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NEW LIGHT ON OSKAR LANGE AS AN INTERMEDIARY
BETWEEN ROOSEVELT AND STALIN IN ATTEMPTS
TO CREATE A NEW POLISH GOVERNMENT
(January–November 1944)*

I. The Prologue to Oskar Lange's Trip to Moscow

It is rare for an academic to play an important role in international politics, unless he already holds high political office. However, Oskar Ryszard Lange, a Polish economist with strong left-wing views, who taught at the University of Chicago in 1938–45, and had personal friends among left-wing Poles in the USSR, was such an exception. His opportunity came after the Soviet dictator, Josif V. Stalin, had broken off relations with the Polish government in London over the Katyń forest massacre in late April 1943. Stalin's conditions for renewing diplomatic relations were that the Polish government change its position over Katyń (it had requested an inquiry by the International Red Cross); recognize the Curzon Line as the Polish–Soviet frontier, and drop several allegedly “fascist” ministers, including the President¹. Both the British Prime Minister, Winston S. Churchill and the Ameri-

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¹ On the Katyń massacre, the best English language work is still Janusz K. Z a w o d n y , *Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyń Forest Massacre*, Notre Dame, Ind. 1962 and reprints, but it must now be supplemented by recently released Russian documents, see: *Katyń. Documents of Genocide. Documents and Materials from the Soviet Archives turned over to Poland on October 14, 1992*, selected and edited by Wojciech M a t e r s k i , Introduction by Janusz K. Z a w o d n y , Warszawa 1993. For Stalin's decision to break off relations with the Polish government in London, Soviet demands regarding the Curzon Line and changes in the Polish government, see: *Documents on Polish–Soviet Relations, 1939–1945*, vol. I. 1939–1943, ed. Stanisław B i e g a ń s k i et al., London 1961, doc. nos. 313 ff. and relevant documents in vol. II, 1943–1945 (henceforth: *DOPSR*). For Anglo–Soviet correspondence on this matter, see: Antony Polonsky, ed., *The Great Powers and the Polish Question 1941–1945, A Documentary Study in Cold War Origins*, London 1976, doc. nos. 54, 55, ff.

can President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, agreed to Stalin's frontier demand at the Big Three Conference of November 28–December 1, 1943, in Teheran, also on compensating Poland with German territory in the north and west — though the extent was left undefined². However, they differed on the character of the revamped or new Polish government, which was to accept the new frontiers. Roosevelt wanted to have the matter settled, if at all possible, before the November presidential elections, for he needed Polish–American votes to win. To achieve this end, the President showed readiness to accept a new Polish government, even if it was dominated by Stalin's nominees, provided it was headed by a Prime Minister acceptable to Polish–Americans, i.e. the Polish Premier, Stanisław Mikołajczyk who was also the deputy leader of the largest political party in Poland, the Peasant Party (*Stronnictwo Ludowe — SL*)³. The British Prime Minister was also striving to reestablish Soviet–Polish relations, but aimed at a revamped or new government dominated by Mikołajczyk and his Peasant Party. Furthermore, Great Britain was formally allied with Poland (1939), and Churchill wanted an independent Poland to emerge from the war, both to satisfy British public opinion and as a check on Soviet power⁴. Thus, as the Red Army neared the prewar eastern border of Poland, the Polish question came to the forefront of American, as well as British attention.

This is where Oskar Lange came in. Some biographical information is necessary to understand why he played the role of intermediary between Roosevelt and Stalin on the Polish question in 1944. He was born in 1904, in the textile manufacturing town of Tomaszów Mazowiecki — about 100 km (60 miles) south–west of Warsaw — as the son of a textile manufacturer of German stock. He was a sickly child (tuberculosis of the bone), and always walked with a limp. He was always sensitive to human suffering but his acquittance with Marxism came through reading the Austrian Social–Democratic press, which led him to Marx, Engels, and other Marxist theo-

² For the Polish Question at the Teheran Conference, see: Jan Karski, *The Great Powers & Poland 1919–1945. From Versailles to Yalta*, Lanham, U.S.A., 1985, chap. XXIX, and references cited there.

³ For Mikołajczyk, see: Andrzej Paczkowski, *Stanisław Mikołajczyk czyli klęska realisty (Stanisław Mikołajczyk or the Defeat of a Realist)*, Warszawa 1991.

⁴ For a brief analysis of British policy toward Poland, see: Anna M. Cienciała, *Britain and Poland, Before and After Yalta*, "Polish Review" vol. XL, no. 3, New York 1995, pp. 281–313; on U.S. policy, see: Richard C. Lukas, *The Strange Allies. The United States and Poland, 1941–1945*, Knoxville, Tenn. 1978, and Piotr S. Wandycz, *The United States and Poland*, Cambridge, Mass. 1980, chap. 5, *Roosevelt and Poland in the Second World War*, pp. 236–306. See also William Lash, *W. Averell Harriman and the Polish Question, December 1942 — August 1944*, "East European Politics and Societies", Berkeley, Cal., Vol. 7, no. 33, 1993, pp. 513–553, and same, *Yalta and the Approach to Free Elections in Poland*, "Polish Review", vol. XL, no. 3, 1993, pp. 267–280.

reticians. In November 1918, he experienced a peaceful Socialist revolution in his home town, where a Workers' Council was established under the auspices of the Polish Socialist (*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna — PPS*). He was very active in the People's University for young workers, established by the Workers' Council. At this time, he was deeply influenced by local left-wing *PPS* activists.

He went on to study Law and Economics at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, but moved after a year to the Jagellonian University, Kraków. There he studied first for a combined M.A. degree in Law and Economics, then for the Ph.D (1928), and the Habilitation (1933). During his eleven years in Kraków, he belonged to the National Union of Socialist Youth (*Związek Narodowy Młodzieży Socjalistycznej — ZNMS*), and was very active in the Youth Organization of the Association of the Workers' University (*Organizacja Młodzieżowa Towarzystwa Uniwersytetu Robotniczego — OM TUR*). At this time, he came to know Wanda Wasilewska (1905–1964), who chaired the *OM TUR* Polish studies' circle. He became a member of the Polish Socialist Party (*PPS*) and came into close contact with the radical Polish Socialist leader Bolesław Drobner (1883–1968). Wasilewska, the daughter of a Polish Socialist and Pilsudskiite, Leon Wasilewski (1870–1936), was a writer and radical left-wing activist, who later became the leading figure in the Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR (*Związek Patriotów Polskich w ZSRR — ZPP*), a Communist-dominated, pro-Soviet organization formed in the USSR in spring 1943, of which Drobner was also a member. After a stay in England, Lange obtained a Rockefeller fellowship which allowed him to study and teach in the United States in 1933–36. In 1937, he was offered a teaching position at the University of California, Berkeley, and a year later began to teach Economics at the University of Chicago. He became an American citizen in October 1943. By this time, he had a series of significant and well regarded economic publications to his name, including work on the model of a planned, socialist economy⁵.

Lange distrusted the Polish government in London, which he considered to be “reactionary”, though he supported General Władysław Sikorski's policy of re-establishing Polish-Soviet relations in late July 1941 and

⁵ See biographical sketch: Lange, Oskar Ryszard, by Tadeusz Kowalik, *Polski Słownik Biograficzny (Polish Biographical Dictionary)*, vol. XVI, Wrocław 1971, pp. 490–495; also: Tadeusz Sierocki, *Oskar Lange*, Warszawa 1989.

raising a Polish army in the USSR⁶. As Polish–Soviet relations worsened, he came into closer contact with left–wing Polish Americans and sympathizers. He began to express his political convictions in public after Stalin broke off relations with the Polish government in London over the Katyń massacre on April 25, 1943. Four days later, he wrote a letter, published in the *New York Herald Tribune* on April 29, attacking Polish Pilsudskiites in America, the Polish government’s anti–Soviet press campaign, and also what he called its anti–Czech propaganda. He proposed the establishment of a new Polish government, which should not be an instrument of anti–Soviet policy, but would solve the eastern frontier problem in a friendly way, taking into consideration the interests and wishes of the Ukrainian and Belorussian population. A similar letter of his was published in the *Chicago Sun* on May 29, 1943⁷.

