictly defined situations. The Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) or the EC Treaty introduced a general ban for state aid in the economy (Art. 87), stating that any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources (in any form whatsoever) which distorts or threatens to distort competition is incompatible with the common market. The applied exceptions are treated as a diversion from the general rule and interpreted in a very narrow way.

1. The size of state aid against the European Union

The Lisbon Strategy assumes gradual limitation and stricter controlling of state aid. The EU Member-States were obliged to limit the sizes of aid in relation to GDP and re-orienting it at horizontal targets, in line with the slogan *less and better targeted state aid.*

Table 1. The size of state aid and its relation to GDP in the European Union in 2004

Country	Total aid less rail transport (in bn euro) [a]	%	Total aid less rail transport in GDP %	Total aid less agriculture, fishery and transport (in bn euro) [a]	%	Total aid less agriculture, fishery and transport in GDP %
EU-25	61.6	100.0	0.60	45.5	100.0	0.44
EU-15	56.4	91.6	0.57	42.0	92.5	0.43
10 new	5.2	8.4	1.09	3.4	7.5	0.70
Belgium	1.0	1.6	0.34	0.7	1.5	0.24
Denmark	1.4	2.3	0.71	1.0	2.2	0.52
Germany	17.2	27.9	0.78	15.1	33.2	0.69
Greece	0.5	0.8	0.29	0.3	0.7	0.20
Spain	4.0	6.5	0.47	3.1	6.8	0.37
France	8.9	14.4	0.54	6.3	13.8	0.39
Ireland	1.0	1.6	0.65	0.4	0.9	0.27
Italy	7.0	11.4	0.52	5.4	11.9	0.40
Luxemburg	0.1	0.2	0.31	0.0	0.0	0.17
Netherlands	1.8	2.9	0.39	0.9	2.0	0.18
Austria	1.4	2.3	0.61	0.5	1.1	0.22
Portugal	1.5	2.4	1.09	1.1	2.4	0.83
Finland	2.5	4.1	1.66	0.6	1.3	0.38
Sweden	2.7	4.4	0.99	2.2	4.8	0.80
United Kingdom	5.4	8.8	0.32	4.2	9.2	0.25
Czech Rep.	0.4	0.6	0.41	0.2	0.4	0.19
Estonia	0.0	0.0	0.30	0.0	0.0	0.09
Cyprus	0.2	0.3	1.48	0.1	0.2	1.06
Latvia	0.0	0.0	0.39	0.0	0.0	0.16
Lithuania	0.1	0.2	0.68	0.0	0.0	0.13
Hungary	1.0	1.6	1.26	0.7	1.5	0.87
Malta	0.1	0.2	3.10	0.1	0.2	2.71
Slovenia	0.2	0.3	0.96	0.1	0.2	0.53
Slovakia	0.2	0.3	0.64	0.2	0.4	0.63
Poland	2.9	4.7	1.47	2.0	4.4	1.01

a - in fixed prices of 1995.

Source: *State Aid Scoreboard autumn 2005 update, Commission of the European Communities,* Brussels, 9.12.2005 COM (2005) 624 final

It results from the data analysis that after a visible fall of the aid size in the 1990s, the present tendencies – covering the last five years – indicate rather that its level has got stabilised. It should be stressed that enlargement of the European Union was not followed by its substantial increase. In 2004 the share of the EU-15 States in the total aid provided in the Union amounted to almost 92.0% (table 1). In a longer period of time, however, we can notice a substantial fall of its size in the countries of the old Union – this aid decreased as much as by 21.1% in relation to the level of 1994.

In 2004 the value of the aid granted in the EU less rail transport (in fixed prices of 1995) was 61.6 bn euro, including 5.2 bn euro in the new EU countries (and less agriculture, fishery and transport 45.5 and 4.2 bn euro respectively). If compared with 2003 there was a slight increase in such an aid - by 1.1 bn euro (ca. 1.9%). In Poland in 2000-2004 the aid value was systematically falling. In 2004 it amounted to 2.9 bn euro, constituting 4.7% of the aid less rail transport and 4.4% of the aid less agriculture, fishery and transport granted in the enlarged EU. The aid received by Polish entrepreneurs constituted 55.8% of the aid in States that joined the EU in 2004.

The amount of state aid granted in Poland approached its levels in Sweden and Finland. Only 5 States granted a higher aid, namely, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain. Among the new members of the Union, besides Poland, a substantial amount of aid was provided only by Hungary. In the remaining States its level was insignificant, and in Latvia and Estonia it was simply of trace character.

An analysis of the State aid amounts in the EU as per countries indicates that the highest value support was granted by three countries Germany, France and Italy (i.e. the largest ones and with the highest GDP). It included almost 54.0%, and jointly with the United Kingdom and Spain as much as almost 2/3 of all means allocated for state aid in the EU.

In the Lisbon Strategy a special attention is paid to lowering of the aid value in relation to GDP. The level of the index, as the data included in chart 1 show, is much differentiated. Its amounts are primarily affected by the levels of the economic development, expressed by the size of GDP. In 2004 in the EU-25 this relation less rail transport was 0.6%, and less agriculture, fishery and transport – 0.4%. In Poland it was 1.5 and 1.0% of GDP respectively and was one of the highest in the EU. A higher level of the index was only in Malta and Cyprus.

2. Aid for horizontal and regional targets

A decisive influence upon enhancement of economy competitiveness in individual EU countries and their regions has the horizontal aid.[1] It is supplemented to some extent by the regional aid. The former supports specific targets, important from the viewpoint of competitiveness, and it may be addressed to all entrepreneurs, irrespective of the business location and the sector of their activity. Whereas the latter serves acceleration of economic growth in the poorest regions of the Community.

[1] The state aid also includes sector aid. It is primarily horizontal and regional aid that are decisive for competitiveness of an economy. Cf. W. Burzyński, W. Karpińska – Mizielińska, T. Smuga, W*pływ pomocy publicznej na konkurencyjność przedsiębiorstwa,* „Gospodarka Narodowa" 2003, No 3.

The horizontal aid is not treated as a source of competitiveness distortion; hence one of the most important aims of the Lisbon Strategy is a shift from the sector aid to the horizontal one. Within it the leading role should be ascribed to aid for R&D, development of small and medium-sized enterprises, environmental protection and employment.[2]

In the mid-1990s, with greater total aid, the share of the horizontal aid was ca. 50.0%. At present, on average in the EU, over ¾ of the total aid less agriculture, fishery and transport are allocated for these targets (table 2).

Allocation of the horizontal aid in 2004 between individual targets in individual countries of the Union is much differentiated. For example:

- Belgium, Luxemburg, Sweden, Estonia and Latvia allocate all their state aid for the horizontal and regional aid, which means that in those countries no sector aid is granted. In Poland only 26.0 % are allocated for such targets.
- The highest share of expenditures on research and development in the total aid was in the Czech Republic, Austria, Finland, The Netherlands and Belgium (between 25.0-33.0%, with the EU average of 12%). W Poland it was only 1.0%.
- Relatively the greatest amounts were spent on environmental protection in Sweden (88.0% of the total state aid), and then in Denmark, The Netherlands, Germany and Finland (between 54.0 – 38%), with the EU average of 25%. In Poland only 1.0% of the aid was allocated for this target.
- Development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) was much stronger supported in the EU–15 countries than in the new Member-States, which was expressed by nearly three-time greater share of the aid for that target in the total aid (14.2 and 4.3% respectively). In Poland such an aid was below 1.0%.
- Relatively the greatest amounts of resources were allocated for improvement of the situation in employment in Denmark (38.0%), and then in Slovenia, Poland and Ireland (between 17.0 – 12.0%), with the EU average of only 4.0%.
- In all countries of the Union – except Italy (13.0%) – aid for training was of insignificant meaning.

The highest amounts of means were allocated for the remaining horizontal targets (e.g. promotion of culture, science and education, protection of national heritage, repairs of damage caused by natural disasters and other unusual

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[2] Within the horizontal aid one should list aid for saving and restructuring, and its target is to assist entrepreneurs who are in a difficult situation. An enterprise, further to a rule: *once and last time*, may be granted such an aid once every 10 years. In Poland granting of such an aid is pursued based on provisions of the so-called "anti-crisis statutes", e.g. *the statute of 30 August 2002 on restructuring of some dues in public law from entrepreneurs* (Dz. U. – Journal No. 155, item 1287, with subsequent amendments) This aid, however, has only little connection with enhancement of competitiveness in the economy.

events) in Estonia, Cyprus and Luxemburg (40.0 – 30.0%), with the EU average of 3%. In Poland this aid absorbed less than 1.0% of the state aid resources.

Table 2. Allocation of the horizontal aid in the EU in 2004 (in % of the total state aid)

Countries	Horizontal in total	R&D	Environmental protection	SME	Employment	Training	Regional development [a]	Other horizontal targets
EU-25	76	12	25	12	4	3	18	3
Belgium	100	25	2	33	4	8	23	4
Denmark	97	1	54	0	38	0	0	3
Germany	78	11	44	3	1	0	18	1
Greece	97	2	8	12	4	0	67	5
Spain	62	13	3	12	1	1	31	1
France	59	15	2	19	4	1	14	4
Ireland	62	10	2	3	12	3	20	12
Italy	95	18	1	34	7	13	20	4
Luxemburg	100	19	0	21	0	0	31	30
Netherlands	96	25	52	14	1	0	4	1
Austria	96	28	18	23	5	6	13	3
Portugal	22	3	0	8	1	4	5	0
Finland	98	25	38	8	6	0	15	6
Sweden	100	4	88	1	0	0	3	5
United Kingdom	99	16	27	22	0	5	26	3
Czech Rep.	82	33	2	10	0	0	36	0
Estonia	100	21	1	3	0	0	31	44
Cyprus	46	2	1	1	0	5	5	32
Latvia	100	0	0	8	0	0	92	0
Lithuania	49	2	0	12	0	0	34	1
Hungary	45	2	0	4	1	0	26	10
Malta	8	0	0	3	0	1	0	4
Slovenia	70	18	19	2	17	3	6	5
Slovakia	35	0	0	0	0	2	32	1
Poland	26	1	1	0	13	0	10	0

[a] – regional aid not classified otherwise.
Source: as in chart 1.

In relation to the regional aid the European Commission is of an opinion that it is not a threat to competition, if it is in compliance with the rules of the TEC. The aid is allocated to the EU regions, where GDP *per capita* is below 75.0% of the average for EU-25.[3] All regions of Poland (100.0% of the population) were covered by such an aid. The highest share of the regional aid was in Latvia (92.0) and then in Greece (67.0%). In Poland this aid was at the level of 10.0%.

[3] Adam A. Ambroziak, *Warunki dopuszczalności krajowej pomocy regionalnej w latach 2007 – 2013*, „Wspólnoty Europejskie" 2006, No. 2.

3. State aid in Poland – a regional approach

So far allocation of the state aid in Poland has been strictly associated with restructuring processes in the Polish economy. A consequence of this was preference for those regions of the country, where restructured traditional sectors of the economy were located. And for example, in 2004 the state aid less the aid in transport was 8.8 bn zl (current prices), out of which almost 1/3 (2.8 bn zl) was the sector aid allocated primarily for restructuring aid for the sector of the hard coal mining.[4] It had a direct impact upon distribution of the aid between individual regions of the country.[5]

Table 3. State aid in Poland in 2004 as per provinces

Name of province	Aid value in m zl [a]	Share (in %)
Total Including:	8.809.3	100
Dolnośląskie	562.8	6.4
Kujawsko-Pomorskie	168.7	1.9
Lubelskie	137.3	1.6
Lubuskie	119.7	1.4
Łódzkie	346.8	3.9
Małopolskie	817.9	9.3
Mazowieckie	848.0	9.6
Opolskie	111.2	1.3
Podkarpackie	450.8	5.1
Podlaskie	64.2	0.7
Pomorskie	751.5	8.5
Śląskie	2 894.6	32.9
Świętokrzyskie	130.3	1.5
Warmińsko-Mazurskie	143.0	1.6
Wielkopolskie	566.5	6.4
Zachodniopomorskie	290.8	3.3
No information	405.2	4.6

a – current prices

Source: *Raport o pomocy publicznej w Poland udzielonej przedsiębiorcom w 2004 roku*, Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów, Warszawa, November 2005.

[4] Although in 2004 4,453.1 m zl (50.5% of the total aid less the aid in transport) were allocated for the horizontal aid, as much as 81.6% of this aid were allocated for saving and restructuring. For example, research and development works were supported only with the amount of 114.4 m zl (2.6%).

[5] Within the regional aid, in 2004 entrepreneurs received support in the amount of 854.7 m zl (9.7% of the total aid less the aid for transport). It was granted mainly in a form of income tax exemptions for businesses acting on the territories of special economic zones – 656.2 m zl (for new investments – 504. 2 m zl and for creation of new jobs – 152.1 m zl).

An analysis of the data presented in chart 4 shows that in 2004 almost 1/3 of the aid value was granted to entrepreneurs from the Śląskie Province (in 2003 as much as 70.9%). The second and the third place held entrepreneurs acting in the Mazowieckie Province (9.6%) and the Małopolskie Province (9.3%), having an over 3-time smaller share in the total aid than the Śląskie Province. If we compare allocation of the state aid regionally since 2000, it turns out that the three regions are the greatest beneficiaries of the aid. It results from location on their territories of enterprises included among traditional fields of the economy and a relatively great number of the remaining businesses. The smallest share had such provinces as: the Podlaskie Province (0.7%), the Opolskie Province (1.3%) and the Lubuskie Province (1.4%).

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In the years 2005–2009 the European Commission in co-operation with the Member-States forecasts implementation of a complex reform of the rules of granting the state aid. The change to the policy in this respect is to contribute to a larger extent to implementation of the Lisbon Strategy targets – sustainable development, competitiveness, social and regional cohesiveness.

The planned actions were presented by the Commission in June 2005 in its *State aid action plan*.[6] Such actions are of an indicative character and are a kind of an action algorithm (a roadmap for state aid reform 2005 - 2009). The plan assumes eight priorities:

- special support for innovations and R&D,
- creation of favourable conditions for development of entrepreneurship,
- investment in human capital, including education and enhancement of qua lifications,
- assuring high quality of services provided in interest of the whole community,
- an easier access to the aid for priority targets,
- orientation of the regional aid policy to reduction of differences between individual regions,
- supporting the sustainable development (full internalisation of environmental costs),
- creation of modern transport and power infrastructure as well as information and communication technology).

It is expected that as a consequence of implementation of the above priority actions an increase in innovativeness, proliferation of research results, an increase in risk capital, especially for SMEs, simplification and extension

[6] *State Aid Action Plan: Less and better targeted state aid: a roadmap for state aid reform 2005 - 2009* (a consultation document).

of group exclusion range, i.e. exclusion from the aid reporting procedure provided for by Art. 88 item 3 of the TEC (at present for employment, training, R&D and SMEs). It is also planned to increase the amount of the trivial aid.

The Commission also announces procedural changes to the system of the state aid control, so that it would become more transparent and covering a smaller range of the aid. It also announces acceleration of the decision-making process concerning compliance of a project with free market rules.

A question arises, however, what the relation is with the Polish reality – the economy still undergoing the systemic transformation. The experience shows that as so far this aid has favoured to a negligible extent enhancement of the economic competitiveness, including enterprises. The horizontal aid, constituting the most important instrument of competitiveness enhancement was primarily used to save and restructure businesses, not for the targets deciding on competitiveness of the whole economy and individual regions of the country. As the consequence it was chiefly allocated for the fields undergoing transformation difficulties (e.g. coal mining, iron and steel metallurgy), and thus it became an important instrument stabilising the position of those branches in the economy. At the same time it should be remembered that in the Polish economy we have still some restructuring processes of many sectors that have not been finished. This means that also the needs in this respect will be greater than in the countries with the well-formed market economy. It is important, however, that the direction of changes to the state aid policy in our country should support competitiveness in the economy.

Streszczenie

ALOKACJA POMOCY PUBLICZNEJ A KONKURENCYJNOŚĆ POLSKIEJ GOSPODARKI

W artykule dokonano analizy wielkości i kierunków alokacji pomocy publicznej w Polsce na tle krajów Unii Europejskiej. W przeciwieństwie do Unii Europejskiej, gdzie wartość pomocy w ostatnim pięcioleciu jest ustabilizowana, w Polsce pomoc ta systematycznie zmniejsza się. Decydujące znaczenie w podniesieniu konkurencyjności gospodarki należy przypisać pomocy horyzontalnej i regionalnej. W warunkach polskich w ramach pomocy horyzontalnej szczególnie preferowana jest pomoc na ratowanie i restrukturyzację, a nie te cele, które decydują o konkurencyjności przedsiębiorstw, jak np. badania i rozwój, szkolenia, zatrudnienie, pomoc małym i średnim przedsiębiorcom oraz ochrona środowiska. Proponowane przez Komisję Europejską kierunki racjonalizacji pomocy publicznej mogą nie w pełni odpowiadać sytuacji, w jakiej znajduje się polska gospodarka – jest ona nadal poddana procesom restrukturyzacji.

WARSAW AS AN AIR TRANSPORT NODE OF CENTRAL EUROPE – QUESTIONS OF THE FUTURE

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The present and the potential role of the Warsaw air transport node constitute a frequent subject of discussions in the media and on political forums. These discussions focus most often on the location of the new airport for the capital of Poland, which would potentially become the primary hub for Central Europe. The considerations mentioned are rarely of scientific character. The analyses elaborated concentrate usually on the economic aspect of the issue, neglecting the geographical-spatial analysis. The purpose of the present paper is to provide a view on the position of Warsaw in the system of international interactions (as the primary source of generation of air traffic) and on the current transformations in the structure of Polish air traffic, and then to attempt answering – from the perspective of geographical sciences – two fundamental questions:

- Does Warsaw need a new airport?
- If so, what potential location would be the best?

1. Warsaw as the place of concentration of international linkages

The spatial pattern of various kinds of international interactions within the territory of Poland is differentiated. Yet, we can state that the western part of the country is characterized by stronger international contacts than the eastern one. The area of stronger contacts reaches farther towards the East in the southern and northern parts of Poland, forming a kind of a fan, reminding through its shape the 19th century Prussian and Austrian parts of the country, with the centre of gravity in Poznań. In the centre of the fan-like pattern an "island" is situated of the absolutely strongest international contacts, constituted by Warsaw. Warsaw itself, though, is surrounded by a ring of areas featuring weak and very weak connections. Other large centres do also constitute the places of concentration of connections. The international economic contacts are

strongly concentrated not only in large agglomerations, but also (with preservation of appropriate proportions) in the regional centres of medium size (in particular: in the locations of sizable foreign investments, see Komornicki, 2003). Warsaw is beyond any doubt the place featuring the strongest international economic interactions in the country in the spheres of foreign trade (especially of imports – roughly 30% of the total Polish imports) and foreign investments. In both these spheres, though, the scale of concentration is overestimated, due to the location of the headquarters of companies in the capital of Poland. Actually, the branches of numerous companies, in particular in the service sector, are often located in many cities. In case of tourist connections the role of Warsaw is balanced out by the equally strong position of Kraków. It is characteristic, in this context, that the tourist traffic registered in Warsaw (nights spent by the foreigners) constitutes to a large extent a secondary effect of the economic connections (business trips), while in Kraków these are primarily the authentic tourist visits.

From the point of view of demand for air transport the differentiation of the directions of international interactions is also important (its higher level is a factor promoting a given centre for the role of an air transport node). Within the area of Poland there are regions featuring higher and lower diversification of partners in international connections. Generally, the level of this diversification increases from the West towards the East, that is – in the direction opposite to that for the overall intensity of contacts. The provinces of western and southwestern Poland are largely dominated by the connections with Germany (this applies in a particular manner to the provinces of Opolskie and Lubuskie, but also, to a certain extent, the entire Wielkopolska, the city of Poznań included). In the East the diversity of connections is much higher. In the set of large towns and counties the highest diversification is observed in Warsaw and in Kraków (Komornicki, 2003).

2. Air traffic in Poland and in Warsaw

Despite the economic development and a significant increase of intensity of various kinds of international interactions after 1990, the demand for air transport remained until 1995 relatively weak, both in Warsaw and in entire Poland. As the basic causes for such a state of things we should mention:

- The income level of the population and the competition in international passenger transport from the side of the cheaper coach lines (while air fares remained at a relatively high level);
- Polycentric spatial structure of the country (Espon 1.1.1 Final report, 2005);
- Geographical distance to some important destination points (especially in Germany);
- Competition from the airports in Berlin and Copenhagen;

- High level of market regulation;
- The perception of air transport, as expensive, having developed in the earlier periods.

After 1990 two waves of rapid increase of transport intensity took place in Polish air transport. The first one occurred in the years 1996-2000 and was associated with the rapid economic development (numerous business trips) and the increase in the tourist chartered flights (mainly oriented at the Mediterranean). The second wave was initiated by the accession to the European Union, and the basic factor was the appearance of the low cost operators. The gradual change of the fare policy of Polish Airlines LOT contributed, as well, to the increase of traffic on domestic flights. These two waves, in conjunction with the deregulation activities, brought about a systematic decentralisation of the air traffic. In 2004 there was an abrupt increase of the number of passengers serviced at the airports of Kraków-Balice and Katowice-Pyrzowice (Table 1). It was also there that the shares of "cheap airlines" were the highest, respectively 46 and 70% (Czyczuła et al., 2005). In 2005 the rate of de-concentration was even higher (Fig. 1). It is envisaged that the share of the regional airports in the international traffic will still be on the increase (Grzelakowski, 2005).

Table 1. International traffic in Polish airports 1990-2004

Airports	1990	1995	2000	2003	2004	2005	Increase 2004-2005 (2004=100)
Warsaw-Okęcie	**2 256 146**	**2 375 079**	**4 180 601**	**4 448 851**	**5 369 530**	**6 406 328**	**119**
Kraków-Balice	58 267	30 954	416 695	419 942	670 396	1 448 200	216
Katowice-Pyrzowice	789	109 360	170 828	231 684	605 609	1 125 374	186
Gdańsk-Rębiechowo	53 517	76 153	181 809	206 381	304 308	521 664	171
Poznań-Ławica	7 589	30 571	151 962	179 229	283 115	341 390	121
Wrocław-Strachowice	458	23 203	85 603	134 752	186 197	317 976	171
Szczecin-Goleniów	1 203	2 291	22 742	15 986	12 270	23 301	190
Bydgoszcz	0	0	1 730	4 410	6 002	11 997	200
Rzeszów-Jasionka	548	1 305	5 801	7 251	5 806	25 452	438
Łódź-Lublinek	0	0	480	877	3 204	19 444	607
Szczytno-Szymany	0	0	1 754	586	562	121	22
Total	**2 378 854**	**2 648 925**	**5 221 166**	**5 651 482**	**7 448 703**	**10 242 682**	**138**

Source: own elaboration based on Border Guard materials

Notwithstanding the changes described, Poland is still characterised by a low number of air passengers serviced per capita (in 2004 around 0.2, while in countries like Switzerland and Spain this number is close to 4). When we compare the number of air travels per capita to the GDP, we can state that Spain is

the country featuring the highest intensity in these terms. At the same time, the group of European countries characterised by the low values of this indicator contains both France (partly due to the well developed network of high speed railways) and Poland (Czyczuła et al., 2005). The largest airports in Europe service more than 40 million passengers per year (London-Heathrow, Frankfurt a/M., Paris-Charles de Gaulle, Amsterdam-Schiphol), while total passenger traffic in all Polish airports amounted in 2005 to just 12 million. These data indicate the potentially high capacities for the development of the market. This development shall be taking place first of all through continued taking over of the market segment serviced until now by the international coach transport (mainly on the western European directions).

Fig. 1. Development of international air traffic in Poland



Source: own elaboration based on Border Guard materials

3. The plans and the development chances of the Warsaw air transport node

The new airport for Warsaw has been envisaged since the beginning of the 1970s. At that time the only location indicated was Modlin. This fact was associated with the plans of development of the agglomeration of Warsaw in the northern direction. At the turn of the 1990s the idea appeared of constructing a common intercontinental airport for Warsaw and Lodz, inscribed into the broader concept of developing a dual agglomeration of Warsaw-Lodz. Simulta-

neously, at the beginning of the 1990s the first extension of the passenger terminal at the Warsaw airport of Okęcie took place, so that its capacity was increased to 3.5 million passengers per annum. As mentioned already, the consecutive years were characterised by a relatively slow increase of the passenger traffic. In 2003 a governmental expert panel was established for selection of the location of the new passenger airport. The prerequisites adopted were, however, little realistic. It was assumed, namely, that the airport would serve ultimately up to 70 million passengers, while the time of transfer between the terminal and downtown Warsaw should be 15 minutes (Suchorzewski, 2004). There were seven potential locations under consideration (Modlin, Sochaczew, Mszczonów, Babsk, Nowe Miasto on Pilicą, Radom, and Wołomin; see Fig. 2). The option of further development of Warsaw-Okęcie airport was not considered at all (even as the reference option, the "variant zero"). The assumptions adopted meant in practice exclusion at the very start of consideration of some of the locations envisaged (thus, e.g., in case of Radom in order to satisfy the assumption of reaching the centre of Warsaw in 15 minutes a railway would have to be built for the trains running at the average speed of 400 km per hour). Simultaneously with the work of the panel, though, another extension of the Okęcie airport was undertaken. It was made necessary by the overcharging of the existing facilities, within which the annual traffic exceeded 5 million passengers. The governmental Panel recommended two locations for further studies: Modlin and Mszczonów. The report did not touch the issue of the future of the airport of Warsaw-Okęcie. On May 12th, 2005 a contract was signed with the Spanish company INECO-SENAR for the consecutive analysis. Despite the earlier recommendations the company was entrusted with the consideration, again, of all the initially considered seven locations. The analysis was terminated in 2006 with the indication of Mszczonów as the location. This location was not based on the existing facility, and entailed the necessity of constructing it from the scratch and buying out land from several hundred owners. In the discussion the condition appeared for the first time of the success of the entire undertaking, requiring the complete closure of the airport of Okęcie. In the meantime, in 2005, an official declaration was made of the beginning of work on the establishment of an airport in Modlin for the cheap carriers and charter flights. The investment project, though, was not actually started. In 2006, initial studies have been started on the development of a civilian airport upon the initiative of the self-governmental authorities in Sochaczew. In both cases the respective existing facilities are still under the military administration, and one of the most important actors, having an influence on the success of the undertakings is the State Agency for Military Property.

Fig. 2. Possible locations of the new airport



According to the independent analyses (Śleszyński, 2004) the present location of the airport, i.e. Okęcie in Warsaw, satisfies to the greatest extent – in comparison with the proposed locations – the requirements of the optimal service for the regional demographic and economic potential. Besides, if we admit that in the year 2020 the total traffic at the Polish airports will amount to 34 million passengers, 60% of that being serviced at the regional airports (Grzelakowski, 2005), the proportion assigned to Warsaw would amount to only 14-15 million passengers. This number should yet be decreased by the passengers of charter flights and cheap operators, that shall certainly by that time have a separate airport (i.e. some 10-20% according to Czyczuła et al., 2005). Consequently, we obtain the estimate for the traffic, which remains within the limits of capacity of the airfield in Okęcie. This leads to the conclusion that construction of a new airport would be justified only in the case the traffic increase would happen to be bigger than currently assumed. This, of course, is not impossible, but would necessitate a very insightful analysis, first of all the economic one.

In this context particular doubts are raised by the concept of developing a facility that would provide service simultaneously to Warsaw and Lodz, meaning that it would in practice be located at significant distances from both centres. The on-going decentralisation of traffic suggests, to the contrary, the construction of a separate, modern facility for Lodz. Currently, the two existing airports, Warsaw-Okęcie and Lodz-Lublinek, have very convenient transport-wise locations with regard to the respective centres. Another important element is constituted by the potential possibility of appearance of the new airports in eastern Poland, especially in Lublin and Białystok. Their construction seems to be justified, and if any of them turns into reality, the effect would be to take away even more passengers from the airport of the capital city.

Summing up, it can be assumed that the most important arguments for the construction of a new airport for Warsaw are as follows:

- potential chance of developing transit functions (establishment of a Central European hub);
- environmental protection aspects, first of all related to limitation of noise levels within the urbanised areas and the pressure from the inhabitants, associated with it;
- development of the region, in which the new airport will be located, and the lobbying from the side of the local self-governments, associated with it.

The most frequently quoted argument of traffic intensity increase is, by itself, not unequivocal at all. Simultaneously, there are sound arguments against a new, large intercontinental facility, among which the most important ones are:

- the polycentric structure of the Polish settlement network;
- the progressing decentralisation of the international connections and the air traffic, both in Poland and in Europe;
- large distance from Warsaw in case of all the proposed new locations (the present very close location of Warsaw-Okęcie is a strong point for the city);
- competition from other European airports (Berlin, Prague, Copenhagen);
- alliance of Polish Airlines LOT and Lufthansa in the framework of the Star-Alliance, limiting the possibility of establishing in Warsaw a transit centre (a hub), given too small a distance from Frankfurt a./M.

4. Conclusions

Warsaw is the biggest transport centre of Poland and one of the biggest in Central Europe. The concentration of connections and of the international traffic in the capital city is very high, but the surrounding areas feature relatively weak international connections. The demand for air transport has been until now rather low, and it is increasing rapidly. That is why Warsaw needs another airport (or airports), but its (or their) scale and location(s) should ac-

count for the economic realities and the present tendencies in the development of air traffic in Europe.

Considering the current economic trends and the previously mentioned already undertaken or planned investment projects, the following scenarios of development of the civilian airports within the reach of influence of the metropolitan area of Warsaw should be treated as plausible:

- further development of the airport of Warsaw-Okęcie alone;
- construction of a new intercontinental airport (in accordance with the current recommendations – in Mszczonów), with a probable closing of the Okęcie facility;
- development of the airport of Okęcie and creation of one or more auxiliary airports for the definite categories of traffic (low cost operators, night flights, cargo, charters).

The political discussions, as they appear in the media, concern primarily the two first scenarios, while the third one is being implemented in reality as of today.

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Streszczenie

WARSZAWA JAKO WĘZEŁ TRANSPORTU LOTNICZEGO EUROPY ŚRODKOWEJ - KWESTIE PRZYSZŁOŚCI

Celem artykułu jest prezentacja pozycji Warszawy w układzie interakcji międzynarodowych (jako w największym stopniu generujących popyt na przewozy lotnicze), przedstawienie aktualnych przemian struktury polskiego ruchu lotniczego, a następnie próba odpowiedzi (na gruncie nauk geograficznych) na dwa podstawowe pytania:

- Czy Warszawa potrzebuje nowego lotniska?
- Jeżeli tak, to jaka ewentualna lokalizacja byłaby najlepsza?

W podsumowaniu stwierdzono, że Warszawa jest największym centrum transportowym Polski i jednym z największych w Europie Środkowej. Koncentracja powiązań i ruchu międzynarodowego w stolicy jest bardzo duża, ale obszary przyległe mają relatywnie słabe powiązania międzynarodowe. Popyt na przewozy lotnicze był dotąd relatywnie niski i szybko rośnie. Dlatego też Warszawa potrzebuje drugiego lotniska (lub lotnisk), ale jego (ich) skala i lokalizacja powinny uwzględniać realia ekonomiczne i obecne zmiany w rozwoju ruchu lotniczego w Europie.

Biorąc pod uwagę obecne tendencje ekonomiczne oraz podjęte lub planowane działania inwestycyjne, jako możliwe uznać należy następujące scenariusze rozwoju cywilnych portów lotniczych w obszarze metropolitalnym Warszawy:

- Tylko dalsza rozbudowa portu lotniczego Warszawa-Okęcie;
- Budowa nowego lotniska międzykontynentalnego (zgodnie z obecnymi rekomendacjami w Mszczonowie), z prawdopodobnym zamknięciem Okęcia;
- Rozwój portu na Okęciu oraz jednoczesne stworzenie jednego lub kilku lotnisk pomocniczych dla określonych kategorii ruchu (tanie linie, nocne loty, cargo, czartery).

Dyskusja polityczno-medialna obejmuje przede wszystkim dwa pierwsze scenariusze, podczas gdy w praktyce już dziś realizowany jest scenariusz trzeci.

SELECTED ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONALISATION PROCESS OF POLISH HIGHER EDUCATION

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Introduction

One of the crucial problems of Polish Higher Education is its low degree of internationalisation. According to GUS (Central Statistical Office) among more than 1.9 million students at Polish universities, number of foreign students equals merely 9 000, i.e. less than 0.5% of total. Conversely, number of Polish students studying at foreign universities approaches 50 000. It means that five times more people have left Poland to study abroad than arrived here. This adverse relation between the number of incoming and outgoing students can deteriorate even further, unless the internationalisation process of Polish Higher Education accelerates and its quality improves.

Generally speaking there are five main reasons for the internationalisation of Polish Higher Education, namely:

- process of globalisation
- Polish integration with the European Union
- Polish membership in the Bologna Process (which aims at establishing until 2010 *the European Higher Education Area*)
- the competition on Polish Higher Education market, and
- the situation on the job market for university graduates.

The internationalisation process is multifaceted and includes students, fields of studies, academics and research. The process can also be analysed from the point of view of potential benefits for society and economy of a given country, the higher education in general, as well as individual universities and from the point of individual students and lecturers. Below we will focus on those aspects which are related to subjects of studies and mobility of students.

It is worth stressing that from the point of view of international co-operation, including trans-border co-operation, the higher education plays double role. First, it is an object of co-operation itself, second – higher education,

or more directly education, is a factor strongly stimulating fields of economy, politics and social life.

Foreign students in Poland

The number of foreign students studying in a given country is the basic and the easiest indicator of internationalisation. In academic year 2004/05 in Poland there were 1 926 100 students, which is almost five times more than in year 1990/91. In this period of time, the number of foreign students at Polish universities expanded more than twice, from 4259 to 8829 people. Despite that significant increase, the number of foreign students has relatively decreased in the academic years 1990/91 – 2004/05 from more than 1% to mere 0.5%. A fall of this indicator in Polish realities could be somehow misleading. In particular, direct reason for that phenomenon was the above mentioned and unobservable in other countries, dynamic growth in number of Polish students. This growth was related to a fulfilment of accumulated demand for education, aroused education aspirations of Poles, demographical growth, as well as legal regulations which have enabled opening of private higher schools (till 2005, 300 of them were established), introduction of tuition fees at these schools, and have allowed for issuing fees for non full-time (*extramural* and *evening* courses) studies at public schools.

When it comes to foreign students, their relatively high interest in medical studies is worth mentioning. This subject of studies was chosen by every fifth foreigner (1800 students).

Table 1. Foreign students in Poland in years 1990/91 – 2004/05

Academic year	Number of students at Polish universities	Number of foreign students	included:		
			universities	medical schools	economic schools
1990/91	403 800	4 259	.	.	.
2000/01	1 800 500	6563	3 200	1100	846
2003/04	1 858 700	8100	3700	1400	1 200
2004/05	1 926 100	8829	3600	1800	1400

Source: *Szkoły wyższe i ich finanse w 2000 r.; 2003 r.; 2004 r.*, GUS, Warszawa 2001, 2004, 2005.

In last few years a share of foreigners of Polish origin among all foreign students has progressively been declining from 55.1% in academic year 2000/01 till 42.9% in 2004/05 (table 2). This problem is quite essential because the number of foreign students of Polish origin at Polish universities has fallen from 3 977 (in the 2002/03 academic year) to 3 788 (in year 2004/05). This tendency will

probably remain in following years, unless Polish higher schools become more open for students from Eastern Europe, including students of Polish origin.

Table 2. Foreign students of Polish origin in Poland in years 2000/01 – 2004/05

Academic year	Number of foreign students of Polish origin	Participation of foreign students of Polish origin among all foreign students
2000/01	3618	55,1
2001/02	3820	51,8
2002/03	3977	52,3
2003/04	3907	48,3
2004/05	3789	42,9

Source: as to table 1.

Table 3. Participants of doctoral studies in Poland in years 1995/96 – 2004/2005

Academic year	Students of doctoral studies	Number of opened doctoral procedures	Number of foreign students following doctoral procedures in Poland
1995/1996	10482	1946	715
2000/2001	25622	6107	710
2001/2002	28345	7016	695
2002/2003	31072	7237	660
2003/2004	32054	7953	597
2004/2005	33040	8869	488

Source: *Szkoły wyższe i ich finanse w 2004 r.*, GUS, Warszawa 2005, tabl. 7.

A significant fall in number of foreign students pursuing doctoral studies in Poland is a worrying phenomenon in Polish Higher Education. In last ten years the number of foreign students following doctoral procedures in Poland decreased from 715 to 488 (table 3). This may indicate a low quality of Polish doctoral degrees, unattractive offer of doctoral studies as well as problems with recognition of the diplomas and qualifications on the international arena.

Barriers to and methods of internationalisation of Polish Higher Education

Giving the Polish Higher Education a European dimension is a priority, for both the Polish authorities and universities. It results from Poland's participation in the Bologna Process, from current competition challenges like global-

isation of the economy, as well as the opening of the European markets for graduates and the education market for prospective and current students (influenced by demographic changes – visible slowdown in population of youth in study age).

Major barriers to the internationalisation process of Polish Higher Education are: quite rigid legal regulations relating to educational system, underfinanced universities and still poor (however fast improving) knowledge of foreign languages among students and academic staff.

The government should introduce legal acts which would encourage students' mobility and increase autonomy of universities. It means allowing universities to decide about standards of education, titles of study subjects, allowing them to accept parts of the studies accomplished abroad (horizontal mobility), and to change school or subject of studies after finishing undergraduate level (vertical mobility), as well as giving them autonomy in issuing joint diplomas and conducting e-studies. Introducing system based on two main cycles: undergraduate and graduate, would be a vital factor contributing to vertical mobility. It is easier for Polish students to go abroad or for foreigners to come to Poland for shorter studies (3-years undergraduate or 2-years graduate studies) and earn diploma of different higher schools or different subjects of studies.