Lange, of course, welcomed the establishment, in late spring 1943, of the Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR (*ZPP*), which was soon followed by the formation of the 1st Polish Kościuszko Division (the embryo of the later First Polish Army). He now came out strongly on behalf of a future, socialist, democratic, Poland which would settle its postwar eastern frontier on the basis of “self–determination”. This implied the cession of most of former eastern Poland to Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belorussia — though even some Polish Communists and left–wing sympathizers, including Lange himself, believed Poland should retain the predominantly Polish cities of Lwów (Ukr: *Lwi’v*) and Wilno (Lith: *Vilnius*). Of course, the new Poland would have good, friendly relations with the USSR. These were, in fact, the goals proclaimed both by the *ZPP* in the Soviet Union and the Polish

⁶ For the texts of the Sikorski–Majski agreement of July 30, 1941, and the military agreement of August 14, 1941, see: Eugeniusz Duraczyński, *Układ Sikorski–Majski. Wybór dokumentów (Sikorski–Majski Agreement. Selected Documents)*, Warszawa 1990; idem, *Rząd polski na uchodźstwie 1939–1945. Organizacja, personalia, polityka (Polish Government in Exile 1939–1945. Organization, Personalities, Policy)*, Warszawa 1993, pp. 105 ff. On raising a Polish army in the USSR, 1941–42, see: Keith Sword, *Deportation and Exile. Poles in the Soviet Union, 1939–48*, Basingstoke, England, and New York, 1994, chap. 2.; see also idem, *Sikorski, Soldier and Statesman*, London 1990, and Władysław Anders, *An Army in Exile. The Story of the Second Polish Corps*, London 1949, reprint, Knoxville, Tenn. 1981; for Russian documents with Polish translation, see: *Armia Polska w ZSSR 1941–1942 (The Polish Army in the USSR, 1941–1942)*, trans. and ed. Wojciech Materski, Warszawa 1992.

⁷ See: *New York Herald Tribune*, April 29, 1943 and *Chicago Sun*, May 29, 1943. For an excellent, detailed study of Lange’s role in 1944, based on American sources, see: Robert Szymczak, *Oskar Lange, American Polonia, and the Polish–Soviet Dilemma During World War II: I. The Public Partisan as Private Emissary*, and idem, *Oskar Lange, American Polonia, and the Polish–Soviet Dilemma During World War II: II. Making the Case for a ‘People’s Poland’*, “Polish Review” col. XL, no. 1, 1995, pp. 2–28, and no. 2, pp. 131–158. See also the older study by Charles Sadler, *Pro–Soviet Polish Americans: Oskar Lange and Russia’s Friends in the Polonia, 1941–1945*, “Polish Review” vol. XXII, no. 4, 1977, pp. 25–39.

Workers' Party (*Polska Partia Robotnicza — PPR*) in German-occupied Poland⁸.

We do not know whether Lange was in secret contact with his old friend, Wanda Wasilewska, in 1943, but this could have been arranged through the Soviet Consulate General in New York, as was to be the case in 1944. What we do know is that in August 1942, i.e. eight months before the break in Polish-Soviet relations, he had written to an official in the Foreign Nationalities Branch (FNB) of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), complaining against the anti-Soviet activities of two leading members of the Committee of Americans of Polish Descent (*Komitet Narodowy Amerykanów Polskiego Pochodzenia — KNAPP*): Maksymilian F. Węgrzynek and Ignacy Matuszewski. The latter was a prewar Polish minister and a founder of *KNAPP*, which attacked Sikorski's policy of good relations with the USSR, while Węgrzynek published a Polish language newspaper, "Nowy Świat" (New World), which supported *KNAPP*⁹.

As Lange became active politically after the break in Soviet-Polish relations in late April 1943, he worked closely with the left-wing Polish-American labor leader Leo Krzycki, President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Union, active in Detroit, Mich., who had helped establish the pro-Soviet American Slav Congress in 1942, of which he was President. Lange also cooperated with Bolesław Gebert, whom he seems to have met in November 1942. Gebert was one of the founders of the Communist Party of America, member of the party's Central Committee, President of the World Federation of Trade Unions, and editor of left-wing Polish newspapers in Detroit. He was also the organizer of a group called "The Democrats in New York", which included the writer Julian Tuwim, the artist Artur Szyk, as well as the psychologist Bohdan Zawadzki and the physical chemist, Ignacy Złotowski. The third and most surprising leader of the pro-ZPP movement in American Polonia was Father Stanisław Orlemański, a Polish-American Catholic priest with a Polonian parish in Springfield, Mass. He was the co-founder and Honorary President of the Kościuszkow

⁸ On the ZPP and PPR in 1943, see: Krystyna Kersten, *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948*, Translated and annotated by John Micgiel and Michael H. Bernhard, Foreword by Jan T. Gross, Berkeley, Ca. 1991, chap. 1, 1943 — pp. 3-38, and notes. For a monograph study of the ZPP, see: Zbigniew Kumoś, *Związek Patriotów Polskich. Założenia programowo-ideowe (Polish Patriots Union-Program and Ideas)*, Warszawa 1983.

⁹ See Lange letter of August 25, 1942, to Artur J. Goldberg, Office of Strategic Services, Foreign Nationalities Branch (henceforth: OSS-FNB). R. Szymczak, *Oskar Lange*, I, pp. 8-9. On *KNAPP* in 1942, see: R.C. Lukas, *op. cit.*, pp. 109; for a short study, see: Wacław Jędrzejewicz, *Polonia amerykańska w polityce polskiej: Historia Komitetu Narodowego Amerykanów polskiego pochodzenia (Americans of Polish Descent in Polish Policy. The History of the National Committee of Americans of Polish Descent)*. New York 1954.

League, established by Polish left-wing sympathizers, including Lange, in Detroit in November 1943. The league program echoed the propaganda of the *ZPP* in the USSR: it proclaimed that friendship and military cooperation should exist between Poland and the USSR in wartime, and the closest cooperation and lasting peace after the war. At that time, Silesia and (East) Prussia should return to Poland¹⁰.

We do not know whether, and if so to what extent, the American Slav Congress and the Kościuszko League received secret Soviet financial support. However, we do know that in June 1943, the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs began to pay attention to pro-Soviet Polish-Americans and their activities. An OSS report of June 14, 1943, noted that Moscow had “referred with approval” to the anti-Polish government campaign waged by Lange, Krzycki and Gebert, though the OSS observers thought Lange was “honestly convinced of the merits of the case”¹¹. Indeed, on June 25, Deputy Foreign Commissar Solomon A. Lozovsky wrote to Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav M. Molotov, urging the need to unite all anti-Sikorski elements in the United States. He recommended the establishment of a daily paper to service all English and Polish language papers there, also the publication of a series of books and brochures on Polish-Soviet relations in the United States and England. Lozovsky thought that only in this way could the *ZPP* win the support of a large part of the Polish emigration in those countries, as well as expand its influence in Poland itself. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander E. Korneichuk, Wanda Wasilewska’s third husband, who also received a copy of Lozovsky’s letter, supported the proposal in a letter of his own to Molotov of June 29, 1943. He wrote that there were many Poles in America sympathetic to the USSR. He mentioned Professor Lange, and said that a Polish newspaper would unite all these circles¹². Although no such newspaper appeared, it is possible that Soviet financial aid helped subsidize the “*Głos Ludowy*” (*People’s Voice*) in Detroit, which constantly

¹⁰ At the founding meeting of the Kościuszko League, in Detroit, Mich., in Nov. 1943, papers were read by Gebert and Lange, among others. While Orlemański was elected Honorary President, a left-wing labor activist, Antoni Karczmarczyk, member of the City of Hamtramk Board of Education, was elected President. Adam Kujtkowski, part owner of the left-wing Detroit newspaper, “*Głos Ludowy*” (*Voice of the People*) was elected Secretary. Information in: “Confidential Report on Polish Situation”, dated May 26, 1944, and sent to Miss [Grace] Tully 1900–1984, Secretary to the President by David K. Niles then in OSS/FNB on June 6, 1944, President’s Secretary Files (henceforth: PSF) 66, Lange-Orlemański, pp. 1–3, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

¹¹ Memorandum on “Development of the Polish-Russian Antagonism in the United States”, June 24, 1943, OSS-FNB, INT-PO-456, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (moved to National Archives at College Park Md, Spring 1995), cit. R. S z y m c z a k, *Oskar Lange*, I, “Polish Review” XL, 1, p. 10.

¹² Lozovsky to Molotov, June 25, 1943, *Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki*, Moscow (henceforth: *AVP*), Vyshinsky Sekretariat, f. 07. op. 4, pap. 40, pp. 28–30; Korneichuk to Molotov, June 29, 1943, *AVP*, Lozovsky Sekretariat, op. 5, pap. 219, p. 12, copy in Korneichuk Sekretariat, d. 5, pap. 1, p. 5.

attacked the Polish government in London. Moreover, copies of the *ZPP* newspaper “Wolna Polska” (*Free Poland*), began to appear in the United States in spring or summer 1943.

Whether or not Lange followed *ZPP*–Moscow instructions, he devoted more and more time to attacking the Polish government in London. In June, he organized thirty Polish–American “liberals” to sign “An Appeal to Reason”, which called for the removal from that government of “all elements which are antidemocratic, Fascist, or hostile to the Soviet Union”. This declaration was published in the “Daily Worker” and reprinted in the “Głos Ludowy”¹³. We should also note that Lange was a member of the National Council of the American–Soviet Friendship Society. On October 5, 1943, the “The New York Herald Tribune” published another letter by Lange, in which he lambasted the Polish government in London and outlined a future, democratic Poland, friendly to the USSR. This Poland, wrote Lange, would gain East Prussia and proclaim a thorough–going land reform. He also spoke of a Poland without the prewar, mainly Ukrainian and Belorussian territories — but including the then predominantly Polish city of Lwów. He culminated his 1943 activities by speaking, together with Leo Krzycki and Father Orlemański, at a town hall meeting in New York on December 19, 1943, where they advocated the same program as the *ZPP* and the Kościuszko League. Moreover, Lange called for an entirely new Polish government, which would accept the Curzon Line as Poland’s eastern frontier and conclude a close military alliance with Moscow. This proposal was noted favorably by *Izvestia* on December 22, 1943¹⁴.

As mentioned earlier, toward the end of 1943, the Red Army was nearing the prewar Polish–Soviet frontier. In view of this fact, as well as of the arrest in November 1944 of Paweł Finder, the successor of Marcelli Nowotko, as leader of the Polish Workers’ Party (*Polska Partia Robotnicza* — *PPR*) in German–occupied Poland, also of Central Committee member Małgorzata Fornalska, direct *PPR* radio communication with Moscow was cut for a period of time (though Soviet intelligence agents may have maintained theirs). Whether these arrests were the impetus, or whether it was the agreement of the western leaders at the Teheran Conference to recognize Soviet claims to former eastern Poland, or the advance of the Red Army toward prewar Polish territory, or all of these combined, in December, the leaders of the *ZPP* in Moscow were discussing the political program for a Polish National Committee (*Polski Komitet Narodowy*, henceforth *PKN*). This program was based largely on the one worked out by the ideologue of

¹³ See R. S z y m c z a k, *Oskar Lange*, “Polish Review” XL, 1, pp. 10–11.

¹⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 11–12.

the party in the USSR, Alfred Lampe (1900–1943). On December 24, Stalin called the *ZPP* leaders to the Kremlin and “approved” the idea of creating a Polish National Committee. After much discussion, the *ZPP* executive agreed that Oskar Lange should be asked to join the *PKN*, while the poet Julian Tuwim, also in the United States, should be asked to cooperate. On the following day, December 25, the *PKN* Organizing Commission agreed to invite Lange to become the director of the *PKN*’s Department of Foreign Affairs¹⁵.

At this meeting, Wanda Wasilewska suggested inviting Stanisław Mikołajczyk — the Premier of the Polish government in London and deputy leader of the Polish Peasant Party — to become a member of the *PKN*. It seems that this suggestion was originally made by Czechoslovak President Edward Beneš in talks with Stalin and Molotov during his Moscow visit on December 11–18, 1943, when he signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR. In his conversation with Stalin on December 12, 1943 — during an intermission at the Bolshoi Theater’s presentation of Rimsky-Korsakov’s “Snow Maiden” — Beneš said that Mikołajczyk, with whom he had talked before leaving for Moscow, wished to restore diplomatic relations and reach agreement with Stalin¹⁶. (Indeed, according to the Czech record of the Beneš–Mikołajczyk conversation, the Polish Premier was reported as anxious for an agreement with Stalin, though he wished to save Lwów for Poland)¹⁷. The Soviet dictator affected ignorance, saying: “Who is this Mikołajczyk? What kind of a fellow is he?” However, after hearing Beneš’s

¹⁵ On the *PKN*, see: K. Kersten, *op. cit.*, pp. 33–36, also Z. Kumoś, *ZPP*, pp. 126–142. For documents and accounts by participants, see: *Notatki Alfreda Lampego dotyczące zagadnień programowych (Notes made by Alfred Lampe on Program Matters)*, ed. Antoni Przygoński, and *Sprawa powołania Polskiego Komitetu Narodowego w Moskwie (Grudzień 1943 — Styczeń 1944) (The Formation of the Polish National Committee in Moscow, December 1943 — January 1944)*, ed. Eleonora Syzdek, *Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego (Archives of the Polish Workers Movement, henceforth: ARR)*, vol. IX, Warszawa 1984, pp. 25–94.

¹⁶ See: Vojtech Mastny, *The Beneš–Stalin–Molotov Conversations in December 1943: New Documents*, “Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas”, v. 20, 1972, p. 370, and doc. no. 1, pp. 376–380. These microfilmed documents from the archives of Jaromír Smutný, head of Beneš’s Chancellery, who accompanied him to Moscow, are in the Columbia University Library, New York. See also the account of Beneš’s Private Secretary, Edward Taborský, *President Edward Beneš. Between East and West, 1938–1948*, Stanford, Ca. 1981, pp. 103–105; the Taborský Papers are in the Hoover Institute Archives, Stanford, Ca.

¹⁷ See notes by Taborský on the Mikołajczyk–Beneš conversation of Nov. 13, 1943, in: E. Taborský, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–101. The Polish record merely records Beneš’s account of Czechoslovak–Soviet relations, and Mikołajczyk’s statement that he did not trust the Russians, suspecting them of planning to make Poland the 17th Soviet republic, see: *DOPSR II*, doc. no. 48. However, it is more than likely that Mikołajczyk would not have included in this record the words noted by Taborský: “Regarding the crucial frontier dispute, he is prepared to go to the absolute limit acceptable to the Poles. He would like to save only Lwów and a part of eastern Galicia for Poland. They would become reconciled to the loss of the rest. He authorized Beneš to inform the Soviet statesmen about all this during his visit to Moscow”, E. Taborský, *ibid.*

reassurances, he even drank a toast to the Polish Premier. Later, after claiming that “people guided by the London government shoot at our partisans”, he asked: “Where can one find any Poles one can talk to?” Deputy Foreign Commissar Korneichuk then said “In America there are Tuwim and Professor Lange”, adding there were also some Poles in Moscow representing all parties, even priests¹⁸.

Beneš also assured Stalin of the positive attitude of President Roosevelt to Soviet claims against Poland, which, in view of the Teheran Conference, was surely no surprize for Stalin. Nevertheless, Roosevelt told Beneš — during his visit to the United States in May–June 1943 — much more than he told Stalin at Teheran. According to Taborský’s notes of a conversation between Roosevelt and Beneš on May 12, both agreed the Germans were responsible for the Katyń massacre, and that the Poles were to blame for the impasse in Polish–Soviet relations. They also agreed that if only the Poles accepted a somewhat improved version of the Curzon Line, the problem would be solved. Moreover, Roosevelt said that in claiming former eastern Poland: “The Russians are demanding nothing more than what rightly belongs to them. Perhaps they could be a little more generous and concede the Poles a few small areas east of the Curzon Line. But we are not going to wage war on Russia because of Poland”¹⁹. Beneš states in his memoirs that Roosevelt asked him to transmit his views on the Baltic States and Poland to Stalin, and he did so in December²⁰. It is worth noting that Beneš also talked with Oskar Lange in New York, at which time he no doubt passed on to the Professor what Roosevelt said about Poland, but no record of that conversation has been found. Thus, it seems that Beneš was the originator of the idea that Mikołajczyk was the one Polish statesman in London who might be willing to cooperate with both Stalin and the ZPP. Whatever the case may be, Stalin accepted this idea, as well as Korneichuk’s proposal (surely prompted by his wife, Wanda Wasilewska), of “talking with” Lange, and Tuwim as well. As we shall see, this was to involve Lange in the scheme for creating a Polish National Committee, then the Polish Committee of National Liberation or/and a new Polish government, each one of which was to include Mikołajczyk. As for Beneš, he aimed at obtaining security for postwar Czechoslovakia through a Czechoslovak–Polish–Soviet alliance directed against Germany, but Poland was only to be included if it accepted

¹⁸ See V. Mastny, *Beneš–Stalin–Molotov Conversations*, p. 371, and doc. 1.

¹⁹ See: E. Taborský, *op. cit.*, pp. 121–122.

²⁰ Roosevelt believed the Baltic States should revert to the USSR. Beneš summarized his last conversation with Roosevelt, of June 7, 1943, in: Eduard Beneš, *Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Beneš*, Boston, 1954, p. 195

a Polish–Soviet frontier on the Curzon Line — and returned western Teschen (Zaolzie) to Czechoslovakia.