In terms of internationalisation of education, the activities of universities should focus on:

- broadening the offer of courses in foreign languages
- increasing levels and programmes of foreign languages education
- offering interdisciplinary programmes of studies (ex. International Relations, European Studies, cross-specialisation studies)
- participating in exchange programmes for students and academic staff
- opening joint degree programmes,
- offering joint or double diploma
- offering full programmes of undergraduate or graduate studies in foreign languages.

Each of these actions should contribute to improving quality of education and to better preparation of graduates for employment either on home or international market.

Internationalisation of education includes also trans-national education or cross-border education. It means opening branches of home university abroad or it has a form of franchising or distance learning. It would be desirable for some Polish universities to start offering cross-border education.

Selected educational and research programmes of the EU

Implementation of *the European Higher Education Area* main objectives, especially those encouraging the mobility of students and academic staff as well as increasing attractiveness and competitiveness of European Higher Education would be made substantially more difficult without financial support from the European Union and other international organisations. Below, we present selected educational and research programmes of the EU, which are particularly contributing to co-operation and international exchange in the field of higher education.

SOCRATES-ERASMUS: exchange programme for students and academic staff between European countries that includes also other forms of co-operation between institutions of higher education in Europe. Its main objectives are:

- improving quality of higher education and giving it European dimension
- providing wide access to existing educational sources in Europe
- promoting improvement of foreign languages proficiency in the EU
- promoting institutional co-operation, including support for mobility of students and academic staff.

In the academic year 1998/99, 46 Polish higher schools participated in the Socrates-Erasmus programme, whereas in 2005/06 already 217 universities. In years 1998/99 – 2004/05 number of Polish students going abroad on Socrates-Erasmus scholarships increased six fold: from approx. 1 400 to 8 400 students. Also the number of foreign students coming to Poland within Socrates-Erasmus programme rose significantly: from 220 to 2 450. But, despite the visible growth in number of incoming foreign students, this figure is still low (table 4).

Table 4. Participants of Socrates-Erasmus programme in years 1998/99 – 2005/06

Specification	1998/99	2000/01	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06
Participating universities	46	98	120	151[1]	187[1]	217[1]
Leaving students	1426	3691	5419	6278	8390	11000[2]
Incoming students	220	614	1054	1478	2450	3500[3]
Average scholarship for outgoing students (euro/month)	375	264	208	148	267	250
Outgoing lecturers	356	678	800	884	1394	1800[2]

[1] Only universities with *Erasmus University Charter* participate in this programme.
[2] Estimated data.
[3] Forecost.
Source: A. Kraśniewski, *Proces Boloński: dokąd zmierza europejskie szkolnictwo wyższe?*, MEiN, Warszawa 2006, p. 30.

According to the Ministry of Higher Education[1] in the academic year 2004/05 2 199 universities in Europe had been given *Erasmus University Charter* by the European Commission that enables to participate in Socrates-Erasmus programme. Thanks to Socrates-Erasmus programme, each year 120 000 students study abroad and almost 18 000 professors hold lectures in participating schools. It is worth mentioning that in 2002 the number of students benefiting from Socrates-Erasmus scholarships exceeded one million and by 2010 it should reach three million[2].

ERASMUS MUNDUS: the European programme, whose aim is to improve quality of the European Higher Education by strengthening co-operation with third countries[3]. The budget of the programme for financial support in years 2004 – 2008 amounts for 230 million euro.
Erasmus Mundus programme comprises four actions:

- Action 1: Erasmus Mundus Masters Courses (refers to graduate studies led by a group/consortium of at least 3 universities from three different countries; its members can be universities from EU, EEA and EFTA countries as well as candidate member states to the EU; in years 2004-2008 a financial support is planned for one hundred master courses, whose graduates receive joint, double or multiply diploma; a subsidy can be made maximum for 5 years in total amount of 15 000 euro per month).
- Action 2: Scholarships for third-country students and scholars (it is assumed that 5 000 graduate students and 1 000 lecturers will benefit from the scholarships).
- Action 3: Partnerships with third-country universities and consortia of European universities taking part in Erasmus Mundus Masters Courses (scholarships for 4 000 graduate students and 1 000 lecturers).
- Action 4: Enhancing the attractiveness of European higher education (a financial support for 100 projects is expected).

CEEPUS: Central European Education Programme of Universities Studies. The signatories of its second edition - CEEPUS II - are: Austria, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary. This programme includes:

- scholarships, internships, term studies and work experience in frames of free co-operation

[1] *Szkolnictwo wyższe: Współpraca międzynarodowa. Programy europejskie w zakresie szkolnictwa wyższego;* http://www.mnisw.gov.pl/mein/
[2] A. Kraśniewski, *Proces Boloński...*, op. cit., s. 12, 35.
[3] *Erasmus Mundus 2004-2008. The European programme of academic excellence and worldwide student mobility*, European Commission;
http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/programmes/mundus/index_en.html

- membership of partners from at least three countries
- seminars, languages courses and professional courses.

Beside above mentioned programmes a vital role in the internationalisation process is also played by others programmes such Tempus or Leonardo da Vinci or EU Framework Programmes (currently at its 6th edition). When it comes to Tempus programme, which has been functioning since 1990 (edition I, II, II bis, III – 2000 to 2006), after joining the EU on 1 May 2004 Poland can no longer be its beneficent because „the Trans-European mobility scheme for university studies enables universities from EU Member States to cooperate with those in Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and the Mediterranean partner countries in higher educational modernisation projects'[4]. Tempus programme finances support for Joint European Projects, Structural and Complementary Measures, and Individual Mobility Grants.

Conclusion

Introducing two-cycle studies, increasing autonomy of universities, increasing number of courses offered in foreign languages, particularly in English, adoption of ECTS, issuing joint or double diploma and improvement of services for foreign students – these are basic conditions for internationalisation of higher education and mobility of students and staff. It should still be supported by special international programmes, such as Socrates-Erasmus, Erasmus Mundus i CEEPUS, and growing number of direct bilateral agreements between particular Polish and foreign universities.

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Streszczenie

WYBRANE ASPEKTY PROCESU INTERNACJONALIZACJI POLSKIEGO SZKOLNICTWA WYŻSZEGO

Jednym z istotnych problemów polskiego szkolnictwa wyższego jest niski stopień jego internacjonalizacji, czyli umiędzynarodowienia. Według danych GUS wśród ponad 1,9 mln osób studiujących na polskich uczelniach liczba studentów obcokrajowców wynosi niecałe 9 000, czyli poniżej 0,5% ogółu. Z kolei liczba Polaków studiujących w uczelniach zagranicznych zbliża się do 50 tysięcy.

Nadanie polskiemu szkolnictwo wyższemu wymiaru europejskiego jest zadaniem priorytetowym, tak dla państwa, jak i poszczególnych uczelni. Wynika ono zarówno z udziału Polski w Procesie Bolońskim, jak i obecnych wyzwań konkurencyjnych związanych z globalizacją gospodarki oraz otwarciem rynków europejskich dla absolwentów i kandydatów na studia.

W artykule zwrócono uwagę na czynniki utrudniające internacjonalizację polskiego szkolnictwa wyższego, którymi są przede wszystkim: dość rygorystyczne przepisy prawa odnośnie do standardów kształcenia i nazw kierunków studiów, niedofinansowanie uczelni i słaba jeszcze (choć szybko poprawiająca się) znajomość języków obcych wśród studentów i pracowników uczelni.

Z przeprowadzonej analizy wynika, że: przejście na system studiów dwustopniowych (pomijamy tu III stopień studiów – studia doktoranckie), zwiększenie autonomii uczelni w sprawach programowych, wyraźne rozszerzenie oferty zajęć w językach obcych, zwłaszcza w języku angielskim, wdrożenie systemu punktów ECTS, wydawanie wspólnych lub podwójnych dyplomów, a także poprawa obsługi studentów zagranicznych, to podstawowe działania na rzecz internacjonalizacji kształcenia oraz zwiększenia mobilności studentów i pracowników. Nadal sprzyjać temu powinny specjalne programy międzynarodowe, zwłaszcza: Sokrates-Erasmus, Erasmus Mundus i CEEPUS, a także coraz liczniej zawierane bezpośrednie bilateralne umowy między poszczególnymi uczelniami polskimi i zagranicznymi.

INSTRUMENTS FOR FINANCING DEVELOPMENT OF ENTERPRISES WITH NATIONAL AND EU MEANS

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Supporting entrepreneurship in development and creating new workplaces in small and medium-sized enterprise sector is a characteristic phenomenon of the contemporary world economy. Stimulating the growth of small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) as well as help with creating favourable conditions for establishing new workplaces are mostly mentioned among the fields of economic policy which realization can easily contribute to the improvement in such a difficult socio-economic situation in many regions of Poland. The state supports small and medium-sized enterprises at three levels; national, regional and local. The primary question is, by which means can be this goal achieved.[1]

Governmental forms of supporting small and medium-sized companies

The Polish Agency for Entrepreneurship Development (PAED) realizes the policy of the state at the national level towards small and medium-sized companies. Its task is the management of funds assigned from the state budget as well as from non-returnable foreign loans. At the regional level are financing institutions, cooperating with the Polish Agency for Entrepreneurship Development and their role relies on:

- provide business consulting within the confines of advisory point,
- help with the choice of the most adequate finance support instrument for an entrepreneur in specifying their basic budget project and the rules of co-financing,
- help with selecting a project executive, submitting and qualifying applications for granting subsidies and their technical and financial assessment

[1] It cannot be achieved year by year. It should be aimed at changing proportions in the budget expenditures i.e. decreasing in the health care expenditures and so called social transfers which Poland has the highest among United Europe countries and allocate this money to investments.

At the local level there are specialized advisory, informational, training and financial units (acting in the confines of the Domestic System of Services) as well as consultants, experts and training institutions, providing services directly for enterprises and their groups. Such a chain is created by regional and local development agencies, business supporting centers, industrial and trade chambers, research and development institutes, credit guarantee funds, loan funds, business schools, craft organizations, foundations and associations providing advisory, informational and training services.

Currently, the most important development barrier of small and medium-sized companies is a shortage of financial resources for investment, development and modernization. Among this group of companies there is a tendency to finance their development on the basis of own resources. Such a susceptibility is declared by 90% of firms existing within an SME sector. Market conditions of functioning as well as internal company factors, the scale of possessions, a lack of credit history and credibility influence this attitude. In Polish reality the access to external financing sources is still limited. In order to develop Polish economy it is need a 40-milliard zlotys yearly. That is why the research problem is, searching for the alternative forms of supporting small and medium-sized companies in Poland and the question whether we have any offer for this group of companies beyond the banking system. One of the system solution forms could be the transfer of support programmes for unemployment elimination e.g. for establishing guarantee funds for small and medium sized and family companies with turnover up to 2 or 3 milliard zlotys. The fund that exists nowadays has significantly lower capital shares. Such a great fund could have insured pawning and support long-term investment activity. Currently, the institutions do not have possibility that their money worked in long-term investments guaranteed by the state, modeling on foreign countries.

In Poland there are special funds for a credit guarantee, which can be very helpful. The guarantees are an important instrument of granting companies the access to credit offered by banks.

Credit guarantee fund system

One of the basic financing instruments of support small and medium-sized companies is a credit guarantee given by special credit guarantee funds. The aim of their activity is granting entrepreneurs access to external sources of financing investments. Credit guarantee funds succeed when there is a mutual link and cooperation between credit givers, the funds and credit takers. Credit guarantee funds and credit guarantee programmes were setting up in 60s and 70s as units of agencies or membership organizations in small business.[2]

[2] Gajewski M.,Kiliński T., Szczucki J., *Zasady organizacji i funkcjonowania funduszy*

Because of processes of concentration and specialization, the funds were independently functioning as rightful companies in which the different activity from guaranteeing has been emerged such as promotional, advisory or other form.

In all the countries the funds are aimed at granting small and medium-sized companies access to external financing, creating new workplaces, convenience at the beginning of an economic activity or capital strengthening of companies. In many countries such a legal and organizational form of credit guarantee funds is described by the acts of the parliament. The funds as institutions shall stabilize the market and the state is obliged to assure of their credibility and the quality of functioning. The experiences of guarantee programmes show that applying for guarantee depends on:

- how big the company is – funds for small and medium-sized companies
- localization of the companies – local or regional funds
- branch – sector funds, mutual funds;
- company development phases – funds for starting up businesses, funds for the unemployed and graduates

Credit guarantee system in Poland consists of :

- Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK) and the Domestic Credit Guarantee Fund (DCGF)
- regional and local institutions for credit guarantee activity.

The institutions offer the following financial instruments:

- credit and loan guarantees for small and medium-sized companies and people starting their businesses (and graduates),
- loans for small companies for workplace creating as well as loans for people setting up their businesses

The Domestic Credit Fund guarantees paying up credits and loans given by banks and financial institutions. It is very helpful for small and medium-sized companies that cannot take credits because of the required security. The Bank BGK guarantees credit for the firms from the whole country. It is possible to turn to 25 banks cooperating with BGK in order to apply for promise granting. The most significant feature of the fund is that the range covers all the country. The fund gives security as guarantees accepted by all the banks in Poland. The most common security is a blank bill of exchange. In a normal cause of action, the guaranteed amount cannot exceed 70% of an interest-free credit, the unit guarantee is up to 1,5 million euros, and applications are considered in a month's time. In a simplified cause of action, the guaranteed amount cannot exceed 50% of an interest-free credit and the unit guarantee is up to 50 000 euros and the applications are considered in a week's time. The chosen results characterizing the range of the Domestic Credit Guarantee Fund activity shows the table 1.

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poręczeń kredytowych, Polska Agencja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości, Warszawa 2002.

Table 1. Given aspects of the Domestic Credit Guarantee Fund functioning

No. Specification	The scale
1. The quantity of cooperating banks	25
2. The quantity of cooperating with BGK bank subsidiaries in the field of credit guarantees	4154
3. The number of given guarantees	3436
4. The value of given guarantees (millions zł)	798,81
5. The number of guarantees in accordance with :	
- normal procedure	476
- simplified procedure	2066
- portfolio procedure for SME	883
- confirmation of guarantee giving	11
6. The number of guarantees given :	
- sales credit	1370
- investment credit	2066
7. The number of guarantees given in accordance with employment in a company:	
- up to 5 people	812
- from 6 to 50 people	749
- from 51 to 250 people	245
- over 250 people	28

Source: the Domestic Credit Guarantee Fund of BGK data,Warszawa,2006

The guarantees are given for a period equal to credit period, increased up to one month.That is why there is a possibility of guaranteeing credits for many years, characteristic of low interest investments. The problem is that the DCGF cannot fully guarantee sales credits. This guarantee is also some kind of credit so the procedure is complicated enough.

The second important element of credit guarantee fund system is local and regional funds that were created in confines of many various support programmes so foreign as national. The range and activity scale of given funds are strongly diversified. There are funds in the range of voivodship or even in the wider one. The condition of credit guarantee funds in Poland is shown on a table 2.

Table 2. The condition and development plans of credit guarantee funds in Poland

Specification	The number of funds		Fund Capital (in PLN)	
	At the end of 2003	The assumed number at the end of 2006	The value of capital at the end of 2003	The assumed value of capital at the end of 2006
Local and subregional	39	100	48 511 330	400 000 000
Regional	11	16	83 646 000	240 000 000

Source:www.ksfp.org.pl/ksfp.html

At the end of December 2005 there were 75 institutions in Poland which ran 81 loan funds and disposed loan capital of 558,2 million zlotys and gave from the beginning of their activity 112,2 thousand loans of value at 1611,9 million zlotys. At the end of 2005 in comparison with the previous year condition there was a very dynamic increase in loan capital and loans given at the level of quantity and value. The loan capital increased in 120,3 million zlotys in 2005 (in 27,5%), loan number in 16,0 thousand units (16,6%), and their value in 240,8 million zlotys (in 17,6%). The average value of a loan amounted to all the given loans till the end of 2005 was at 14,4 thousand zlotys and non-significantly increased in comparison with the previous year condition.

Currently, the most numerable group of funds in Poland are local and sub local ones, because they require significantly lower capital than regional funds and that is why their effects of activity are easily visible by entrepreneurs and the local market. The funds function in confines of many legal and organizational structures. The most popular guarantees are offered by the funds created by local governments and their list should be accessible in every bank. They act in the range of one or two counties.

Podkarpackie province has a very low level of supply in credit guarantee funds. There are :

- the Leżajsk Development Association - covers Leżajsk, Łańcut, Przeworsk. It has a fund with a capital of a 1 million zlotys., 500 thousand zlotys has had as a subsidy from the DCGF;
- the Bieszczady Regional Development Agency Ustrzyki Dolne - zasięgiem działania covers Ustrzyki Dolne;
- the Credit Guarantee Fund in Tarnow – covers Tarnow area;
- the Local Credit Guarantee Fund Ltd. in Stalowa Wola;
- the Podkarpackie Province Credit Guarantee Fund Ltd. in Rzeszow.

At the end of May, 2006 there should be functioning strong regional institutions in every province and around 100 local institutions. Local and regional guarantee funds fight against the Domestic Credit Guarantee for the victor's palm of the accessibility to guarantees.

On the table 3 there is a structure of given loans from the activity beginning of funds till the end of 2005 in accordance with its destination, the entrepreneur activity sector, the scale of a given loan, the number of the employed by the loan taker.

Table 3. The structure of loans in accordance to the number and value if given loans by regional and local funds

Specification	Acruingly up to 31.12.2005		In the period of 1.01.2005-31.12.2005	
	Number	Value	Number	Value
The structure of loans in accordance with the destination				
a) sales	28,5%	22,9%	26,5%	26,1%
b) investments	67,6%	69,4%	68,6%	61,5%
c) sales and investments	3,9%	7,8%	5,0%	12,4%
The structure of loans in accordance with the loan taker activity sector				
a) production	12,8%	19,6%	10,6%	16,9%
b) trade	50,2%	40,4%	49,4%	39,3%
c)services (transport included)	36,0%	32,6%	39,0%	39,1%
d) construction	0,2%	1,0%	0,5%	2,6%
e) agriculture	0,3%	1,2%	0,2%	0,7%
f) other	0,4%	5,1%	0,3%	1,3%
The structure of loans in accordance with the value of a given loan				
a) up to 10 thousand zl	72,3%	34,4%	70,3%	26,3%
b) over 10 to 30 thousand zl	21,7%	29,0%	19,5%	23,8%
c) over 30 to 50 thousand zl	3,4%	11,5%	4,7%	13,1%
d) over 50 do 120 thousand zl	2,0%	12,7%	5,3%	32,5%
e) over 120 to 300 thousand zl	0,4%	6,4%	0,2%	2,7%
f) over. 300 thousand zł	0,1%	6,0%	0,1%	1,7%

Source: Loan funds Report in Poland, Polish Loan Fund Association, Szczecin, 2006

Among loans, so in the quantitive view as in the valuable ones, dominated:

- investment loans - two thirds of all the loans,
- trade loans and service activity loans,
- up to 10 thousand zl, but there was also visible the share of loans from 10 thousand zl to 30 thousand zl,
- given to entrepreneurs employing up to 9 people.

Financing SME sector by investing funds

Venture capital funds are the funds of a higher risk that help to realize business ideas provided they are promising and deal with using new technologies. Venture capital funds are eager to a higher investing risk but in return, they are expected to have a higher investment return rate. The highest chances for gaining money throughout these financial investments have small and medium-sized companies from such branches like teleinformatics, medicine, biotechnology, and finances. The most common higher risk funds are Pioneer Poland Fund (Polish Private Equity Fund) - Enterprise Investors, Caresbac – Poland Plc., Enterprise Investors. I will present an offer of financial support concerning given venture capital funds. l

- (Polish Private Equity Fund) - Enterprise Investors Fund I and II ,Warsaw
- The fund invests in Polish private firms that have effective managerial staff and a good developing potential. It can be represented in the companies' supervisory board in which it has invested. Preferred branches: export firms. The minimal investment amount: 500 thousand USD but it is possible to credit smaller ventures. The fund does not invest in the ventures which the overall expenditure exceeds a 10 million dollars.
- Caresbac – Poland Plc., Poznan
- The investment criteria are the companies at a potentially high level of return in which at least 51% of shares belongs to Polish firms. Their initial capital should not exceed 500 thousand USD, and the annual turnover 2,5 million. USD. The firms should employ form 15 to 200 workers. Preferred branches: agricultural and food processing, new products' export, light industry, cheap housing, entrepreneurship services, energy manufacturing, environment protection. The minimal amount of investment: 50 thousand USD, maximal investment amount: 400 thousand USD.
- Copernicus Capital Management –Warsaw
- The fund invests in private firms, privatized or being under privatization but has not gone public. Preferred branches: telecommunication, media. Minimal amount of investment: 1 million USD Maximal investment amount: 4 million USD
- Regional Investment Funds –Warsaw, Lodz, Katowice, Walbrzych
- The funds support the development of the chosen regions throughout the capital supply for small and medium sized companies by means of minority shares (up to 49%) or dependent loans. The sale of the shares in a company is after 3 to 7 years. Preferred branches: production or services, trade is out of it. Minimal investment amount: 50 000 euros ,Maximal investment amount: 500 000 euros.
- Enterprise Investors

- The fund buys shares for 3 to 7 years and participates in making strategic decisions of a company. Preferred branches: IT, telecommunication, pharmacy, the health care and medical services, media. Minimal investment amount: 3 million. USD Maximal investment amount: 25 million. USD

Venture capital funds purchase a part of company's shares and participate in its management. The funds engage no only money but also time, experience and contacts. After reaching a certain level of company development the venture capital fund sells its share and realizes profit. The average period of investment is 5 years. The biggest benefits for this form of financing are the access to the sources, the lack of repayment necessity and the lack of financial costs connected with capital accumulating. On the other side, venture capital financing means sharing the control over a firm, possessing a significant share in a firm capital and a long-term preparatory period before the financing. Their role of financing the sector of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) is little significant.

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Streszczenie

INSTRUMENTY FINANSOWANIA ROZWOJU PRZEDSIĘBIORSTW ŚRODKAMI KRAJOWYMI I UNIJNYMI

Po przemianach ustrojowo-gospodarczych, które rozpoczęły się w Polsce po 1990 roku, nastąpił szybki rozwój sektora małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw. Pomimo tego, że sektor ten jest bardzo elastyczny i szybko reaguje na zmiany to musi on pokonać wiele barier związanych z szybkim rozwojem. Małe przedsiębiorstwo posiada zwykle mocno ograniczone zasoby finansowe i personalne oraz niewielkie umiejętności zarządzania. Problemem badawczym podjętym w artykule jest poszukiwanie alternatywnych form wsparcia finansowego polskich małych przedsiębiorstw i zapytanie czy my mamy jakąś ofertę pozabankową dla tej ważnej grupy podmiotów gospodarujących.W latach dziewiędziesiatych, zaczęły powstawać w Polsce lokalne pozabankowe instytucje wspierające finansowo sektor MSP. Należą do nich między innymi fundusze poręczeń kredytowych i fundusze venture capital. Są to ważne instytucje finansowego wsparcia badanego sektora. Fundusze poręczeń kredytowych oferują ważną pomoc dla przedsiębiorców Celem nadrzędnym ich działalności jest ograniczenie bezrobocia poprzez ułatwienie dostępu mikro, małym i średnim przedsiębiorcom do kapitału zewnętrznego, a przez to umożliwienie im rozwoju do tworzenia nowych, trwałych miejsc pracy. Celem szczegółowy jest udzielanie poręczeń dla kredytów i pożyczek oferowanych przez współpracujące instytucje finansujące oraz udzielanie pomocy w przygotowaniu wniosków kredytowych, biznes planów. Biorąc pod uwagę zakres polityki wspierania przedsiębiorczości oraz przemiany zachodzące w otoczeniu małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw w naszym kraju rezultaty działalności funduszy poręczeniowych w zakresie wzrostu ich skali i dostępności uznać należy za znaczące. Inicjatywa tworzenia funduszy lokalnych wynika w zasadzie z inicjatywy jednostek samorządu terytorialnego i realnych możliwości ich dokapitalizowania. Otoczenie prawne i instytucjonalne, w jakim obecnie rozwijają się fundusze poręczeń kredytowych są sprzyjające dla wzrostu ich znaczenia w polskim systemie finansowym. Ważnym instrumentem wsparcia dla funduszy o odpowiedniej strukturze kapitałowej są udziały kapitałowe Banku Gospodarstwa Krajowego i ich rola koordynująca. Dużą rolę we wzmocnieniu kapitałowym odgrywają również fundusze strukturalne Unii Europejskiej Dla małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw jest to duża pomoc w pozyskiwaniu kredytów i rozszerzaniu prowadzonej działalności. Niewątpliwie dzięki funduszom pożyczkowym wzmacnia się pozycję mikro i małego przedsiębiorstwa, tworząc pozytywne wzorce przedsiębiorczości, co zapewnia szybkie i najbardziej widoczne efekty dla społeczności lokalnej.

PART IV

GEOPOLITICAL CONDITIONS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES IN BORDERLANDS

CHANGING FUNCTIONS OF POLITICAL BORDERS ON POLISH LANDS

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The incorporation of Poland together with nein other countries to the European Union has brought about a new spatial frame of the European integration. It seems worthwhile to examine the role of Polish lands in the process of integration of Europe and to discuss in this context the functions of international borders (Sobczyński 2005).

Poland has participated in the process of European integration (understood as adjoining of different historical lands to a uniform national or supranational system of government) since the 14th century, mainly through state unions (personal or real) between Poland proper (*Corona Regni Poloniae*) and neighbouring lands (tab. 1).

Table 1. State unions between Poland and her neighbours

States in Union	Period
Poland and Bohemia	1300-1305
Poland, Bohemia and Hungary	1305-1306
Poland and Hungary	1370-1382
Poland and Lithuania (Commonwealth)	1385-1795
Commonwealth and Hungary	1440-1444
Commonwealth and France	1574-1575
Commonwealth and Transylvania	1576-1586
Commonwealth and Sweden	1592-1599
Commonwealth of Three Nations (Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine)	1658-1659
Commonwealth and Saxony	1697-1763
Duchy of Warsaw and Saxony	1807-1815
Kingdom of Poland and Russia; Kingdom of Galicia, Duchy of Tesin and Austro-Hungary; Grand Duchy of Poznań and Germany	1815-1914
Kingdom of Poland and Germany and Austro-Hungary	1916-1918

Source: author's elaboration according to: Koneczny, 1981; Chwalba 2000.

The above-mentioned state unities included mainly the area between the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Sea, owing to which Polish territory assumed a 'bridge' function joining Western and Eastern Europe (or, more broadly, Eurasia) (fig. 1, 2). It should be noticed the Poland throughout her history as an independent state has always been within the area referred to as Heartland in J.H. Mackinder theories. Polish monarchs reached the peak of their territorial expansion in 1492 when closely related kings of the Jagiellonian dynasty occupied the thrones of the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania, Bohemia and Hungary while Moldavia, Masovia and the Duchy of Prussia were their vassals.

The Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania was a state that played a particularly important role in the process of European integration. Undergoing various political changes from incorporative union through personal union, real union to unitary constitutional monarchy, this state always respected the separateness of Poland and Lithuania (Rykała, Sobczyński 2003, p. 481). The Commonwealth was ranked among superpowers and during most of its history its hegemony in Central Europe was unquestionable (Długosz, 2000, p. 30). This was also during a few centuries a main centre of culture and a key element of order in Eastern Europe (Maliszewski, 1920).

Fig. 1. State unions between Poland and her neighbours until the end of 14th c.



Fig. 2. State unions between Poland and her neighbours in 15th - 18th centuries



In the 14th century the Polish State far exceeded the borders of Poland proper, which were established under the Piast dynasty. These lands have been named by A. Piskozub 'the White Eagle's nestle' making reference to Poland's national emblem (Piskozub, 1987, p. 36-37). The territory of the Commonwealth underwent multiple changes: the state area expanded till 1634 when it became the second biggest country in Europe (after the Muscovy), then territorial losses occurred and three partitions (1772, 1793, 1795) made by neighbouring states, which put an end to the existence of the Commonwealth (tab. 2).

The union with Lithuania meant that Polish foreign policy focused hitherto on the West became East-oriented (Olejnik, 1985, p. 231).

The borders of the Commonwealth could be divided into two categories: international (external) and interstate (internal) borders that separated quasi-sovereign units forming the Commonwealth.

Among the internal borders of particular importance was the border between Poland proper (the Crown) and Lithuania (the Grand Duchy), which was an interstate border. Running from the border of the State of the Teutonic Order

this border divided the Commonwealth into two uneven parts. The Polish-Lithuanian border was a real barrier in the economic and legal terms because the separateness of Lithuania, confirmed by several legal acts, was strongly marked. On the other hand this border was quite permeable for transfer of ideas and innovations going from the West to the East. This cultural and economic permeability of the border contributed to rapid Polonization and Europeization of Lithuanian society (Furdal, 2000, p. 58-65).

Table 2. Territorial development of the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania

Year	Area in thousand km^2
1370	244
1492	1 115
1582	815
1634	990
1750	730
1771	733
1772	522
1793	215
1795	0

Source: author's own calculation according to: Mizerski 1996. p. 357; Jezierski 1994, p. 14; Jezierski, Wyczański 2003, p. 21.

The western border of the Commonwealth, which had an international character, played a similar role. Here western ideas, culture and innovations reached Poland along with a stream of German settlers moving eastward. In this case it was also a 'one way transfer' as the diffusion of ideas from the East to the West was insignificant. This explains why most of Poland remained under the influence of the Latin culture, although her eastern peripheries were influenced by Eastern culture.

Some fragments of external borders formed a cultural border between the Latin and eastern political systems.

During the early period of the Commonwealth practically there were hardly any forms of control or protection of borders. The total length of borders of the Commonwealth in the mid-16th century was 6,500 km (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 71).

In that period the Muscovy introduced a border defence system called *'linija'* consisting of small guard posts that punctuated the border line. This system meant a very efficient isolation of societies of both states (Maruszewski, 1936, p. 42).

The western border of the Commonwealth was not heavily protected because till the mid-17th century there was no threat from this direction. Likewise, the southern borders were considered secure (Olejnik, 1985, p. 237). Such neg-

ligence, however, resulted in incursions of foreign troops, which during the 18th century easily entered the territory of the weakened Commonwealth. This was one of the causes of the collapse of the Polish statehood at the end of the 18th century. Highly significant is the fact of extreme instability of the eastern border of the Commonwealth that shifted back and forth within the zone 500 km wide (fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Changes of the Commonwealth territory



Source: Dominiczak, 1997, p. 77

From the mid-16th century the eastern border was becoming less permeable not only for trade but also for exchange of ideas. On the other hand, as the Commonwealth was losing in weight the transfer of ideas was gradually shifting the course from the traditional west-to-east direction to the opposite one. The eastern pattern of governing was favoured by increasingly larger classes of the Lithuanian society including some magnate families ready to give up their country to the eastern Emperor in exchange for their own benefits and privileges. In the pertinent literature state peripheries are often referred to as *'kresy'*. This Polish term does not denote any kind of borderland: it denotes territories outside the core area of a nation and outside the original ethnic nucleus of a state usually annexed subsequently to it by seizure, dynastic succession, etc. In most cases these are multicultural areas of very complex ethnic, political and social relations (Koter, 1997, p. 10).

According to M. Koter the Commonwealth had *kresy* only on its eastern outskirts, namely in Ukraine and Livland. The western borderland e.g. Wielkopolska should not be considered as kresy because it was Poland's core area and on its western border two equivalent cultures met. Here there was no analogy to the Wild Steppes that formed the eastern frontier. Conversely, it was Germany that could regard New March as its *kresy* (Koter, 1997, p. 32).

The eastern and south-eastern *kresy* of the Commonwealth was inhabited by the Rusyns – ancestors of Belorussians and Ukrainians. On these areas there were some enclaves of allochthonous population e.g. Poles, Jews, Germans, Tatars and Armenians (Koter and Kulesza, 2001, p. 172). According to R. Umiastowski (1925, p. 90) in the central part of the eastern borderland the range of the Orthodox religion reached far to the west, which may be explicable in terms of marshy and forested character of these lands.

The Commonwealth kept the old customs system introduced under the Piast dynasty, which remained in force till 1661 (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 66-68). Custom-houses occurred not only on the borders; to the contrary, most of them were located on inland areas. Their number was proportionate to the economic level of a region. Therefore the custom-houses were much more numerous on the western border than on the southern, and particularly eastern border. In 1400 in Silesia there were 77 custom-houses, which is one for every 25 kilometres of the border. In Poland as a whole, there were some 250 custom-houses, most of them in the interior, but in 1643 there were 120 border custom-houses (tab. 3, fig. 4).

Table 3. Border custom-houses in the Kingdom of Poland in 1643

Border	Number of custom-houses
Poland – Prussia	31
Poland – Russia	20
Poland – Turkey	12
Poland – Hungary	12
Poland – Austria	23
Poland – Brandenburg	20
Duchy of Siewierz – Austria	2
Total	120

Source: author's own elaboration after Dominiczak, 1997, p. 159-160

Fig. 4. Custom-houses in Polish part of the Commonwealth in 1643

At that time the circulation of traders was not restricted by either visa requirement or other constrains except the custom duty.

Re-established in 1918, Polish State had to struggle for its border through diplomatic negotiations, three plebiscites (Silesia, Ermeland and Masuria, Powiśle) and, first of all, wars against its neighbours (Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Soviet Russia) or uprisings (Germany). Endeavours to draw the new borders according to the pre-partition status quo succeeded only partially, mainly on the western and southern borders (Ślusarczyk 1995, p. 96-97). The eastern and north-eastern borders assumed totally different course and so did the newly emerged northern border. Finally shaped in 1922, the territory of the Republic of Poland covered 388,634 km², which was 345,000 km² less then before the partitions (Dominiczak, 1997, 217). Despite territorial losses, the length of borders that totalled 5,529 km (including 140 km of Baltic shore) was still very significant (Ślusarczyk, 1995, p. 113). The longest was the border with Germany 1912 km, then with the Soviet Union 1412 km, Czechoslovakia 984 km, Lithuania 507 km, Romania 349 km, the Free City of Gdańsk 121 and Latvia 109 km. From the geopolitical point of view, the border configuration was very dangerous in Pomerania where a strip of Polish lands (merely 15 km wide in the narrowest part) separated German territories. It laid basis for German request of a extraterritorial corridor that would provide for communication between East Prussia and the main part of German territory (Kula, 1994, p. 13).

From among six neighbours, Poland maintained friendly relationships only with Latvia and Romania with no border disputes.

Nevertheless the eastern outskirts of Polish State, traditionally called kresy, continued to be inhabited predominantly by Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainian population with some quite numerous enclaves of Polish, Jewish, German and Armenian population. On the other hand in the western part of the country there were many German enclaves. In total minorities accounted for 30% of population. Like in the pre-partition period, Poland again was bisected by a N-S line that represented the major cultural division of Europe. Areas west from this line inhabited by Polish, Jewish and German belonged to the Latin culture, whereas the lands to the east, predominantly Ukrainian and Belorussian (with and important share of Jews) belonged to Byzantine civilisation with some small Muslim enclaves. This zone of cultural junction was overlaid since 1917 with a new conflict between western democracy and eastern Bolshevik dictatorship. The eastern borders of Poland became a buffer defending from expansion of communism. Owing to the victory in 1920 war Poland was able to keep this wrongful political system away from Western Europe until August 1939 when the Soviets concluded an agreement with the Nazis providing for partition of Poland (Albert, 1984).

Considering the situation in the Soviet Union during the interwar period Poland, although not ideally democratic, was a mainstay of political stability and human rights. The 1921 constitution warranted equality of all citizens regardless their nationality, religion and social background. Minorities had rights to pursue their political, cultural and educational objectives, including use of minority languages. Nevertheless Polonization and Europeization of eastern borderlands continued, which was considered by some partisans of eastern civilisation as a cultural aggression (Furdal, 2000, p. 82).

Relationships with Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania were correct, despite the fact that the borders did not meet expectations of any of the parties concerned. Military defence of the borders was not necessary; only the traffic of goods was under control in the interest of economic affairs of individual countries (Maruszewski, 1936, p. 65). As early as 1920 an agreement with Germany was settled to allow borderland inhabitants, mainly farmers having fields on both sides of the border, to cross the boundary (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 229). Originally, since 1918 borders of re-established Polish State were controlled by the Military Border Guard. In 1926 on the southern and western borders the Border Guard was installed. Eastern and north-eastern sections of Poland's border (with the Soviet Union and Lithuania) were of totally different character. Delineated after armed conflicts, these borders played chiefly defensive role and a potential military aggression of neighbouring countries had to be expected. Since November 1, 1924 the border with the Soviet Union was guarded by special military units named Border Guard Corps (KOP). In 1926

these units extended their control over the borders with Lithuania and Latvia, and in 1927 also over some portions of German and Romanian borders. In total this system of border defence covered 2,334 km of borders (Kula, 1994, p. 14; Dominiczak, 1992, p. 120).

The border with the Free City of Gdańsk was a particular case: it was not a customs barrier as Gdańsk was included into Polish customs area (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 233).

During the interwar period Poland implemented two different border systems according to specific character of her borders. In the east it consisted in politico-military defence of borders that constituted barriers separating democracy from the Bolshevik system. In the south and west the borders had chiefly economic character (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 249). The costs of defending the eastern borders was 3.7 times higher the western borders (Kula, 1994, p. 39).