Until now, what we knew of Oskar Lange’s activities in 1944, came mainly from American documents. These should now be supplemented by the Lange file in Molotov’s “Secretariat”, in the *Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation, henceforth *AVP*), Moscow. These papers throw new light on Lange’s contacts with the *ZPP* and document his suggestions regarding a new Polish government. While they only add a few details and nuances to what we already know about his visit to the USSR in April–June 1944, they show him to have been very active before that time, and indicate a strong likelihood of the secret involvement of the U.S. government in his messages to the *ZPP* at an early date.

The first *ZPP* message to Lange was dated January 6, 1944, when the Soviet Consul General in New York, E. Kiselev, transmitted to the Professor a letter typed in Russian on paper with the letterhead of the Soviet Consulate General. Kiselev wrote he was instructed to give Lange a message. This was an invitation (included in the letter) to join the Polish National Committee, which was to be established in the near future. Lange was offered the post of director of foreign affairs, and was asked to indicate immediately whether his name and agreement could be published, also whether he could immediately leave for Moscow. He was informed that the other members of the *PKN* were: [Andrzej] Witos, younger brother of the Peasant Party leader Wincenty Witos; [Stanisław] Skrzyszewski, [Wanda] Wasilewska, [Bolesław] Drobner, [General Zygmunt] Berling, and [Professor Leon] Chwistek. Consul Kiselev added he was transmitting the message through a responsible co-worker of his, and asked Lange to give his answer on the back of the letter, which Kiselev would immediately forward. He ended by saying that confidentiality would be fully safeguarded²¹.

Kiselev’s co-worker, who delivered the message, was Shabanov, from the Soviet Consulate General, New York (no name or position available). His handwritten note dated January 9, 1944, is titled: *Dopolnienie k messazhu prof. Langa* (Supplement to Prof. Lange’s Message). Here, Shabanov summarized briefly his two conversations with Lange. The key points of this summary are in Lange’s letter which will be discussed below, but it is worth mentioning Shabanov’s comment that Lange showed no surprise at the news

²¹ E. Kiselev, *Genkonsul SSSR v Niu–Jorke, Prof. Oskaru Lange, Chikago, 6 ianvaria, 1944* (in Russian), *AVP*, f. 06 (Molotov Sekretariat), op. 6, pap. 42, d. 546, p. 3. All translations from Russian to English are by the author of this article (A.C.), using the American Library Association–Library of Congress transliteration system (ALALC).

on the establishment of the *PKN*, though he could not hide his emotion at being offered a post in it. Furthermore, he warned Shabanov to be “careful”, saying that a few days after his conversation with President Edward Beneš (during the latter’s visit to the United States, mentioned above, A.C.), he was contacted by a member of the New York section of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) who inquired about the character of this conversation. This, said Lange, indicated the acute attention with which the American government followed the development of Polish–American relations²². We will also find the OSS involved in Lange’s later activities.

Lange’s answer, dated January 8, 1943 (error for 1944) was addressed to the *ZPP*, Moscow, and written in English, in his own handwriting. Since he did not write the letter in Polish to his Polish addressees, this suggests it was to be read by some English–speaker, probably someone in the OSS/FNB office, with which Lange had been in touch at least since June 1942. Lange wrote that the *PKN* would have his fullest support, and the idea of his joining it as the head of foreign affairs had his fullest sympathy. However, he felt this step was premature because he was a U.S. citizen. Furthermore, his joining the *PKN* without the American government’s consent would lead to accusations that he was, and always had been, a Soviet agent. He went on to say that to obtain American and British recognition of the future Polish government, the *PKN* must show it was not a puppet of the Soviet government. Therefore, it should include Poles from England and America. He suggested American citizens Leo Krzycki and Father Stanisław Orlemański, also Polish citizens in the United States, Julian Tuwim and Bohdan Zawadzki, adding that the latter was sick and could not come to Moscow, but his name was important. He called Krzycki the “greatest Polish–American leader”. In a note at the bottom of the page, he suggested Poles to be added from England: Michał Kalecki, whom he described as a “world known economist”, and Edward Puacz, adding: “Be careful with Puacz”²³.

Lange then went on to suggest that the *PKN* be organized without him, but proclaim that it would hold open ministerial posts for American Poles and Poles from England. It should then approach the American Government, i.e. Secretary [of State Cordell] Hull or President Roosevelt, asking for consent to invite Lange and other Polish Americans, or Poles resident in America,

²² Handwritten note by Shabanov, in Russian. dated 9/1/44, *AVP, ibid.*, pp. 6–9.

²³ Lange [to] Union of Polish Patriots, Moscow, January 8, 1943 (should be 1944), typed in English, *AVP, ibid.*, pp. 6–8. The *ZPP* invitation to Lange and his letter of January 6, 1944, are summarized in: T. S i e r o c k i, *op. cit.*, pp. 140–141. Michał Kalecki, an economist, worked in England during the war, and in the economic section of the U.N. Secretariat in 1946–54. After retiring to Poland, he occupied important posts in economic planning. Edward Puacz was a left–wing Socialist leader and journalist in London, sympathizing with the *ZPP*. Eventually, he emigrated to the United States and founded the Polonia Bookstore in Chicago.

according to its own choice. He stressed that the American government's consent "would be a great diplomatic victory, almost unofficial recognition". The American government should be told that the persons the *PKN* wanted to invite would be approached only after Washington's consent was secured. In a note at the bottom of the page, he added that he would be willing to join the *PKN* only if the American government gave its consent.

Next, Lange said he would make a few suggestions not directly connected with his participation in the *PKN*. He wrote that American public opinion and eighty percent of Polish-Americans — who, he said, would be the decisive factor in the next election — believed the USSR wanted to sovietize Poland. To counteract this, he suggested that: (1) the Soviet government send a note — which should be published — to the American and British governments pledging to respect Polish independence. (2) To secure a favorable acceptance by the Polish people and world opinion, the *PKN* must declare that it could protect Polish national interests better than the "London government". He thought this would require "spectacular friendly gestures" by the Soviet government on frontier matters, e.g. official statements on Silesia and East Prussia [to go to Poland], also some "minor" concessions on the eastern frontiers, and a statement on the right of Polish "refugees" to return to Poland. (3) The *PKN* would greatly strengthen its position by inviting three members of the London government, i.e. [Stanisław] Mikołajczyk, [Jan] Stańczyk (Socialist minister in the Polish government, supporter of Mikołajczyk) and Banaszek (Władysław Banaszek, Minister, Polish Peasant Party). If they accepted the invitation, the London government would be "torpedoed" and the withdrawal of British and American recognition was likely. If they refused, the invitation would still have great symbolic value. Lange warned the *PKN* not to underestimate the diplomatic difficulties it faced, nor to misjudge American and British public opinion. He concluded by saying that whether or not he would be able to join the *PKN*, or whether in view of the facts (presumably his arguments against joining, A.C.), its members still wanted him to join, he would give them his fullest support. In a P.S. he added that if he joined the *PKN*, there would be no obstacles to his trip to Moscow. Lange's memorandum was passed on to Wanda Wasilewska on January 12 by Molotov's Secretary, Podtserob (first name unknown), who wrote that he was transmitting it to her on Molotov's instructions. He also wrote that the telegram (clearly the invitation to Lange, A.C.) had been handed to Oskar Lange in Chicago on January 7, and that he gave the answer enclosed²⁴.

²⁴ Typed note in Russian, addressed: Tov. V.L. Vasilevskoi, signed: Podtserob, dated 12 January 1944, *AVP, ibid.*, p. 20.

Stalin must have liked Lange's detailed suggestions or/and he may have thought they were inspired by a high official in the U.S. government. Whatever the case may be, when the American ambassador in Moscow, W. Averell Harriman told Molotov on January 18, 1944 of President Roosevelt's wish that the Soviet government give most favorable consideration to the Polish government's request to discuss all outstanding questions between them, the Foreign Commissar made a startling statement followed by a no less startling proposal. He said that from the Soviet point of view, there was no longer a question of reconstructing the Polish government — but of establishing an entirely new one. He went on to say that it should be made up of prominent Poles from the United States and the USSR. It could include Prime Minister Mikołajczyk, though Molotov had doubts about [Tadeusz] Romer (Foreign Minister, former Ambassador to the USSR, 1941–42). Finally, he mentioned three individuals from the United States: Krzywicki (Harriman's spelling, it should be Krzycki, A.C.), Professor Lange and [Father] Orlemański. He also said that the Soviet government had proposed the Curzon Line as the Polish–Soviet boundary, and this was the basis for any resumption of relations²⁵.