The role of borders was to inhibit the import of goods thus protecting national economy. The number of persons crossing the borders averaged 25,000 a day and 12 million a year. In the years 1923-1939 over 130 million people crossed the borders, of whom merely 10 million were subject to passport requirements. The whole system of border inspection consisted of 118 customs entryways, 108 other border checkpoints and 597 border crossings reserved for local population. In 1925 at the Polish-German border there were 101 customs entryways (road and railways) and 37 other border checkpoints (without local border crossings) (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 274) (fig. 5).

On the border with the Free City of Gdańsk and Germany (eastern Prussia) there were 7 customs entryways, 2 local border crossings and 10 temporary border posts. The border with Gdańsk was of political character with no customs inspection. The border formalities were hardly restrictive and a permit was sufficient to cross the border. The situation changed after the Nazis gained power in Gdańsk; the border regulations became more severe thereafter (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 256). The border guard and customs were under control of the Polish Ministry of Finance.

On the border with Czechoslovakia there were 19 customs entryways, 51 border checkpoints and 125 local border crossings, mostly on western portion of the border. Populations living on both sides of the border were in many cases related to each other and many farms were divided by the border line. In 1934 the number of persons crossing the border averaged 9,000 a day, most of them on its western section (Kula, 1994, p. 123).

On the Polish-Romanian border with just 3 customs entryways, 4 border checkpoints and 2 local border crossings, the cross-border circulation was very scarce (Kula, 1994, p. 135).

On the Polish-Soviet border 32 border crossings of two categories were opened in 1921. Category I was to serve travellers subject to passport requirements, whereas category II was reserved for local border traffic of people en-

rolled in a special list (Dominiczak, 1992, p. 166). In 1922 a railway border crossing was established at Podwołoczyska-Wołoczysk and by the terms of 1924 convention another three railway border crossing were opened (Zahacice-Farinowo, Stołpce-Żytkowice, Zdołbunów-Szepietówka) (Dominiczak, 1992, p. 31; Dominiczak, 1997, p. 232). After the Border Guard Corps was created the crossborder traffic was totally broken off and a sanitary cordon was set up. The customs matters were finally settled only in 1939 and a trade treaty with the Soviet Union was signed as late as May 1939. For political reasons the passport traffic crossing the Polish-Soviet border was insignificant. In 1927 merely 16 road and 6 railway border crossings operated at this border (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 280).

Fig. 5. Border checkpoints in inter-war period

Source: Dominiczak, 1992, p. 167

The border with Lithuania was also restless. Till 1923 both countries were separated by a nearly uninhabited neutral zone. Later on the border was sealed, the traffic of goods and persons was suspended and the Warsaw-Vilnius railroad was closed. The border was not properly demarcated, just marked with bunches of straw (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 223, 280). Only in 1928 local crossborder traffic was started for farmers having fields separated by the boundary. Only two road border crossings were in use and the railway border crossing at Zawiasy-Vievis was open only in 1938.

The border with Latvia was quiet and transborder relations were peaceful. For strategic reasons, however, this border was put under control of the Border Guard Corps in order to maintain a continuous zone protected by these units. It resulted though in reduction in local border traffic. There was one railway border crossing at Turmant-Zemgale and one road border checkpoint (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 223, 280; Dominiczak, 1992, p. 38).

On the whole area controlled by the Border Guard Corps the local transborder traffic averaged less than 150,000 persons a year, mostly at short fragments of borders with Eastern Prussia, Romania and Latvia (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 279). In 1923-1929 only 35,200 Polish visas were issued for Soviet citizens, whereas in the year 1929 alone 176,000 German citizens obtained Polish visas. All in all the Border Guard served 15 times more travellers than the Border Guard Corps.

In the interwar period Poland had in total 259 border checkpoints and 597 local border crossing points (tab. 4, fig. 5).

Table 4. Number of checkpoints on Poland's borders in the interwar period

Border	Customs entryways	Border checkpoints	Local border crossings
Borders controlled by the Border Guard			
Poland – Germany	101	37	468
F.C. Gdańsk – Germany	7	10	2
Poland – Czechoslovakia	19	51	125
Poland - Romania	3	4	2
Borders controlled by the Border Guard Corps (KOP)			
Poland - USSR	22		
Poland - Lithuania	3		
Poland –Latvia	2		
Total	157	102	597

Source: Kula, 1994; Dominiczak, 1997

After Second World War under the terms of the Jalta treaty Poland lost her eastern territories of 180,000 km² and got into the Soviet sphere of influence. According to decision of Potsdam Conference Poland acquired as a recompense eastern territory of Germany of 105,000 km² up to the Oder-Neisse

line (Albert, 1984, p. 44-45; Ślusarczyk, 1995, p. 149). The territory of Poland was thus shrank to 312,683 km², which represented a reduction of 78,000 km² (20%) compared to the area before the war (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 328). The length of the new Poland's borders was 3,538 km that is 38% less than before the war. On the other hand the sea border became longer – 384 km. In the new geopolitical configuration Poland bordered with three neighbours (down from seven before the war): the Soviet Union in the north and east (the Russian Federal Republic, Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainian republics) with border 1244 km long, Czechoslovakia in the south with border 1310 km long and Germany (strictly speaking with Soviet sector of partitioned Germany transformed later into the GDR) with border 461 km long. In the aftermath of Second World War Polish territories not only shrank and shifted westward; the consequences included mass movements of people. German population was expelled from the territories recovered by Poland, whereas from the eastern territories formerly inhabited by Polish, Jewish, Ukrainian, Belorussian, German, Lithuanian, Tatar and Armenian populations, only Poles and Jews were allowed to move to Poland. At the same time Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Belorussians living west from the so-called Curzon line (it means within the post-war boundaries of Poland) were displaced to the Soviet Union. As a result, ethnically Poland became one of the most homogenous countries in Europe: the minorities accounted for merely 3% of the population and the borders were mostly (except the eastern border) conformable with ethnic divisions.

During the period of Soviet domination the function of firm political barrier was assigned, at least officially, to the western boundary. As a matter of fact, a real politico-military barrier moved from the former Polish-Soviet border line to the western limits of the Soviet-occupied sector of Germany, that is to the Elbe river which is some 1,000 km westward. The eastern boundary of Poland remained a cultural frontier as it constituted confines of Polish ethnicity and Catholic faith.

Although Poland, joined with her neighbours by military (the Warsaw Pact) and economic (COMECOM) alliances, officially maintained friendly relations with them, nevertheless the borders under the system of Soviet domination became more restrictive barriers than before the war. In 1951 the Soviet Union forced a correction of boundary, in detriment to Poland, with total exchange of population (formally it was an exchange of equal areas of 480 km²).

Contrary to the slogans about "friendship boundaries" propagandised by the authorities, in reality the border protection system was similar to those developed between hostile nations (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 334). Along all the borders there were strong military cordons which hindered legal entry to a neighbouring country thus reducing the transborder traffic. Illegal border crossing was subject to severe punishment including putting in jail. Heavy restrictions

were imposed upon traffic of goods and particularly circulation of ideas (e.g. by import of publications).

Before the end of Second World War Poland's borders were manned by the Soviet Army. After the war, border protection was taken over by Polish Army, at first at the line Oder-Bystrzyca, then - by June 10, 1945 - at the line middle Oder-Neisse, and by the end of June on the southern border (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 334-335). In 1945 four border checkpoints were open on the western border. The cross border traffic was strictly controlled, but no special documents were required. Germans and Soviet soldiers were able to leave Poland freely and people speaking Polish or Russian could enter Poland without obstructions (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 362). The Polish-Soviet boundary was controlled at that time only by the Soviets. Some portions of the Polish-Czechoslovak border were protected by a tank corps till mid-July 1945 when the border dispute was settled.

On September 13, 1945 a special military formation called Frontier Guard (WOP) was created. It was subordinated to vice-minister of national defence, a post occupied at that time by a Soviet citizen. In October 1945 on all Polish borders there were 51 border crossings (27 road and 19 railway border crossings, 4 maritime ports of entry and 1 international airport) (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 340). Since January 1, 1945 the authority over the Frontier Guard (WOP) was vested in the Ministry of Public Security (secret political police) which clearly showed the real character of 'border protection' under the communist system. It was meant to exert strict control over all persons and things passing through the borders. After 1954 Frontier Guard (WOP) was submitted to the Ministry of the Interior (police) whereas the customs was under the Ministry of Finances. Of special strategic (military) importance were the western border (because of the proximity of western Germany) and the sea border. Decision whether to allow a citizen to go abroad depended on security forces. Passport was the document required to cross the border whereas in small border traffic (across the Polish-Czechoslovak border) a border card was sufficient. After 1949 as the repatriation action finished the cross-border traffic dropped from 6 to 3 million. In the years 1946-1955 the total number of persons who crossed Polish borders amounted to 50 million including 23 million in the small border traffic, 6 million fishermen and only 1.2 million travellers in passport traffic (120,000 a year on average) (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 364). Till 1955 an additional control zone was created along 2,901 km (or 80%) of borders (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 355).

In 1971 Poland had 136 border crossings, including merely 68 normal ones (tab. 5, fig. 6). Most border crossings (92) were on the southern border. On the western border there were 17 border crossings while on the eastern one only 10, including 9 railway and one road border crossing (Terespol). Only 3 railway border crossings served passenger traffic (Terespol and Kuźnica Białostocka on

the Belorussian part of the border and Medyka on the Ukrainian part of the border). There were no border crossings allowing entry for persons from the other Soviet republics bordering on Poland, that is from Russia and Lithuania. As a general rule on all Polish borders it was more difficult to cross the border by road than by railway. For example, out of 17 border crossings on the Polish-German border only 5 was serving road traffic (Gubin, Kołbaskowo, Słubice, Świecko, Zgorzelec) while 7 were on railroads and another 5 were river checkpoints for non-passenger traffic.

Table 5. Border crossings in Peoples Republic of Poland

Border	Border crossings						
	Total	road	railway	river	small border traffic	maritime	airports
Poland – GDR	17	5	7	5			
Poland – Czechoslovakia	92	16	8		68		
Poland - USSR	10	1	9				
Baltic See	13					13	
Airports	4						4
Total	136	22	24	5	68	13	4

Source: author's own calculation after Ptasiński, 1974, p. 264-271

The Czechoslovak border was an exception as there were as many as 16 road border crossings (out of 24). In total Poland had 21 road border crossings, but some of them were reserved only for Polish citizens or travellers from the communist block countries (tab. 6). All in all, 45 border crossings served passenger traffic (including all road border crossings). In addition to this, in 1971 Poland had 13 maritime ports of entry and 4 international airports (Warsaw, Gdańsk, Cracow, Poznań) (Ptasiński, 1974, p. 264-271).

Fig. 6. Border checkpoints in the Peoples Republic of Poland



Beside border crossings of general use, there were three categories of road border crossings on the Czechoslovak border allowing access to the tourist convention area and for small border traffic. From 1959 there were 19 border crossings of the category I with border inspection where borderland inhabitants could pass the border with border cards. At 43 border crossings of category II with no checkpoints the border could be crossed exclusively by farmers having farms divided by a border line. Category III included 6 border crossings used only for transportation of white beets for sugar production (Jarzyna, 1974, p. 172-187). In total there were 68 border crossings for small border traffic, all of them on the southern border.

Table 6. Types of passenger border crossings on Polish borders

Border	Total	Road	Railway	No restrictions	Only for Polish citizens	Only for citizens of the communist block
Poland – GDR	7	5	2	5	2	-
Poland – Czechoslovakia	18	16	2	9	1	8
Poland - USSR	4	1	3	4	-	-
Baltic See	12			5	7	-
Airports	4			4		
Total	45	22	7	27	10	8

Source: author's own calculation after Ptasiński, 1974, p. 264-271

In the years 1945-1993 the Soviet Army kept on the territory of Poland its military forces including shooting ranges, airports, naval bases and whole towns, which had extraterritorial status. These areas were separated from the rest of the country by boundaries similar to state borders. Traffic between these areas and territories of the USSR and the GDR was out of control of Polish state. Soviet citizens present on these areas formally remained within the confines of their country and were not allowed to get in touch with Polish population.

It can be stated that the Iron Curtain not only separated the democratic and the communist worlds, but also constituted a barrier that set apart the countries belonging to the eastern block. With sealed borders, their societies were completely isolated and only a small number of people could enjoy international contacts. Even family ties were broken by border restrictions.

By terms of the decree on border protection from March 23, 1956 the border restrictions eased. It put an end to further development of barriers and to military control of borderland population. Moreover, systematic searching of persons crossing the border was replaced by random customs examination. At the same time, the border protection system was improved by establishing a squadron of reconnoitring airplanes operating within the Border Guard forces. In 1959 tourist convention with Czechoslovakia was signed which facilitated tourist movement in the Carpathian Mountains. Owing to this libaralization the crossborder traffic doubled during the first decade and tripled till 1970 amounting to 14 million persons a year. The most striking increase – up to 6,5 million persons in 1970 - was in the passport traffic. A revolutionary changes occurred on the western border after the agreement with the GDR signed on January 1, 1972 – by terms of this agreement it was possible to cross the border with ID only instead of passport. At the same time the convention on visa-free travelling was extended over the other socialist-block countries. In 1972-1973 visa requirements were abolished for travelling to Austria, Sweden and Finland,

nevertheless the restrictions on passports issuance kept most of Polish citizens from going abroad. In spite of this fact, among all eastern-block countries the most intensive cross-border traffic was in Poland. In 1977 alone, 44 million people crossed the border while in the whole period between 1971 and 1982 this number amounted to 463, including 360 million in the passport traffic, 43 million in the small border traffic and 26 million in the passport-free traffic (Dominiczak, 1997, p. 366). So in the years 1971-1979 when the socialist system was fully developed, the restrictiveness of the western and southern borders as spatial barriers temporally diminished. Nevertheless as soon as the Solidarity movement sprung up, Poland's neighbours imposed again restrictions on cross-border traffic, which remained in force during the whole martial law period.

The fall of the communism in Europe in 1989 and the political transformations brought about changes in the border protection system in Poland. After unification of Germany and disintegration of another two Poland's neighbours Poland borders again on 7 countries. The longest border section is with the Czech Republic – 786 km, then with Slovakia 533 km, Ukraine 526 km, Germany – 461 km, Belarus – 407 km. The sea border remained unchanged but its geopolitical position has altered.

The reform of the border protection system was initiated by the law on the Border Guard, which restored the pre-war formation of civil-military character, according to models known in democratic countries. The number of border crossings increased significantly: in 1993 there were nearly 150 checkpoints, including 27 border crossings of facilitated traffic regulations and 31 checkpoints for small border traffic. Possession of a passport is not any longer a privilege, but a citizen's right, although the passport issuance became linked with the fiscal system. The cross border traffic increased immediately: 185.5 million people crossed the borders in 1993. In 2004 there were 259 border crossings in Poland (tab. 7, fig. 7), 92 of them on the Czech border, 52 on that with Slovakia, and 38 on the German border. Border crossing facilities are still underdeveloped on the eastern borders: there are 15 border crossings on the border with Ukraine, 14 on the border with Belarus, 7 on the Russian and 3 on the Lithuanian borders (*Straż Graniczna*, 2004).

Table 7. Border crossings in Poland in 2004

Border	Border crossings							
	Total	Road	Railway	River	Small border traffic	Pedestrian	Maritime	Airport
Poland - Germany	38	18	8	5	7			
Poland - Czech Republic	92	23	8		37	24		
Poland - Slovakia	52	9	3		17	23		
Poland - Russia	7	3	3		1			
Poland - Lithuania	3	2	1					
Poland - Belarus	14	6	5		3			
Poland - Ukraine	15	6	6		3			
Baltic See	18						18	
Airports	20							20
Total	259	68	34	5	68	47	18	20

Source: Straż Graniczna, 2004

Fig. 7. Border checkpoints in 2004



Table 8 represents changes in average distance between border crossings on Poland's borders from the interwar period till now. It can be stated that great changes have occurred since the communist period when, for instance, on the border between Poland and the Soviet Union average distance between border crossings was 124 km. A similar situation was during the interwar period on the Polish-Lithuanian border, which was closed for a dozen or so years. These days the great disproportion between the density of border crossings on the eastern and northern borders persists as a heritage of previous epoch.

Table 8. Average density of border crossings in Poland between 1938 and 2004

Border	Inter-war Poland			Polish Peoples Republic			Republic of Poland (2004)		
	Length	Number of border crossings	Aver. distance in km	Length	Number of border crossings	Aver. distance in km	Length	Number of border crossings	Aver. distance in km
Baltic Sea	140	17	8,2	384	13	29,5	389	18	21,6
Poland-Latvia	109	2	54,5	-					
Poland-Romania	349	9	38,8	-					
F.C.Gdańsk-Germany	86	19	4,5	-					
Poland-Germany	1912	606	3	461*	17	27,1	461	38	12,1
Poland-Czechoslovakia	984	195	5	1310	92	14,2			
Poland-Czech Rep.	-						786	92	8,5
Poland-Slovakia	-						533	52	10,3
Poland-USSR	1412	22	64,2	1244	10	124,4			
Poland-Lithuania	507	3	169				102	3	34.0
Poland-Russia	-						210	7	30,0
Poland-Belarus	-						407	14	29,1
Poland-Ukraine	-						526	15	35,1

Source: author's own calculation

The accession of Poland and its neighbours to the European Union on May 1, 2004 will redefine once more time the role of Poland's borders. The eastern border, apart from being a cultural frontier, becomes again an important political barrier with increasing spatial restrictiveness. On the other hand, the process of gradual abolition of southern border initiated a few years ago goes apace and will be completed in the near future. The same process is likely to occur in the western border, although at a slower pace.

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Streszczenie

ZMIENNOŚĆ FUNKCJI GRANIC POLITYCZNYCH NA ZIEMIACH POLSKICH

W artykule omówiono w ujęciu historycznym zmiany funkcji pełnionych przez państwowe granice Polski (międzynarodowe i wewnętrzne) począwszy od okresu polsko-litewskiej unii personalnej aż do czasu wejścia Polski do Unii Europejskiej. W toku dziejów Polska była jednym z animatorów procesów integracji obszaru Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, stanowiąc zarazem główne mocarstwo regionu. Jednakże ziemie polskie służyły również procesom integracji dokonywanym przez sąsiednie mocarstwa.

Granice Rzeczypospolitej Szlacheckiej można podzielić na dwie kategorie: międzynarodowe (zewnętrzne) oraz międzypaństwowe (wewnętrzne),oddzielające quasi-suwerenne jednostki tworzące Rzeczpospolitą. Także funkcje granic Polski międzywojennej były silnie zróżnicowane.

Granica wschodnia pozostawała nadal granicą polityczno-kulturową, w owym czasie pomiędzy systemem demokratycznym a radziecką dyktaturą. Pozostałe zaś granice II RP, nie wyłączając zachodniej, również stały się istotnymi barierami w przestrzeni, choć oddzielały państwa względnie słabo zróżnicowane pod względem politycznym i kulturowym.

Po drugiej wojnie światowej funkcja zasadniczej bariery politycznej została przeniesiona ze wschodnich na zachodnie kresy Polski chociaż granica wschodnia nadal pozostawała barierą kulturową. Wszystkie granice Polski w owym czasie przybrały charakter szczególnie restrykcyjnych barier przestrzennych.

Przystąpienie Polski i jej kilku sąsiadów do UE z dniem 1 maja 2004 r. zmusza do ponownego przedefiniowania funkcji naszych granic państwowych. Wschodnia granica poza pełnieniem nadal roli bariery kulturowej znów staje się niezwykle ważną barierą polityczną a jej restrykcyjność ponownie wzrasta.

БИОСФЕРНЫЙ РЕЗЕРВАТ «ПРИБУЖСКОЕ ПОЛЕСЬЕ» КАК ЭЛЕМЕНТ ЭКОТУРИСТИЧЕСКОЙ СЕТИ ЕВРОПЫ

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Прибужское Полесье – регион, расположенный в юго-западной части Беларуси, в приграничье трех европейских государств: Беларуси, Польши и Украины. Эта территория находится на пересечении двух важнейших торговых путей древности: с Приднепровья по Припяти, Пине и Муховцу в Польшу и дальше в страны Западной Европы; и с Прикарпатья по Западному Бугу на север в Прибалтику и Скандинавию. Особенностью региона является его расположение на стыке трех культур: белорусской, украинской и польской, что обусловило здесь синтез разных этнических традиций. На территории резервата по-соседски проживают представители многочисленных этносов, мирно сосуществуют различные конфессии. Именно поэтому, созданный биосферный резерват является уникальным регионом для сохранения и дальнейшего развития природных ландшафтов, экосистем, социально-этнических, культурных и исторических ценностей края. Проводимые на данной территории в течении последних почти двадцати лет научные исследования позволили выделить уникальные особенности региона. Итогом исследований стало создание в 2003 г. государственного ландшафтного заказника «Прибужское Полесье».

В октябре 2004 г. решением 18 сессии Международного Координационного совета Программы «Человек и Биосфера» ландшафтный заказник «Прибужское Полесье» был включен во Всемирную сеть биосферных территорий ЮНЕСКО в качестве биосферного резервата.

История биосферных территорий уходит своимим корнями в 1970 год, когда на 16-й сессии Генеральной конференции ЮНЕСКО была принята долгосрочная межправительственная междисциплинарная программа «Человек и биосфера» («Man and Biosphere», MAB). Целью данной программы стало изучение в рамках естественных и общественных

наук научно-исследовательских проблем управления естественными ресурсами и основных путей сосуществования человека и природы.

Руководящим органом МАВ является международный координационный совет. В странах-членах ЮНЕСКО существуют 144 национальных комитета, реализующих деятельность по программе МАВ. Программа «Человек и биосфера» включает 14 проектов, изучающих возможности устойчивого использования и сохранения биологического разнообразия, влияние многообразной деятельности человека на основные типы природных сообществ и на окружающую среду в целом. В качестве основного инструмента программы МАВ была создана Международная сеть биосферных территорий. Биосферные территории используются как модель устойчивого развития для изучения взаимодействия человека и природы, решения научно-исследовательских и образовательных задач, осуществления глобального экологического мониторинга. В соответствии с принятой в 1995 году Севильской стратегией, биосферные территории должны быть населены и выполнять охранную функцию, функцию развития и функцию научно-технического обеспечения. Следовательно, биосферные территории должны включать в свой состав особо охраняемые территории, быть двигателем регионального устойчивого развития и способствовать проведению научных исследований, образовательных и просветительских программ, а также развитию экотуристической деятельности.

Для того, чтобы выполнять эти функции, биосферные территории делятся на три зоны: одну или несколько основных территорий (или ядер), пользующихся долгосрочной защитой государства; буферную зону, которая используется для осуществления экологически безопасной деятельности; переходную зону (или зону сотрудничества), где могут проводиться некоторые виды сельскохозяйственной деятельности, размещаться населённые пункты, или которая может использоваться в других целях. В отличие от национальных парков и заповедников, в функции которых преимущественно входит изучение и охрана природных экосистем, целью создания биосферных территорий является обеспечение и развитие сбалансированных взаимоотношений между населением и окружающей средой [1].

На март 2001 года Международная сеть включала более 440 биосферных территорий (441), расположенных в 94 странах. Из общего числа биосферных резерватов около 40 % находятся в Европе (таблица).

Биосферный резерват (БР) «Прибужское Полесье» расположен в долине реки Западный Буг и на преимущественно плоских местоположениях водоразделов небольших притоков Буга. Его территория является частью Малоритской водно-ледниковой равнины. В границах территории выделяются ландшафты полого-волнистой моренной равнины и плоско-

волнистой водно-ледниковой равнины, пойменной и надпойменной террас, а также аквальные ландшафты. На территории выявлены редкие для региона виды ландшафтных урочищ, интересные геоморфологические объекты – дюны, комплексы верховых и переходных болот, небольшие лесные озера.

Таблица. Количество биосферных резерватов в странах Европы

Наименование страны	Количество биосферных резерватов *
Австрия	5
Беларусь	2
Болгария	17
Германия	13 (1)
Греция	2
Дания	1
Великобритания	13
Венгрия	5
Ирландия	2
Испания	20
Италия	5
Латвия	1
Нидерланды	1
Польша	10 (3)
Португалия	1
Румыния	2 (1)
Россия	23
Словакия	2 (1)
Украина	6 (2)
Хорватия	1
Чехия	5 (1)
Финляндия	2
Франция	9 (1)
Швейцария	2
Швеция	1
Эстония	1
Югославия	2
Всего	154

* в скобках указано количество трансграничных резерватов

Водные экосистемы, широко распространенные на территории резервата, занимают почти 1,5 тыс. га и представлены водотоками (река Буг, ее притоки Копаёвка, Середовая, Прирва, Спановка, другие малые реки и ручьи), а также водоемами (карстовые озера, озера-разливы, старичные озера и речные затоки в пойме Буга). Наиболее крупные озера –

Селяхи, Рогознянское, Белое и Стадечское. На территории резервата находится три созданных рыбоводческих хозяйства – Страдечские, Домачевские и Комаровские пруды. На указанных объектах налажен лицензионный лов рыбы. Кроме того, богаты рыбой и другие водоемы региона, что дает предпосылки для успешного развития рыболовного туризма.

Леса на территории резервата представляют собой доминирующий тип растительности, занимая более 30 тыс. га. Они весьма разнообразны и богаты по видовому составу флоры и фауны, выполняют важные водоохранные и почвозащитные функции, обладая при этом и высокой хозяйственной значимостью. Леса богаты ягодной и грибной продукцией, что привлекает сюда большое количество людей, в первую очередь жителей г. Бреста. Особенностью резервата является наличие массивов островных ельников, находящихся за пределами южной границы распространения вида. В результате координации действий БР «Прибужское Полесье», Шацкого национального природного парка (Украина) и Полесского национального парка (Польша) будет создан значительный по масштабу и природоохранному режиму защитный экран в прирусловой части и бассейне Западного Буга, являющегося одной из наиболее сохранившихся больших рек Европы.

Важная особенность «Прибужского Полесья» - сравнительно богатая представленность коренных природных сообществ. Здесь выявлены все типы основных лесов, болот, лугов и пойменных лесов Беларуси. Кроме того, на территории выявлены редкие экосистемы, не характерные для Полесья, а также большое количество редких и исчезаемых видов флоры и фауны. Резерват интересен для орнитологов, возможна организация специализированных орнитологических туров, в ходе которых в течение суток можно наблюдать до ста видов птиц. На рассматриваемой территории обитает достаточное количество промысловых видов млекопитающих и птиц. Проведение структурами резервата охотничьих туров может стать еще одним видом организованного туризма.

Не менее важным ресурсом и потенциалом резервата является местное население. Заселение территории резервата началось с 10-9 тыс. до Р.Хр. (поздний палеолит). Об этом свидетельствуют археологические памятники и орудия труда древних людей, неоднократно находимые на данной территории.

Территория резервата служила своеобразным коридором, позволяющим продвижение от Черного к Балтийскому морю в обход полесских болот и лесов.

В VII-IX вв. в бассейне Зап. Буга располагалось восточно-славянское племя бужан. В этот период у славян происходит переход от

родо-племенных отношений к феодальным. Подсечное земледелие и скотоводство как основные занятия делают невозможным частую смену места жительства. Поэтому временные поселения (стоянки) уступают место постоянным – селищам и укрепленным городищам. Согласно сообщений географа Л. Баварского (кон. IX в.) у бужан был 231 «город». На рубеже 1-го и 2-го тысячелетий земли резервата заселяло племя волынян, которое находилось в тесном контакте с дреговичами. Наиболее значимые в экономическом и политическом значении поселения становятся городами. К 1019 г. относится первое упоминание о Берестье, городе находящемся вне территории резервата, но оказывающем влияние на него на всем протяжении истории вплоть до сегодняшнего дня.

Для территории резервата по сравнению с Брестским районом и областью в целом характерна высокая лесистость, наличие озер, своеобразный характер расселения, низкая плотность населения. Более половины экономически активного населения занято в сельском хозяйстве. Незначительная его часть работает в сфере услуг, на транспорте и в лесном хозяйстве. В регионе практически отсутствует промышленность, что может способствовать производству здесь экологически чистой сельскохозяйственной продукции. Природные особенности региона могут способствовать активизации местных инициатив в дорожном сервисе, местных агро-, лесо- и водно-экологических промыслах, экологическом туризме.

Наиболее крупными населенными пунктами являются г.п. Домачево (1400 жителей), д. Томашевка (1220 жителей) и Медно (950 жителей). Современный этнический состав населения на территории биосферного резервата формировался на протяжении длительного периода под влиянием сложного комплекса исторических, социально-экономических и природных факторов. Согласно данных Первой Всероссийской переписи населения 1897 г. и результатов исследований многочисленных ученых (Я. Карский, М. Драгоманов, Л. Нидерле, Т.Флоринский и др.) абсолютное большинство населения резервата считалось украинцами [2]. Однако польские переписи населения 1921 и 1931 гг. зафиксировали здесь преобладание населения, идентифицируемого себя как «тутэйшие». К середине XX в. местное население считает себя уже белорусами. Объяснение подобному этническому преобразованию можно найти в постоянных (с XV в.) исторических, культурных и социально-экономических связях региона с Беларусью, а также в массовой деятельности белорусских культурно-просветительских организаций в первой половине XX в. Диалектологическая особенность региона может быть интересна не только для специалистов, но и любителей экзотики.

Интерес для туристов представляют культурные и исторические памятники региона. Наличие неограниченных лесных ресурсов обуслови-

ло массовое строительство культовых сооружений из дерева. Исторически на юге Беларуси сложилась полесская школа деревянного церковного зодчества, а в бассейне Мухавца – ее локальная часть – малоритская школа. Она представлена памятниками с утонченными формами шатров и пластичными оригинальными чертами куполов. В них угадываются многие межэтнические особенности, присущие деревянному культовому зодчеству Волыни, Польши, Карпат. К данной школе принадлежит самый старый и самый известный храм на территории резервата – Свято-Михайловская церковь в д. Черск (1700 г.). Храм состоит из квадратного в плане основного и пятигранного алтарного срубов, накрытых общей вальмовой крышей. Основной объем и апсиду завершают фигурные барочные башенки. В интерьере – резной иконостас и иконы XVII – XVIII вв. Отдельно от церкви стоит трехъярусная звонница, накрытая четырехскатной крышей с главкой [3].

Памятником традиционного народного зодчества является Ильинская церковь в д. Дубок, построенная на рубеже XVIII-XIX вв. Храм состоит из основного прямоугольного объема с трехгранной алтарной апсидой и двухъярусного бабинца, накрытых общей двускатной крышей с вальмами над алтарем и главкой. С западной стороны к притвору примыкает квадратная трехъярусная колокольня [4]. Архитектурная выразительность горизонтально обшитого досками и лишенного декора здания достигается исключительно композиционными средствами, что издавна было характерно для народного деревянного зодчества.

Образцом полесской архитектурной школы считается Преображенская церковь в д. Медно (кон. XVIII в.). Здание односрубное с трехскатной крышей. С северной стороны примыкает предел, а с запада – бабинец и одноярусная колокольня. Стены основного объема и придела прорезаны узкими прямоугольными оконными проемами [4].

На протяжении почти ста лет до Второй мировой войны в Домачево стоял величественный костел Непорочного Зачатия Найсвятейшей Девы Марии, построенный в стиле позднего классицизма. К сожалению, время не пощадило его.

Памятником гражданской архитектуры является старинное еврейское кладбище в районе д. Томашевка. Молчаливыми свидетелями трагедии еврейского народа, с XV в. свободно проживающего на территории региона, являются места расстрелов 1942 г. около д. Томашевка и г.п. Домачево.

Из дерева строили жители региона жилые дома и хозяйственные постройки. Некоторые образцы традиционной западнополесской деревянной архитектуры еще сохранились по деревням и являются туристическими объектами. На территории резервата исследователями выделяется ряд деревень с редкой ландшафтно-планировочной

структурой, где застройка гармонично «вмонтирована» в естественный лесной массив и «подчиняется» природной доминанте. Такая планировка обусловлена не только утилитарными соображениями, но и факторами, связанными с народной экологической культурой, имеющей многовековые традиции уважения к окружающей природной среде. Среди подобных объектов можно выделить деревни Рогозно, Рудня и Рытец (Демянчик, 2003). Резерват может стать одной из первых в Беларуси охраняемых территорий, где будет целенаправленно сохраняться ряд исторических ландшафтов, способствующих социокультурной устойчивости и гармоничному развитию этноса.

Территория резервата сохранила следы необычного для своего времени эксперимента. Во второй половине XVI в. на землях, принадлежащих Радзивилам, в районе Домачево была поселена большая община выходцев из Голландии. Они основали в пойме Буга две колонии Нейборов и Нейдорф. Голландцы, которых полешуки называли голендрами, к тому времени уже имевшие опыт мелиоративных работ, провели здесь некоторые осушительные мероприятия. На отвоеванных у реки землях колонисты выращивали различные зерновые культуры, а заливные луга позволяли им держать не малое животноводческое хозяйство. В начале XX в. у общины были свои молочный и земледельческий кооперативы, две ветряные мельницы [5]. В целом хозяйства жителей колоний были достаточно прочными, а сами колонисты далеко не бедными людьми, что позволяло им нанимать для работы в своих хозяйствах жителей близлежащих деревень. Разность в вероисповедании (колонисты являлись лютеранами) позволила им сохранить свою этническую самобытность и не быть ассимилированными местным населением. Колонии просуществовали до Второй мировой войны и были ликвидированы фашистами. Остатки мелиоративных систем в излучине Буга сохранились по сей день.

Объектом, имеющим в определенной степени международной значение, является военное кладбище, расположенное в д. Томашевка. Здесь в 1262 могилах, из них более 20 братских, похоронено 1346 военнослужащих царской и советской России, кайзеровской Германии, Австро-Венгрии, Польши, погибших в годы Первой мировой войны и период революционных войн (1915-1920 гг.). В 1920 г. кладбище было благоустроено и взято под контроль Международного Красного Креста.

Отдельной страницей в истории региона вписана Вторая мировая война.

На территории резервата в 1941 г. располагались пять пограничных застав и комендатура. Пограничники героически обороняли рубежи родины, сумев на много часов задержать продвижение гитлеровцев. У ст. Дубица стоит дуб, природные особенности которого умело

использовал мл. сержант А.А. Новиков. Замаскировавшись в дупле дерева, отважный пограничник в течение почти суток пулеметным огнем не позволял гитлеровцам переправится на этом участке через Буг. В 1969 г. на месте боя установлена стела.

О героизме пограничников и воинов 75 стрелковой дивизии Западного фронта, оборонявшей территорию резервата, напоминают обелиски в дд. Черск, Приборово, Збунин, Томашевка, мемориальная доска на стене санатория «Берестье». В целом земля, благодаря пограничному режиму территории, сохранила многочисленные места сражений 1941 г. Проведение некоторого благоустройства этих мест с последующим охранным статусом, может способствовать включению их в перечень туристических объектов.

Высокая лесистость региона способствовала развертыванию партизанского движения. В разные периоды здесь действовали бригада им. В.И. Ленина, отряды им. К. Ворошилова и Г. Жукова. В лесоболотном массиве между озерами Белое и Тайное располагался семейный лагерь, где прятались от карателей женщины, старики и дети. В настоящее время на месте лагеря стоит памятный знак.

Война оставила не только героические, но и трагические страницы. 23 сентября 1942 г. на окраине д. Леплевка были расстреляны 53 воспитанника Домачевского детского дома и их воспитатель П. Горохольская, которая в трудную минуту не покинула детей. На месте страшной трагедии в 1987 г. установлен памятник «Протест», представляющий собой стелу из белого мрамора с прикрепленными бронзовыми фигурами детей, взывающих о помощи. Практически в каждом населенном пункте стоит обелиск в память о земляках погибших на фронтах войны или замученных фашистами.

Для туристов будут интересны имеющиеся в резервате музеи, и в первую очередь, уникальный в своем роде музей космонавтики. Он открылся в ноябре 1978 г. в Томашевской СШ и посвящен жизни и деятельности известного земляка, первого космонавта Беларуси, П.И. Климука. В экспозиции музея представлены более двух тысяч экспонатов.

В Домачевской СШ работают музей боевой славы и литературный музей, в которых представлено культурное и историческое наследие региона. Богата и интересна для посетителей экспозиция музея народной славы и этнографии в д. Медно, созданного стараниями большого энтузиаста и краеведа П.Д. Коробейко.

Рекреационный потенциал ландшафтов современной территории резервата по достоинству оценен еще в середине XIX века. На живописной террасе Западного Буга в урочище Александрово среди старых боров и дубрав был основан реабилитационно-курортный комплекс для

Наиболее используемой является санаторно-курортная зона «Белое озеро». Здесь среди смешанного леса на берегах трех живописных озер расположены санаторий «Берестье» и 9 баз отдыха, способные удовлетворить запросы различных категорий отдыхающих: от VIP-персон до групп детей. Расчетная емкость зоны отдыха составляет более двадцати пяти тысяч человек. Пляжи на озерах Белое и Рогознянское оборудованы необходимым для отдыха инвентарем, имеются спасательные службы. Для услуг отдыхающих имеются лодки, катамараны, велосипеды, лыжи. По лесной зоне отмаркированы прогулочные пешеходные маршруты. Наличие хорошей транспортной связи зоны отдыха «Белое озеро» с Брестом делает ее очень популярным местом отдыха горожан.

В последние годы для летнего отдыха активно осваивается побережье озера Страдечское. Наиболее популярное место – дюна на юго-восточном берегу с хорошим песчаным пляжем. Однако озеро срочно нуждается в упорядочении рекреационной нагрузки, оборудовании специальных мест для отдыха и других подобных мероприятиях.

В южной части резервата находится зона отдыха «Селяхи». На северной стороне озера расположена одноименная база отдыха, располагающая всем спектром услуг. С другой стороны озера находится ведомственная база «Динамо», используемая для тренировочных сборов спортивных команд Брестчины.

В последние годы в регионе стало развиваться такое направление туризма как отдых в агроусадьбах. Туристам, в том числе и зарубежным, предлагается широкий комплекс услуг.

По территории резервата возможна организация одно-, двух- и многодневных пеших, велосипедных и лыжных туристических походов.

Таким образом, биосферный резерват «Прибужское Полесье» обладает достаточным туристским и рекреационным потенциалом. Развитие туристской индустрии на данной территории должно идти путем модернизации существующей инфраструктуры с учетом сохранения экологического равновесия.

В настоящее время ведется работа по координации деятельности трех расположенных рядом биосферных резерватов: «Прибужское Полесье» (Беларусь), «Западное Полесье» (Польша) и «Шацкий» (Укарина). Совместными усилиями подготовлена и подана в ЮНЕСКО номинационная заявка на объявление трех данных резерватов единым Трансграничным биосферным резерватом «Западное Полесье». Появление данной структуры позволит ускорить процесс интеграции Прибужского Полесья в европейскую экологическую и туристическую сети.

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Summary

BIOSPHERE RESERVE UNESCO «PRIBUZHSKOE POLESIE» AS ELEMENT ECOTOURISTIK OF THE NETWORK OF EUROPE

Article is devoted to an estimation of touristic-recreational resources of geographical region Pribuzhskoe Polesie included per 2004 in a global network Biosphere Reserve UNESCO. Original objects of wildlife and the cultural - historical heritage, representing interest for the organization of various kinds of tourism and recreational activity are submitted, the estimation of an existing infrastructure and its way perfection is carried spent.

ACCULTURATION IN THE LITHUANIAN–LATVIAN BORDER REGION

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Introduction

In the most general sense *acculturation* means a process of cultural adaptation. Prolonged direct contacts between different cultural groups result in borrowing traits from another culture. Usually the process of cultural adaptation bears a reciprocal character. Yet in most cases, it is possible to distinguish the dominant national or religious group whose culture and values are acquired by groups of minorities (Akultūracija, 2006). When one of the cultural groups fully absorbs another culture we have a case of assimilation linked with the change or even complete loss of identity. The difference between assimilation and acculturation may be demonstrated on the following example: if a Lithuanian learns the language of his neighbours (Poles or Latvians) he does not become a Latvian or Pole. Here we have an instance of acculturation. Yet if he identifies himself as a representative of one of these nations and intercepts the traditions and model of cultural behaviour of one of these nations discarding the Lithuanian culture he is involved in the process of assimilation. Though acculturation and assimilation are not always directly linked, acculturation often may be the initial stage of assimilation.

Acculturation is common for communities of immigrants, regions with mixed ethnical structure and border regions. Its character, scope and rates depend on the traditions and stability of identity of a group. When the attitude toward ones own ethnical group is positive and steadfast and the cultural differences distinct and the attitude toward other ethnical groups is negative (typical ethnocentrism), acculturation is usually rejected and antagonised. Acculturation in such cases is very slow. Yet if different cultural groups are linked by many important cultural processes, traditions and elements (for example, common historical fate) and language or religion and there is weak or no hostility toward others acculturation may take an easy and rapid course. The concept of accul-

turation should, perhaps, be extended from the point of view of geography (geography of culture). The process then could be related with the effect of cultural kinship, cultural diffusion, changes of the boundaries of cultural area or region ("retraction") and decline of territorial organization of a group.

Acceleration of the processes of globalisation makes the preservation of ethnical and cultural identity especially relevant for the countries of uniting Europe. Yet the mutual acculturation should not be viewed as a negative process. Ethnical minorities living in the border regions of Central Europe are becoming moderators of international collaboration. Acculturation is a result of international cultural collaboration, which promotes training of tolerance toward and cognition of other cultures; it mitigates tensions between different cultural groups and possibilities of conflicts.

The present article is an attempt to discuss the character and results of acculturation process taking place in the community of Latvian minority living in the North Lithuanian border region employing descriptive, analytical and statistical methods. It is also a survey and evaluation of the changes of territorial distribution of Latvians and their cultural centres as well as their attempts to resist acculturation.

Changes of number of Latvians and their distribution in Lithuania

It is uncertain when Latvians inhabited some areas of North Lithuania. This issue is worth of special studies. It seems possible that there have been a few waves of migration from the territory of Latvia: Semigallian, "Curonian" and Soviet. The causes of migration were different as were the character migration and fate of immigrants. Also there were a few waves of repatriation. Yet traditionally, Latvians concentrated along the Latvian–Lithuanian border. Their living area coincided with the historical territory of Semigallia.

Already in the 13th century, attempts were made to annex the southern lands of Latvia not only by Germans but by Lithuanians as well. According to historical sources, when Germans burnt down the last rebel Semigallian castle Sidabrė (near Joniškis) in 1290 about 10 000 Semigallians moved to Lithuania. The number of emigrants accounted for about half of the total Semigallian population. Yet Latvian burials or remains of settlements have not yet been found in Lithuania.

The wars with the Knights of the Sword and later with the Livonian Order turned the territory of North Lithuania into a very sparsely populated, forested and boggy wasteland. Only the almost depopulated territories of Curonians, Selonians and southern Semigallians were annexed by Lithuania. Already in the 14th, century Latvians lived in mixed communities with Lithuanians in many areas. There were few territories where the Semigallian language was used (Astramskas, 2005). It is assumed that Semigallians rapidly assimilated

and disappeared as far back as the second half of the 15th century (Zinkevičius, 1984: 18–19, 24–26; Šenavičius, 1998).

The fact that most North Lithuanian Latvians were evangelicals Lutherans implies their settling in the border region already after the Reformation. Namely in North Lithuania the first non-catholic communities settled at the beginning of Reformation (Lutherans settled in Žeimelis and Skuodas in 1540[1]).

The number of Latvians began to increase dramatically at the beginning of the 19th century. North Lithuania was then inhabited by Curonian immigrants; mostly farmers and artisans. At the end of the 19th century, already 35 000 Latvians lived in Lithuania. They accounted for 1.3% of Lithuania's population (Butkus, 1990) and formed a rather compact community of ethnical minority. The immigration wave from Latvia slackened during World War I. Many Latvians then moved to the Russian up-country and returned to Latvia after the war. In 1923, the number of Latvians living in Lithuania was half as small (14 883) as in 1897. They accounted for 0.7% of the total population and were the fifth largest ethnical minority of Lithuania (Lietuvos..., 1926: XXXIX; Fig. 1).

Correction of the state border with Latvia also affected the number of Latvians in Lithuania. In 1921, a few villages inhabited by Latvians were handed over to Latvia in exchange for Palanga and Šventoji environs inhabited by quite a few Latvians (under the rule of Tzarist Russia, these settlements belonged to the Curonian Governor's District). In the inter-war years, Latvians continued to live as a compact ethnical community. Almost the whole population of Lithuanian Latvians – 13 569 or 91% – were living in four northern counties. They formed there a rather numerous ethnical minority. In Mažeikiai County, they even accounted for more than 4% of the county population (Table 1). In some districts of North Lithuania, Latvians accounted for 10–15% or even 19% (in the Palanga District) of the total population (Lietuvos..., 1926: 19–25). Most of Lutherans were also concentrated in North Lithuania – 16 855 or 25% of the total number of Lithuanian Lutherans. In 1923, 91.1% of Lithuanian Latvians were Lutherans. Naturally, the number of Latvians in North Lithuania was close to the number of Lutherans (Table 1).

Table 1. The number and proportion of Latvians in the counties of North Lithuania

County	Number of Latvians	%	Number of Lutherans	%
Mažeikiai	3157	4.44	3504	4.93
Biržai–Pasvalys	3421	2.97	3799	3.30
Šiauliai	4716	2.67	5639	3.19
Kretinga	2275	2.41	3913	4.17
Total:	13569		16855	

Source: Lietuvos..., 1926: 35–36.

[1] The first Lutheran community settled in Vilnius only a year earlier

The number of Latvians in Lithuania continued to reduce in the inter-war years. Many of them repatriated to Latvia. They number reduced even more in the aftermath of World War II marked by shocking events. In 1959 they accounted for only 0.2% of the total population. Since 1970, the Latvian population in Lithuania has reduced to 0.1% despite that Latvian families which returned from the exile but had no permission to live in Latvia were allowed to settle in the border zone of Lithuania and despite the fact that in the years of Soviet industrialization many Latvians came to live in Lithuania (Fig. 1). In 1989, Latvians were the seventh largest ethnical minority in Lithuania.

Fig. 1. Reduction of the number of Latvian population in Lithuania



The markedly reduced ethnical minority of Latvians continued to concentrate in North Lithuania in the last years of the Soviet period. Yet there occurred certain changes in the pattern of territorial distribution of Latvians in comparison with in the inter-war years. Larger Latvian communities appeared in the remote from the border large industrial cities of Lithuania: in Vilnius 585, Klaipėda 337, Kaunas 319, and Šiauliai 290 Latvians (Table 2). Their number also increased in smaller cities which developed into industrial ones in the Soviet years: Naujoji Akmenė 134, Mažeikiai 130, Visaginas 106, Jonava, Kėdainiai, and Elektrėnai. The number of Latvians grew in the cities due to external and internal migration. In comparison with the inter-war years, the number of Latvians relatively slightly increased also in the northeastern Lithuanian districts (Zarasai, Rokiškis and Ignalina) (Table 2).

Analysis of 17 northern Lithuanian administrative districts where the number of Latvian population is statistically significant based on the population census of 1989 (1989 metų..., 1991; Всесоюзная..., 1989) revealed that the total of 2 700 Latvians resided in North Lithuania (65% of Lithuanian Latvians). About 950 (or 80% of the total rural Latvian population in Lithuania) lived in the rural areas of the region and 1 800 (or 59% of the total number residing in urban areas) lived in the cities. In the last years of Soviet regime, the largest

Table 2. Latvian communities in Lithuania in 1979, 1980 and 2001.

Districts	Latvians*					
	Number			% of the total population		
	1979 m.	1989 m.	2001 m.	1979 m.	1989 m.	2001 m.
Akmenė	364	241	285	2.1	1,7	0.9
Joniškis	157	103	125	0.8	0,6	0.4
Skuodas	125	90	75	0.6	0,5	0.3
Mažeikiai	69	36	170	0.3	0.2	0.3
Pakruojis	187	121	65	0.7	0.5	0.2
Biržai	85	106	80	0.4	0.5	0.2
Šiauliai	107	69	51	0.3	0.2	0.1
Pasvalys	41	47	38	0.1	0.2	0.1
Rokiškis	38	37	58	0.1	0.2	0.1
Zarasai	29	20	31	0.2	0.1	0.1
Kretinga	34	16	35	0.1	0.1	0.1
Jonava	7	11	35	0.0	0.1	0.1
Kupiškis	10	3	14	0.1	0,0	0.1
Radviliškis	15	14	25	0.1	0.0	0.1
Telšiai	28	22	28	0.1	0.1	0.1
Ignalina	14	14	27	0.1	0.1	0.1
Utena	9	9	23	0.0	0.1	0.1
Elektrėnai	-	-	16	-	-	0.1
Vilnius	41	57	43	0.1	0.1	0.1
Cities						
Žagarė	54	59	-	1.9	2.2	-
Palanga	384	368	220	3.2	2.1	1.3
Naujoji Akmenė	142	134	97	1.0	1.0	0.8
Joniškis	49	48	-	0.5	0.4	-
Mažeikiai	121	130	-	0.5	0.3	-
Visaginas	42	106	104	0.8	0.3	0.4
Skuodas	47	28	-	0.7	0.3	-
Klaipėda	316	337	232	0.2	0.2	0.1
Šiauliai	229	290	140	0.2	0.2	0.1
Biržai	42	27	-	0.3	0.2	-
Vilnius	593	585	467	0.1	0.1	0.1
Kaunas	249	319	211	0.1	0.1	0.1
Panevėžys	68	94	63	0.1	0.1	0.1
Jonava	16	33	-	0.1	0.1	-
Kėdainiai	36	30	-	0.1	0.1	-
Total in Lithuania	**4354**	**4229**	**2955**	**0.1**	**0.1**	**0.1**
In rural areas	**1597**	**1179**	**860**	**0.1**	**0.1**	**0.1**
In urban areas	**2757**	**3050**	**2095**	**0.2**	**0.1**	**0.1**

* rural population in 1979 and 1989

Source: 1989 metų..., 1991; *Population by Sex...*, 2002.

rural Latvian communities in Lithuania accounted for 1.7% of the population in the Akmenė District, traditionally 0.6% in the Joniškis District, and 0.5% in Pakruojis, Biržai and Skuodas districts. They also accounted for considerable part of the population of some urban areas: Žagarė 2.2%, Palanga 2.1%, and Naujoji Akmenė 1.0% (Table 2).

The data of the last (2001) population census (Population by Sex..., 2002) show that the Latvians of Lithuania tend to reside in a definite area or region (Fig. 2). The centre of gravity of this region virtually does not change. It is situated west of the centre of Lithuanian–Latvian border region – Akmenė (0.9%) and Joniškis (0.4%) districts. This core also includes Skuodas and Mažeikiai (0.3%) and Pakruojis and Biržai districts (0.2%) (Fig. 2, Table 2). Today, almost 3000 Latvians reside in Lithuania. The largest communities live in the following cities: Vilnius (467), Klaipėda (232), Palanga (220), Kaunas (211), and Akmenė (285; the largest communities live in New Akmenė (86) and Akmenė (46) smallest municipal units) and Mažeikiai (170) districts. Latvians are the second largest ethnical minority in Palanga, Akmenė, Joniškis, and Skuodas districts and the third largest ethnical minority in Pasvalys and Pakruojis districts.

Fig. 2. Distribution of Latvians in Lithuania 2001 (%)



Source: *Population by Sex...*, 2002.

With the reducing total number of Latvians in Lithuania, the Latvian communities decline more rapidly in districts remote from the Latvian–Lithuanian border. The boundary of the Latvian residence area retreats to the north. The numerous inter-war communities have almost disappeared. For example, the „Latvian" rural district of Akmenė was inhabited by 1311 Latvian in 1923. Today (2001), only 46 Latvians live in the Akmenė smallest municipal unit, 86 in New Akmenė, 976 and 43 in Joniškis rural district and smallest administrative unit respectively, 881 and 23 in Nemunėlio Radviliškis, and 703 and 24 in Kruopiai. Therefore, the „saturation" of the territories inhabited by Latvians also is decreasing.

Attempts to preserve national identity

The large national minority of Latvians in the 19th and in the first half of the 20th century did its best to preserve the national identity. At the rule of Tsarist Russia, the boundary between the Curonian and Kaunas governor's districts bore a formal character. Neither was the border between the two states (Latvia and Lithuania) a blind barrier in the inter-war period. The Latvians living on the both sides of the border kept close contacts. These contacts were the main prerequisite for preservation of national identity.

Activity of parishes, societies and schools also contributed to preservation of national identity. Latvians were rather well organized. They kept contacts with the Latvian parishes, schools and societies. Especially close relations existed between the societies operating in the border region. The first and the second generations of immigrant Latvians kept personal relations with their relatives living in Latvia (Akmenytė, 2004).

Various Latvian institutions and organizations supported the activity of Latvians in Lithuania (Latvians of Lithuania groundlessly complained about lack of attention from Latvia). From time to time articles about the status of Lithuanian Latvians would appear in press. They often expressed a critical attitude towards the unconcern of the representatives of the Latvian government about the emigrants. The necessity to support the emigrants lest they would lose their national identity was emphasized not once. The Diaspora of Latvians was regarded a part of the Latvian nation. Attempts were made to preserve its culture at the same level as in the mother country. This was a serious support for Latvian emigrants as living far away from the Latvian and Lithuania cultural centres they had no opportunity to acquire the high culture. Society of Support to the Latvian Culture and Cooperation with Latvian Emigrants together with the Latvian Culture Foundation presented Latvian books to the Latvian societies of Lithuania. Due to this, half of Latvian societies of Lithuania were named library or library–reading-room societies. The Latvian support was not only material. The Latvian societies of Lithuania did their best to engage Latvian

activists. The Latvian nationality was almost the only decisive criteria for admission of new members. Citizenship was of minor importance. Latvian citizens were most active members of Latvian societies. They kept close relations with Latvia and in most cases were leaders of cultural life of Latvian emigrants (Akmenytė, 2004).

Special attention was paid to young people. Young Latvians were prepared for studies in Latvia. National Latvian schools received substantial support. Concern about assimilation of Lithuanian Latvians had grounds because of close linguistic and cultural links. Emphasis was placed on the different religion, slightly different language and different historical traditions (Akmenytė, 2004). Latvians would not closely communicate with Lithuanians. Dissociation was mainly based on religious differences (Akmenytė, 2003). The Lutheran Church in Lithuania was regarded alien until the end of the 20th century notwithstanding that its confession was ethnically mixed (Lithuanians, Germans and Latvians). The Lutheran Church has received recognition only recently and today it is more actively integrating in the life of Lithuanian society.

According to the data of population census of 1923 (Lietuvos..., 1926: 43), the absolute majority (13 555) of the Latvian population in Lithuania (14 883) were evangelicals Lutherans[2] at that time (91.1% of the total population of Latvians in Lithuania). Baptists were the third largest religious community (258 or 1.7%). They concentrated in the western part of Lithuania. The confessional differences (Latvians Lutherans and Lithuanians Catholics) were the main factor of choosing nationality. Often nationality and religious beliefs were identified. When asked about their nationality, Latvians sometimes indicated that they were Lutherans. For this reason, Latvians kept closer relations with Germans than with Lithuanians (Akmenytė, 2003). The identification of nationality and religious beliefs was preconditioned by the status of national minority and unwillingness to assimilate with the lingual and national majority.

Representatives of national minorities often face the problem of national self-identity. When linguistic and cultural differences between national minority and national majority are supplemented by differences of religious beliefs, the representatives of the national minority more easily decide what nationality to chose (in ethnic–linguistic, ethnic–confessional or ethnic–civil sense). Due to minor linguistic and cultural differences between the Lithuanians and Latvians confession was often a decisive factor choosing nationality (Lithuanian or Latvian).

Yet some Lithuanian Latvians were Catholics. This was the second largest Latvian confession in Lithuania. There were 972 Latvians Catholics (or 6.5%) (Lietuvos..., 1926: 43). They mostly concentrated around Žeimelis and in the north-eastern part of Lithuania (they were, presumably, the emigrants from the Catholic Latgallia). Latvians Catholics often found themselves in an ambiguous situation. Catholics were regarded Lithuanians. Latvians were believed

to be only Protestants. The stamps in passports indicated confession and nationality. Some Latvians of Lithuania were „converted" to Lithuanians. Latvians did not welcome the situation considering it to be in breach of the national rights (Kiploks, 1983: 116; Akmenytė, 2003).

Fig. 3. Latvians by religious confession in 1923



Source: *Lietuvos...*, 1926

A few Latvian cultural and organizational centres developed in Lithuania in the inter-war years (Table 3). Yet the system of centres was unstable. The largest North Lithuanian city Šiauliai was the main organizational centre of Latvians in Lithuania in the eve of World War II. The strongest Latvian societies operated in Alkiškiai and Žeimelis. These localities were the first most important cultural centres of Lithuanian Latvians (Akmenytė, 2003, 2004; Table 3). The structure of the cultural life of Latvians in Lithuania changed once more in the late 30ties due to the influence of the Latvian Society in Kaunas. A corporation of Latvian students of Vytautas Magnus University "Sidrabenia" was established in Kaunas in 1927. It gave birth to the Latvian Society established in Kaunas in 1932. On its initiative a union of Lithuanian Latvians was established in 1935. Its objective was to unite the Latvians of Lithuania, improve their cultural, economic and social status, defend their interests and rights and steer their cultural and social activity. The League of Lithuanian Latvians (Joniškis) and Latvian Education Society of Žeimelis lost their leading positions (Akmenytė, 2004). The peripheral centres did not meet the requirements of the Latvian community in large. It is natural that the role of the Lithuanian capital strengthened. Yet even the coordination centre in Kaunas was unable to properly "supervise" the cultural activity of North Lithuanian Latvians (great distance and bad communication conditions). For this reason the core of the

Table 3. Latvian cultural centres in Lithuania in the inter-war years

Locality	Lutheran confession	Latvian elementary schools in 1935 y /pupils	Latvian societies	Other institutions	Portion of Latvians (%) in local municipalities in 1923
Main centres					
Alkiškiai	+	+ /41	+	Meeting of Lithuanian Latvians in 1921; central office of the society of temperance „Gaisma"	
Žeimelis	+	+ /62; progymnasium (1931-1938)	+	Festival of Latvian children in 1925	783 (13.9)
Šiauliai	+			Latvian consulate; Central Office of the Union of Lithuanian Latvians; Congress of Lithuanian Latvians in 1938	96 (0.5)
Kaunas	+	+ /9	+	Corporation of students "Sidrabenia"	123 (0.1)
Joniškis	+	progymnasium (1921-1931)	+	Office of the Union of Lithuanian Latvians since 1921	976 (6.2)
Important centres					
Mažeikiai	+	+ /48	+ 2		284 (5.8); In Mažeikiai – 192 (4.5)
Skuodas	+	+ /33	+		777 (6,1)
Žagarė		+ /26	+		323 (7.0); in Žagarė – 343 (7.3)
Biržai	+	+ /37			187 (3.5)
Other centres					
Laižuva			+		167 (5.4)
Klaipėda			+		
Būtingė			+		
Pasvalys	+				59 (0.6)
Šeduva	+				46 (0.8)
Panevėžys	+				50 (0.3)
Pakruojis	+				50 (1.1)
Biliniškiai		+			
Šventoji		+ /49			
Totorkalnis		+ /22			
Ramučiai		+ /37			
Stripinai		+ /21			
Daunoraičiai		+ /34			
Bambalai		+ /26			

Source: Akmenytė, 2003, 2004; Šetkus, 2001.

Latvian union – Central Office – moved to the Lithuanian northern city Šiauliai. Therefore, in the last inter-war years Šiauliai logically turned into the coordination centre of Latvian activity in Lithuania. Šiauliai was also the residence of Latvian consulate and Latvian Lutheran confession. Yet there were no Latvian society or elementary school in the city. The congress of Lithuanian Latvians of 1938 took place in Šiauliai (Akmenytė, 2004).

The activity of the Latvian national societies and schools was interrupted in the Soviet years. Latvian confessions declined as also the system of the Latvian cultural centres. This served as a precondition for rapid assimilation of Latvians.

After the restoration of Lithuania's self-dependence, the activity of Latvian organizations in Lithuania revived. Two Sunday schools for Latvian children were opened in Vilnius. Twenty seven children have an opportunity to learn their native language and songs. Teams of artists, writers and politicians are invited from Latvia. The Latvians of Lithuania celebrate the Day of Latvian Independence (November 18) and other festivals. Eight Latvian societies and communities are operating in Lithuania (in Vilnius, Joniškis, Panevėžys, Būtingė, Palanga, Akmenė District, Klaipėda County, Klaipėda Land). A coordination board of Lithuanian and Latvian public organizations was established.

Processes of acculturation

The active cultural, educational and social activity of the Latvian community of Lithuania in the inter-war years and its striving to keep close relations with its motherland Latvia show the strength of national identity of this minority, self-isolation, resolution in preserving the national culture and unwillingness to succumb to assimilation. Assimilation actually did not take place or was very weak.

Acculturation was neither very pronounced. Yet in the ethnically mixed border regions acculturation is unavoidable. Its manifestations can be traced out in North Lithuania already in the first half of the 20th century. Acculturation and modernization processes accelerated the processes of assimilation.

Latvians did not avoid communication with Lithuanians. There were no tensions between these two nations. Lithuanians would join the activity of Latvian societies because they had common interests and felt among Latvians as among ones own. Yet Lithuanian officials did not like the situation. In 1932, an inspector of elementary schools of Biržai County complained to the Department of the Ministry of Education that "the majority of the population in the Latvian border zone were Lithuanians yet many of them spoke Latvian even among themselves" (Akmenytė, 2004). In his secret report a school inspector of Šiualiai County also complained that in Žeimelis environs "there are many

Lithuanians by origin who preferred the Latvian language for Lithuanian and Latvian schools for Lithuanian ones" (Šetkus, 2001).

The presented facts show that not only Latvians but Lithuanians as well responded to acculturation. Many Lithuanians in the border zone spoke or at least understood Latvian and knew many Latvian songs. There were many mixed families. The knowledge of Latvian was useful for Lithuanians who went to Latvia to earn money or to market. The fear of assimilation was obviously overestimated. On the other hand, Latvians who succumbed to assimilation could also be taken for assimilated Lithuanians.

As was mentioned above, many Latvians of Lithuania attended Lithuanian schools. The willingness to attend the schools of national majority was practically motivated. Better knowledge of the culture of national majority facilitated the integration in the society and allowed seeking higher education or career. The Latvian origin could be proved only by birth certificate. Who failed to do this was considered Lithuanians. This could set the Latvian community against Lithuanians. Latvians were concerned in good quality of teaching Latvian. They invited to schools the persons who could tech "pure" Latvian. "Pure Latvian" was the language spoken in Latvia (Akmenytė, 2004). Presumably, the purity of language was then a problem. Its loss was a phenomenon of natural acculturation and lingual syncretism (fusion).

Population census of 2001 provided data about the present state of acculturation and assimilation of Latvians of Lithuania. Based on these data (*Population by Sex...*, 2002; *Population by Education...*, 2002) it is possible to evaluate the actual state of national identity of Latvians and to predict its future trends.

Acculturation and assimilation of Latvians gathered momentum in the Soviet years. This was one of the causes of reducing number of Latvians. There were Latvians who considered Lithuanian, Latvian or even Russian as their mother tongue. The language indicated as mother tongue by Latvians is a very eloquent index (Fig. 4). Only slightly more than a half of Latvian population in Lithuania indicated Latvian as their mother tongue. This demonstrates a high degree of assimilation of this national minority. Yet according to this index, Latvians are in the middle position among other Lithuanian national minorities (Fig. 5). Russians, Poles and the Romany more often indicate their national language as the mother tongue one whereas Ukrainians, Jews or Byelorussians do this more rarely. Most of the Latvians assimilate with Lithuanians (about 29%). Almost 14% of Latvians indicated Russian as their mother tongue. Only 120 Lithuanians and 32 representatives of other nationalities indicated Latvian as their mother tongue (*Population by Education...*, 2002: 74, 76).

Fig. 4. Latvians by mother tongue in 2001



Source: *Population by Education...*, 2002

Fig. 5. Population who indicated the language of their ethnicity as their native language in 2001 (%)



Source: *Population by Education...*, 2002

Knowledge of other languages is another important index (Fig. 6). It is not surprising that most Latvians know Russian (68%). This is a Soviet heritage. Yet the fact that 40% of Latvians do not know the official language Lithuanian is rather interesting. Most likely, the greater part of Latvians who do

not know Lithuanian is represented by immigrants Russian-speakers or offspring of mixed families. This can be demonstrated on the example of Visaginas city. This Russian town established as a satellite of the atomic power plant is inhabited by 104 Latvians 65 of whom indicated Russian as their mother tongue (only 5 of them indicated Lithuanian). 88% of Latvians residing in urban areas indicated Russian as their mother tongue (*Population by Education...*, 2002: 74, 76). Some Latvians know local Lithuanian dialects better than the common Lithuanian language and indicate that they do not know Lithuanian...

Fig. 6. Latvians by other languages, which they know 2001 (%)



Source: *Population by Education...*, 2002

Persons knowing Latvian by almost six times exceed the number of Latvians living in Lithuania (16 537). It is natural that they prevail in the northern part of the country (in the border region traditionally inhabited by Latvians) and in the largest Lithuanian cities (Fig. 7). This phenomenon of Lithuanian acculturation is closely related with the age of persons (Fig. 8). Most persons knowing Latvian are 50 and more years of age. Only 233 children know Latvian. The older population knows Latvian because in the inter-war years and later the relations with Latvia in the border region were very important (many Lithuanians of the border region earned their living and marketed in Latvia. Many Lithuanians lived in Latvia). The Latvian language was then an important tool of communication. The small number of children speaking Latvian today indicates that the national Latvian minority is declining and may disappear in the nearest future. The young generation of Lithuanians does not learn Latvian any more. Therefore, this phenomenon of Lithuanian acculturation is also declining. The Latvian language is a compulsory subject only for students of Lithuanistics. The Latvian language is included into the curricula of 5 Lithuanian universities (Kaunas, Klaipėda, Šiauliai and 2 in Vilnius). This accounts for greater number of those knowing Latvian in these cities. 62% of per-

sons knowing Latvian reside in urban areas (*Population by Education...*, 2002: 176-180).

Fig. 7. Distribution of the population knowing the Latvian language in Lithuania in 2001



Source: *Population by Education...*, 2002

Fig. 8. Age groups of population knowing Latvian language in 2001



Source: *Population by Education...*, 2002

The present confessional composition of Latvians in Lithuania has radically changed in comparison with 1923 (Fig. 3). These changes reflect the results of acculturation and assimilation processes. The differences between 1923 and 2001 are substantial. In the inter-war years, 91% of Latvians were Lutherans. Today they make only one third (Fig. 9). One third of Latvians are Catholics and 25% non-believers. Orthodox believers account only for 4% of Latvian population in Lithuania. They are mostly Soviet immigrants and offspring of mixed families. As Lutheran belief has lost the status of the main indicator of national identity it is likely that resistance of Latvian minority to acculturation and assimilation also has weakened.

Fig. 9. Latvians by religious confession in 2001



Source: *Population by Sex...*, 2002

Conclusions

1) Acculturation and assimilation of Latvians have gained momentum since the inter-war years. Latvians are unable to resist fusion with the national majority. The system of cultural centres and institutions has declined, the living area of Latvians is reducing, and the cultural activity has slackened. Due to low birth rates and accelerating assimilation, the once large national minority may disappear in the nearest 20–30 years. This will be a loss to the Lithuanian cultural diversity. Lithuania is losing a traditional national minority, partner of cultural cooperation, mediator and bridge between the neighbouring countries. This process may induce dissociation of nations, the border region instead of a bridge may become a cultural barrier, and the geocultural and geopolitical situation may change.
2) Today the status and problems of Latvian minority produce almost no influence on the international relations. Yet the traditional communication among the inhabitants of border region continues and cooperation at mu-

nicipal level strengthens. Culture is the main field of cooperation at municipal and national levels. Assimilation of Latvians in Lithuania may weaken motivation for cooperation. On the other hand, mutual acculturation and knowledge of languages would facilitate cooperation. For this reason, learning Latvian should be encouraged in Lithuania.

3) Territorial organization of national and cultural groups of the border region and territorial distribution of acculturation are interesting geographical phenomena and important objects of future studies of cultural geography.

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Streszczenie

AKULTURACJA W LITEWSKO-ŁOTEWSKIM REGIONIE PRZYGRANICZNYM

W najogólniejszym znaczeniu *akulturacja* oznacza proces adaptacji kulturalnej. W wyniku długotrwałych bezpośrednich kontaktów pomiędzy różnymi grupami kulturalnymi następuje zapożyczenie pewnych cech drugiej kultury. Zazwyczaj proces adaptacji kulturalnej ma charakter wzajemny. Jednakże w większości przypadków można wyróżnić dominującą grupę narodowościową lub wyznaniową, której kulturę i wartości przyswajają grup mniejszościowe. Akulturacja jest powszechna pośród społeczności imigrantów, w regionach przygranicznych i o mieszanej strukturze etnicznej. Chociaż akulturacja i asymilacja nie są zawsze bezpośrednio powiązane ze sobą, często akulturacja może stanowić początkowy etap asymilacji.

Być może koncepcja akulturacji winna wywodzić się z geografii (geografia kultury). Zatem wtedy można by ten proces powiązać ze skutkami pokrewieństwa kulturalnego, rozproszenia kulturalnego, zmian granic kulturalnego obszaru lub regionu („retrakcja") oraz załamania się organizacji terytorialnej danej grupy.

Niniejszy artykuł stanowi próbę omówienia charakteru i wyników procesu akulturacji, mającego miejsce w społeczności mniejszości łotewskiej żyjącej w regionie przygranicznym północnej Litwy, z użyciem metod opisowych, analitycznych i statystycznych. Jest to zarazem przegląd i ocena zmian rozmieszczenia terytorialnego Łotyszy i ich ośrodków kultury, jak również ich prób przeciwstawiania się akulturacji.

Akulturacja i asymilacja Łotyszy nabrała rozmachu od czasów międzywojennych. Łotysze nie są wstanie przeciwstawić się swojemu stapianiu się z większością narodową. Sieć ośrodków i instytucji kultury upadła, obszar zamieszkiwania Łotyszy zmniejsza się, a działalność kulturalna osłabła. Z powodu niskiego przyrostu naturalnego i przyspieszonej asymilacji, niegdysiejsza duża mniejszość narodowa może zniknąć w ciągu najbliższych 20-30 lat. Będzie to strata dla litewskiej różnorodności kulturalnej. Litwa traci tradycyjną mniejszość narodową, partnera współpracy kulturalnej, pośrednika i pomost pomiędzy sąsiedzkimi krajami. Ten proces może wywołać dysocjację narodów, a region przygraniczny zamiast być pomostem może stać się barierą kulturalną. Ponadto położenie geokulturalne i geopolityczne może ulec zmianie.

Dzisiaj status i problemy mniejszości łotewskiej prawie nie mają wpływu na stosunki międzynarodowe. Co więcej, tradycyjne komunikowanie się pomiędzy mieszkańcami regionu przygranicznego nadal trwa, współpraca na poziomie municypalnym umacnia się. Kultura jest głównym polem współpracy na poziomach municypalnym i ogólnokrajowym. Asymilacja Łotyszy na Litwie może osłabić motywacje współpracy. Z drugiej strony wzajemna akulturacja i znajomość języków ułatwi współpracę. Z tego względu należy zachęcać do nauki łotewskiego na Litwie.

Organizacja terytorialna grup narodowościowych i kulturalnych z regionu przygranicznego, oraz rozmieszczenie terytorialne akulturacji są interesującymi zjawiskami geograficznymi, a także ważnymi celami przyszłych badań w dziedzinie geografii kultury.

PECULIARITIES OF DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN FORMER SOVIET COUNTRIES – INFLUENCE OF DIFFERENT HERITAGE

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Introduction and background

New geopolitical structures in the South-Eastern Baltic Sea coast region have been major objective of many scientific studies during last decade. Actually every university or other scientific centres located on East Baltic sea cost from Gdansk to Turku have been involved in various analysis of social, economic and of course political issues going on between Kaliningrad region and other countries. A lot of scientific conferences and paper issues are devoted to the problems (especially geopolitical ones) of Kaliningrad region. The same processes of Belarus weren't so actively analysed. Scientific activity in the field of trans-border processes also is fastened by events organised under Baltic Sea Region university network. It involves universities from Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Belarus and Poland (http://bsrun.utu.fi).

Foreign trade between post soviet countries has undergone big changes since the collapse of Soviet Union. Former united market collapsed as well and importance of new trade direction have started to grow. In fact we could have find very few similarities between spatial patterns of foreign trade in 1990 and 2005 of any former communist country. At present all central European countries developed rather similar spatial structure of foreign trade directions. Main feature everywhere is the same – import of resources from the East and export of goods to the West. However economic relations between the central European countries aren't so uniform and their mechanisms are still not very well analysed. This article mainly concentrates on revealing main features and some hidden factors of development of economic relations between former soviet countries, which at present are EU member states, on the one hand and their neighbours, which are not there, on the other hand. Article is based on the cases

of Lithuania and Poland from the one side and Kaliningrad region and Belarus, from the other one.

Objective and tasks of the article:

- **To find out peculiarities of international economic relations between former communist states and factors determining them.**
- to define existing premises which may create differences of economic relations in different countries
- to find out main trends of development of economic relations between different states
- to find out actual situation and existing differences of international relations of Lithuania and PolandThe main idea of the article is based on few assumptions:
- While the intensity of economic relations should depend on sizes of relating countries, distance between them and degree of economic differences, then elimination of such factors should reveal existing differences, which could be explained by the presence of some factors of other kind and possibly influence of socio – cultural and political factors could be established

Lithuania and Poland, being essentially similar countries in present economic state but having different historical traditions in 20th century appear to be a good example for analysis of such assumptions. So comparison of development of foreign economic relations between Poland and Lithuania could possibly reveal influence of some non-economic factors, which are more related to different recent historical tradition than to actual economic conditions.

Short description of development of foreign economic relations in Poland and Lithuania

There were plenty of studies analysing development of foreign economic relations (first of all export and import) of any country in central Europe so here is no sense to make one more detailed analysis of these phenomena. Finally the aim of the article has more to do with analysis of factors making difference to certain relations between countries but not to the relations themselves. That's why here will just shortly be presented main peculiarities of changes of foreign trade and investments of Lithuania and Poland during last decade. The purpose of this presentation is to reveal context in which economic relations with Belarus and Kaliningrad region have been developing.

In general main trend of changes of foreign trade was similar in both countries – Increasing role of western markets and decreasing role of eastern markets. This trend was especially evident in export, while import was more stable due to the lack of possibilities of alternative sources for import of raw materials. However these changes were much more intense in Lithuania due to the soviet

heritage, when turnover of foreign trade outside USSR did not exceeded 10% of total foreign trade.

The present major foreign trade destinations of Poland are principally the same as these of Lithuania, though the share of western countries is slightly higher, while CIS countries aren't very important export markets for Polish exporters comparing to Lithuanian ones. 65% of whole Polish export went to EU15, and just 9% to not EU countries of Eastern Europe in 2004. Major import destinations in Poland differs from export destinations slightly less than in Lithuania. Approximately 55% of whole import comes from EU15 and 10% from not EU countries of Eastern Europe (Central statistical office of Poland, www http://www.stat.gov.pl.).