Within a month of this Soviet proposal, Lange wrote a long memorandum, without an addressee, but clearly intended for the Soviet leaders. It must have been considered important in Moscow, for one copy is in the Molotov files, *AVP*, and another in the archives of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. It was typed in Russian, dated New York, February 14, 1944, and probably dictated by Lange to a Soviet official there. Lange wrote that the events of the last four weeks afforded evidence of British and American opinion on the Polish question. (He probably had in mind the Polish request of renewing diplomatic relations and discussing key issues, which Stalin refused, A.C.). He now believed that the idea of creating the Polish National Committee (*PKN*) on Soviet territory should be shelved²⁶.

Indeed, Lange advised not only that the *PKN* be shelved but that a Polish Provisional Government be established once the Red Army was on

²⁵ Harriman to the Secretary of State, Moscow, January 18, 1944, *FRUS*, 1944, vol. III, Washington, 1965, pp. 1230–1232, cf. *Zapis besedy narodnogo komissara inostrannykh del SSSR s poslom SShA v SSR, 18 ianvaria, 1944*, in: *Sovetsko–amerikanskije otnoshenija vo vremia velikoi otechestvennoi voiny, 1941–1945 (Soviet–American Relations during the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945)*, t. 2, Moscow 1984, doc. no. 3, pp. 8–10.

²⁶ According to Jakub Berman the establishment of the *PKN* was shelved in late January 1944, on receipt of news of the establishment of the Home National Council (*Krajowa Rada Narodowa — KRN*), see: 1973 kwiecień, Warszawa — Relacja Jakuba Bermana o okolicznościach prac nad powołaniem Polskiego Komitetu Narodowego, *ARR*, IX, doc. no. 11, p. 94. It is more likely, however, that Lange's memorandum determined the matter.

Polish soil (i.e. what the Soviets recognized as such, A.C.). He suggested Lublin, and added "(1918)"²⁷. He added that this government should do the following: (1) Call on the Polish people to undertake an armed struggle against the Germans and to cooperate with the approaching Polish Army, allied with the Red Army; (2) Appeal to Poles all over the world to support the uprising of the Polish people with a special appeal to the Polish armed forces, including the army of General [Władysław] Anders; (3) It should inform the governments of all the United Nations about the organization of a Provisional National government on free Polish territory. (4) This government should issue a manifesto listing the immediate tasks it would undertake. These should include the following: (a) assurances that Poland would be an independent, democratic republic, and that the return of semi-fascist and antidemocratic governments was impossible; (b) the organization of a network of administrative organs in all regions of liberated territory; (c) the preparation of conditions for democratic, free, sovereign and independent elections to a national assembly; (d) the immediate distribution of land to the peasants; (e) the implementation of such changes in the economic and social structure of the country as to secure its speedy reconstruction, social justice and uninterrupted development. In the next point (5), Lange wrote that the new government should appeal to all truly democratic elements in the London government to return to Poland and cooperate with the National Provisional government. At the same time, it should declare that no form of help to the enemy and no attempt at establishing an anti-democratic or reactionary government would be tolerated. Furthermore (point 6) the provisional government should demand Upper Silesia and East Prussia, and express readiness to "regulate" Polish frontiers with neighboring states, i.e. Ukraine, Belorussia, Czechoslovakia and Lithuania.

Lange went on to say that in order to create a truly representative government, half of its members should be persons who had actively resisted the Germans in Poland. The other half should be made up of members of the ZPP, the London government (if they accepted the invitation), and representatives of democratic elements among Polish-Americans such as Leo Krzycki and Father Orlemański. They should be invited in a manifesto stating that the Provisional government would ask the U.S. government's permission in this matter. Lange continued that the invitation of Polish-American members was important from two points of view: (1) The United States was extremely popular with the Polish people; therefore, the presence

²⁷ A Provisional People's Government of the Polish Republic (*Tymczasowy Rząd Ludowy Republiki Polskiej*) was established in Lublin in early November 1918, headed by the Socialist leader Ignacy Daszyński; it resigned when Józef Piłsudski became Head of State on November 14.

of Polish–Americans in the Provisional government would dispel suspicions that it was a Soviet puppet. Their inclusion would also indicate the approval of this government by other United Nations Governments. (2) This inclusion would also show American society as a whole, and Polish–American opinion in particular, that the Soviet Union was not making a unilateral decision on the Polish question, but was settling it with the participation of the United States, which had the largest Polish population outside of Poland. Lange noted that this last factor was extremely important because **the American government very much wanted to achieve a satisfactory solution of the Polish problem with the Soviet government** (emphasis A.C.). However the American government faced two difficulties: (a) the great role that the Poles (i.e. Polish–Americans, A.C.) would play in the forthcoming presidential election, and (b) fear that the U.S. would lose prestige in appearing to “capitulate” to Russia. The inclusion of Polish–Americans in the Provisional government would, wrote Lange, facilitate an American–Soviet understanding on both these questions without any loss of prestige by the American government.

Lange concluded his memorandum by saying that the Yugoslav experience indicated that British and American public opinion would be favorably disposed toward the establishment of a provisional government on Polish territory²⁸. At the same time, Lange wrote he thought American and British opinion would not favor a Polish government on Soviet territory, for it would be seen as just another government–in–exile, also as subordinated to the USSR. In such a case, he felt western opinion would favor the London government. However, a Polish government organized on Polish territory could not, he wrote, fail to obtain diplomatic recognition from America, England, and all other United Nations. Finally, in demanding such recognition and thus coming out against the London government, the Provisional

²⁸ In early 1944, Churchill decided to switch British military support from the royalist “Chetnik” resistance leader, Draža Mihailović, to the Communist partisan leader, Josip Broz Tito, justifying this by the allegedly greater military value of Tito’s Partisans in tying down German and Italian troops in Yugoslavia. Under British and Soviet pressure, King Peter of Yugoslavia agreed to dismiss his Prime Minister, Božidar Purić, in late May 1944, and appointed a Croat lawyer and politician, Dr. Ivan Subasić. In June, Subasić met with Tito on the island of Vis, where they signed an agreement fulfilling Tito’s demands. Subasić recognized Tito’s Anti-Fascist Council (AVNOJ) and the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia, after which he became the Prime Minister of the new Yugoslav, though still royal, government on July 7, 1944. On September 12, King Peter called on all Yugoslavs to join the National Liberation Army under Tito. On September 28, 1944, Marshal Fyodor Tolbukhin announced that Soviet troops were entering Yugoslavia with Tito’s permission, and Tito ordered two British units which had landed in Boka Kotorska in late October without such permission, to leave. See: Nora Belfoff, *Tito’s Flawed Legacy. Yugoslavia & the West since 1939*, Boulder, Co. 1985, pp. 108–110, and David Martin, *The Web of Disinformation. Churchill’s Yugoslav Blunder*, San Diego 1990, pp. 242–244. Stalin constantly cited the Subasić–Tito agreement as a model for Poland.

National government would be acting in accordance with the principles of the “Atlantic Charter”²⁹.

Again we may ask whether Lange had worked out these interesting proposals on his own? In this writer’s opinion, this is possible but unlikely, for he would surely have consulted someone in drawing up such detailed proposals. Most likely, it was someone in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Foreign Nationalities Branch (FNB), the director of which, DeWitt C. Poole (1885–1957), met with Father Orlemański in New York on February 11. On the next day, Poole reported Orlemański’s wish to go to Moscow to Elbridge R. Durbrow (b. 1903), Assistant Chief of East European Affairs at the State Department³⁰. It is most likely that, since Lange was also in New York at this time, he also met with Poole, or some other OSS/FNB official, who passed on to him the views of the State Department — perhaps even Roosevelt himself — on establishing a new Polish Provisional National government in Poland, and in particular, who should be in it. The rest of the program reflected Lange’s own ideas, but was probably acceptable to the American official with whom he was in touch.

Whoever Lange’s official contact may have been, it is clear that the Professor was now under pressure from the *ZPP* — i.e. Stalin — to go to Moscow. In an undated note, handwritten in English, with no addressee but clearly intended for Wasilewska and the Soviet government, Lange wrote he saw no other way of obtaining a passport and transport to Russia, but to disclose the purpose of his trip to Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt. An invitation for him to visit the *ZPP*, possibly with Orlemański and Krzycki, would not be sufficient. He added that his political activities could raise suspicions that both the Soviet government and he wished to conceal the purpose of the trip from the American government. Therefore, he suggested the Soviet government agree to his approaching Hull and Roosevelt, stating the goal of his trip and asking permission to go. He commented: “I think that I could convince Mr. Hull and Mr. Roosevelt that it is in their interest that I make the trip to Moscow. With [the] co-operation of the American government my trip could be made in utmost secrecy, without embarrassing the government of the United States”³¹.

²⁹ *Memorandum Lange (Niu-Iork, 14 fev. 1944)*, *AVP, ibid.*, pp. 24–25, also copy in f. 17 (Central Committee, Communist Party of USSR), op. 128, d. 709, pp. 18–20, *Rossiiskii Tsentralnyi Arkhiv i Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii*, Moscow.

³⁰ Dewitt C. Poole, Director, Foreign Nationalities Branch [OSS] to Elbridge Durbrow, Department of State, 12 February, 1944 (letter typed in double space on paper with letterhead: Office of Strategic Services, 630 — 5th Avenue, New York, N.Y.; accession date stamp, Department of State, Feb. 23, 1944), National Archives, OSS–FNB, Poland, 1940–44, decimal files, Box 21.

³¹ Undated, unsigned, note in Lange’s handwriting, *AVP, ibid.*, p. 13.

This undated note was probably cabled to Moscow at about the same time, or a few days after the memo of February 14, for seven days later the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Andrei Gromyko asked President Roosevelt about the proposed Orlemański and Lange trip to Moscow. Gromyko reported Roosevelt as saying he personally did not see why the matter was being delayed. However, he also remarked that he was a bit worried about the reaction to the Orlemański–Lange trip by some Congressmen, especially the representative from Detroit, Michigan³². Having said this, the President again repeated that he personally did not see any obstacles to the trip and promised to speak to [Edward R.] Stettinius (Jr., 1900–1949, Under Secretary of State, 1944–45). Gromyko commented that from the President's reaction it was clear he had not heard anything about Orlemański and Lange before, or if he had, that he had forgotten it³³. The President was a good actor, for he was hardly likely to have forgotten Harriman's report of Molotov's startling proposals of January 18, in which the Soviet Foreign Commissar had mentioned both men, along with Krzycki, as possible Polish–American members of a new Polish government.

While Roosevelt meditated on Molotov's proposal, Churchill's attempts to secure Stalin's agreement to talk with the Polish government in London were getting nowhere. On February 21, the British Prime Minister had forwarded to Stalin a Polish proposal for establishing a demarcation line, based on the Curzon Line, between Polish and Soviet administrations, noting that the Poles wished to keep Lwów and Wilno. The Prime Minister favored this proposal, and also proposed an undertaking by the USSR and Great Britain to each other and to Poland, to respect Polish sovereignty and independence, not to interfere in each other's domestic affairs, and to secure for Poland Danzig (Gdańsk), Opoln (Opole) Silesia, and East Prussia³⁴. A week later, on February 28, Sir Archibald Clark–Kerr, the British ambassa-

³² Roosevelt must have meant John D. Dingell (Dziegielewski, 1894–1955), the Democratic Congressman from Detroit in the years 1933–1955.

³³ *Telegram posła SSSR v SSHA v Narodny'i Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, Fev. 21, 1944*, in: *Sovetsko–Amerikanskije Omosheniia ... 1941–1945*, t. 2, doc. no. 20, pp. 43–44. There is no American record of this conversation, but it is known that Roosevelt saw Gromyko that day between 12.45 and 1.00 p.m. In a memorandum of March 6, Roosevelt directed his military aide and [appointments] Secretary, Major–General Edwin M. ("Pa") Watson, to see Gromyko and inquire (presumably in the State Department, A.C.), whether Lange and Orlemański had applied for their passports, see *FRUS 1944*, v. III, p. 1402, note 44. Watson was a highly decorated soldier and diplomat, who had served as President Woodrow Wilson's military aide at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Roosevelt valued him highly for his ability to judge people correctly and for his sense of humor, see: Eric L a r r a b e e, *Commander in Chief. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*, New York 1987, pp. 26–27.

³⁴ Churchill to Roosevelt, 20 February, 1944, *FRUS 1944*, v. III, pp. 1259–1262, also in *Stalin's Correspondence with W.S. Churchill and C.R. Attlee, 1941–1945*, *op. cit.*, Moscow 1957, no. 143; reprinted in: A. P o l o n s k y, *op. cit.*, doc. no. 87.

dor in Moscow, reported to Foreign Secretary Antony Eden that Stalin had “sniggered and snorted” at Churchill’s proposals. He told the Ambassador he wanted recognition of the Curzon Line as the Polish–Soviet frontier and the “reconstruction” of the Polish government. He mentioned recruiting Poles in America and England, suggesting two Polish Americans: Prof. Lange and Father Orlemański “who might come to Moscow to see what was going on here and advise on the choice of appropriate Poles”. Stalin added he assumed the U.S. government would not object³⁵. A few days later, on March 3, Stalin also told the U.S. ambassador that he would not deal with the Polish government as it stood. He then asked Harriman if he had the answer to his request, submitted to Roosevelt by Gromyko, to allow Lange and Orlemański to come to Russia. Harriman could not reply, since he had not heard of it (*sic*). When the ambassador asked what Lange and Orlemański hoped to accomplish with their visit, Stalin said they would meet the Poles in Moscow, find out what was going on in Poland from information available in the Soviet capital, look the situation over, and return to United States. Harriman expressed anxiety about reactions to the trip in America³⁶.

Stalin’s pressure moved Roosevelt to ask Under–Secretary Stettinius on March 8, to issue passports to Lange and Orlemański so they could go to Moscow. Stettinius suggested that to avoid possible difficulties, the U.S. government should issue a public statement that the two men were travelling as “private citizens” without any connection with the U.S. government³⁷. On March 24, Secretary of State Hull wrote the President that if the trip became the subject of public comment, a statement should be made to the effect that Lange and Orlemański were proceeding to the Soviet Union on the invitation of the Soviet government, also that they were private citizens and not the representatives or spokesmen of the U.S. Government³⁸. In the meanwhile, the Office of War Information (OWI), as well as Lange and Orlemański were instructed to keep silent about the trip until they reached Moscow³⁹. Indeed, Roosevelt told Stalin that if there was a leak, the two men would be disavowed; Stalin made no protest⁴⁰. The President thought

³⁵ Sir Archibald Clark–Kerr to Anthony Eden, Telegram, Moscow, 28 February 1944, Foreign Office, 371. C2793/8/55, A. Polonsky, *op. cit.*, doc. no. 88.

³⁶ Harriman to Secretary of State, Moscow, March 3, 1944, midnight (received March 4 — 10 a.m.), *FRUS 1944*, v. III, pp. 1264–1266.

³⁷ Stettinius to Roosevelt, March 8, 1944, *ibid.*, p. 1402.

³⁸ Hull memorandum for Roosevelt, *ibid.*, p. 1403.

³⁹ See R. S z y m c z a k, *Oskar Lange*, “Polish Review” XL, 1, p. 16, and note 35.

⁴⁰ Secretary of State Hull to Harriman, March 24, 1944, asking him to transmit to Stalin “secret and personal message from the President; Roosevelt also asked for Soviet transport for the two men”, *FRUS 1944*, vol. III, p. 1403. Stalin agreed to provide transport, and said the Soviet government considered the trip as that of private citizens, Stalin to Roosevelt, March 28, 1944, *ibid.*, p. 1405.

of informing Churchill, but decided not to do so⁴¹. Therefore, we must assume the Prime Minister learned of the planned trip from his ambassador in Moscow, Clark-Kerr. Churchill and Eden were both dismayed at Roosevelt's unilateral venture, which undercut their efforts to reconstruct the Polish government with Mikołajczyk as Premier, with a Cabinet consisting of his Peasant Party supporters and a few of their allies⁴².

II. Oskar Lange's Talks in Moscow, May-June 1944

Lange and Orlemański flew separately in U.S. military planes to Fairbanks, Alaska, and thence in Soviet military planes to Moscow. Orlemański went first, returning to Chicago on May 12, while Lange remained in the USSR until the end of the month, returning to the United States on June 7. (As of summer 1994, there were no records of Orlemański's conversations with Stalin in the Molotov Secretariat files, *AVP*, A.C.). When news of the trip appeared in the American press, it set off a series of protests by the Polish-American community as early as May 1, 1944⁴³. The priest also created a furore by his remarks at a press Conference in Chicago on the day of his arrival in that city. He cited Stalin's statements to him of his (Stalin's) interest in cooperating with the Vatican against the persecution of the Catholic Church, and his (Stalin's) view that, "as an advocate of freedom of

⁴¹ Roosevelt to Hull, March 16, 1944, Roosevelt Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., Box 31, cit. R. Szymczak, *Oskar Lange*, "Polish Review", XL, 1, p. 17, note 36. There is no mention of Lange and Orlemański in the published Roosevelt message to Churchill of March 16, 1944, which was not sent. The President merely advised the Prime Minister that frontier problems could be laid aside, and to "let nature take its course". In the meanwhile, he thought they might learn more about Polish sentiment and whether to continue allowing the Polish government in London to speak for the Poles, see: Warren F. Kimball, ed., *Churchill & Roosevelt. The Complete Correspondence*. vol. III. *Alliance Declining February 1944 — April 1945*, Princeton, N.J. 1984, R-501/1, not sent, p. 48.