Economical factors making impact on peculiarities of economic relation between countries

In general amounts of foreign turnover between two countries first of all depends on various economical factors. Existing economic differences here play crucial role. These differences involve many different sides of economy – structure of economy, price levels, size of economy, trade conditions and etc.. In our case there is no need to concentrate on analysis of these differences between analysing countries because author does not seek to explain actual detail amounts or variations of economical relations between countries. Instead, the task lays in trying to define and explain major differences between foreign trade of countries having similar economies but different historical traditions. Summarising survey of economic factors here just should be stressed:

- Both countries have in general similar economical basis – structure of economy is very similar. In fact there are no essential differences of economic kind, which could make decisive impact on differences of foreign economic relations.
- After entering of EU there are no legal-political differences making impact on conditions of foreign trade.
- However still exist some differences for journeys of population (visa regime), they cannot make decisive impact on economic flows between countries.Main factors, which could make great impact on actual spatial distribution of foreign trade, are related to different geographical location of Lithuania and Poland. Due to them countries have different neighbours as an alternative partners. Germany and Ukraine in Polish case plays much more important role.

Geographic location can be a serious possible cause of differences of actual foreign trade of Lithuania and Poland. Its importance first off all is related to closeness (distance, routes, money) and size of the analysed trade partner country (population and market) and closeness and size of „alternative" countries.

One of factors of economic kind, which at the first sight could be regarded as important factors of present differences of economic relation can be described as an **economic heritage**. In fact Lithuania coexisted in the same economic „market" with Belarus and Kaliningrad for 45 years and some economical relations can be inherited from this period. However the actual economic relations (trade, first of all) were rather weak due to the same specialization of economies. Of course there is no sense to speak about exchange of financial capital or foreign investments during Soviet period.

Some economic relations can be traced also at local level. They were based on personal journeys to neighbour country for some goods, which weren't available in Lithuania or in Belarus during Soviet period. This phenomenon of personal retail flows still exists however reasons now are different and mostly related to price difference and quality of goods and services. Conditions for such relations also are different so one can be sure that historical traditions play very weak role here as well.

This means than in fact „economic heritage" in general plays rather weak role at present economic relations. This also can be confirmed by the trends of development of foreign trade of Lithuania presented in fig.1 and fig.2. It is easy to notice that period of transformations has ended a few years ago so the role of historical heritage here is hardly noticeable.

Fig. 1. Changes of main destinations of Lithuanian export in 1993 – 2004. (Statistical.., 2005)



Fig. 2. Changes of main destinations of Lithuanian import in 1993 – 2004. (Statistical.., 2005)



Socio-cultural factors making impact on foreign trade

It was stated that economic factors, including economic heritage, couldn't create important differences of conditions for international economic relations in Lithuania and Poland. So it may be stated, that in fact economic relations with Belarus and Kaliningrad area should proportionally be the same both in Poland and in Lithuania. Kaliningrad region and Belarus are neighbour countries for both Lithuania and Poland, with the approximately the same conditions for trade turnover, so geographical location also could not be regarded as an important factor of difference. The next task is to try to find out factors, which also could play some role in developing economic relations with neighbour countries.

Economy itself is more and more often regarded as a social-cultural phenomenon in contemporary economic geography and is rather often understood through social-cultural relations. These factors could also be taken into account when trying to understand and explain differences of spatial patterns of foreign economic relations. In many cases these factors are related to differences of historical traditions, which create societies with different social-cultural structures and relations. As a consequence states with different history (especially new one) have different attitudes towards business making, different contacts with surrounding countries, different knowledge about neighbour countries and different possibilities to establish new economic contacts with companies and firms outside state border. Many factors can actually cause these different possibilities among which language knowledge, private relations and cultural understanding are most important in our case. Here we can see rather serious differences between Lithuania and Poland. Due to them Lithuania have

advantages in developing economic relations both with Kaliningrad and Belarus. These advantages are mostly related to language knowledge, personal contacts, understanding of eastern mentality, existing ethnical minorities etc. and also to specific geographic location of Kaliningrad region, whose main terrain communications with Russia crosses Lithuanian territory. Theoretically, influence of socio-cultural factors, which are related to different historical tradition should decrease if factors causing appearance of different social-cultural structures have ceased to exist. Finally existing objective economic and geographic differences should start to play main role defining actual intensity of economic relations between two countries.Differences but also similarities can be found between Lithuania and Poland. Main differences are related to „Soviet heritage", while similarities are related to longer historical traditions and most recent cultural, social and political phenomena.

Indicators of intensity of cross border economic relations

The next task of the article is to try to verify earlier made statements. In fact one should measure actual economic relations and to compare their intensity having in mind different size of countries and their economies. Actually there are very few indicators, which could be reliable source for this task. Obviously turnover of foreign trade (including separately export and import) and rates of foreign investment are the best and most convenient indicators for measuring level of economic relations between two countries. Some other data also could characterise intensity of such relations, but in most cases these indicators cannot provide reliable information because they depend on many different factors, while two sided economic relations compose just a part of them. Among such indicators one could mention exchange of labour force, number of cars, trucks and persons crossing common state border, amounts of custom taxes gathered between two countries and flows of merchandise. In some cases available data are rather unrelieble (exchange of labour force for instance) in some cases indicators cannot be used due to earlier mentioned reasons (for example number of cars crossing border indicates not only two sided contacts, but also transit from the third countries).

It is also necessary to have in mind different sizes of countries, when trying to compare intensity of economic relation between two countries. Obviously, bigger state could generate bigger trade turnover and would have greater potential for investments. In fact Lithuanian economy is 9.8 times smaller than Polish one, so potentially export-import could also seem to be 9.8 times smaller but trade turnover depends on two countries, so generated flows of merchandise could depend on a size of economies of both countries. So theoretically Lithuania's trade turnover with Belarus should be somewhere in between 4.4 –9.8 times smaller than Poland's one. Lithuania's trade turnover with Kaliningrad region should be 8,6 – 9,8 times smaller than Poland's one.

Also one should have in mind growing distance factor, when analysing bigger countries, so in fact difference of intensity of economic relations could be expected even smaller then estimated ones, but not essentially. It was stated that there are no essential economical differences between Poland and Lithuanian, which could make decisive influence on differences of foreign economic relations of these countries with Belarus and Kaliningrad region. Estimated possible intensity of economic relations.Investment rates of Lithuania and Poland in Kaliningrad and Belarus could differ even higher, because they depend on possibilities of one country. On the other hand investment potential depends on many various factors, some of which aren't easy measurable or are very inconstant (profit of companies for example). Notwithstanding such problems, it is obvious that Poland has few times higher investment potential than Lithuania doe's and consequently Poland companies should be much more important investors for Belarus and Kaliningrad region than Lithuania's ones.

Economic relations with Belarus

Belarus republic is the most important trade partner neither for Lithuania nor for Poland. On the other hand both countries have rather constant and sufficient trade relations with Belarus. The analysis of actual amounts of import from and export to Belarus during last several years in fact confirms previously made suggestions. The trade turnover with Belarus in 2001 was almost equal in Lithuania and Poland (Fig. 3 and fig. 4) (data of Belarus foreign ministry (http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/index). This means that actual Lithuanian – Belarus relations were 5 times more intense than these of Poland and it can be assumed that this first of all can be explained by the factors related to Soviet heritage.

Fig. 3. Belarus foreign trade with Lithuania and Poland in 2001



Fig. 4. Belarus foreign trade with Lithuania and Poland in 2005



The situation has changed considerably in 2005. Though there were no major changes of spatial structure of foreign trade of Lithuania, but Polands' relations with Belarus increased rather seriously. Export to Belarus from Lithuania was 5 times smaller than one from Poland the beginning of this year. Import differs approximately 3 times.

Obviously present economic factors are starting to dominate and social cultural factors related to Soviet heritage are weakening. Naturally Poland foreign trade turnover is at present proportionally higher than Lithuania's one. This is also a consequence of spreading of interests of Polish companies to the east, while Lithuanian business has established these relations earlier.

Another regularities should have private crossborder trade, based on different prices, which mostly are related to taxation difference (mostly alcohol, tobacco, and fuel) . Nobody can estimate amounts of goods bought during these retail journeys, but here differences between Lithuania and Poland should depend mostly on prise difference and length of the border and location of border crossing points. Socio-cultural relations also could play a role and due to them illegal trade and contraband to Lithuania should be higher, though price difference acts in opposite way.

The very similar picture is with foreign investments in Belarus. Lithuanian investments in Belarus were approximately 2.5 times smaller than Polands and this also means that Investors from Lithuania have better relations with Belarus than these from Poland. However this difference is also reducing.

Summarising the analysis of peculiarities of economic relations of Lithuania and Poland with their eastern neighbours there could be stressed that the difference of total economic relations with Belarus between Lithuania and Po-

land is increasing.•This natural increase is first of all based on activating relations with of Poland. The lag, which existed due to previous (Soviet period) economic and political barriers, is starting to vanish.

Relations with Kaliningrad region

Economic relations of both countries with Kaliningrad region are very similar to those of Belarus. One essential difference in this case, which should be kept in mind – the role that plays big market of whole Russia. In many cases trade relations with Kaliningrad region are influenced by the efforts to reach a whole Russian market. That's why relations with Kaliningrad region are deeply effected by the processes taking place in mainland Russia's market.

In general Kaliningrad region plays a rather weak role as a foreign trade partner both in Lithuania and Poland at present. For example it takes 14th place among Lithuania's export partners and just 45th among importers Main reasons of such weak role are related to the structure of Kaliningrad economy, its small size and Russian foreign trade policy.

But on the other hand Lithuania and Poland are rather important international partners of Kaliningrad – Poland takes 4th and Lithuania 5th place in the list of Kaliningrad export destination countries. Poland is 2nd and Lithuania is 3rd among importing countries (Tab. 1) (data of 2003).

Table 1. Major foreign trade partners of Kaliningrad region in 2003 (Data of Consulate General of Lithuania in Kaliningrad region)

Export from Kaliningrad region		**Import to Kaliningrad region**	
Country	**%**	**Country**	**%**
Sweden	16,7	Germany	20,3
Germany	15,1	Poland	16
Belarus	9,8	Lithuania	9,4
Poland	7,7	China	3,9
Lithuania	6,5	Other	50,4
Other	44,2		

Direct foreign investments present another example of foreign economic relations between countries. Poland and Lithuania used to be one of the most important investors in Kaliningrad region for the several last years. Though due to present economic situation neither Lithuania nor Poland aren't important investor countries, but Kaliningrad region presents a good opportunities for both countries to reach market of whole Russia. Having closer contacts than western investors Poland and especially Lithuania (proportionally to its size) were rather

active investors. For example not withstanding 9 times smaller economy, Lithuanian investments in Kalningrad region were 1.5 times higher than Polish ones in 2004 (fig. 5).

Fig. 5. Lithuanian and Polish investments in Kaliningrad in 2004



However situation once again has changed in 2005. Poland investments in Kaliningrad were few times bigger than these of Lithuania in 2005 (fig. 6). This once again indirectly confirms idea that cultural relations have played important role at the beginning of development of economic relations of Kaliningrad region, but later economic factors starts to prevail.

Fig. 6. Major investors in Kaliningrad region in 2005



Main conclusions

Notwithstanding differences of economic heritage of last decades of 20th century, spatial pattern of major foreign trade destinations of Poland and Lithuania at present is very much the same. Geographic location determines major destinations of foreign trade if other factors cease to play role.

Though both countries have rather medium economic relations with Belarus and Kaliningrad region and Lithuanian economic relations proportionally are still stronger, but latest trends show increasing role of Poland as foreign trade partner of these two countries.

The intensity of relation between neighbouring countries depends on complex of various economic and also non-economic factors, which depend on clearly visible actual economic situation in wider regions and rather mute socio – cultural cross-border phenomena.

The social-cultural factors, depending on latest historical heritage can make very noticeable influence on economic relations between countries but economic factors tend to prevail in longer period.

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Streszczenie

SPECYFICZNE CECHY ROZWOJU STOSUNKÓW GOSPODARCZYCH POMIĘDZY KRAJAMI POSTSOWIECKIMI – WPŁYW RÓŻNEGO DZIEDZICTWA

Artykuł poświęcony jest analizie trendów rozwojowych zagranicznych stosunków gospodarczych Litwy i Polski z Białorusią i regionem Kaliningradu. Autor skupia się na znacznych różnicach pomiędzy Polską i Litwą, jednak nie próbuje ustalić szczegółowych cech zagranicznego handlu i inwestycji. Autor usiłuje odkryć wpływ czynników pozagospodarczych na rozwój stosunków gospodarczych pomiędzy państwami

postsowieckimi. Reformy postsowieckie, różna historia najnowsza, szybkie zmiany gospodarcze i różne orientacje polityczne czynią ten region dość wyjątkowym polem badań.

Mimo różnic w tradycji gospodarczej z ostatnich dekad XX w., wzorzec przestrzenny ważniejszych kierunków handlu zagranicznego Polski i Litwy jest obecnie bardzo podobny. Najważniejsi partnerzy handlowi znajdują się na zachodzie Europy, podczas gdy rola wschodnich krajów sąsiedzkich jest znacznie mniejsza. Mimo że ogólna sytuacja jest raczej stabilna, to obecne stosunki z Kaliningradem i Białorusią zmieniają się dość wyraźnie. Mając na uwadze inne wielkości gospodarek Litwy i Polski, to ten drugi kraj powinien mieć 5-9 razy intensywniejsze stosunki z tymi krajami. Jednak analiza stosunków gospodarczych pomiędzy tymi czterema krajami pokazuje, że w czasie ostatnich kilku lat litewskie stosunki gospodarcze z regionem Kaliningradu i Białorusią były prawie równe relacjom Polski. Można to jedynie wyjaśnić istnieniem czynników pozagospodarczych. Historycznie Litwa posiadała bliższe kontakty gospodarcze i społeczne z tymi krajami; nie istnieje bariera językowa, a kontakty społeczne pomiędzy przyjaciółmi i krewnymi, itp., również odgrywają rolę.

Chociaż czynniki dziedzictwa kulturalnego odgrywają ważną rolę w rozwoju międzynarodowych stosunków gospodarczych, to ostatecznie zaczynają dominować rzeczywiste czynniki ekonomiczne. Ostatnie dane pokazują, że Polska rozwija swoje stosunki zagraniczne z Białorusią i regionem Kaliningradu szybciej niż Litwa, a naturalna różnica w intensywności handlu i przepływie finansów ma miejsce w regionie.

THE REALISATION OF THE INTEGRATED REGIONAL OPERATIONAL PROGRAMME IN THE PODKARPACKIE VOIVODSHIP

Wojciech LICHOTA

The Marshal Office of Podkarpackie Voivodship
The Department of Structural Funds and Pre-accession Programme

Introduction

The Integrated Regional Operational Programme (IROP)[1] is one of seven operational programmes to be used in implementing the 2004-2006 National Development Plan/ Community Support Framework (NDP/CSF).[2] The programme develops NDP goals by setting out priorities, trends and amount of funds for implementing the State's regional development policy, to be disbursed in parallel with structural funds in the initial period of Poland's membership in the European Union.

The Ministry of the Economy, Labour and Social Policy (MELSP) prepared IROP in close cooperation with regional self-government in all voivodships. Proposed goals, priorities and measures cover the whole of Poland; however most funds differ between regions and locations in their implementation, depending on the socio-economic structure and situation in the voivodships and the development strategy being implemented.[3]

At the implementation stage, IROP is managed nationally by MELSP to ensure coordination and uniform application of agreed rules. Simultaneously, most tasks for implementation will be vested with regional entities, i.e. regional self-government - Marshal Offices for project identification, and regional state

[1] The Integrated Regional Operational Programme taking into account by Ordinance of Minister of Economy and Labour of 1 July 2004 in re accept The Integrated Regional Operational Programme 2004-2006 (Dz.U. Nr 166, poz. 1745).
[2] Act from 20 April 2004, about National Development Plan (Dz.U. Nr 116, poz. 1206, z późn. zm.)
[3] http://www.funduszestrukturalne.gov.pl

administration - Voivodship Offices for audit, monitoring, payment verification and certification.[4]

The Integrated Regional Operational Programme is being implemented by the following institution of Podkarpackie Voivodship:

1. The Marshal Office of Podkarpackie Voivodship:
   - The Department of Structural Funds and Pre-accession Programme co-ordinates the implementing process of the IROP. Furthermore the Department achieves the formal application opinion and coordinates the Panel of Experts task for Priority I i III (excluding the Measure 3.4) i.e. infrastructure investment,
   - The Department of Regional Development is responsible for the measure of regional innovation strategies and transfer of knowledge (Measure 2.6). Moreover coordinates the process of putting into practice the measure of entrepreneurship promotion and the measure of micro-enterprises (Measure 2.5 and 3.4),
   - The Department of Education and Culture is in charge of implementing of equalising educational opportunities by scholarship programmers (Measure 2.2),
2. The Voivodship Labour Office in Rzeszow takes care of implementing development of competencies linked to the regional labour market needs and life long learning opportunities, vocational reorientation of persons leaving in agriculture sector and the workforce affected with restructuring processes (Measure 2.1, 2.3, 2.4).
3. The Agency of Regional Development in Rzeszow is responsible for the entrepreneurship promotion and micro-enterprises (Measure 2.5 and 3.4).

The IROP provides the support for: infrastructural investment (transport, environmental, social, tourism and culture and information society infrastructure), human resources development (development of competencies, vocational reorientation, scholarships for youth and students), entrepreneurship promotion and micro-enterprises and co-operation between research and development sector and enterprises relates to regional and local area.

According to Addition of the Integrated Regional Operational Programme[5] for Podkarpackie Voivodship per priorities and measures by exchange rate 1 EUR = 3,9254 PLN[6] the allocation of funds is presented below.

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[4] The Integrated Regional Operational Programme 2004-2006, Ministry of the Economy and Labour, Warsaw, November 2004, pp. 15-17.

[5] Addition of the Integrated Regional Operational Programme 2004-2006, taking into account by Ordinance of Minister of Economy and Labour on 25 August 2004 in re accept The Additional Integrated Regional Operational Programme 2004-2006 (Dz.U. Nr 200, poz. 2051, z późn. zm.)

[6] Exchange rate from 27 July 2006, applied in monitoring in August 2006.

Priority / Measure	**Description of the programme priorities/measures**	**allocation 2004-2006 - PLN**
Priority I.	Development and modernisation of the infrastructure to enhance the competitiveness of regions	433 221 125,65
Measure 1.1	Modernisation and development of the regional transport system	210 850 029,96
Measure 1.2	Environmental protection infrastructure	80 332 017,49
Measure 1.3	Regional social infrastructure	66 180 869,09
Measure 1.3.1	Regional educational infrastructure	39 805 772,80
Measure 1.3.2	Regional health care infrastructure	26 375 096,29
Measure 1.4	Development of tourism and culture	52 709 852,95
Measure 1.5	Information society infrastructure	23 148 356,16
Priority II.	Strengthening human resources development in regions	117 993 085,93
Measure 2.1	Development of competencies linked to the regional labour market needs and life long learning opportunities	28 443 447,17
Measure 2.2	Equalising educational opportunities through scholarship programmes	35 266 578,86
Measure 2.2.1	Suport for young people from rural areas	25 544 932,27
Measure 2.2.2	Suport for students	9 721 646,59
Measure 2.3	Vocational reorientation of persons leaving agriculture sector	15 078 245,46
Measure 2.4	Vocational reorientation of the workforce affected with restructuring processes	10 332 238,04
Measure 2.5	Entrepreneurship promotion	16 577 065,92
Measure 2.6	Regional Innovation Strategies and transfer of knowledge	12 295 510,48
Priority III.	Local development	201 829 856,44
Measure 3.1	Rural areas	99 666 631,65
Measure 3.2	Areas undergoing restructuring	31 868 427,12
Measure 3.3	Degraded Urban, post-industrial and post-military sites	27 138 768,91
Measure 3.4	Micro-enterprises	15 000 096,52
Measure 3.5	Local social infrastructure	28 155 932,25
Measure 3.5.1	Local educational and sport infrastructure	14 056 721,80
Measure 3.5.2	Local health care infrastructure	14 099 210,49

Priority IV – "Technical Assistance" is supposed to assure effectiveness of structural funds management and clearness of financial aid operation, as well as increase the level of knowledge on structural funds within potential beneficiaries and society. This Priority is very need for institutions involved in IROP implementation because they require support in terms of appropriate qualified

staff, training, office equipment, organization and servicing of Monitoring Committee, monitoring Subcommittees and Steering Committees as well as support for information and promotion activities.

Assistance recipients consist of the following:
- IROP Managing Authority at the Ministry of Regional Development,
- Marshal Offices,
- Voivodship Offices,
- Final Beneficiaries dealing with IROP Priority II and Measure 3.4.

Within the Priority IV – "Technical Assistance" the above mentioned institutions receive assistance in fulfilling their obligations related to IROP implementation. Within the Priority three measures have been formed:
- Measure 4.1 – Support for IROP implementation process – limited expenditure,
- Measure 4.2 - Support for IROP implementation process – non-limited expenditure,
- Measure 4.3 – Information and promotion activities.[7]

The realization of the Integrated Regional Operational Programme will have been ended by the time of 30 June 2008, when the beneficiaries is obliged to submit the latest application for payment.,

Implementation state

An allocation of € 192 million is provided for implementation of the Integrated Regional Operational Programme (IROP) in the years 2004-2006 in Podkarpackie Voivodship. The first adoption of application for Measure 1.1, 1.2 and 1.5 took place in June 2004. Absorption among the beneficiaries was very high that is why the allocation in these measures amounted properly 94%, 75% and 70%. The large quantity of applications results from the fact that The Podkarpackie Voivodship has realised all of Pre-accession Programme in Poland thanks to very good preparation of the IROP beneficiaries. The beneficiaries within Priority I-III have applied 730 application on amount of 1,1 mld PLN to the end of 2004. This shows the interest among beneficiaries in acquire of fund. Within Priority I-III have been applied 2753 applications on amount of 2,29 mld PLN since 31 August 2006. It was:

- Priority I – 223 applications on 887,26 mln PLN,
- Priority II – 932 applications on 508,04 mln PLN,

[7] http://fundacja.europa.pl

– Priority III – 1 598 applications on 895,41 mln PLN.

The applications were valuated according to the appropriate instructions. The Voivodship Board selected only the best one. Within Priority I and III (without Measure 3.4) were accepted 294 projects – i.e. 30% out of all applications. Within Priority II and Measure 3.4 were accepted 480 projects – i.e. 26% out of all applications. Because of limited founds the Voivodship Boards or Voivodship Offices accepted only some of the projects which gained above 60% points during valuation. Within Priority I and III without Measure 3.4 were 689 applications, which gained above 60% points. In order to accept these projects in case of money appearing the reserve list was formed.

The process of the IROP realisation is presented diagrammatically.



Graph I shows that the wholeness funds from Priority I and III were allocated. It results from large interests among beneficiaries of infrastructure projects and the effectiveness of entrepreneurs in advantage structural funds. The extent of Priority II advantage results from acceptation of Plan of Realisation Measure. Long- lasting of paying procedures causes that all of payments are low.

The type of infrastructure projects accepted by the Voivodship Board within Priority I and III (without Measure 3.4) is presented diagrammatically, according to amount and value (mln PLN).



Most of funds were divided out transport infrastructure which is the base of regional development. The value of projects from this field represents 50% out of infrastructure projects. By the end of 2008 will be build 300 km roads and 10 bridges.

A building road near Air Port Jasionka is the most important project in this field, which facilitates access to the Air Port.

158 mln PLN was divided on environmental protection infrastructure. Founds made possible to build 20 sewage treatment plants and water intakes and 500 km sewage system and water supply systems. One of important project in this field is the protection of dike on Łęg River 5,52 km in length.

The athletic stadium and a hospital ward of cardiosurgery in Hospital nr 2 in Rzeszow have been build within regional social infrastructure.

Wanda Siemaszkowa Theatre and the National Museum in Przemyśl are modernising within the area of tourism and culture.

A network is build as a result of information society infrastructure. This project is going to enable using free Internet for public institutions and part of Rzeszow dweller.

The most popular among measure destination for entrepreneurs were investment fund. The demand was higher than financing possibility of programme.

The measures dedicated for human resources development help enabled people to take part in free language and computer course, development of competencies (16 thousand people). Until 30 June 2006 32 thousand pupils, 4,5 thousand students and 40 doctoral students received scholarships. 40 pupils have got a job in Aviation Valley enterprises after finishing practises.

The rough localisation of projects within IROP Priority I and III (without Measure 3.4) show below maps.



The dates about applications within Priority I and III (without Measure 3.4):

- 103 from 159 communes have got funds – i.e. 65%,
- 40 communes applied but did not get funds – i.e. 25% from Podkarpackie communes,
- 16 commune did not apply – i.e. 10% from Podkarpackie communes,
- 19 from 21 districts have got funds – i.e. 90%,
- 1 district turned applications but did not get funds,
- 1 district did not turn application,
- The largest number of applications were from Rzeszowski District – 101 for 150 mln PLN,
- The least applications were from Krosno Magistrate District – 10 for 20 mln PLN,
- The largest number of accepted applications were from Rzeszowski District – 24 for 40 mln PLN,
- The least accepted applications were from Bieszczdzki District – 3 for 3 mln PLN,

- The largest number of accepted applications per capita were from Krosno Magistrate District – 484 PLN,
- The least accepted applications per capita were from Jasielski District – 37 PLN.

Barriers in the IROP implementation

The experience in the IROP implementing during 2,5 years has diagnosed problems and difficulty complicated process of allocated funds. Apart from limited funds for Podkarpackie Voivodship bureaucratic barriers are one of basic problems e.g.:

- Applications were valuated without legal basis during first competition,
- Complexity and long-lasting process of competition, choices and contracts may cause that allocation may be used completely,
- Acts of legislation were published too late,
- The Additional Integrated Regional Operational Programme 2004-2006 was changed 3 times, the textbook of procedure implementing was changed 10 times, the instruction of application was changed 3 times, and generator of applications was changed 47 times; that is why applications were corrected again,
- Despite training many of beneficiaries made mistakes.

Literature

Act from 20 April 2004, about National Development Plan (Dz.U. Nr 116, poz. 1206, z późn. zm.)

Addition of the Integrated Regional Operational Programme 2004-2006, taking into account by Ordinance of Minister of Economy and Labour on 25 August 2004 in re accept The Additional Integrated Regional Operational Programme 2004-2006 (Dz.U. Nr 200, poz. 2051, z późn. zm.)

The Integrated Regional Operational Programme taking into account by Ordinance of Minister of Economy and Labour on 1 July 2004 in re accept The Integrated Regional Operational Programme 2004-2006 (Dz.U. Nr 166, poz. 1745).

The Integrated Regional Operational Programme 2004-2006, Ministry of the Economy and Labour, Warsaw, November 2004, pp. 15-17.

http://fundacja.europa.pl

http://www.funduszestrukturalne.gov.pl

Streszczenie

STAN WDRAŻANIA ZINTEGROWANEGO PROGRAMU OPERACYJNEGO ROZWOJU REGIONALNEGO W WOJEWÓDZTWIE PODKARPACKIM

Na realizację Zintegrowanego Programu Operacyjnego Rozwoju Regionalnego (ZPORR) w Województwie Podkarpackim zostało przeznaczone 192 mln EUR. Środki te pozwoliły na dofinansowanie wielu projektów infrastrukturalnych, projektów z zakresu rozwoju zasobów ludzkich oraz wsparcie przedsiębiorstw.

Województwo Podkarpackie uczestniczyło w realizacji wszystkich Programów Przedakcesyjnych, dlatego też beneficjenci od samego początku wdrażania ZPORR byli bardzo dobrze przygotowani do aplikowania o środki unijne. W ramach przeprowadzonych naborów wniosków do dnia 31 sierpnia 2006 r. złożono 2 753 wnioski na łączną kwotę dofinansowania 2,29 mld zł. Z powodu ograniczonych limitów finansowych wybrano do dofinansowania jedynie 774 projektów, czyli przeciętnie, co 3 złożony wniosek. Zastanawiający jest fakt, że 16 jednostek samorządu terytorialnego nie starało się uzyskać dofinansowania w ramach przedmiotowego Programu.

Liczne problemy i bariery biurokratyczne znacznie wydłużały proces wdrażania ZPORR, a wnioski złożone w pierwszym konkursie oceniane były bez podstawy prawnej.

Województwo podkarpackie potrzebuje olbrzymich zasobów kapitału. Region ten jest jednym z najbiedniejszych w Polsce. Mimo to rozwija się bardzo dynamicznie i wykorzystuje niemal w 100 % wszelkie pozyskane środki. W celu pełnego wykorzystania funduszy strukturalnych należy przyspieszyć działania związane z aneksowaniem umów o dofinansowanie przez beneficjentów. Pozwoli to zagospodarować uwolnione środki na projekty z list rezerwowych.

Począwszy od 2007 r. Podkarpacie będzie mogło skorzystać ze środków w ramach Programu Rozwój Polski Wschodniej oraz Regionalnego Programu Operacyjnego na lata 2007 – 2013. Programy te pozwolą na inwestycje w dziedzinach, w których nie realizowano dotąd zbyt wielu projektów. Należy jednak pamiętać, że pomimo tych Programów w ciągu kilku najbliższych lat nie jesteśmy w stanie dogonić w poziomie rozwoju obecnej czołówki kraju.

PART V

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES DURING SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

ИЗМЕНЕНИЕ ЭТНИЧЕСКОГО СОСТАВА НАСЕЛЕНИЯ В СТРАНАХ ПОСТСОВЕТСКОГО ПРОСТРАНСТВА В 1989-2005 ГГ

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Прошло 15 лет, как нет СССР. Что произошло с населением страны и его этническим составом за этот период? Чтобы ответить на это вопрос, мы собрали материалы последних постсоветских переписей по всем странам СНГ и Балтии, и сравнили их с материалами последней советской переписи 1989г.

Так как в последующих разделах будут приведены данные об этническом составе населения отдельных постсоветских стран, здесь приведена в качестве общей справки информация об этническом составе СССР в целом в динамике (по всем советским переписям; см. табл. 1).

Таблица 1. **Численность населения СССР по национальностям (тыс. чел.) более 40.000 человек** (цифры взяты из материалов соответствующих переписей; названия народов по старым переписям приведены в скобках)

национальности	**1926 г.**	**1939 г.**	**1959 г.**	**1970 г.**	**1979 г.**	**1989 г.**
Все население	147.028	170.557,1	208.826,7	241.720,1	262.085	286.717
Русские	77.791,1	99.591,5	114.113,6	129.015,1	137.397,1	145.155,5
Украинцы	31.195,0	28.111,0	37.252,9	40.753,1	42.347,4	44.186,0
Узбеки	3.904,6	4.845,1	6.015,4	9.195,1	12.456,0	16.697,8
Белорусы	4.738,9	5.275,4	7.913,5	9.051,8	9.462,7	10.036,3
Казахи	3.968,3	3.100,9	3.621,6	5.298,8	6.556,4	8.135,8
Азербайджанцы	1.706,6	2.275,7	2.939,7	4.379,9	5.477,3	6.770,4
Татары	3.287,9	4.313,5	4.967,7	5.930,7	6.317,5	6.648,8
Армяне	1.567,6	2.152,9	2.786,9	3.559,2	4.151,2	4.623,2
Таджики	978,9	1.229,2	1.396,9	2.135,9	2.897,7	4.215,4
Грузины (в т.ч. мегрелы	1.821,2	2.249,6	2.692,0	3.245,3	3.570,5	3.981,0

национальности	1926 г.	1939 г.	1959 г.	1970 г.	1979 г.	1989 г.
и аджарцы)						
Молдаване	278,9	260,4	2.214,1	2.698,0	2.968,2	3.352,4
Литовцы	41,5	32,6	2.326,1	2.664,9	2.850,9	3.067,4
Туркмены	763,9	812,4	1.001,6	1.525,3	2.027,9	2.728,9
Киргизы	762,7	884,6	968,7	1.452,2	1.906,3	2.528,9
Немцы	1.238,5	1.427,2	1.619,7	1.846,3	1.936,2	2.038,6
Чуваши	1.117,4	1.369,6	1.469,8	1.694,4	1.751,4	1.842,3
Народы Дагестана	550,4	857,5	944,2	1.364,6	1.657	...
Латыши	151,4	128,3	1.399,5	1.429,8	1.439,0	1.459,0
Башкиры	713,7	843,7	989,0	1.239,7	1.371,5	1.449,2
Евреи	2.600,0	3.028,5	2.267,8	2.150,7	1.810,9	1.378,3
Мордва	1.340,4	1.456,3	1.258,1	1.262,7	1.191,8	1.154,0
Поляки	782,3	630,1	1.380,3	1.167,5	1.151,0	1.126,3
Эстонцы	154,7	143,6	988,6	1.007,4	1.019,9	1.026,6
Чеченцы	318,5	408,0	418,8	612,7	755,8	956,9
Удмурты (вотяки)	504,2	606,3	624,8	704,3	713,7	746,8
Марийцы	428,2	481,6	504,2	598,6	622,0	670,9
Аварцы	158,8	...	...	396,3	482,8	601,0
Осетины	272,3	354,8	412,6	488,0	541,9	598,0
Лезгины	134,5	...	...	323,8	382,6	466,0
Корейцы	87,0	182,3	313,7	357,5	388,9	438,7
Каракалпаки	146,3	185,8	172,6	236,0	303,3	423,5
Буряты	237,5	224,7	253,0	314,7	352,6	421,4
Кабардинцы	139,9	164,2	203,6	279,9	321,7	390,8
Якуты	240,7	242,1	233,3	296,2	328,0	381,9
Болгары	111,3	113,5	324,3	351,2	361,1	372,9
Даргинцы	109,0	...	...	230,9	287,3	365,0
Греки	213,8	286,4	309,3	336,9	343,9	358,1
Коми (зыряне)	226,4	299,9	287,0	321,9	326,7	344,5
Кумыки	94,5	...	...	188,8	228,4	281,9
Крымские татары	179,1	218,9	50	...	132,0	271,7
Уйгуры	42,6	97,4	95,2	173,3	210,6	262,6
Цыгане	61,2	88,2	132,0	175,3	209,2	262,0
Ингуши	74,1	92,1	106,0	157,6	186,2	237,4
Турки	...	...	35,3	79,5	92,7	207,5
Тувинцы	...	...	100,1	139,4	166,1	206,6
Гагаузы	...	...	123,8	156,6	173,2	197,8
Народы	...	140,7	129,0	150,9	158,3	184,4

национальности	**1926 г.**	**1939 г.**	**1959 г.**	**1970 г.**	**1979 г.**	**1989 г.**
Севера						
Калмыки	129,3	134,4	106,1	137,2	146,6	173,8
Венгры	...	...	154,7	166,5	170,6	171,4
Карачаевцы	55,1	75,8	81,4	112,7	131,1	155,9
Курды	54,7	45,9	58,8	88,9	115,9	152,7
Коми-пермяки	149,5	122,4	143,9	153,5	150,8	152,1
Румыны	...	...	106,4	119,3	128,8	146,1
Карелы	248,1	252,7	167,3	146,1	138,4	130,9
(Черкесы и адыгейцы)	65,3	-	-	-	-	-
Адыгейцы	...	55,0	79,6	99,9	108,7	124,8
Черкесы	...	33,1	...	...	46	52,4
Лакцы	40,4	...	...	85,8	100,1	118,1
Абхазы	57,0	59,0	65,4	83,2	90,9	105,3
Табасараны	...	...	...	55,2	75,2	97,5
Балкарцы	33,3	42,7	42,4	59,5	66,3	85,1
Хакасы	45,6	52,8	...	...	71	80,3
Ногайцы	36,3	36,6	...	51,8	59,5	75,2
Алтайцы (ойроты)	39,1	47,9	...	...	60	70,8
Финны	134,7	143,4	92,7	84,8	77,1	67,4
(Таранчи)	53,0	См. уйгуры	См. уйгуры	См. уйгуры	См. уйгуры	См. уйгуры
(Курама)	50,1	См. узбеки	См. узбеки	См. узбеки	См. узбеки	См. узбеки
(Персы) иранцы	44,0	39,4	20,8	27,5	31,3	40,2
Талыши	77,3	88,0	...	...	14	21,2

Доля славянских народов (русских, украинцев, белорусов) из-за более низкого уровня рождаемости в 1959-89гг. сократилась с 77% до 70%. Наименьшую долю коренных титульных этносов в населении в 1989г. имели Казахстан (40%) и Киргизия (52%), наибольшую – Армения (93%) и Литва (80%).

АЗЕРБАЙДЖАН

Первая национальная перепись населения проведена в 1999г. (см. табл. 2).

Таблица 2. **Этнический состав населения Азербайджана в 1979-1999гг.** (тыс. чел.)
(Источник: www.azstat.org/publications/yearbook/SYA2004/pdf/02en.pdf)

национальности	**1979 г.**	**1989 г.**	**1999 г.**
Все население	6026,5	7021,2	7953,4
в т.ч. Азербайджанцы	4708,8	5805,0	7205,5
Лезгины	158,1	171,4	178,0
Русские	475,3	392,3	141,7
Армяне	475,5	390,5	120,7
Талыши	...	21,2	76,8
Аварцы	36,0	44,1	50,9
Турки	7,9	17,7	43,4
Татары	31,4	28,0	30,0
Украинцы	26,4	32,3	29,0
Цахуры	8,5	13,3	15,9
Грузины	11,4	14,2	14,9
Курды	5,7	12,2	13,1
Таты	8,8	10,2	10,9
Евреи	35,5	25,2	8,9
Удины	5,8	...	4,1

Судя по цифрам, в материалы этой переписи внесены сведения о населении Нагорно-Карабахской АО, которая де-факто вышла из состава Азербайджана, а также о районах, занятых армянскими войсками (каким образом там была проведена азербайджанская перепись, совершенно не понятно; это внушает мысль о ее неполноте и недостоверности). Численность азербайджанцев значительно увеличилась (с 82,7% в 1989г. до 90,6%); армян сократилась по известным причинам; значительно уменьшилась доля русских (с 5,6% до 1,8%); увеличилась численность талышей. В Нахичеванской республике в 1999г. подавляющее большинство (из общего населения в 309,3 тыс. чел.) составляли азербайджанцы (306,5 тыс. чел.); меньшинствами являлись курды – 1,9 тыс., русские – 0,5 тыс., турки – 0,2 тыс. чел.