⁴² On April 1, 1944, Eden commented to Churchill on the forthcoming Lange-Orlemański visit to Moscow: "I am afraid that this visit will not be helpful. These men are clearly being sent to assist the overthrow of the Polish government". PREM (Prime Minister's Files), 3/355/55, Public Record Office, London.

⁴³ Congressman John Lesiński, the Democratic representative from the 18th District, Michigan (1933-1950), wrote the Secretary of State on May 1, 1944, saying "Both Rev. Orlemański and Professor Lange are avowed opponents of Poland and are well-known Russian sympathizers". He mentioned that the day before — i.e. April 30 — Monsignor Michael J. Ready, General Secretary of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, had denounced Orlemański's visit to Russia, and his statement had been printed in the May 1 issue of the *Washington Post*. Ready noted that Orlemański had left his parish without proper ecclesiastical permission. Lesiński asked Hull when the two men left the United States and by what means of transport they reached Russia. He also asked whether they went as private citizens or were the guests or representatives of a foreign power, see Lesiński to Secretary of State, May 1, 1944 (letterhead: Congress of the United States. House of Representatives). Hull answered Lesiński a few days later, stating that Lange and Orlemański had travelled to the Soviet Union on the invitation of the Soviet government, as private American citizens. — see: copy of Hull letter attached to Lesiński's, date stamp: May 5, 1944, National Archives, OSS-FNB, Poland, decimal files, Box, 21, also microfilm no. 711.60C/40.

conscience and worship”, he excluded Soviet persecution and coercion of the Catholic church (*sic!*). We can find an indication of Father Orlemański’s personality in his statement that: “As an American citizen, I stood up man to man and talked to Stalin”. ..He described the Soviet leader as “very democratic, very open”⁴⁴. At the founding meeting of the Polish–American Congress in Buffalo, May 28–June 1, 1944, the Lange–Orlemański venture was strongly condemned, and a delegation lodged a protest with the State Department. The Polish government also protested through its ambassador, Jan Ciechanowski⁴⁵.

Meanwhile, Lange arrived in Moscow on April 23 and stayed in the USSR until May 30. We can see how very busy he was from the notes he made of his many conversations there, the most important of which was the one he had with Stalin, accompanied by Molotov on May 17, and two with Molotov. He also spoke with A. Korneichuk, W. Wasilewska, A. Witos, General Z. Berling, ambassadors Harriman and Clark–Kerr; and the Czech minister, Zdeňek Fierlinger. He also spoke with the freshly arrived members of the Communist Home Council (*KRN*) delegation, and even visited the Committee for a Free Germany. Furthermore, he visited Polish army units at the front, as well as Polish schools and children’s homes in Zagorsk near Moscow and in Barnaul (Altai region). His status as intermediary between Roosevelt and Stalin was indicated both by his long conferences with Stalin and Molotov, and by the fact that, while in Moscow, he gave short oral reports of all his conversations to Maxwell M. Hamilton (1890–1957), Minister and Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

On his return to the United States, Lange submitted typed notes of his conversations to Secretary of State Stettinius and a copy to President Roosevelt. He was received at the White House by Thomas D. Blake, assistant to Stephen T. Early, Press Secretary, later Secretary, to President Roosevelt. A summary of Lange’s notes has long been available in print, and his typed notes are in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.⁴⁶. These include notes on the most important conversations he held in Moscow, i.e. the one with Stalin and Molotov, on May 17, and two with Molotov on April 24 and May 20. The Molotov Secretariat files in the *AVP*,

⁴⁴ “Stalin for Cooperation with Pope, Free Worship, Orlemański says”, also: “Record of Priest’s Remarks”, Chicago, May 12, see: *New York Times*, May 13, 1944.

⁴⁵ For the Polish–American Congress, see: R. C. L u k a s , *op. cit.*, p. 55; Ambassador Ciechanowski seems to have made an oral protest.

⁴⁶ Lange’s notes, called a report, were summarized in a memorandum of June 28, 1944, by Elbridge R. Durbrow, see: *FRUS 1944*, v. III, pp. 1418–1423. The Professor sent one copy to the State Department (June 12) and one to the President (June 15); the latter is in the Roosevelt Papers, F. D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., PSF 66, Diplomatic Correspondence, Poland, Box 48. (Henceforth cited as: Lange Notes).

Moscow, contain only the Russian records of Lange's conversation with Molotov on April 24th, and his conversation with Stalin, accompanied by Molotov on May 17. Since these were his most important meetings, they deserve detailed consideration, including a comparison with Lange's own account of them.

It is striking that Lange's typed notes of his first conversation with Molotov (April 24) cover only half a page in single space, while the Russian record, typed in 1 1/2 space covers 11 pages⁴⁷. Molotov's Secretary, Podtserob, who recorded it, noted the conversation lasted one and a half hours⁴⁸. While Lange's summary lists the main points of the conversation, it does not give us either the significant remarks made by each speaker, nor their reactions to each other. (Lange noted that the conversation was in Russian, and this is borne out by the fact that no translator was listed by Podtserob). After a wide-ranging discussion of the German question, Polish-Czechoslovak relations, and condemnation of the Polish government in London, Lange suggested that to avoid the new Polish government being regarded as "Soviet Quislings", it would be well to include in it some members of the Polish government in London, and above all, Mikołajczyk. Molotov commented: "This was also our opinion". (*Takoe mnenie bylo i u nas*)⁴⁹. Lange went on to say that both Beneš and [Jan] Masaryk (Czechoslovak Foreign Minister) thought the Polish Peasant Party had a better attitude toward the USSR than the Socialist Party. He continued that while there were some good people in the Polish government, they had no influence, for they were in the hands of the military. He even claimed that Mikołajczyk had once wished to leave the government and go to America or Moscow, but [President Władysław] Raczkiewicz had not allowed this. Moreover, said Lange, there was also the "myth" of [Polish] national unity. Molotov answered that there was much truth in what Lange said⁵⁰. The Professor continued that if

⁴⁷ April 24. Conference with Mr. Molotov. Length, 1 1/2 hours; language, Russian. Also present, Mr. Molotov's secretary, who took notes, Lange Notes. This follows Lange's notes on his conversation with Stalin and Molotov, May 17, and his "outline of Trip to the Soviet Union". The latter shows that he left Chicago on April 10, Alaska on April 17, and arrived in Moscow on April 23, also that after a visit to Polish children's schools and homes in the Altai region on May 27-29, he arrived in Alaska on June 1, and in Chicago on June 7. All of Lange's meetings and activities are summarized according to the dates on which they took place, except the conversation with Stalin and Molotov of May 17, which comes first.

⁴⁸ *Iz dnevnika V. M. Molotova, Priim professora chikagorskogo universiteta Oskara Lange, 24 aprelia 1944, v. 19 chas. 00 min., AVP, ibid., pp. 27-33, of which the text covers pp. 29-39, internal page nos. 1-11; the note that the conversation lasted 1 and a half hours is on p. 11. Copies of the report were sent by Podtserob on April 29, 1944, to Vladimir Georgevich [Dekanozov] (a Deputy Foreign Commissar), and Andrei J. Vyshinsky (First Deputy Commissar), with the comment that Molotov had not reviewed the report, and the request that, after reading it, the recipient return it to the Commissar's Secretariat, *ibid.*, pp. 27, 28.*

⁴⁹ *Priim O. Lange*, pp. 31 (3) and 34 (6).

an agreement were reached with Mikołajczyk, the problem of the Polish government would be solved. Then people would not say that it was a government made up of Soviet Quislings. Molotov commented that this would be considered a good thing in Soviet circles⁵¹.

Lange mentioned that had asked Wasilewska whether there had been any contact with Mikołajczyk, and she had said no. He then claimed there had been a government crisis in London in January, in which some Polish activists there wanted members of the *ZPP* to join the Polish government. Lange also said he had made proposals in November 1943 for a “union of Polish Democrats”, and wrote an article on this subject. He had proposed that the Socialist and Peasant Parties leave the government and form a coalition government with representatives of the *ZPP*. He then listed the tasks of such a government, including a united underground movement, cooperation with the Red Army, and joining the Soviet–Czechoslovak alliance. He thought the government could be reconstructed after the liberation of Warsaw, and that half of it should consist of people who had been in Poland during the war. After about a year, this government would give way to a new government. However, said Lange, there was a negative reaction from London to these proposals⁵².