АРМЕНИЯ

Первая национальная перепись населения проведена в 2001г. (см. табл. 3).

Таблица 3. **Этнический состав населения Армении в 1979-2001гг.**
(тыс. чел.)
(Источник: www.armstat.am/census/)

национальности	**1979г.**	**1989г.**	**2001г.**
Все население	3037,3	3304,8	3213,0
в т.ч. Армяне	2725,0	3083,6	3145,4
Езиды	...	...	40,6
Русские	70,3	51,6	14,7
Ассирийцы	6,2	6,0	3,4
Курды	50,8	56,1	1,5
Азербайджанцы	160,8	84,9	-
Украинцы	8,9	8,3	1,6

При общем сокращении численности населения, число армян в межпереписной период увеличилось (несмотря на массовую эмиграцию в Россию и другие страны). Все азербайджанцы покинули Армению в 1989-91гг. в связи с армяно-азербайджанским конфликтом. Численность русских значительно уменьшилась. Из курдов вновь выделились в самостоятельную этническую группы езиды (иезиды), которые в переписи 1926г. считались отдельным этносом. Армения потеряла после распада СССР значительную часть своего населения. Большое число армян переселилось в Москву, регионы Северного Кавказа, а также за пределы бывшего СССР. После 2001г. начался незначительный рост, за исключением северных областей.

БЕЛОРУССИЯ

Первая национальная перепись населения проведена в 1999г. (см. табл. 4).

Таблица 4. **Этнический состав населения Белоруссии в 1979-1999гг.**
(тыс. чел.)
(Источник: СНГ в 2004г. – М., 2005.)

национальности	**1979г.**	**1989г.**	**1999г.**
Все население	9532,5	10.151,8	10.045,2
в т.ч. Белорусы	7568,0	7904,6	8158,9
Русские	1134,1	1342,1	1141,7
Поляки	403,2	417,7	395,7
Украинцы	231,0	291,0	237,0
Евреи	135,4	112,0	27,8

Численность населения страны в межпереписной период уменьшилась, но незначительно; число белорусов увеличилось, а русских, поляков и украинцев немного уменьшилась.

ГРУЗИЯ

Первая национальная перепись населения Грузии проведена в 2002г. (см. табл.5). В ней не учтено население Абхазии и Южной Осетии. В январе 2003г. была проведена перепись населения в Абхазии, численность которого по предварительным итогам составляла 330 тыс. чел. (www.abkhaziya.info/GOS/). Население Южной Осетии – 70 тыс. (оценка 2003г.).

Таблица 5. **Этнический состав населения Грузии в 1979-2002гг.**
(тыс. чел.)
(Источник: www.statistics.ge/index_eng.htm)

национальности	**1979г.**	**1989г.**	**2002г.**
Все население	4993,2	5400,8	4371,5
в т.ч. Грузины	3433,0	3787,4	3661,2
Азербайджанцы	255,7	307,6	284,8
Армяне	448,0	437,2	248,9
Русские	371,6	341,2	67,7
Осетины	160,5	164,1	38,0
Абхазы	85,3	95,9	3,5
Езиды	-	-	18,3
Курды	25,7	33,3	2,5
Греки	95,1	100,3	15,2
Украинцы	45,0	52,4	7,0

Численность населения в межпереписной период сократилась более чем на 1 млн. чел. (многие жители покинули страну во время гражданской войны и последовавшего за ней глубокого экономического кризиса; не учтены также жители Абхазии и Южной Осетии). Уменьшилась численность самих грузин, проживавших в Грузии, а также азербайджанцев (незначительно). Численность армян сократилась значительно, русских – в 5 раз, греков – в 6,5 раз. Так как перепись не учла осетин и абхазов, проживающих в самопровозглашенных республиках Абхазия и Южная Осетия, их численность в пределах Грузии сильно сократилась. Среди курдов в качестве самостоятельного этноса выделились езиды (см. также Армению).

КАЗАХСТАН

Первая национальная перепись населения проведена в 1999г. (см. табл. 6).

Таблица 6. **Этнический состав населения Казахстана в 1979-2004гг.**
(тыс. чел.)
(Источник: разные)

национальности	**1979г.**	**1989г.**	**1999г.**	**2004г.**
Все население	14.684,3	16.464,5	14.953,1	14.951,3
в т.ч. Казахи	5289,3	6534,6	7985,0	8550,8
Русские	5991,2	6227,5	4479,6	4072,6
Украинцы	898,0	896,2	547,1	469,4
Узбеки	263,3	332,0	370,7	409,7
Немцы	900,2	957,5	353,4	237,7
Татары	313,5	328,0	249,0	232,7
Уйгуры	147,9	185,3	210,3	223,0
Белорусы	181,5	182,6	111,2	...
Корейцы	92,0	103,3	99,7	...
Азербайджанцы	73,3	90,1	78,3	...

Население Казахстана сократилось из-за эмиграции русских, немцев, украинцев. Выросла численность и доля казахов и узбеков.

КИРГИЗИЯ

Первая национальная перепись населения проведена в 1999г. (см. табл. 7).

Таблица 7. **Этнический состав населения Киргизии в 1979-1999гг.**
(тыс. чел.)
(Источник: разные)

национальности	**1979г.**	**1989г.**	**1999г.**
Все население	3522,8	4257,8	4823
в т.ч. Киргизы	1687,4	2229,7	3128
Русские	911,7	916,6	603
Узбеки	426,2	550,1	665
Немцы	101,1	101,3	...
Украинцы	109,3	108,0	50
Татары	72,0	70,1	...

Население Киргизии сократилось из-за массовой эмиграции русских, немцев, украинцев. Значительно выросла численность киргизов; увеличилось число узбеков (проживают в Ферганской долине).

ЛАТВИЯ

Вторая национальная перепись населения проведена в марте 2000г. (первая – в 1935г.). Из 2377,4 тыс. жителей 74,5% имели латвийское

гражданство, 21,2% не имели его (504 тыс. чел.); 103 тыс. чел. имели иностранное гражданство. Статистика этнической структуры населения в Интернете не доступна (необходимо приобретение платного печатного текста). Доступны лишь общие цифры в процентах (см. табл. 8), из которых нами рассчитана приблизительная численность этнических групп Латвии (они приведены в графе за 2000г.). Наибольшее число русских проживает в Риге (43,5% населения города), Даугавпилсе (55,2%) и Резекне (50,7% населения города). Поляки концентрируются в Латгалии. Численность латышей немного уменьшилась, русских – значительно (эмиграция в Россию и другие страны). Также сократилось число украинцев и белорусов.

Таблица 8. **Этнический состав населения Латвии в 1979-2000гг.** (тыс. чел.)
(Источник: Интернет)

национальности	**1979г.**	**1989г.**	**1989г.** Доля (%) от всего населения	**2000г.** (рассчитано автором)	**2000г.** Доля (%) от всего населения
Все население	2502,8	2666,6	100%	2377,4	100%
в т.ч. Латыши	1344,1	1387,8	52,0%	1369,4	57,6%
Русские	821,5	905,5	34,0%	703,7	29,6%
Белорусы	111,5	119,7	4,5%	97,5	4,1%
Украинцы	66,7	92,1	3,5%	64,2	2,7%
Поляки	62,7	60,4	2,3%	59,4	2,5%
Евреи	28,3	22,9	0,9%	9,5	0,4%
Литовцы	37,8	34,6	1,3%	...	...

ЛИТВА

Перепись населения проведена в апреле 2001г. (см. табл.9).

Таблица 9. **Этнический состав населения Литвы в 1979-2001гг.**
(тыс. чел.)
(Источник: Интернет)

национальности	**1979г.**	**1989г.**	**2001г.** вся Литва	**2001г.** Вильнюс	**2001г.** Каунас
Все население	3391,5	3674,8	3484,0	553,9	378,9
в т.ч. Литовцы	2712,2	2924,2	2907,3	318,5	352,0
Поляки	247,0	258,0	235,0	104,4	1,6
Русские	303,5	344,5	219,8	77,7	16,6
Белорусы	57,6	63,2	42,9	22,6	1,1
Украинцы	32,0	44,8	22,5	7,2	1,9
Евреи	14,7	12,3	4,0	2,8	0,4

Население Литвы заметно сократилось в межпереписной период. Численность литовцев и поляков уменьшилась совсем незначительно, тогда как русских более чем на 120 тыс. чел., равно как и украинцев и евреев. Большинство поляков проживает в восточной части страны (Виленский коридор), русские – в Вильнюсе и Клайпеде.

МОЛДОВА

Перепись населения в Республике Молдова проведена в октябре 2004г., в Приднепровской Молдавской Республике (ПМР) – в ноябре 2004г. Результаты обеих этих переписей в части этнической структуры населения еще не опубликованы (по Республике Молдова – только в %%); сведения по этнической структуре населения в целом в границах прежней Молдавской ССР приведены в табл.10. Доля молдаван увеличилась на 12%, доля украинцев и русских сократилась почти вдвое, поскольку не учтено население ПМР. В переписи появились румыны, которые в советский период в Молдавии официально не признавались как отдельный этнос.

Таблица 10. **Этнический состав населения Молдовы в 1979-2004гг.**
(тыс. чел.)
(Источники: материалы переписей 1979г. и 1989г.;
www.statistica.md/recensamint/Totalurile_recensamintului_populatiei_ru.doc)

национальности	**1979г.**	**1989г.**	**2004г.** рассчитано автором через проценты	**1989г. в %%**	**2004г. в %%**
Все население	3949,8	4335,4	3383,3	100	100
в т.ч. Молдаване	2525,7	2754,7	2564,5	63,53	75,8
Украинцы	560,7	600,4	284,2	13,85	8,4
Русские	505,7	562,1	199,6	12,97	5,9
Гагаузы	138,0	153,5	148,9	3,54	4,4
Болгары	80,7	88,4	64,3	2,04	1,9
Евреи	80,1	65,7	...	1,52	...
Румыны	-	-	74,4	-	2,2

По итогам переписи 5 октября 2004г. численность населения Республики Молдова составила 3383,3 тыс. чел. Переписью не охвачено Приднестровье вместе с Бендерами (там, по оценке на 1 января 2003г., проживало 611,2 тыс. чел.; на 1 января 2001г. – 651,8 тыс.; см. Демоскоп. – 2001. - №37-38).

РОССИЯ

Перепись населения проведена в октябре 2002г. (см. табл. 11).

Таблица 11. **Этнический состав населения России в 1979-2002гг.**
(тыс. чел.) (Источник: материалы переписей)

национальности	**1979г.**	**1989г.**	**2002г.**
Все население	137.409,9	147.021,9	145.166,7
в т.ч. Русские	113.521,9	119.865,9	115.889,1
Татары	5005,8	5522,1	5554,6
Украинцы	3657,6	4362,9	2943,0
Народы Дагестана	1402,2	1749,0	2614,5
Башкиры	1291,0	1345,3	1673,4
Чуваши	1689,8	1773,6	1637,1
Чеченцы	712,2	899,0	1360,3
Армяне	364,6	532,4	1130,5
Мордва	1111,1	1072,9	843,4
Белорусы	1051,9	1206,2	808,0
Казахи	518,1	635,9	654,0
Удмурты	685,7	714,8	636,9
Азербайджанцы	152,4	335,9	621,8
Немцы	790,8	842,3	604,3
Марийцы	599,6	643,7	597,2
Кабардинцы	318,8	386,1	520,0
Осетины	352,1	402,3	514,9
Буряты	349,8	417,4	445,2
Якуты	326,5	380,2	443,9
Ингуши	166,0	215,1	413,0
Коми	320,1	336,3	293,4
Тувинцы	165,4	206,2	243,4
Евреи	692,3	536,8	229,9
Народы Севера	155,7	181,5	219,3
Грузины	89,4	130,7	197,9
Карачаевцы	125,8	150,3	192,2
Цыгане	120,7	152,9	182,8
Калмыки	140,1	165,8	174,0
Молдаване	102,1	172,7	172,3
Корейцы	97,6	107,1	148,6
Адыгейцы	107,2	122,9	128,5
Коми-пермяки	146,0	147,3	125,2
Узбеки	72,4	126,9	122,9
Таджики	17,9	38,2	120,1
Балкарцы	61,8	78,3	108,4
Греки	69,8	91,7	97,8
Карелы	133,2	124,9	93,3
Турки	3,6	10,0	92,4
Хакасы	69,2	78,5	75,6
Поляки	99,7	94,6	73,0
Алтайцы	58,9	69,4	67,2
Черкесы	44,6	50,8	60,5
Литовцы	66,8	70,4	45,6
Финны	55,7	47,1	34,0

Население России сократилось из-за низкой рождаемости, высокой смертности и эмиграции. Численность и доля русских также уменьшилась (с 81,6% в 1989г. до 79,8%). Значительно возросла численность народов Кавказа (армян – в 2,1 раз; азербайджанцев – в 1,9 раза; грузин – в 1,5 раза; чеченцев – в 1,5 раза; народов Дагестана – в 1,5 раза; ингушей – в 1,9 раза; кабардинцев – в 1,3 раза; карачаевцев – 1,3 раза; балкарцев – 1,4 раза), а также таджиков (в 3,1 раза) и башкир (в 1,25 раз). Численность татар увеличилась незначительно. Сократилось число евреев, немцев, украинцев, белорусов, поляков, литовцев, которые репатриировались. Из-за сильной ассимиляции сократилась численность финно-угорских народов (марийцев, удмуртов, коми, коми-пермяков, карелов, финнов), а также народов Поволжья (чувашей, мордвы). Численность народов Севера увеличилась.

ТАДЖИКИСТАН

Перепись населения проведена в январе 2000г. (см. табл.12).

Таблица 12. **Этнический состав населения Таджикистана в 1979-2000гг.**
(тыс. чел.)
(Источник: www.tajik-gateway.org/)

национальности	**1979г.**	**1989г.**	**2000г.**
Все население	3806,2	5092,6	6127,5
в т.ч. Таджики	2237,0	3172,4	4898,4
Узбеки	873,2	1197,8	936,7
Русские	395,1	388,5	68,2
Киргизы	48,4	63,8	65,5
Лакайцы	-	25,5	51,0
Туркмены	14,0	20,5	20,3
Татары	79,5	72,2	18,9
Кунграты	-	-	15,1
Украинцы	35,8	32,7	3,8
Немцы	38,9	41,3	1,1

Население страны и число таджиков в межпереписной период увеличилось, что связано с высоким уровнем рождаемости. Часть узбеков репатриировалась из-за межэтнических конфликтов. Страну во время гражданской войны покинули почти все немцы, украинцы, русские и татары.

ТУРКМЕНИЯ

Численность населения страны на 1 октября 2001г. составляла 5478,8 тыс. чел., на 1 декабря 2004г. – 6525,8 тыс. чел. (www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/econom/ek&stat.htm).

Последняя национальная перепись населения проведена в январе 1995г. (см. табл.13).

Таблица 13. **Этнический состав населения Туркмении в 1979-1995гг.**
(тыс. чел.)
(Источник: СНГ в 2004г. – М., 2005.)

национальности	**1979г.**	**1989г.**	**1995г.**
Все население	2764,7	3522,7	4438
в т.ч. Туркмены	1891,7	2536,6	3402
Русские	349,2	333,9	299
Узбеки	233,7	317,3	407
Казахи	79,5	87,8	87
Азербайджанцы	23,5	33,4	37
Армяне	26,6	31,8	34
Татары	40,4	39,2	...
Украинцы	37,1	35,6	...

Население страны и численность туркменов в межпереписной период увеличились, что связано с высоким уровнем рождаемости. Страну покинуло большинство русских, украинцев и татар. По данным прессы, туркмены в 2001г. составили 91% всего населения, узбеки – 3%, русские – 2%. Точных данных о численности отдельных этнических групп на более поздние даты нет.

УЗБЕКИСТАН

Перепись населения после 1989г. не проводилась. Этнический состав населения за советский период показан в табл.14. Современной информации о нем отсутствует ввиду закрытости статистики страны.

Таблица 14. **Этнический состав населения Узбекистана в 1979-1989гг.**
(тыс. чел.)
(Источник: материалы переписей СССР 1979г. и 1989г.)

национальности	**1979г.**	**1989г.**
Все население	15.389,3	19.810,1
в т.ч. Узбеки	10.569,0	14.142,5
Русские	1665,7	1653,5
Таджики	594,6	933,6
Казахи	620,1	808,2
Татары	648,8	467,8
Каракалпаки	297,8	411,9
Крымские татары	...	188,8
Корейцы	163,1	183,1
Киргизы	142,2	174,9
Украинцы	113,8	153,2
Туркмены	92,3	121,6
Турки	48,7	106,3
Евреи	99,9	65,5
Армяне	42,4	50,5
Немцы	39,5	39,8

Население страны в 1990-2004гг. значительно увеличилось, что связано с высоким уровнем рождаемости. Ее покинуло много русских, украинцев и татар. Точных данных о численности отдельных этнических групп нет.

УКРАИНА

Первая национальная перепись населения проведена в 2001г. (см. табл.15).

Население страны в 1989-2004гг. сократилось, что связано с низким уровнем рождаемости и массовой эмиграцией. Страну покинуло много русских, евреев, белорусов, поляков, молдаван, греков. Число украинцев несколько увеличилось. Выросла численность крымских татар (репатриация из Средней Азии в Крым), румын, армян.

Таблица 15. **Этнический состав населения Украины в 1979-2001гг.**
(тыс. чел.)
(Источник: материалы переписей)

национальности	**1979г.**	**1989г.**	**2001г.**
Все население	49.609,3	51.452,0	48.052,3
в т.ч. Украинцы	36.489,0	37.419,1	37.541,7
Русские	10.471,6	11.355,6	8334,1
Белорусы	406,1	440,0	275,8
Молдаване	293,6	324,5	258,6
Крымские татары	-	46,8	248,2
Болгары	238,2	233,8	204,6
Венгры	164,4	163,1	156,6
Румыны	121,8	134,8	151,1
Поляки	258,3	219,2	144,1
Евреи	634,2	486,3	103,6
Армяне	38,6	54,2	99,9
Греки	104,1	98,6	91,5
Татары	90,5	86,9	73,3
Цыгане	34,4	47,9	47,6
Азербайджанцы	17,2	37,0	45,2

ЭСТОНИЯ

Первая национальная перепись населения проведена в марте 2000г. (см. табл.16).

Таблица 16. **Этнический состав населения Эстонии в 1979-2004гг.**
(тыс. чел.)
(Источник: Интернет)

национальности	**1979г. Эстония**	**1989г. Эстония**	**2000г. Эстония**	**2000г.** Таллинн	**2000г.** Нарва	**2004г. Эстония**
Все население	**1464,5**	**1565,7**	**1370,1**	400,4	68,9	**1351,1**
в т.ч. Эстонцы	947,8	963,3	930,2	215,1	3,3	924,6
Русские	408,8	474,8	351,2	146,2	58,7	347,6
Украинцы	36,0	48,3	29,0	14,7	1,8	28,6
Белорусы	23,5	27,7	17,2	7,9	1,5	16,7
Финны	17,8	16,6	11,8	2,4	0,7	11,2

Население Эстония сокращается. Численность эстонцев уменьшилась совсем незначительно, тогда как русских более чем на 130 тыс. чел. Большое число русских проживает в Таллинне, Кохтла-Ярве, Нарве, Силламяэ. Сокращается также численность украинцев, белорусов, финнов.

ВЫВОДЫ

После распада СССР население многих бывших республик сократилась; особенно сильно – в Эстонии, Латвии, Грузии, Армении, Украине, Казахстане, России. В Литве, Белоруссии и Молдове после некоторого спада оно несколько увеличилось. В среднеазиатских странах и Азербайджане численность населения увеличивалась по-прежнему благодаря высокому уровню рождаемости. Особенно быстро росло население в Таджикистане (+40,7%), Туркмении (+40,6%), Узбекистане (+35,5%), Киргизии (+20,9%) и Азербайджане (+12,7%). Общая численность населения бывшего СССР, несмотря на массовую эмиграцию, все же увеличилась в 1989-2005гг. на 0,3%; если же сравнивать с 1991г. (290.077 тыс. чел.), то она сократилась на 0,2%.

Этнический состав населения большинства новых стран постсоветского пространства изменился в пользу увеличения доли титульного этноса страны (см. табл. 17). В начале 2000-х годов особенно высока была доля армян в Армении (97,9% во всем населении), азербайджанцев в Азербайджане (90,6%), грузин в Грузии (83,75%), литовцев в Литве (83,45%), белорусов в Белоруссии (81,22%), таджиков в Таджикистане (79,94%), русских в России (79,83%). При этом за счет массовой эмиграции славянских и других народов значительно возросла доля титульных этносов в Таджикистане (на 17,65%), Казахстане (на 17,5%), Грузии (13,62%), Киргизии (12,49%); она увеличилась на 6-8% в Азербайджане, Латвии, Эстонии; на 4-5% - в Армении, Литве, Туркмении, Украине.

Доля русских во всех постсоветских странах в 1989-2000-е гг. значительно сократилась (см. табл.18), особенно в Казахстане (на 10,58%), Киргизии (на 9,03%), Таджикистане (на 6,52%), Грузии (на 4,77%), Украине (на 4,73%), Эстонии (на 4,7%), Латвии (на 4,4%), Азербайджане (на 3,8%). Уменьшилась она даже в России: как абсолютно (с 119,9 млн. до 115,9 млн.), так и относительно (с 81,53% до 79,83%). Численность русских, проживавших за пределами России, сократилась с 24.980 тыс. чел. в 1989г. до 16.217 тыс. в 2003г. (без Узбекистана и Приднестровья, где нет данных об этническом составе населения на начало 2000-х гг.; если взять данные переписи 1989г. по Узбекистану, то все равно общая численность русских, живущих не в России, составит на начало 2000-х гг. не более 17,8 млн. чел.). Таким образом, численность русских,

проживающих в постсоветских странах за пределами России, сократилась по крайней мере на 7 млн. чел. (с 25 млн. до 18 млн.).

Таблица 17. **Доля титульного этноса в населении стран СНГ и Балтии в 1989-2004гг.**

страна	% титульного этноса во всем населении в 1989г.	% титульного этноса во всем населении в начале 2000-х гг.	Прирост в %%
Азербайджан	82,7	90,6	+7,9
Армения	93,3	97,9	+4,6
Белоруссия	77,86	81,22	+3,36
Грузия	70,13	83,75	+13,62
Казахстан	39,69	57,19	+17,5
Киргизия	52,37	64,86	+12,49
Латвия	52,0	57,6	+5,6
Литва	79,57	83,45	+3,88
Молдавия	63,54	...	...
Россия	81,53	79,83	-1,7
Таджикистан	62,29	79,94	+17,65
Туркмения	72,01	76,66	+4,65
Узбекистан	71,39	...	...
Украина	72,73	78,13	+5,4
Эстония	61,53	67,89	+6,36

Обращает внимание значительная депопуляция русского населения на всем постсоветском пространстве (уменьшение на 12.739,5 тыс. чел.) – почти на 13 млн. чел. (даже с учетом Узбекистана и Приднестровья эта цифра приблизительно составляет 11 млн. чел.). Это означает с одной стороны абсолютную депопуляцию русских, с другой стороны – этническую мимикрию, т.е. изменение своей национальности при проведении переписи на титульную (был русским, стал украинцем и т.д.). Такой сильной депопуляции у других многочисленных этносов на постсоветском пространстве не наблюдалось, за исключением евреев и немцев, которые массово эмигрировали в 1990-е гг. в Израиль, США и Германию. Количество евреев в России сократилось почти вдвое (с 536,8 тыс. до 229,9 тыс.), на Украине – в 4 раза (с 486,3 тыс. до 103,6 тыс.), в Белоруссии – в 4 раза (с 112,0 тыс. до 27,8 тыс.), в Литве – в 3 раза (с 12,3 тыс. до 4,0 тыс.), в Азербайджане – в 3 раза (с 25,2 тыс. до 8,9 тыс.). Численность немцев в России сократилась незначительно (с 842,3 тыс. до 604,3 тыс.), но значительно – в Казахстане (с 957,3 тыс. до 237,7 тыс.), Таджикистане (с 41,3 тыс. до 1,1 тыс.) и Киргизии. Сократилась также

численность греков (эмигрировали из Грузии и Украины в Грецию). Численность поляков медленно сокращалась в Белоруссии (с 417,7 тыс. чел. в 1989г. до 395,7 тыс. в 1999г.), Литве (с 258,0 тыс. до 235,0 тыс. чел.), России (с 94,6 тыс. до 73,0 тыс.), Латвии (с 60,4 тыс. до 59,4 тыс. чел.); значительно – на Украине (с 291,2 тыс. до 144,1 тыс. чел.).

Таблица 18. **Численность и доля русских в населении стран СНГ и Балтии в 1989-2004гг.**

страна	Численность русских (тыс. чел.) в 1989г.	Численность русских (тыс. чел.) в начале 2000-х гг.	% русских во всем населении в 1989г.	% русских во всем населении в начале 2000-х гг.	Прирост в %%
Азербайджан	392,3	141,7	5,6	1,8	-3,8
Армения	51,6	14,7	0,016	00045	-0,0115
Белоруссия	1342,1	1141,7	13,22	11,37	-1,85
Грузия	341,2	67,7	6,32	1,55	-4,77
Казахстан	6227,5	4072,6	37,82	27,24	-10,58
Киргизия	916,6	603	21,53	12.50	-9,03
Латвия	905,5	703,7	34,0	29,6	-4,4
Литва	344,5	219,8	9,37	6,31	-3,06
Молдавия	562,1	199,6	12,97	5,9	-7,07
Россия	119.865,9	115.889,1	81,53	79,83	-1,7
Таджикистан	388,5	68,2	7,63	1,11	-6,52
Туркмения	333,9	299	9,48	6,74	-2,74
Узбекистан	1653,5	...	8,35	...	...
Украина	11.355,6	8334,1	22,07	17,34	-4,73
Эстония	474,8	351,2	30,33	25,63	-4,7
Всего без России	24.979,5	16.217,0*	17,88	11,24*	-6,64*
Всего с Россией	144.845,6	132.106,1*	50,52	45,92*	-4,60

* - без учета Узбекистана, где отсутствуют данные об этническом составе

В ряде постсоветских стран (за исключением Азербайджана и Грузии, где их доля сократилась) увеличилась численность и доля армян, а также азербайджанцев (за исключением Армении, где их больше нет); в России – кавказских народов, особенно народов Дагестана и чеченцев.

Summary

DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC STRUCTURE IN POSTSVIET COUNTRIS IN 1989-2005

The ethnic structure of population of all post-Soviet countries has dramatically changed after the dissolution of the USSR. The materials of last national population census in each country (for 1997-2004) were analyzed in this article and the change of its ethnic structure in comparison with the las Soviet census of 1989. The main tendency is the increasing the share of dominant ethnic group in each country besides of Russia. The share of the Armenians in Armenia grew up to 97,9% in total population, the Azerbadzhanis in Azerbaycan – up to 90,6%, the Georgians in the Georgia – to 83,75%, the Lithuanians in Lithuania – to 83,45%, Belorussians in Belorussia – to 81,22%, the Tadzhiks in Tadzhikistan – to 79,94%.

The share of Russians in many post-Soviet countries drastically decreased: by 10,58% in Kazakhstan, by 9,03% - in Kyrgyzstan, by 6,62% - in Tadzhikistan, by 4,77% - in Georgia and by 4,73% - in the Ukraine. The main reason of this tendency – the massive emigrations of Russians from almost all republics of the former USS to Russia or to abroad. The number of Russians, living outside Russia, decreased from 24.980.000 (in 1989) to 16.217.000 (2003). The number of Russians has been reduced even in Russia: from 119.9 millions to 115.9 millions (their share has fallen from 81,53% to 79,83%). Total number of Russians in all post-soviet space has reduced by 13 millions. The number of Germans, Jews, Poles also reduced, but the absolute number of Armenians and Azerbaydzhans grew up in some times due to its mass emigrations from Armenia and Azerbaydzhan to Russia and another adjacent CIS countries.

PROBLEMS OF POLISH POPULATION IN UKRAINE AND OF UKRAINIAN POPULATION IN POLAND

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Introduction

Common historical experience and geographical closeness were the causes of the fact that many Ukrainians lived on Polish territory, while Polish population lived, in a bigger or lesser dispersion, in Ukraine.[1] A wide borderland existed, featuring a mixed ethnic character, where Ukrainians and Poles lived side by side. It was only the decisions taken by the allied powers in Yalta, linked with the adoption of the Curzon line as the political boundary between Poland and the USSR, that brought about the significant migration movements, meant to liquidate Polish minority in Ukraine and the Ukrainian one in Poland. This required carrying out massive bilateral population resettlements. They were in fact carried out and resulted in the new boundary between Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic becoming a distinct ethnic divide. The data associated with the post-war repatriation of the Ukrainian population from Poland are quite precise, since these movements had an organised character. Thus, 488,600 persons of Ukrainian nationality left Poland for the USSR in the years 1944-46. The Ukrainian minority still remaining in Poland was in the course of the so-called "Vistula Action" in 1947 resettled towards the Polish western and northern lands. According to the official data some 95,800 Ukrainians were resettled then from the province of Rzeszów, and 44,700 from the province of Lublin. Thus, the action encompassed altogether 140,500 Ukraini-

[1] The problems of distribution and numbers of Polish population in Ukraine, and of the Ukrainian population in Poland, in various historical periods, constituted the subject of numerous analyses. From the Polish side these problems were considered, in particular, by W. Wakar (1917). On the other hand, known Ukrainian historians, V. Kubiyovych (1996) and V. Sadovski (1927) also dealt with the problem. Important information on the same problem can be found in the work of the French historian D. Beauvois (1996).

ans. It is estimated that within the entire Polish eastern borderland, between the Carpathians in the South and the town of Włodawa on Bug river in the North, just a couple of thousand persons of Greek Orthodox of Greek Catholic faith remained, considering themselves to be Ukrainians. The areas abandoned by the Ukrainians were settled by the Polish population of Roman Catholic denomination. The borderland, having been mixed in both ethnic and religious terms, became an ethnically Polish area.

Statistical information, concerning the numbers of Polish population resettled in the post-war period from the Ukrainian SSR is not very precise. A large number of Poles left those areas in an unorganised manner, fleeing the terror from the side of the Ukrainian nationalist organisations. The organised repatriation action encompassed 117,000 Poles in 1944, 512,000 in 1945, and 159,000 in 1946. It is estimated that 788,000 Poles left the territory of western Ukraine in an organised manner. The official data quoted are not complete. On the basis of additional information (including Polish population census of 1950) it is estimated that after the cessation of military activities the broadly conceived resettlement action from the Ukrainian SSR affected 1,200,000 persons of Polish nationality. It is also acknowledged that at least half a million Poles were not encompassed by the repatriation and remained in their former places of residence. Almost all Poles were forced to leave western Volhynia as well as the districts of Lwów (Ukrainian L'viv) and Tarnopol (Ternopil'). The biggest number of Poles remained to the East of river Zbrucz, on the areas, which had belonged to the USSR before 1939. The bilateral exchange of population, carried out after the war brought about liquidation of the clusters of Polish population in Ukraine and of the Ukrainian population in Poland. The drastically reduced Polish and Ukrainian minorities have been significantly spatially dispersed. This brought important demographic consequences, resulting in rapid assimilation processes.

Polish population in Ukraine

The population census of 1959 showed that 363,300 persons of Polish nationality lived on the territory of the Ukrainian SRR. The biggest number of Poles lived in the district of Zhytomir – 103,000, in the district of Khmel'nyts'kyi – 70,100, of L'viv – 59,100, Ternopil' – 23,500 and Vinnytsa – 20,800.

The subsequent census, carried out in 1970, showed the number of Poles in Ukraine as equal 295,100 (decrease with respect to 1959 by 68,200 persons). The successive one took place in 1979 and according to its results there were 258,300 Poles in Ukraine (decrease by 36,800 in relation to 1970), while the last one in the Soviet period was carried out in 1989, showing 219,000 Poles (the decrease with respect to 1979 having amounted to 39,100). The number of Polish population dropped between 1959 and 1989 by altogether 144,100

persons. This constant demographic erosion encompassed all the districts, in which Poles lived (see Table 1).

Table 1. Changes in the numbers of Polish population in the Ukrainian SSR in the years 1959-1989

No.	Districts	Numbers of Polish population			
		1959	1970	1979	1989
1.	**Zhytomir**	103,000	90,700	82,400	69,400
2.	**Khmel'nytskyi**	70,100	52,300	43,900	36,700
3.	**L'viv**	59,100	41,500	32,900	26,900
4.	**City of Kiev**	8,500	9,700	10,600	10,400
5.	**Ternopil'**	23,500	14,700	9,200	6,700
6.	**Vinnytsa**	20,800	13,400	10,800	8,400
7.	**Ivano Franko**	6,500	6,500	4,800	3,400
8.	**Rivne**	3,700	3,700	3,500	3,000
9.	**Remaining districts**	68,100	62,600	60,200	54,300
	Totals	363,300	295,100	258,300	219,200

Sources – for 1959: Itogi vsesoiuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1959 goda, Ukrainskaya SSR, Moskva 1963; for 1970, 1979, 1989: F.D. Zastavnyi, Geografiya Ukraini, L'viv 1994, pp. 413-417.

The statistical data presented show the image of a continuous and progressing decrease of Polish population numbers. Explanation of this process requires a comment related to the political situation of the Polish population. The remaining population of Polish nationality after the post-war repatriation lived in a significant dispersion. There was no analogy with the situation of Poles in Lithuania or in western Belarus'. Poles lived there to a large extent on the areas ethnically Polish, on which Polish population dominated, or at least constituted an important share of the total population (e.g. in the region of Vilna). There was no such a situation in Ukraine. Individual Polish families remained, surrounded by the Ukrainian population. Given these circumstances, preservation of Polish language and culture was difficult. The majority of the Roman Catholic parishes were liquidated. The still functioning Catholic churches served highly limited numbers of parishioners. Polish schools were virtually totally liquidated, except for L'viv. The general socio-economic conditions made, therefore, maintenance of national identity difficult. The urbanisation and industrialisation processes stimulated migrations. Communities of local character were dissolving. The new generations, entering their adult life in the Soviet period, were subject to total indoctrination, oriented against any expression of reference to Polish traditions. Program of planned atheist and entirely lay upbringing accelerated, as well, denationalisation and integration of the few Poles in the society of Soviet Ukraine. This was the effect of the traditional identification of Polish identity with Roman Catholicism. The most important role in the de-Polonisation should be assigned, though, the mixed marriages. Less and less young couples had purely Polish char-

acter. Polish-Ukrainian or Polish-Russian marriages dominated. Children from such marriages took on mostly the nationality of the environment, in which they lived, and so they would unavoidably become Ukrainians or Russians. Polish minority gradually turned into the society of older people. Populations of this kind start to die off in a natural manner.

The data from the Soviet censuses were questioned in Poland. It was held that the actual number of Poles was much higher. A number about twice as high as the one provided by the Soviet censuses was usually quoted. That is also why the results of the Ukrainian census, carried out already in the new political conditions, were much expected. This census, carried out in December 2001, showed the number of merely 144,100 Poles, that is – much less than in 1989. Numbers of Polish population decreased in all districts (see Table 2).

Table 2. Changes in the numbers of Polish population in Ukraine in the years 1989-2001

Lp.	Districts	Numbers of Polish population		Changes in the numbers of Polish population 1989-2001	
		1989	2001	absolute	in %
1.	**Zhytomir**	69,400	49,000	–20,400	–29.3
2.	**Khmel'nytskyi**	36,700	23,000	–13,700	–37.3
3.	**L'viv**	26,900	18,900	–8,000	–29.7
4.	**City of Kiev**	10,400	6,900	–3,500	–33.6
5.	**Ternopil'**	6,700	3,800	–2,900	–43.2
6.	**Vinnytsa**	8,400	3,700	–4,700	–55.9
7.	**Ivano Franko**	3,400	2,800	–600	–17.6
8.	**Rivne**	3,000	2,000	–1,000	–33.3
9.	**Remaining districts**	54,300	34,000	–20,300	–37.3
	Totals	219,200	144,100	–75,100	–34.2

Sources – for 1989: natsyonal'nyi sostav naseleniya sssr. Gosudarstvennyi komitet sssr po statistike, moskva 1991; for 2001: pro kilkist ta sklad nasel'eniya ukraini za pidsumkami vseukrainskovo perepisu nasel'eniya 2001 roki, kyiv 2003.

Spatial dispersion is the main factor in the decrease of numbers of Polish population. It accelerates the assimilation processes and brings about a gradual disappearance of the population declaring in a decisive manner their Polish nationality.

Numbers of Ukrainian population in Poland

The reasons for carrying out the "Vistula Action" and resettling the Ukrainian population into the areas of western and northern Poland are quite complex. To a certain degree the resettlement was meant to liquidate the activity of the Ukrainian nationalist underground movement, which was difficult without isolating the Ukrainian Uprising Army from its base, that is – the local

Ukrainian population. The objective was to terminate quickly and effectively the military conflict, through liquidation of the armed Ukrainian forces. The fighting brought about a lot of victims, both among Poles and Ukrainians. Yet, a more important reason behind the entire action was the decision to remove the Ukrainian minority from the Polish eastern borderland area. It was assumed that this minority is disloyal with respect to the Polish statehood and that its presence would destabilise all aspects of life within the regions along the border with the USSR (T.A. Olszański, 1987, p. 114).

The primary aim of the authorities was to disperse the resettled Ukrainian population as much as possible. The principle was adopted that they should not be settled close to the western border and to the seacoast. Attempts were undertaken to avoid their concentration close to the capitals of the provinces. In order not to establish concentrations of Ukrainians the principle was adopted of settling a couple of Ukrainian families in a village, with the share of Ukrainian population not exceeding 10% per county.

The biggest number of Ukrainians was resettled to the province of Olsztyn – 55,089 persons, then to the provinces of Szczecin – 48,465 persons, Wrocław – 21,237 persons, Poznań – 8,042, Gdańsk – 6,838, and Białystok – 991 persons (R. Drozd, 1998, p. 198).

The period of administrative persecutions terminated with the October 1956. This was the end of the Stalinist practices and certain liberalisation of the political life of the country took place. Ukrainian schools were established, and opening of the Greek Catholic churches was allowed. Returning to the former places of residence and birth was not forbidden any more. Yet, this was difficult for practical reasons, since the old homesteads of the Ukrainians were usually either completely ruined or inhabited by the Polish population. The latter had an inimical attitude towards the returning Ukrainians. Still, some 10,000 Ukrainians returned to their former places of living. The remaining Ukrainian population would increasingly strongly integrate within the new places of residence. Many of them left the countryside and found jobs in the nearby towns. There they would often conceal their Ukrainian origins (W. Mokry, 1987, p. 122). The authorities allowed for the establishment of the Ukrainian Social and Cultural Association, which started its educational, cultural as well as publishing activity. This, however, did not bring the expected results in terms of activation of the Ukrainian national life. Ukrainian population was characterised by passivity. Dispersion made difficult activity on a broader scale, especially so as the young generation of Ukrainians were not interested in pronouncing their separate ethnic identity. Polish-Ukrainian intermarriages played the biggest role in the assimilation processes. They were not a sporadic phenomenon and there were an increasing number of them. Children from such marriages would most often choose Polish national identity and would break away from the ethnic environment of their Ukrainian parents. They were also baptised most often in the Roman Catholic Church, which additionally accelerated their integra-

tion in the Polish surroundings. There were only few centres (Górowo Iławeckie, Banie Mazurskie, Barlinek), in which more Ukrainians lived and where conditions could arise for the Ukrainian children to preserve the mother tongue and to remain faithful to the national traditions.

The turning point for the Ukrainian population in Poland was the year 1989. The change of the system, the collapse of the socialism and the appearance of a democratic state changed entirely the situation of the Ukrainian minority in Poland. A change in the ethnic policy of the state gave large possibilities of action to all kinds of social organisations. That is why the announced population census, in which it was envisaged to ask, for the first time since 1946, about the nationality and mother tongue of all the inhabitants of Poland, was expected with impatience. This census was finally carried out in April 2002 and its results in the setting of provinces were made public. Only 30,957 persons declared in the census Ukrainian nationality. Besides, 5,863 Polish citizens admitted being "Lemkos". If one treats Lemkos as a part of the broader Ukrainian nation, then the total number of Ukrainians in Poland would amount to 36,820 persons, having told the census takers that they are Ukrainians or Lemkos. At the same time, 22,700 persons declared Ukrainian as their mother tongue. The biggest number of Ukrainians showed up in northern Poland, close to the border with the Russian district of Kaliningrad (see Table 3).

Table 3. Ukrainian population in Poland in 2002

No.	Provinces	Ukrainian population		
		Totals	Including	
			Ukrainians	Lemkos
1.	**Lower Silesia**	4943	1859	3084
2.	**Cuiavia-Pomerania**	207	191	16
3.	**Lublin**	699	694	5
4.	**Lubusza**	1560	769	791
5.	**Lodz**	296	290	6
6.	**Little Poland**	2338	754	1584
7.	**Masovia**	1311	1281	30
8.	**Opole**	285	275	10
9.	**Subcarpathia**	3418	3271	147
10.	**Podlasie**	1448	1441	7
11.	**Pomerania**	3026	2987	39
12.	**Silesia**	680	660	20
13.	**Holy Cross**	142	141	1
14.	**Warmia-Masuria**	12022	12009	13
15.	**Greater Poland**	436	392	44
16.	**Western Pomerania**	4009	3943	66
	Poland	36820	30957	5863

Source: Ludność, stan i struktura demograficzno-społeczna 2002, Główny Urząd Statystyczny (Central Statistical Office), Warszawa 2003.

As it could be expected, there has been a decline in the number of Ukrainian population in the south-eastern Poland, close to the border with Ukraine. In the provinces of Lublin, Subcarpathia and Little Poland, where until the World War II a significant Ukrainian minority lived (around 650,000 persons) only 6,455 persons declared now the Ukrainian or Lemko nationality.

The results of the census were questioned by the representatives of the Ukrainian organisations in Poland. It was held that the census does not reflect the actual reality, since the true number of Ukrainians in Poland is much higher. In this context various, usually quite abstract, estimates were provided. Most often the number of 300,000 Ukrainians has been forwarded. Such information is then repeated in some scientific studies of the subject. One can cite here the report by G. Babiński (1998, p. 74), where the same number is quoted. Besides, the number of Lemkos is estimated as equal 80,000 (J. Żurko, 1997, p. 53). It was indicated that the Ukrainian population featured high natural increase, and maintained that Polonisation did not have a massive character. Based upon such assumptions, it was held that the Ukrainian minority in Poland must have several hundred thousand members. The problem is very hard to resolve and nowadays it is subject to more detailed scientific analyses. It can be supposed, though, that these analyses would not bring much explanation and that some myths will continue to function in the mass media and in some documents signed by the authorities of the Association of Ukrainians in Poland. It is usually so that the representatives of the ethnic minorities overestimate as much as possible the data on the number of members of these minorities. This increases their prestige and significance and gives the possibility of acquiring higher financial subsidies for their activity.

When considering the results of the population census of 2002 we should note that contemporary Poland is a democratic country and no one could be afraid of being persecuted for having declared this or another nationality. Some deformations or errors always occur in the census materials. Persons living at the interface between two ethnic groups may not admit their membership in a minority. They often adopt the nationality declaration of the dominating ethnicity, since the status of the representative of an ethnic minority may lead to a definite personal marginalisation. This is a common phenomenon and is by no means specific for Poland. It is usually admitted that a population census provides the lower bound on the respective number. The actual numbers of ethnic minority populations may in reality be higher.

Concluding remarks

Both the Polish minority in Ukraine and the Ukrainian minority in Poland have been during the entire post-war period living in conditions making it difficult to maintain their ethnic identity (national, religious and language-wise). Despite the fact that the situation in Poland was more advantageous, since the state system was less repressive, and human rights have been observed in a better manner, the status of a member of a national minority was not too comfortable. The objective conditions were conducive to assimilation, while the state policies were oriented at evening out all kinds of ethnic differentiation.

There was one aspect in the living conditions of the two minorities considered, which was very similar. Both Poles in Ukraine and Ukrainians in Poland lived in a significant dispersion. There were no ethnically Ukrainian areas in Poland, nor Polish in Ukraine. The limited Ukrainian community in Poland lived within the Polish environment, while Poles in Ukraine lived and worked among Ukrainians. These disadvantageous conditions impacted in a decisive manner on the possibility of preserving their language and nationality. It can even be stated that they determined the fate of both ethnic minorities. Both Ukrainians in Poland and Poles in Ukraine were bound for the gradual assimilation and denationalisation. And this is what in principle happened in reality.

The first post-war Soviet census, carried out in 1959, registered 363,300 Poles. The last one, carried out in free Ukraine in 2001, showed only 144,100 of Polish population. The decrease during only 42 years amounted, in absolute numbers, to 219,200 persons. In this period the number of Poles in Ukraine has been decreasing on the average by 5,200 per annum. A similar downward trend was observed for Ukrainians in Poland. The data from 1947 showed the number of the Ukrainian minority in post-war Poland at around 150,000. The census carried out in 2002, that is – after 55 years, showed 36,800 Ukrainians. The assimilation processes in Poland and Ukraine were taking place at a similar pace. When stating this, we refer to the census data, whose reliability is always easily criticised. Without going into details, which can have various interpretations, the general image is clear and beyond discussion. The dispersed Polish population in Ukraine and the Ukrainian one in Poland underwent a highly significant reduction. It can be expected that these processes will continue to take place in the nearest future in an intensive and unavoidable manner.

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Streszczenie

PROBLEMATYKA LUDNOŚCI POLSKIEJ NA UKRAINIE I UKRAIŃSKIEJ W POLSCE

Artykuł poświęcony jest określeniu liczebności i rozmieszczenia ludności polskiej na Ukrainie oraz ukraińskiej w Polsce. We wstępnej części opracowania omówiono przyczyny historyczne, które spowodowały, że na szerokim pograniczu polsko-ukraińskim wspólnie mieszkała ludność polska i ukraińska. Następnie przedstawiono skalę i kierunki ruchów migracyjnych, które miały miejsce po II wojnie światowej. W rezultacie tych przemieszczeń, które objęły łącznie około 2 mln mieszkańców, nowa granica między Polską a Ukraińską SRS stała się wyraźnym rozgraniczeniem etnicznym oddzielającym Polaków od Ukraińców. Szczególną uwagę zwrócono na konsekwencje „Akcji Wisła". Liczebność ludności polskiej na Ukrainie w okresie powojennym rozpatrywano na podstawie spisów sowieckich, które były zrealizowane w 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989. Wykazały one stopniowe zmniejszenie się liczby ludności polskiej (w 1959 r. – 363,3 tys., 1989 – 219,2 tys.). To obniżenie było wywołane procesami asymilacyjnymi. Dane spisów sowieckich były kwestionowane. Z tego powodu oczekiwano na rezultaty spisu ukraińskiego przeprowadzonego w nowych warunkach politycznych. Spis ten zrealizowany w 2001 r. ujawnił jedynie 144,1 tys. Polaków, głównie mieszkających w obwodzie żytomierskim i chmielnickim. Autor wyjaśnia przyczyny tego spadku liczebności ludności polskiej.

W drugiej części artykułu autor omawia sytuację ludności ukraińskiej w Polsce, która będąc też rozproszona, miała trudności w zachowaniu swojej odrębności narodowej i religijnej. Nastąpiły silne procesy akulturacji i asymilacji społeczności ukraińskiej w otoczeniu polskim. W kolejnej części artykułu przedstawiono wyniki polskiego spisu ludności z 2002 r. Wykazał on na terytorium Polski 36,8 tys. Ukraińców, w tym

5,9 tys. zadeklarowało narodowość łemkowską. Najwięcej Ukraińców znajduje się w woj. warmińsko-mazurskim.

Na zakończenie autor porównuje warunki życia Polaków na Ukrainie i Ukraińców w Polsce. Stawia tezę, że obie te mniejszości będą podlegały intensywnym procesom asymilacyjnym.

CHANGES OF POPULATION IN SLOVAK BOUNDARY REGIONS, 1961-2001

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Introduction

State boundary always represented a marked barrier of socio-economic development for the immediately neighbouring territories. Brabec (1991) quotes that in the conditions of free market every state boundary constitutes of economic barrier of certain size hindering market expansion with centrifugal effect on location of population and economic activities (industry, transport infrastructure). Also Mikus (1986) notes that only in exceptional cases have border regions been integrated into the process of industrialization (with corresponding process of creation of conditions for growth of population), and usually if they have been possessed by mineral or other natural resources worked in situ. Therefore long time the boundary regions were considered the specific cases of problematic and peripheral regions of prevailingly less developed territories that are sharply limited in their economic activities by political boundary hence, are not attractive for potential immigrants either. In their territory a process of circular cumulative causation (described by Myrdal, 1957) has been fully manifested itself in the past. The essence of this process lies in a causative action of one negative factor (for instance, existence of state boundary) on other factors (for instance, emigration and consequent decrease of population number) while the negative effect upon the life of region is growing. The whole process of the circular cumulative causation creates a "vicious circle" stepping out of which, as show experience of numerous European states, is extremely difficult.

Aim of the paper, methodology, and applied statistical data

It is presumed that the territory lying next to the state frontier would no represent a homogeneous demographic spatial unit. It is also presumed that precisely the spatial heterogeneity of boundary territory may cause that some

of its parts would develop and grow (from the demographic point of view), some might stagnate and some decline. Friendly or unfriendly attitudes of political representatives to their partners from neighbouring countries could also be reflected in spatial policy of the particular country (approximation of economic activities to positively perceived neighbours or distancing of economic activities from negatively perceived neighbours). Realized spatial policy, as result of different attitudes of politicians to neighbours, has the important influence on the natural and mechanical population movement in boundary regions.

Slovakia borders on five states: Austria, Czech Republic, Poland, Ukraine, and Hungary. The main aim of the study is identification of differences among the boundary territories in Slovakia during 1961-2001 period from the changes of population point of view. Delimitation of boundary areas is not always univocal. As a rule it is either space delimited by physical distance from the frontier (for instance the territory within 10 km from the frontier) or the area of administrative units at different hierarchic levels (commune, district) where part of administrative frontier coincides with the state frontier. Boundary territory for the purpose of this study is the territory of former districts[1], of which some part coincided with the state frontier.

Hence the primary task was to analyse the development of population number in districts (which represent for us the basic referential units) in five years (1961, 1970, 1980, 1991, 2001), when censuses were carried out in Cze-

[1] All data are related to former districts delineated according to the territorial-administrative division, which was in force in 1968-1996 and from the point of view of study period, its validity was the longest. Only two exceptions given by the essence of the territorial-administrative division of Slovakia and the criterion of the correct spatial comparison are applicable to spatial allocation of data about population number. It was necessary to create not only approximately equal spatial units. Their inner structure had to be comparable as well. This is why, for purposes of this study, the urban districts of Bratislava and Košice were attached to their corresponding rural hinterlands (district of Bratislava-mesto was united under one spatial unit with the district Bratislava-vidiek and likewise, the district Košice-mesto with the district of Košice-vidiek formed one common spatial unit) creating a kind of "metropolitan" regions denoted the Bratislava region and Košice region. A network of 36 compatible spatial units where each of them contains both the urban and rural component was created by the applied methodological procedure.
Another point of preparation related to the effort to obtain compatible spatial units was the assignment of the individual municipalities to territories of districts as they existed in the years 1968-1996 - which concerned only the years 1961 and 2001. Summing up the population of the individual municipalities in given districts, the numbers of inhabitants in the quoted two years were obtained. This was the way how the population numbers of spatial units were obtained although some of them (for example Veľký Krtíš, Stará Ľubovňa) were not yet districts in 1961 or which ceased to be districts after the last territorial-administrative division in 1996.

choslovakia and in the Slovak Republic. The data aggregation and computation of values for individual boundary regions followed. We alert some districts neighbour on two States and thus their population entered twice into our analysis – their numbers were included into two boundary territories. There are five of them: region of Bratislava neighbours on Austria and Hungary, district Senica borders on Austria and Czech Republic, district Čadca borders on Poland and Czech Republic, district Humenné borders on Poland and Ukraine, and district Trebišov borders on Ukraine and Hungary.

The selected time period of 1961-2001 includes not only the period of socialist changes, which are manifested by higher natural increase and transfer of part of population into the regions of economic growth, but also the transition period with its specific conditions for population growth and spatial redistribution of population.

RESULTS

a. The 1961-2001 period

Population of 5,379,455 lived in 36 former districts of Slovakia in 2001. The population increased in study period (1961-2001) by 1,205,409 i.e. increased by 28.9%. Population 3,336,285 lived in boundary regions (23 former districts area of which accounts for 64.9% of the total area of the country) i.e. 62% of total population in the same period. The population of boundary regions increased by 741,565 i.e. by 28.6 % in study period (1961-2001) Figures of the population growth rate of Slovakia and its boundary regions are very similar. Population of the Slovak Republic as a whole grew naturally in particular, based on its own sources while the differentiating element was natality. The share of the population increase in the consequence of immigration was negligible (Podolák, 1995).

The continuous growth of population number and was sharply differentiated in terms of space and time. The most intensive growth took place in intercensus period of 1970-1980 when population number increased by 10.0% in Slovakia, while the rate of population growth in boundary regions was somewhat higher (10.1%). In this period, pro-natality measures of the socialist population policy were fully manifested and found reflection in more than average values of natural population increase (Andrle, Srb, 1983). On the other side, the smallest population growth (by only 2.0% in Slovakia and 1.7% in boundary regions) is connected with extensive transformation of society in the 1990's characterised by economic and social uncertainty, fall of living standard, increased emigration and absence of measures promoting natality. Lower population growth rate in boundary regions is rather surprising with

regard to opening of the frontiers and increased attractiveness of boundary territory.

Growth of boundary region population was highly differentiated depending on individual reaches of the state frontier (fig.1). Compared to the national population growth rate values, it is obvious that the number of population living in districts that border on Austria increased most rapidly in 1961-2001. The Austrian frontier is short and only two districts lie on it: Senica, and region Bratislava which has been formed on a distinctly metropolitan territory of Slovakia which results attractive for migrants from entire country. This is the reason of high concentration of population in a small territory that the major part has been under the direct economic influence of Bratislava (high level of commuting from rural and urban settlements into Bratislava-city).

Fig. 1. Regional differences in rate of population growth, 1961-2001



The distinctly above average population growth rate is also evident in a belt of districts neighbouring on Poland which are traditionally distinguished by high natural population increase. The majority of population declares high rate of religiousness that is closely associated with the tradition of big family (the big family model is the most typical for regions Orava and Kysuce). Lack of jobs was the cause why a comparatively great part of population living in the northern boundary region moved out and the high regional growth rate slowed down. However the Roma minority significantly contributes to the above average growth with its specific demographic behaviour reflected mainly in high natality. The Romas are spatially concentrated in Polish boundary regions mainly in districts Poprad, Stará Ľubovňa and Bardejov.

The territory neighbouring on Ukraine is the one that lagged behind the national population increase means most (by almost 10%). The cause was in the settlement structure of this territory with comparatively high occurrence of small communes (especially in its northern part). No bigger town, no natural pole of growth existed in this territory. Even in spite of declarations of officials about the favourable position of the territory with regard to the main trading partner of the socialist Czechoslovakia (i.e. USSR) no important propulsive economic activities that might have led to redistribution of jobs and population developed there.

Fig 2 brings a more detailed view of spatially differentiated population growth rate in individual boundary regions during a relatively long period of 1961-2001 along with differentiated changes in the population density.

The absolutely highest gain of population number is attributed to the region of Bratislava which has been subject to different phases of artificially promoted population growth - this particularly goes for the city of Bratislava, which was intended to become a "workers' city" - until it reached the stage of depopulation in the last inter-census period. The region of Bratislava gained more than 190 thousand inhabitants (48.6 %) in the 40 years study period.

Fig. 2. Spatial changes of population growth and population density in Slovak boundary regions, (1961-2001)



The relatively more dynamic population growth is connected with the second metropolitan region of Slovakia - Košice region. The population number in region of Košice which is part of Hungarian boundary region (the same as region Bratislava), increased by as much as 81.2 %, in 1961-2001, what represents the absolute increase of almost 154 thousand inhabitants. In spite of the fact that the two metropolitan areas with the highest population growth rates lie in the territory of the Hungarian boundary region, the resulting value of the whole boundary region does not reach the national average. Explanation is very simple. There are some territories (their administrative frontiers partly coincided with southern longest Slovak state frontier) which were characterized by population stagnation or population decrease in 1961-2001 (district Levice). The Hungarian boundary region inhabited by a large portion of Hungarian minority is situated in a prevailingly agricultural territory and it is not among the most attractive areas in terms of migration. That is to say, the territory, which has been showing features of population stagnation even depopulation for a long time. The causes include accumulation of negative causes of different nature that affect the development of population: demographic composition of population, relative geographical position and consequential location of economic activities, economic backwardness of the region. It is the result of historic development and wrong decisions that have deepened spatial polarization of Slovakia. On the other side, the specific demographic behaviour of the Hungarian minority characterised by low natality is generally considered the main cause of the present situation and the dynamics of regional population.

b. Inter-census periods – time and spatial differentiation of population development in boundary regions

From the point of view of the detailed cognition of the development of boundary regional population it is appropriate to divide the study period of 1961-2001 into four inter-census periods as presented in table 1 and fig. 3.

While tab.1 is the source of basic information about population change in boundary regions, fig. 3 (which uses time disaggregation and represents the detailed version of fig. 1) expresses spatially differentiated positive or negative differences of population growth rate from the national averages in individual inter-census periods.

It is interesting to observe the changes in ranking of individual boundary regions according to different indicators. The ranking by regional population number does not display any changes in the course of the 1961-2001 period. Population grew in each of boundary regions continuously. However, in every census year (1961, 1970, 1980, 1991, 2001) the higher number of population lived in the territory, which did not border on any other country. This territory is the biggest of all delimited territories; hence the result is not surprising. Com-

pared to other boundary regions, the highest number of inhabitants lived in the area bordering on Hungary. This result is due not only to the largest area of the delimited boundary territories but also to the above mentioned contact of two metropolitan territories of Slovakia (regions Bratislava and Košice) with the territory of Hungary. Boundary territories neighbouring with Poland, Austria, the Czech Republic and Ukraine follow the Hungarian boundary region. The easternmost and one of the least economically developed region of Slovakia was and remains without any distinct spatial concentration of population.

Table 1. Number of population in individual boundary regions and population growth in individual boundary regions, 1961-2001

Boundary region	Number of population					Population growth			
	1961	1970	1980	1991	2001	1961-1970	1970-1980	1980-1991	1991-2001
Polish boundary	623128	680306	753018	809961	853665	9,2	10,7	7,6	5,4
Austrian boundary	518650	575967	669381	735982	729451	11,1	16,2	9,9	-0,9
Ukrainian boundary	294637	314326	331747	341967	351248	6,7	5,5	3,1	2,7
Hungarian boundary	1463799	1589826	1760697	1862732	1867182	8,6	10,7	5,8	0,2
Czech boundary	515390	550572	593867	618488	627660	6,8	7,9	4,1	1,5
Non-boundary territory	1579356	1726176	1895557	1994465	2043170	9,3	9,8	5,2	2,4
Slovak Republic	4174046	4537290	4991168	5274335	5379455	8,7	10,0	5,7	2,0

Source: *Sčítanie ľudu, domov a bytov 1970,1980,1991,* Okresné oddelenia Slovenského štatistického úradu +*Sčítanie obyvateľov, domov a bytov 2001,* Štatistický úrad Slovenskej republiky + own calculations

Fig. 3. Time disaggregation of regional differences in rate of population growth, 1961-2001



However, analysis population growth rates (fig. 4) provides the complete different picture about ranking of individual boundary regions. In the first inter-census periods the highest place of population growth was identified in the territory neighbouring on Austria. It was period of urbanization which especially manifested in Bratislava and Košice - the cores of metropolitan regions. The growth of population in Bratislava during 1961-1970 was the consequence of immigration above all. Immigration was stimulated by the concentration of economic activities (extensive industrialisation) into core cities and their hinterlands (mainly Bratislava). The industrialization process was accompanied by creation of new jobs. The subsequent extensive construction of flats inspired by stabilisation of labour force provoked the migration from rural communes into core cities as well as the movement from the neighbouring districts into centres of economic growth. It was the main reason why the boundary next to Austria was characterized by the highest growth rate at the beginning of the study period. In the following years the most rapidly growing region of Bratislava benefited not only from the migration flows but also from its newly created own sources what manifested in favourable natural increase.

Fig. 4. Changes in the order of the boundary territories according to the rate of population growth, 1961-2001



The last inter-census period of 1991-2001 brought about some dramatic changes. One of them was a surprising drop of population number in the boundary region neighbouring with Austria and the subsequent bottom ranking of the area in terms of the growth rate. Bratislava recorded the first loss of population between the two official censuses from 1869 (Korec, 2003). More details on causes of this dramatic change are available in the study devoted to population change in whole Slovakia (Székely, 2005) where it is reported that the change is the result of natural decrease and also of migration. The sharp attenuation of construction of flats after 1989 (Bezák, 2002) accompanied by enormous price increase of real estates in the Capital reduced migration flows to Bratislava. On the other side, the well-to-do inhabitants of the Capital leave the city and move to houses in rural area. In spite of it, the ongoing suburbanising process cannot explain the population decrease in region of Bratislava as its moving inhabitants prefer the inner-regional accessible localities in the rural hinterland of the city. The reason of this surprising result lies perhaps in registration of permanent residents. There are a lot of people with practically permanent staying in Bratislava region, but officially registered in other regions of Slovakia.

The above average population growth rates were found in the boundary region neighbouring on Poland during the whole study period. This region climbed from the original third position to the leading one during the last inter-census period. The period of big political, social, and economic changes found reflection in a distinct drop of natality at the national level. It was the response of young population to new living conditions, which brought on social and economic uncertainty, and also new life style including the change of traditional

scale of values. Natality also decreased, though in lesser extent, in districts bordering on Poland. It is one of the causes why the Polish boundary region experiences the most dynamic development in terms of population growth rate. Another, equally important cause, is the strong reduction of population's mobility between regions, the strong reduction of spatial redistribution of population (Bezák, 2002). Emigration from the traditional population source areas of the northern Slovakia into other parts of the country has distinctly decreased. Short-term or long-term commuting to work is preferred to the change of the permanent place of living.

Dramatic changes of the last inter-census period also manifested in the boundary region neighbouring on Ukraine where the population growth rate ranked at the second place in Slovakia. The causes are practically the same as in case of the Polish boundary region: decrease of natality below average and emigration reduction determined by more-or-less absenting options. Population of the economically less developed territory lacks financial sources necessary for moving out to the centres of development.

The Hungarian boundary region was also subject to important changes. The population growth rate in this area was highly influenced by the situation in the metropolitan regions of Bratislava and Košice. If it was high, position of the whole boundary region improved. If it slowed down, position of the whole boundary region deteriorated. Other territories of Hungarian boundary region did not display any traits of distinct changes in the demographic behaviour of population. Even in time of the greatest population growth in Slovakia (1970-1980), the population of southern Slovakia remained almost untouched by the pro-natality measures, what led to its stagnation. Demographic stagnation was accompanied by economic stagnation (or vice versa) and southern Slovakia with underdeveloped transport infrastructure was in the periphery of interest of new companies, the fact that affected possibilities of its social and economic development. In spite of it, some authors (for instance Paulov, 1996) believe that southern Slovakia has the chance to become a new space for development. Regarding the existing backwardness of this part of the country and partial (including population) potential for regional development though, it will be (according to our opinion) a long-term process.

Conclusion

Regional analyses of population change can provide very valuable information about the socio-economic atmosphere in regions, their attractiveness and competitiveness. Population very sensitively responds to the changes of political and economic nature. Prosperous regions attract young people who are potential parents. Combination of natural and mechanical increase strengthens the overall population growth. On the other side, young people leave the economi-

cally less developed, less attractive, and less competitive regions: It is clear their departure also manifests in reduction of the natural population increase what results in demographic weakening of the particular region.

Boundary regions are specific as the action of several negative factors met there in the past. Extensive investments have as rule avoided these territories mainly from the safety reasons. Local people did not find enough work opportunities and had to leave after reaching a certain age. Changes in the 1990s offered new changes to boundary regions. Possibilities of cross-frontier cooperation, which in turn results in economic revival, emerged. The positional factor acquired the decisive role in this process. The territories, which bordered on an economically advanced area, enjoyed an advantage. This is the reason why many entrepreneurs and firms have used this opportunity and created joinventure companies with their neighbours. However, it has to be noted that the majority of boundary territories still struggle with inherited problems. These territories are geographically too far from the economic centres of the country, with disadvantaged transport accessibility and age structure of local population. Their economic revival accompanied by demographic revival seems improbable at the moment when investments concentrate in the existing growth poles. It will be interesting to observe how the regional self-governments would address the undesirable trend of excessive economic and demographic polarisation of territories they administer.

Translated by H.Contrerasová

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Streszczenie

ZMIANY LUDNOŚCIOWE W SŁOWACKICH REGIONACH PRZYGRANICZNYCH W LATACH 1961-2001

Granica państwowa zawsze stanowiła znaczącą barierę w rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczym obszarów w bezpośrednim sąsiedztwie. Regiony przygraniczne były uznawane za szczególne przypadki pośród regionów peryferyjnych i z problemami, o ograniczonej aktywności gospodarczej, oraz za atrakcyjne dla potencjalnych imigrantów.

Słowacja graniczy z pięcioma państwami: Austrią, Czechami, Polską, Ukrainą i Węgrami. Głównym celem tych badań jest ustalenie zmian ludnościowych na terytoriach przygranicznych Słowacji pomiędzy rokiem 1961 a 2001. Terytorium przygra-

nicznym dla potrzeb tych badań jest obszar dawnych powiatów, których granica częściowo pokrywała się z granicą państwową (rys. 2). Wybrany okres czasu, lata 1961-2001, obejmuje nie tylko okres zmian socjalistycznych, których przejawem był wyższy przyrost naturalny i przepływ części ludności do regionów wzrostu gospodarczego, lecz także okres przejściowy ze specyficznymi warunkami dla przyrostu ludności i redystrybucji przestrzennej ludności.

Ludność regionów przygranicznych wzrosła o 741 565 osób, tj. o 28,6% w okresie badań (1961-2001). Stały przyrost liczby ludności był znacznie zróżnicowany pod względem przestrzeni i czasu. Największy przyrost miał miejsce w okresie pomiędzy spisami ludności w latach 1970-1980, kiedy liczba ludności na Słowacji wzrosła o 10,0%, podczas gdy przyrost ludności w regionach przygranicznych był trochę wyższy (10,1%). Z drugiej strony najmniejszy przyrost ludności (jedynie o 2,0% na Słowacji i o 1,7% w regionach przygranicznych) jest związany ze znacznymi przekształceniami społeczeństwa w latach 90-tych XX w. Niższy przyrost ludności w regionach przygranicznych jest raczej dziwny, biorąc pod uwagę otwarcie granic i zwiększoną atrakcyjność obszarów przygranicznych.

Przyrost ludności regionów przygranicznych był znacznie zróżnicowany zależnie od zasięgu granicy państwowej w poszczególnych latach (rys. 1). W pasie powiatów sąsiadujących z Austrią czy Polską widać przyrost ludności znacznie powyżej średniej. Obszar graniczący z Ukrainą jest terytorium najbardziej odbiegającym (o prawie 10%) od średniej krajowej dla przyrostu ludności.

THE BELARUSIAN MINORITY IN THE REGION OF BIAŁYSTOK

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The province of Podlasie in Poland can be called a twin region to the district of Grodno (Hrodna) in Belarus'. During long historical periods large parts of their territories belonged to the same state organisations (Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Russian Empire, Poland). Both regional centres, Białystok and Grodno, were also situated in the same administrative units. Before the World War I Białystok had belonged for decades to the governorship of Grodno. In the inter-war period Grodno belonged to the province of Białystok. After the World War II the two cities were separated by the state boundary. In the present time they have a similar number of inhabitants and are the capitals of regions of similar magnitudes. As they neighbour, they are also characterised by a similar ethnic specificity. The region of Grodno is inhabited, side by side with the Belarusians, by the Polish minority. The province of Podlasie, dominated by the Polish population is also the place of residence for the Belarusian minority. The situation of the Polish minority in the district of Grodno was presented in an earlier volume of the monograph series (Kowalski, 2001). The present article shows the situation of the Belarusian minority in the province of Podlasie.

Historical and cultural conditioning

Ethnic situation in the region of Białystok appears to be largely a continuation of the phenomena taking place on the other side of the border. The intensity of the same phenomena, though, undergoes a discontinuous change, which is certainly the result of the existence of different political and cultural realities on the two sides of the Polish-Belarusian boundary.

The eastern part of the area making up today the territory of the province of Podlasie (i.e. the surroundings of Sokółka and Hajnówka) was incorporated into the Polish state only in the 20th century. The western part of the region was settled by the ethnically Polish population. The western part of Podlasie became

Polish in character already in the Middle Ages. The eastern part was settled by the population of the Eastern Slavonic origin. This was linked with the long-term association with the territory of the Ruthenian states, and then - with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Eastern Slavonic population, inhabiting this area, flowed in here from two main directions – the eastern and the south-eastern ones. The effects of this differentiation can be seen until today (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Cultural differentiation of Bialystok region



The northern dialects (to the North of river Narew) are considered to be purely Belarusian. The population speaking these dialects are referred to by the neighbours as the „Lićwini" („Lithuanians"). In the southern dialects (spoken by the so-called „Podlaszuks") one can notice some similarities with the Ukrainian dialects (Fig. 1). In this case a distinct analogy can be seen with

the language specifics of the „Poleszuks", inhabiting southern Belarus' (Frasunkiewicz 1990, Hawryluk 1999, Wełpa 1962, Wiśniewski 1964).

Denomination is an important feature differentiating local population. The Polish-speaking population is Roman Catholic. The population speaking the eastern Slavonic dialects is associated with the Eastern Orthodox denomination. There is only one bigger group of Catholic population, speaking Belarusian dialects, living in the northern part of the region (Fig. 1). This latter phenomenon reminds of the situation observed in Belarus', at the border with Lithuania. In this case, as well, this could be the Lithuanian population, having become Slavonic (Turska 1982), or the ancient Ruthenians, who turned towards Roman Catholicism under the influence of their neighbours (perhaps by the intermediary of the Uniate Church).

Until the World War I the population inhabiting to the South of river Narew („Podlaszuks") had been considered in the censuses carried out by the Russian authorities as belonging to the Little-Russian („Maloroussy") group of the Russian nation. The population living to the North of this river („Lićwini") were considered to be the representatives of the Belarusian group of the Russian nation. Spoken language was taken as the criterion. In this manner the Catholics living in the northern part of the region were also treated as Belarusians. This was largely different from the true national choices of the population. The Orthodox faithful considered themselves mainly to be Ruthenians and identified themselves with the Russian statehood. Catholic population gravitated towards the Polish identity (Eberhardt, 1993). The population census of 1921 showed a strong connection between denomination and nationality. Catholics declared Polish nationality, while the Orthodox were registered as Belarusians. There appeared, though, a large group of the Orthodox of Polish nationality (especially strong in western Polesie). One can speak of a reversal of the trend from before the World War I. Not only did the Belarusian Catholics disappear, but the Orthodox Poles appeared. The census of 1931 did not account for the question of nationality. The relevant questions concerned only denomination and mother tongue. In this case, as well, Belarusian turned out to be the dominating language among the local Orthodox population. It is characteristic, though, that in the neighbouring region of Polesie the local language was referred to exactly as the „local" one. There was, again, an important group of the Orthodox, declaring Polish as their mother tongue. Polish citizenship was certainly conducive to such a phenomenon, the more so insofar as national awareness of the local population was not very strong.

The sole compact concentration of Belarusians in Poland exists on the area of the province of Podlasie. Outside of this province we may speak just of a dispersed and marginal diaspora. It can be supposed that identification of the local Orthodox population, irrespective of the language they spoke, with the Belarusian nationality, took place because of the historical tradition.

The region belonged to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and then to the governorship of Grodno, making, together with the remaining Lithuanian and Belarusian territories, a part of the north-western land of the Russian empire. The administrative connections proved to be more significant than those based on language. Many Ukrainians scholars maintain, on the other hand, that turning of the Orthodox population of Podlasie and Polesie („Podlaszuks" and „Poleszuks") into Belarusians was the effect of the purposeful policy of the Soviet and Polish authorities, aiming at the weakening of the Ukrainian element, as more dangerous than the Belarusian one (Hawryluk, 1999). Whatever the causes of this state of affairs, facts show the domination of the Belarusian option over the Ukrainian one among the local population. This is not much different from the phenomena observed in other parts of Europe. The inhabitants of eastern Holland speak German dialects, which is not contradictory to their own Dutch identity and to being treated as Dutch. Historical tradition is decisive there. A similar phenomenon is observed, in particular, in Switzerland, where despite of the four languages (spoken in, or similar to those spoken in the neighbouring countries), belonging to two distinct language groups (Germanic and Romance), the feeling of unifying national identity is very distinct.

In the reality, which took shape after the World War II, the phenomenon, which turned out more important than the Belarusian-Ukrainian dispute, was the process of Polonisation of the local Orthodox population. The beginnings of this process could be seen already before the World War II. A doubtless step in this direction was the complete Polonisation of the Roman Catholic population. The tendency appearing here is quite opposite to that seen in Belarus'. There, almost all the Orthodox faithful identify themselves with the Belarusian nationality. This applies, as well, to an important group of Catholics. In the region of Białystok all the Catholics identify themselves as Poles, and are accompanied in this identification by a significant group of the Orthodox population.

Belarusians in the light of the population census of 2002

A scholar dealing with the ethnic problems in Poland encountered until quite recently the barrier of lack of statistical data. In distinction from Belarus', the population censuses carried out in Poland after the World War II have not accounted for the questions concerning ethnic identity. It was only the census of 2002 that provided the current statistical material (Mironowicz, 2004). According to the official data of the census, there were in 2002 in Poland 48,700 Belarusians. Of this number, 46,400 – that is, a vast majority – concentrated in the province of Podlasie. The next in this ranking is the Masovian province, where only 761 persons declared themselves to be Belarusians, while in the last one, the Holy Cross province, barely 13 persons.

Fig. 2. Share of Belarusians among population of communes



In the province of Podlasie the Belarusians are not evenly distributed, neither. Outside of the very city of Białystok, where 7,434 Belarusians (2.5% of the city population) live, and its satellite towns (Wasilków, Czarna Białostocka), Belarusians concentrate primarily in the south-eastern part of the province. In the county of Hajnówka they account for some 40% of the population, and outside of the urban areas (Hajnówka, Kleszczele) the share increases to more than half of the population. In the neighbouring counties (Bielsk Podlaski, Siemiatycze, Białystok) the percentage falls off, although there also exist smaller areas, where Belarusians dominate. Between Hajnówka and Bielsk Podlaski four municipalities are situated, where the Belarusian population dominates in numbers (the respective shares peaking in the municipalities of Czyże and Dubicze Cerkiewne – in excess of 80%). They are surrounded by

a belt of several further municipalities, where Belarusians account for more than 40% of the population, approaching in some cases 50% (it can be supposed that in some of them, like Narwa, Narewka, they constitute the relative majority). Belarusians are therefore nowadays the sole ethnic minority in Poland, constituting majority on the area of several communes (Fig 2.). There is only one other commune in Poland, where a non-Polish nationality accounts for more than 50% of the population (municipality of Puńsk – 75% of inhabitants are Lithuanians).

Until the recent census only estimates were available for the numbers of the Belarusian population in Poland. Their number was most often estimated at 200,000-300,000, since this was also the estimate for the number of the Orthodox inhabitants of the region of Białystok. Two errors were inherent in these estimates. First, the number of the Eastern Orthodox faithful living in the region of Białystok was overestimated. Secondly, the stereotype of „Poles are Catholics, and the Orthodox are the Belarusians" overshadowed the fact that many of the Orthodox from this region in fact subscribed to the Polish national identity.

An estimate of a more reliable character, concerning the number of the Orthodox in the province of Podlasie, was developed quite recently (2004) by Krzysztof Goss (Fig. 3). Owing to a meticulous study in the Orthodox and Catholic parishes, he estimated the number of the Orthodox in the region as equal to 150,000. This result was questioned both by the Orthodox Church and by the Belarusian activists. When the estimate of the number of the Orthodox population is obtained on the basis of the relative number of Orthodox marriages, then the number arrived at is around 100,000 (which can be an definite underestimation, since in case of mixed marriages the majority of the ceremonies take part in the Catholic churches). Somewhat earlier Andrzej Sadowski (1995, 1999) estimated on the basis of the sociological studies that only roughly 30% of the Orthodox persons identify themselves with the Belarusian nationality, 50-60% would opt for the Polish identity, and some 10% would put forward mainly their religious identity (an Orthodox inhabitant of the region of Białystok). Accounting for the study of A. Sadowski would yield approximately 50,000 Belarusians, that is, more or less the number having turned out in the census.

Belarusian identity in the social and political life

The phenomenon of the progressing Polonisation of the Orthodox population is in a definite contrast with the state of the Belarusian movement. Its organisational activity and a strong involvement of a part of the young, educated generation is readily noticed. One of the expressions is constituted by the active participation of Belarusians in the political life, including elections, where they form their own election committees. One can certainly speak

of a definite duality or split in terms of ideology among the Orthodox inhabitants of the region of Białystok, of their dual identity.

Fig. 3. Share of the Orthodox among the population of communes



In distinction from the Polish community in Belarus', Polish Belarusians do not put forward the demands for the establishment of the Belarusian schools. All is indicative of the fact that they settle for the schools with the „Belarusian language of teaching" (which is a misnomer, in fact), where, simply, side by side with the subjects taught in Polish, like in other Polish schools, there is, in addition, the Belarusian language as another subject of teaching. This is not a barrier, indeed, for the Catholics of the Polish nationality to go to these schools, which are often considered of high quality level. This „Polonisation"

of the „Belarusian" schools is indeed an evidence for a much general process, associated with the development of the Polish national identity among the local Orthodox population.

The biggest share of the Belarusian population is observed on the rural areas of the counties of Biels Podlaski and Hajnówka (Fig. 2). A similar phenomenon concerns the highest shares of votes for the Belarusians election committees. These phenomena are accompanied also by the highest concentration of the schools with the „Belarusian language of teaching" (Fig. 3). It can be supposed that these phenomena are linked by a certain joint interrelation. It is hard to say, though, whether schools facilitate the maintenance of the national identity, or the schools were established just there, where the Belarusian national feelings were at the strongest. Concentration of the pronounced support for the Belarusian election committees and the appearance of the „Belarusian" schools, yet before the publication of the results of the 2002 population census, allowed for the supposition that the percentage share of the Belarusian population is the highest exactly in those areas (Kowalski, 2002).

The election committees of the Belarusian minority gain much smaller support than this would be expected on the basis of the share of Belarusians in the numbers of inhabitants of the communes (Fig. 4). In the most Belarusian communes, only approximately 50% of the Belarusians vote for these committees. A much stronger support was gained in these areas by the post-communist Alliance of the Democratic Left, which was perceived as defending the minorities against the attempts of the Polish and Catholic majority. In the years 1990-2005 the candidates of the left gained on the areas dominated by the Orthodox population the best results in the country (Kowalski, 1998). This is most probably the reason for the electoral failures to date of the Belarusian activists (as opposed to the successes of the German committees, for which not only Germans, but also Poles and Silesians vote). On the other hand, though, an astonishing phenomenon is observed at the fringe of the Orthodox and Belarusian territory. In the most recent self-governmental elections (in 2002) the Belarusian committee won there in many municipalities many more votes than the Belarusian nationality declarations during the census. When we account for the fact that only adults vote, the difference yet increases. Thus, in the commune and town of Siemiatycze together the Belarusian committee got 787 votes, while only 417 persons (i.e. about a half of the number) declared Belarusian nationality (both events took place in the same year). This might indicate that at the border of the Belarusian ethnic area, in the circumstances of the domination of Polish population, there is a group of people that dither or, for various reasons, are not willing to declare their Belarusian nationality in the face of the census taker. In those fringe communes the census taker was usually a Pole, while in the communes dominated by the Belarusians – more probably a Belarusian. During the elections the voters enjoy anonymity and express their con-

victions in a freer manner. An uncomplicated estimate (in the most Belarusian of communes some 50% of Belarusians voted for the Belarusian candidate lists) allows for the supposition that there might be some 10,000 such hidden Belrusians. Accounting for their number yields the total number of Belrusians in Poland as equal around 60,000.

Fig. 4. Share of votes for Belarusian Election Commitie in communes (2002)



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Streszczenie

MNIEJSZOŚĆ BIAŁORUSKA W REGIONIE BIAŁOSTOCKIM

Województwo podlaskie jest największym skupiskiem Białorusinów w Polsce. Miejscowa ludność katolicka utożsamia z białoruskością wszystkich mieszkańców wyznania prawosławnego. Badania socjologiczne dowodzą jednak, że jedynie 30% miejscowych prawosławnych uważa się za Białorusinów. Potwierdza to ostatni spis ludności, przeprowadzony w roku 2002. Większość spośród miejscowych prawosławnych uważa się za Polaków. Praktycznie nie ma Białorusinów wyznania katolickiego, choć duża część miejscowych katolików jeszcze do niedawna używała w życiu codziennym dialektu białoruskiego. Białoruska oświata znajduje się w stanie stagnacji. Tzw. „szkoły białoruskie" (ok. 40 podstawowych, 2 średnie) to szkoły z polskim językiem wykładowym, gdzie tylko jednym z przedmiotów jest język białoruski. Na listy białoruskie w wyborach parlamentarnych głosuje jedynie kilka tysięcy wyborców. Polska mniejszość mieszkająca, na Białorusi, tuż za pobliska granicą, pomimo znacznie gorszych warunków rozwoju wykazuje znacznie większą żywotność. Polska kultura na pograniczu obu państw wyraźnie dominuje, co ma wpływ na liczebność i kondycje mniejszości białoruskiej w Polsce.

THE SITUATION OF LITHUANIAN MINORITY IN POLAND AND ITS IMPACT ON RELATIONS BETWEEN POLAND AND LITHUANIA

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Introduction

Like other East-Central European countries, today's Poland endeavours to establish liberal democratic system, free-market economy and cultural openness. Western democracy has been successfully introduced to Poland – political pluralism is firmly established – nevertheless, on the level of ordinary citizens democratic mechanisms are less developed than in other European countries. On the other hand, free-market economy allowed the society to intensify economic activity. Economic liberalization brought about also some negative consequences (e.g. high unemployment) that stimulate social tensions and political extremism. Owing to cultural opening the society is inclined to recur to Poland's cultural heritage with its national, ethnic and religious diversity. Polish majority became more disposed to notice the presence of national minorities and their role in the history of the common state. This period saw a sharp shift in state policy toward different national, ethnic and religious communities. Political changes favoured active involvement of minorities in external politics, in particular in shaping relations between the country of residence and their 'remote homeland'.

National and ethnic minorities in Poland according to the 2002 census

In Poland officially there are 13 long-established (living in the country from at least 100 years) national and ethnic minorities. National minorities (it means communities that identify themselves with some other nation-states) include: Belorussians, Czechs, Lithuanians, Germans, Armenians, Russians, Slovaks, Ukrainians, and Jews. Ethnic minorities (i.e. communities without their own state) include: Karaites, Roma, Tatars and Lemkos.

In addition, there are some new minorities e.g. Greeks and Macedonians who came in the 1940s and 1950s in organized groups of political refugees, as well as other late immigrants, mainly from 1990s (e.g. Vietnamese) who are not legally entitled to the status of national minorities. In the 1990s the community of Silesians started to struggle for recognition as a distinct nation (tab. 1).

Table 1. Number of person declaring non-Polish nationality in 2002

Persons declaring non-Polish nationality	Number	
	In thousands	% of total population in Poland
Silesians	173,2	0,453
Germans	152,9	0,399
Belorussians	48,7	0,128
Ukrainians	31,0	0,081
Roma	12,9	0,034
Russians	6,1	0,016
Lemkos	5,9	0,016
Lithuanians	5,8	0,016
Kashubians	5,1	0,013
Slovaks	2,0	0,006
Jews	1,1	0,003
Armenians	1,1	0,003
Czechs	0,8	0,003
Tatars	0,5	0,002
Karaites	0,05	0,001
Total	447,15	1,174

Source: author based on National Population Census.

According to the 2002 census 36,983.7 thousand persons (96.74%) declared Polish nationality while 471.5 thousand (1.23%) declared nationality other than Polish. In case of 774.9 thousand (2.03%) none nationality was determined. It seems surprising that those of undetermined nationality (most certainly non-Polish) outnumber those declaring non-Polish nationality. Here arises a question: whether the estimates of national and ethnic minorities were much exaggerated in each category, or minorities get rapidly assimilated. It is also possible that for some reasons members of minorities deny their non-Polish identity. Whatever the case, the number of 'old' minorities dropped radically compared to previous estimates. According to Babiński (2004) these numbers should be understood as close to minimal rather than maximal numeric force of minorities.

Population of non-Polish nationality concentrates in three provinces: Śląskie (186.3 thousand or 39.5%), Opolskie (133.3 thousand or 28,3%), and Podlaskie (52.2 thousand or 11.7%). In the Śląskie province the percentage

of non-Polish population exceeds 10%, whereas in the other two provinces it is below 5% of the total population.

The 2002 census has shown that 'hard' national minorities (e.g. Germans, Ukrainians) are undergoing a crisis. The most interesting cultural phenomenon is strengthening of regional identity among Silesians and Kashubians. Contrary to popular opinions, waves of immigrants from 'remote homelands' did not result in significant increase in numeric force of the minorities concerned.

Lithuanian minority in Poland – 'alien neighbours'

The overwhelming majority of national and ethnic groups in Poland are Polish citizens. The 'citizen-alien' opposition corresponds to basic distinction between countryman and foreigner largely used in law, political sciences, sociology[1]. It should be noticed though that in relation to national and ethnic minorities such sharp sociological division is not quite adequate.

During the communist period, despite great efforts made by the authorities, minorities in Poland were commonly perceived as alien. Today, the way of perceiving minorities is changing. Of importance here is the fact that most national and ethnic groups in Poland are autochthonous, which favours cultural openness and reduces the distance between the predominant Poles and minorities. 'Aliens' living in Poland (particularly those who have lived here for centuries) are increasingly well-known, so they can be labelled as 'aliens-neighbours' (or, after E. Nowicka 'inner aliens') (Nowicka 1990, Bauman 1996). This cannot be said of recent minorities, in some cases of very different culture (e.g. Vietnamese), who can be classified as 'aliens-guests' (or 'extern aliens'). For the majority of Poles these are neither friends nor enemies; some people express anxiety, others curiosity about their presence (Ząbek 2002). It can be stated then that these people cannot be properly classified to either of these categories.

Although sociological surveys show that social distance to minorities is still considerable, nevertheless in the legal and political sphere many favourable changes have occurred after 1989, particularly concerning freedom of association. Launching different forms of activeness, minorities have become an important element of public life in Poland influencing relations with other countries.

This paper has two objectives. First is a general analysis of present-day situation of Lithuanian minority in Poland. This autochthonous group is predominantly composed of Polish citizens aware of close historical ties with Polish majority. Although culturally close to Poles, these people are often regarded as 'alien-neighbours' which makes them feel like second-class citizens forming a distinct community living very close to their 'foreign homeland' adjacent to

[1] Sociologically, it is important to notice that acquisition of Polish citizenship is commonly considered as an essential condition for being recognized as Polish.

their country of residence. Second is examination of the influence of situation of Polish Lithuanians on relationships between Poland and Lithuania.

Numerical force, distribution and organizations of Lithuanian minority

According to 2002 census Lithuanian minority in Poland is represented by 5639 Polish citizens, concentrated mostly in the Podlaskie province (5097), in the communes of Puńsk (74.4% of population), Szypliszki, Krasnopol and Sejny (fig. 1)[2].

Fig. 1. Distribution of Lithuanians in Poland by districts in 2002



[2] Other concentrations of this minority are in the following provinces: Mazowieckie – 99 persons, Warmińsko-Mazurskie – 83, Pomorskie – 75, Zachodnio-Pomorskie – 67, Dolnośląskie – 53.

Compared to other minorities, Lithuanian community in Poland is very well organized. Lithuanians are associated in 10 socio-cultural organizations, which cooperate rather than compete against each other, even if their scope of activity is more or less similar[3].

Established in 1989, the Association of Lithuanians in Poland continues the activity of the Lithuanian Socio-Cultural Society (founded in Puńsk in 1957). As the unique Lithuanian organization during the communist period, it popularized Lithuanian language and literature by amateur artistic undertakings, propagation of Lithuanian schooling and reading habits. Due to legal and political situation, this organization did not pursue any political goals. The Association of Lithuanians in Poland extended this scope of activity: it deals with protection of minority rights and preservation of Lithuanian cultural heritage (fig. 2)[4].

The Community of Lithuanians in Poland, founded in 1992, associates various social, economic, religious, educational and cultural Lithuanian organizations. The main goal of the Community, which is to represent interests of Lithuanians in their relations with Polish authorities and administrative bodies, distinguishes it from other Lithuanian organizations in our country.

The Association of Lithuanian Youth was established in 1994 by most active young Lithuanians in the Suwałki region. It works for preservation of Lithuanian identity and popularization of national culture among young Lithuanians in Poland (members are aged 16-35). The Association, 60 strong, is a member of the World Association of Lithuanian Youth[5].

Other organizations that support development of Lithuanian education and culture include: the Association of Lithuanian Ethnic Culture (based in Puńsk), the Seina Foundation, the 'Lithuania House' Bishop Antanas Baranauskas Foundation in Sejny (since 2002), the St. Casimir Lithuanian Society (est. 1990 in Sejny), the Society of Ethnic Culture of Lithuanians in Poland (est. 1997 in Sejny), the Society of Lithuanian Teachers in Poland, the Lithuanian Society in Gdańsk (1997, Gdynia).

The Lithuanian organizations are chiefly active in the field of culture; their variety can only add to plurality of initiatives and undertakings. Particularly intense cultural activity is being pursued in the communes of Puńsk and Sejny – the largest concentrations of Lithuanians.

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[3] For some historical reasons the Association of Lithuanians in Poland and the St. Casimir Society keep at distance. Such situation is typical of other minorities in Poland: newly established (after 1989) organizations tend to compete with the old ones and discredit them due to their faults committed in the past.

[4] 2535 strong, the Association based in Sejny had 9 sub-offices and 39 local branches (*Wyznania*...2002). Outside the Suwałki region, branches of the Association were in Warsaw, Wrocław, Szczecin, Słupsk, Gdańsk, Olsztyn and Białystok.

[5] In 2002 the Association based at Punsk had 60 members.

In Punsk is the House of Lithuanian Culture serving as a seat of, among others, the 'Dzūkija' choir, folk music bands ('Klumpė'), dance ensembles ('Jotwa', 'Vyčiai' and children's 'Puniukai') and the 'Barn' Theatre. Lithuanian elementary school, middle school and high school house different youth groups (e.g. chorus 'Ulbuonėlės', dance company 'Šalčia', Club of Poetry lovers). Moreover, there are folk groups 'Šalcinėlis', 'Alna' and 'Gimtinė' operating at the Association of Lithuania Ethnic Culture and the ethnographic museum.

Cultural activity of Lithuanians in Sejny was animated at the beginning of the transformation period. In 2000 the Lithuanian House was founded (financed by the Lithuanian state); it houses a choir ('Seinijos aidas'), folk band ('Sainiai'), children's and youth modern dance ensembles and the 'Seina' performance group, art and theatre studio as well as the 'Barn' theatre.

Lithuanian community has put great emphasis on publishing press and books in Lithuanian. The following Lithuanian titles appear in Poland: 'Aušra' (biweekly from 1960), 'Aušrelė' (monthly for children from 1997), 'Pasaulio Lietuvis' (2003), 'Šaltinis' (2005) and 'Suvalkietis' (quarterly from Suwałki). All the journals (except the last one) are edited and printed by 'Aušra' publishing house in Puńsk (est. 1993)[6].

Fig. 2. Organizations of Lithuanian minority in Poland as of 2005



[6] Till 1973 'Aušra' was issued clandestinely, once or twice a year. Later it became a quarterly, since 1989 it was a monthly, and recently it is issued every two weeks. This title, subsidized by the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, is published by the Association of Lithuanians in Poland.
The 'Aušra' publishing house has published some 80 books and brochures in Lithuanian, mostly concerning ethnography, history, literature.

Of great importance for preservation of Lithuanian tradition, culture and language is their presence in electronic media. The Polish Radio broadcasting station in Białystok broadcasts programmes in Lithuanian language three times a week (on Tuesday and Thursday – 15 minutes, on Sunday – 30 minutes)[7].

Compared to other national minorities in Poland, Lithuanians exhibit highly diversified and widespread cultural activeness. Concentrated within relatively small area, this community managed to launch many valuable initiatives supporting national traditions (fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Cultural activity of Lithuanian minority in Poland as of 2005



[7] There are also some programs in Lithuanian broadcast twice a month by regional television of Białystok.

The most striking characteristic of Lithuanians' activity in Poland is the emphasis put on education and learning of mother tongue. The role of Lithuanian schooling in forming national identity is widely acknowledged and understood among this minority.

Lithuanian education

In accordance with the act on educational system (1991) and the decree of the Ministry of National Education on realization of the task of sustaining national, ethnic, linguistic and religious identity of students belonging to national and ethnic minorities (2002) there are schools where all subjects except Polish language, literature and history, are taught in Lithuanian[8].

It should be noted that apart from schools with the minority language, as the main language as instruction, there are bilingual schools (where teaching is in two equally treated languages: Polish and the minority language, and schools in which all subjects taught in Polish except an additional subject – the language of a particular minory group. Teaching in the native language is also conducted in the form of interschool courses of three types: in the minority language, bilingual and with the minority language as additional subject.[9] More over, the teaching of national ethnic minority languages takes place at the pre-school level. As regards the school and inter-school level, minority language as an additional subject is the predominant form.

Lithuanians are the only minority group in Poland that has chosen the teaching of nearly all subjects in their native language, as the dominant model of instruction in most classes or schools, though varying in terms of the organizational form depending on the circumstances (staffing, accommodation, number of applicants). Schools with Lithuanian as the language of instruction are in the Podlaskie province in the communes of Puńsk and Sejny and in Sejny and Suwałki (towns) (fig. 4)[10].

[8] According to the legislation on schooling in native language, the minimum number of students required to create a class with minority language is 7 in primary school and 14 in medium school. The decree issued by the Ministry of Education provided for teaching native language in all types of educational institutions (including inter-school groups of students).

[9] Native language teaching is conducted both in classes with a national minority language and in classes with an ethnic minority language.

[10] Lithuanian minority concentrations in other areas of Poland (in Pomerania, Wrocław and Warsaw) are small, and their representatives have not hitherto expressed interest in organizing Lithuanian language teaching in schools.

Fig. 4. Schools with Lithuanian as the main language of instruction in 2001/02



In the academic year 2002/03 there were 452 elementary schools teaching minority languages in Poland (202 with a minority language as additional subject, 20 with instruction in a minority language, 6 bilingual schools and 22 interschool courses) providing education to 34016 pupils in total. In 13 of these schools the teaching was in Lithuanian for a total of 395 children (2.9% of all elementary schools teaching a minority language and 1.2% of pupils attending schools with a minority language) (tab. 2).

The higher the level of education, the smaller the number of schools teaching Lithuanian and the number of children attending them. This is also the case with other minority groups in Poland, which is due to a number of factors, the primary reason being continuation of education in schools with Polish as the language of instruction. In 2002/03 obligatory education was continued in Lithuanian intermediate schools by 48.3% of Lithuanian elementary school

leavers. This ratio, even though it is below 50%, is higher than the average percentage for all national and ethnic minorities in Poland (40%).

Table 2. The teaching of Lithuanian at all levels of education in 2002/03

Educational level	Number of schools	Number of all schools teaching a minority language	Number of pupils	Number of all pupils attending schools teaching a minority language
Elementary schools	13	452	395	34016
Intermediate schools	3	142	191	13253
Secondary schools*:				
Grammar school	1	15	73	1637
Specialized school	1	2	20	40
Total	18	611	679	48946

Source: author's research based on data published by the Ministry of National Education and Sport; *Krajobraz* ... 2003.
*At the secondary level there is also a vocational school with the Lithuanian language.

At the post-elementary level in the academic year 2002/03 3 intermediate schools with Lithuanian (2.1%) provided education to 191 pupils (1.4%), 1 grammar school had 73 pupils from this minority group (4.5%), and 1 specialized grammar school – also the only school offering education to the Lithuanian population – had 20 pupils (50%).[11] In addition, one of two vocational schools in Poland with instruction in a minority language belonged to the Lithuanian minority. At the pre-school level several dozen Lithuanian children were taught the Lithuanian language in 2002/03 (*Krajobraz* ... 2003).[12]

Analysis of the situation of Lithuanian education in Poland in 2002/03 indicates that the teaching of the Lithuanian language and in the Lithuanian language was organized in 19 schools (including the vocational school) and comprised a total of 679 pupils. In 2004/05 – the last year covered by this study –

[11] In the academic year 2002/03 there were 142 schools teaching a minority language at the intermediate level (116 schools with a minority language as additional subject, 7 schools with a minority language as the main language of instruction, 6 bilingual schools and 13 inter-school courses), with a total of 13253 pupils learning their native language. At the secondary level there were 15 high schools (8 with a minority language as additional subject, 5 with most subjects in a minority language and 2 bilingual schools) and 2 specialized schools with respectively 1637 and 37 pupils. There also were 2 vocational schools and 5 inter – school courses attended by 55 persons.

[12] There were 72 pre-school establishments in Poland at that time (kindergartens and nursery classes in elementary schools) teaching national and ethnic minority languages to a total of 1003 children.

the number of such schools did not increase, while the number of pupils attending them rose slightly (755).[13]

As regards the rate of charge in Lithuanian education from the early 1990s to 2005, the number of schools rose substantially – from 12 in 1990/91 to 19 in 2004/05. It is the more noteworthy as educational offer for Lithuanian pupils is rather concentrated geographically, so the rise in the number of schools is not a result of struggle by Lithuanian groups scattered all over Poland to have their own school teaching their native language, but the outcome of actual needs and active involvement of the Lithuanian community in the development of their national education. It should be noted that the number of pupils attended Lithuanian schools remains constant (0.7%), which suggest that these schools are not in regress due to outflow of pupils to Polish schools. In the last two years this percentage even rose slightly, while in all other schools for national and ethnic minorities the number of pupils dropped by 310 persons.

The existing network of Lithuanian educational institutions almost fully satisfies the demand of this minority group for primary and pre-school education, while the staffing (especially in the commune of Sejny) and the number of classrooms is not quite sufficient.

Of particular importance in the Lithuanian educational system is the 11 March High School in Puńsk, established in 1956. It offers education to primary school leavers from the communes of Puńsk, Sejny, Szypliszki and Suwałki. About 50–60% of the graduates from this school go on to higher education institutions, mostly Polish. During 60 years of its operation, this high school has educated a large group of intellectuals who are now actively engaged in supporting the Lithuanian community in Poland. Another place with a long tradition of intensive educational activity is Sejny. The Lithuanian minority group resident in this town succeeded in reviving educational traditions from the period of 'Žiburys' Grammar School, that is about 80 years ago, and initiated actions aimed at foundation in this town of the Centre for Lithuanian Education (financed by the government of Lithuania).

Lithuanian minority and Polish-Lithuanian relations

The issue of national minorities has a considerable and increasing importance in the analysis of international relations, even though – as L.Nijakowski has observed – referring to national minorities as 'bridges' in international relations has already become diplomatic routine and a rhetorical figure of political correctness in the media (Nijakowski 2000). However, even in cases where there

[13] Compared with the year 2002/03, slight changes occurred in the structure of Lithuanian education – in 2004/05 in Poland there were the following schools teaching in Lithuanian language: 12 elementary schools, 4 intermediate schools, 2 high schools and 1 inter-school course (5 pupils) organized in that year.

is no open conflict in contacts between the majority population and minority group, the role of this group in bilateral relations between their country of residence and their old homeland is quite significant, though may vary widely.

Roger Brubaker, who views national minority as a political position, argues that to analyse the situation of minorities, two more categories are necessary: remote homeland and nationally oriented state. As a result of interaction between these elements a combination arises which can be roughly depicted as a tried connecting national minorities, newly established states (in his view: nationally oriented) in which this minorities are resident and 'remote homelands' to which they belong, or can be regarded as belonging, through ethnocultural identity, but not through legal citizenship. Brubaker's view, although not fully applicable to the situation of the Lithuanian minority in this triad, can serve as a paint of reference, because it helps to realize that relations between state authorities and a national minority often are implicitly also an element of bilateral relations with the motherland of this minority, regardless of its members' loyalty as citizens (Brubaker 1998, Nijakowski 2000).

The impact of the Lithuanian minority on Polish- Lithuanian relations depends on a number of factors, which can be divided into two interdependent groups:

I – 'internal' factors, being results of the situation (activity) of the Lithuanian minority itself, which encompasses:

1) distinct ethnic identification and high level of national awareness of a relatively small (over 5 thousand) community living in a compact area (comprising about 50 localities in the communes of Puńsk and Sejny);

2) active struggle for institutionalization of its ethnicity (national identification), mainly to foster and promote own culture (organizations, educations);

3) activity on a scale wider than own community – participation in local government (Lithuanians have a dominant representation in local authorities in the commune of Puńsk and the district of Sejny.

II – 'external' factors, being the function of principal variants of the three – sided relations: Lithuanian minority, Poland, Lithuania.

1) The regulatory framework of human rights in the context of external (international) and internal (domestic) legal regulations.

The **external** (international) **context** ensures that supra- and international institutions seeking observance of human rights, imposed the requirement to protect the rights of national ethnic and religious minorities, and may enforce the improvement of their situation in contravention of their country of residence and often regardless of the attitude of a given minority's 'remote homeland'.

In this context Lithuanian minority is legally protected through Poland's ratification of a number of international laws, such as Convention on Human Rights and Basic Liberties (1950), European Charter for Regional or Minority

Languages (1992), or the European Council's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995).

In the relations between the country of residence of Lithuanian minority – Poland – and their homeland – Lithuania – there is certain constant, namely respecting basic human rights by the Lithuanian minority's country of residence.

The **internal context**, supplementing the international commitments, consists of additional regulations that the country of residence enacts to enable a minority to preserve and cultivate their national identity. The right of Polish Lithuanians to retain their national identity is guaranteed by Polish Constitution (1997) and – with respect to participation in public life – by: act on national and ethnic minorities and on the regional language (2005), act on freedom of conscience and religion (1989), act on associations (1989), act on gatherings (1990), act on political parties (1997), electoral law (2001), act on protection of personal data (1997), act on population and housing census (1999) and Decree of the Minister Labour, Social Policy and National Education on exemption from work or school attendance of persons of other religious denominations to celebrate religious holidays (1999); regulations of language: act on Polish language (1999), decree of the Minister of Home Affairs and Administration on adding foreign language versions to Polish names and texts (2002); regulations on culture – act on radio and television (1992); regulation on education – act on the educational system (1991) and Decree of the Minister of National Education and Sport on enabling minority students to maintain their national, ethnic, language and religious identity (2002); rules contained in 6 codes of law.

2) Bilateral relations between Poland and Lithuania

The impact of a minority group on the establishment of relations between the country of residence and its foreign homeland depends primarily on the attitude of the country of residence to that minority and its motherland, the attitude of the minority to own identity and their motherland, and conversely, the attitude of the remote homeland to the minority. In the case of the Lithuanian minority, especially in the context of the last type of relation, the involvement of their motherland in their affairs is quite strong – substantial funds are granted for the running of associations, schools and cultural centres, promotion of socio-cultural cooperation and, to a lesser extent, there is some political activity for the benefit of the Lithuanian minority.

Having painted out the multidimensional nature of the relations between the Polish and Lithuanian parties, the author identifies three aspects of these relations, in which the impact of the Lithuanian minority is clearly discernible: **legal-contractual framework, common institutions, participation in cross-border community**.

Legal-contractual framework

The role of the minority in bilateral policy is evident in the signing of the following treaties and agreements:

- treaty (1994) between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Lithuania on friendly relations and good neighbourly cooperation;
- bilateral agreements on trans-border cooperation and youth exchange (1997) and on cooperation in the field of culture and education (1998);
- agreements (1992) and programme of cooperation for the years 1998–2001 (1998) between the Ministry of National Education RP and the Ministry of Culture and Education RL in the field of education, including higher education.

It should be emphasized that the rights of the Lithuanian minority guaranteed by these treaties and agreements are broad in scope and, more importantly, provide a basis for Lithuania's active policy toward the 'separated brothers'.

The efforts of the Lithuanian minority aimed at maintaining and cultivating their national identity and good relations between the two countries resulted also in an act of 2001 on the development of Lithuanian minority's education in Poland.

Common institutions

As a result of Polish-Lithuanian cooperation at the central government level the following institutions were established:

- Consultative Committee of the Presidents of RP and RL;
- Standing Committee of the Parliament RP and Parliament RL (established in 1997 as a forum for the cooperation of both parliaments)[14];
- Council for Cooperation between RP and RL's Governments (1997)[15];
- Polish-Lithuanian Intergovernmental Committee on Trans-border Cooperation (1996)[16];

[14] The aim of this parliamentary representation, as stated in declaration, is to ensure that the rights of Poles in Lithuania and the rights of Lithuanians in Poland are observed.

[15] In 1998 the Council set up, among others joint committees on education, culture and research, cultural heritage and national minorities. With regard to national minorities the Council resolved to continue supporting the development of education and preservation of cultural identity of national minorities – Polish in Lithuania and Lithuanian in Poland, as well as the teaching of minority languages in both countries and their use in public life, in accordance with international law and standards. It also undertook to actively cooperate on editing and issuing textbooks for Polish pupils in Lithuania and Lithuanian pupils in Poland. The Council declared to speed up negotiations on the issue of spelling of the names of Polish and Lithuanian minorities' members.

- Polish-Lithuanian Local Government Forum (1998).

Polish-Lithuanian cooperation at the regional level led to the establishment of, among others:

- Polish-Lithuanian Business Chamber (set up in 1993 in Suwałki, organizes international fairs);
- Lithuanian-Polish-Russian Committee on Border Regions (set up in 1997 to stimulate trans-border cooperation and select promising projects funded externally);
- Association of Local Governments of the District of Sejny (comprising also regions in Lithuania);
- Polish-Lithuanian Forum of Non-governmental Organizations;
- 'Bordersland' Foundation in Sejny (set up in 1990, promoting mutual respect and understanding between people representing different cultures);
- Cultural Community 'Borussia' (set up in 1990 in Olsztyn, engaged in publishing and educational work oriented to national minority issues and coexistence of cultures and nations in contemporary East-Central Europe).

Participation in trans-border community

The rule of the representatives of the Lithuanian minority in Poland in the development of Polish-Lithuanian cross-border cooperation is definitely the most significant. Participation in the creation of trans-border community takes various forms, such as:

- formation of Euroregional structures (Niemen Euroregion);
- local cooperation between Lithuanian and Polish border communes (i.a. annual municipal forums);
- twin-city cooperation (districts of Mariampol and Đakiai with the district of Suwałki, mainly in the field of culture and sport);
- cooperation between cultural institutions and schools;
- organisation of trade missions to Lithuania (by specialized enterprises);
- organization of international fairs in Puńsk;

Individual cross-border contacts take the form of:

- one-day shopping trips;
- border trade;
- recreational trips;
- business visits;
- visiting families/friends or places of sentimental interest.

[16] The Committee is promoting closer contacts between border region on the Polish and Lithuanian sides.

One more issue to be addressed is the 'principal of reciprocity' in mutual relations, which is the subject of recurring dispute. There are two conflicting attitudes both in discussion and in action: the 'Old Testament' conditional approach, according to which 'your people' in Poland will be treated as badly (their rights will be as limited) as 'our people' in Lithuania, and the 'New Testament' unconditional approach – 'see how well they are treated here'.

The latter principle seems to be dominating in the relations between our two countries and – as L.Nijakowski concludes when considering Poland's relations with foreign homelands of 'Polish' minorities – it should be the norm, while the former attitude is neither ethically acceptable nor politically beneficial (Nijakowski 2000).

Conclusions

In the light of the information provided above the situation of the Lithuanian minority in Poland has improved considerably compared with the situation from before 1989. There is no intentional discrimination or marginalization of this community, which is not to say that there is nothing more to do in this respect.

The relations between Poland and Lithuania have improved in recent years, too, though there are still a number of elements that can ensure be improved. The future shape of the relations between the two countries largely depends on conscious development of national identity and good organization of Lithuanian minority groups in Poland. Despite a 'good climate' a mutual declarations about 'the best relations in history' a number of issues remain unresolved. Negotiations concerning the agreement on the spelling Lithuanian of the names of Lithuanian minority representatives (referred to in the Treaty). Have come to a standstill. The planned agreement on cooperation on cultural heritage protection has not been signed yet either. These are no visible effects of the work of the joint committee on textbooks, and Lithuania voices some complaints regarding provision of Lithuanian schools with textbooks and limited time and range of radio broadcasts in Lithuanian. These problems seem to be the most difficult aspects of Polish-Lithuanian relations.

It should be noted, though, that – as Lithuanian president's advisor, Czeslaw Okińczyc, has said – there is no other country that Lithuania has such close cooperation with as Poland. Thus, these are grounds for hope that the process of improving mutual relations is so far advanced as to be irreversible.

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Streszczenie

SYTUACJA MNIEJSZOŚCI LITEWSKIEJ W POLSCE I JEJ WPŁYW NA STOSUNKI MIĘDZY POLSKĄ I LITWĄ

Zmiany polityczne, jakie nastąpiły w Polsce i innych krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej po 1989 r. przyczyniły się do wzrostu aktywności mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych na rzecz umocnienia swojej tożsamości. Równocześnie wzrosła rola mniejszości narodowych w polityce zewnętrznej państwa, szczególnie w kształtowaniu relacji między krajem zamieszkania a „zagraniczną ojczyzną" tych mniejszości.

Opracowanie to stanowi więc, po pierwsze, próbę analizy współczesnej sytuacji jednej z takich grup mniejszościowych w Polsce, tj. mniejszości litewskiej – autochtonów, w znakomitej większości polskich obywateli, mających świadomość wspólnoty losów z polską większością, i niewykazujących większego dystansu kulturowego wobec niej, ale też: postrzeganych często jako „obcy-sąsiedzi", i często postrzegających samych siebie jako obywateli drugiej kategorii, tworzących odrębną „wspólnotę pamięci",

a ponadto: mających swoją „zagraniczną ojczyznę", i to w bezpośrednim sąsiedztwie państwa ich zamieszkania; po drugie, dotyczy określenia wpływu sytuacji polskich Litwinów na kontakty między Polską i Litwą.

Wpływ ten zależy od wielu czynników, które można podzielić na dwie zasadnicze, wzajemnie od siebie zależne, grupy. Pierwszą grupę stanowią czynniki „wewnętrzne", wynikające z sytuacji samej mniejszości litewskiej (m. in. wyraźnej identyfikacji etnicznej i wysokiego stopnia świadomości narodowej jej przedstawicieli), drugą zaś – czynniki „zewnętrzne", będące funkcją układu podstawowych wariantów trójstronnych relacji: mniejszość litewska, Polska, Litwa.

W świetle przedstawionych w opracowaniu danych należy powiedzieć, że współczesna sytuacja mniejszości litewskiej w Polsce, w porównaniu z okresem sprzed 1989 r., uległa wyraźnej poprawie. Nie można już mówić o świadomej dyskryminacji tej społeczności, choć nie znaczy to, że wszystko zostało już zrobione (np. w zakresie wspomagania litewskiej oświaty). Poprawie w ostatnich latach uległy także, na co istotny wpływ miała sytuacja mniejszości litewskiej żyjącej w Polsce, stosunki między Polską i Litwą, choć i na tym polu wiele elementów można i należy jeszcze udoskonalić (m.in. w dziedzinie współpracy na rzecz ochrony dziedzictwa kulturowego). Pamiętać należy jednak słowa wypowiedziane przez doradcę prezydenta Litwy, Czesława Okińczyca, który mówił, że z żadnym innym krajem Litwa nie ma tak ścisłej współpracy jak z Polską.

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