Lange then asked if Molotov had seen his memorandum about forming a new government in Lublin? (This was a reference to his memorandum of February 14, 1944, A.C.). Molotov said he had seen it and that an answer had been sent at that time⁵³. Lange asked if Wasilewska knew about it and Molotov said she did. Lange then said he thought a better decision could be made now. Molotov said Soviet circles had reacted favorably to Lange’s proposal, and considered that it would be useful to adopt it as a basis [for action]⁵⁴. Lange then returned to his point that the inclusion of Mikołajczyk and a few other persons from London would resolve “international problems”, but if a government were formed without him, this would fuel propaganda about “Soviet Quislings”. After some comments about the Polish underground and the Polish army in England, Molotov said the main problem was forming a Polish government and that Lange’s proposal of establishing it in Lublin seemed to be correct. When Lange asked about the Home National Council (*Krajowa Rada Narodowa* — *KRN*), Molotov said

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 35–36 (7–8).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 36 (8). There is no documentary evidence that there was a crisis in the Polish government in January 1943, or of Lange’s proposal of November 1943, nor to whom it was made.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 36 (6). There is no record of an answer either from the *ZPP* or the Soviet leaders to Lange’s memorandum of Feb. 14, 1944, A.C.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

it had been established without any Soviet or ZPP input. To Lange's remark that if this was so, the *KRN* could be the base of the new government, Molotov commented that it was not known how "solid" this organization was⁵⁵.

Molotov then asked about the attitude of "American circles" toward the Polish question. Lange answered that while the Polish government had a large propaganda machine in the United States, American circles had a very critical attitude toward that government, mainly because of its "interference" in American politics, notably its support of anti-Roosevelt elements. (Presumably, this was a reference to Republicans, A.C.). He then said that Americans would like to cooperate in reconstructing the London government and strengthening Polish-Soviet relations. They could, said Lange, soon achieve this if they talked 'sharply' to the Poles, but this was difficult since the latter always said: "The British government is for us!" He went on to say that the American government had a better understanding of the fact that the [Polish] London government's cooperation with the Soviet Union was impossible, but commented that the crisis in this matter would come after the elections in the United States. Until then, the internal situation would prevent any decisive American measures⁵⁶. (This was a reference to the Presidential elections in November 1944, A.C.)

When Molotov said he had the impression the American government did not want Lange to travel to the USSR, the Professor answered he thought its attitude was positive. In conclusion, Lange expressed the wish that a press communiqué be issued about his arrival and that of Orlemański. He suggested it should state he had come to visit the Polish army, that he was an American citizen of Polish origin and a Professor at the University of Chicago. If there was no such communiqué, he feared there would be all kinds of undesirable comments about him and his trip to Moscow. The conversation ended with Molotov's statement that he considered Lange to be his guest — but as a private person, as Roosevelt had informed Stalin⁵⁷.

Lange's most important conversation in Moscow was, of course, with Stalin, accompanied by Molotov. According to Lange, the conversation was in Russian, but Vladimir Pavlov, Stalin's chief translator for English, who recorded it, did not note it was in Russian. However, we may assume Pavlov was there in case he was needed, for Lange would repeat Stalin's words to President Roosevelt. Lange's record covers five and one sixth pages typed

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 38 (10).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 39 (11).

in single space, while the Russian record covers eighteen pages typed in one and a half space⁵⁸.

In comparing the Russian record of Lange's conversation with Stalin and Molotov on May 17, with Lange's own notes on the same, we see that while the order of topics discussed is different and each version contains some items left out in the other, the two records are generally in agreement. The Russian record, however, besides being longer is also much more colorful, reflecting the Soviet leader's way of formulating his thoughts. To begin with, Stalin asked if Lange has seen Berling, to which the Professor replied that the general had accompanied him on his visit to Polish army units. Stalin then said he had news of attacks on Orlemański in America, to which Lange answered he feared there would be a break between the priest and the church authorities. Stalin commented: "What crocodiles. Why did they attack Orlemański?" (Stalin was referring to the Roman Catholic church leadership in the United States, A.C.). After some discussion of the priest's difficulties, Lange mentioned that Orlemański would probably be removed from his parish. Here Stalin observed: "What crocodiles! That's democracy for you! They didn't even call Orlemański to give clarifications, but imposed a penalty on him". (*Kakie-to krokodili! Vot eto demokratiia! Orlemanskogo dazhe ne vyzyvaii dlia ob'iasnenii i nalozhili na nego vzysskanie.*) At the end of the conversation Stalin again mentioned Orlemański and repeated: "What crocodiles!" He asked Lange to pass on his greetings to Orlemański⁵⁹. In Lange's record, there is nothing about the priest. He obviously considered this part of the conversation unimportant, though it was clear that Stalin had a soft spot for the priest from Springfield, Mass.

The first substantial topic in Lange's own record deals with his visit to Polish [Berling] army units at the front. He said the soldiers were very bitter about the condition of their families in the Soviet interior. Lange said that after the soldiers' return to Poland, their tales of the Soviet Union would shape Polish opinion; therefore, strong measures to improve the lot of their families would create a more favorable attitude on their part. Stalin admitted these facts and said that improved Soviet economic conditions would allow measures to be taken. Lange noted that next day Stalin called in Wasilewska and told her the ZPP should prepare plans for improving the situation and submit them to the Soviet government⁶⁰. In the Russian record, after Lange's

⁵⁸ May 17. "Conference with Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov". Length, 2 hours, 20 minutes. Language, Russian. Also present, Mr. Pavlov, who took notes of the conversation. Lange Notes: *Conference, Stalin; Zapis besedy Tov. I. V. Stalina i Tov. V. M. Molotova s pol'skim professorom Lange, 17 maia 1944 g. AVP, f. 06, pap. 42, d. 546, pp. 53–70 (1–18)*. Pavlov noted at the end that the conversation lasted 2 hours and 15 minutes (henceforth referred to as: *Zapis*).

⁵⁹ *Zapis*, pp. 53–54 (1–2) and p. 70 (18).

mention of the soldiers' questions about their families, Stalin said "now we could make lighter the situation of the Polish military servicemen's families. We could help them. It would be nice if there was as much material as there are families. Perhaps they should be moved nearer the Dnieper, so that Polish soldiers could visit their families". To Lange's remark that when the soldiers returned home, they would influence Polish opinion of the USSR, Stalin said: "Kot and his group provoked the Soviet government to take certain steps regarding Poles in the USSR. We repressed them. But let them tell the whole truth in Poland" (*No pust' oni rasskazhut v Pol'she vsiu pravdu*)⁶¹.

In Lange's own report, there is, of course, much about the future of Poland. The Professor emphasized that Stalin wanted a strong Poland, which would play "a leading role in Europe", and that he was ready to expand the Polish army up to one million men. When Lange asked whether the *ZPP* was not demanding too much German territory for Poland — East Prussia, plus land up to the Oder — and whether this would not fuel German nationalist desire for revenge, Stalin said he didn't care. Furthermore, Lange reported him as saying: "There are two possibilities: either the peace will be such that it will create no [*sic!*] desire for German revenge, or it will be such as to make German revenge impossible". He said the first course would mean a German threat to Europe within a generation⁶². This is a garbled version of Stalin's remarks, for surely he meant the first course was a peace that would create a desire for German revenge. In the Russian record, the Soviet leader said the German problem was discussed at Teheran. He went on to say: "Formal decisions were not taken. He, Com. Stalin, pointed out that Stettin [Szczecin] and Breslau [Wrocław] could be included in Poland. Churchill said this would result in a fine Polish state and asked whether the Soviet Union would help in establishing such a Poland. He, Com. Stalin answered the Soviet Union will help Poland obtain these territories. This was discussed as part of the general question of weakening Germany"⁶³.

It is interesting that in his own report Lange noted that Stalin was not sure whether the Poles should get Breslau (Wrocław)⁶⁴.

⁶⁰ Lange Notes Conference, Stalin, pp. 1–2.

⁶¹ *Zapis*, p. 55 (3). Stanisław Kot was Polish Ambassador in the USSR 1941–42, later Minister of Information and Propaganda in the Polish government, London. The repressive measures Stalin mentioned were probably a reference to the arrest, in June–July 1942, on charges of espionage, of Polish Embassy delegates, who organized relief for Polish deportees in the USSR. Most of them were released, but could not continue the relief work. See: Keith S w o r d , *Deportation and Exile*. chap. 4.

⁶² Lange Notes Conference, Stalin, p. 2.

⁶³ *Zapis*, p. 64 (12).

⁶⁴ Lange Notes, Conference, Stalin, p. 3.

There was an interesting exchange on the projected German territorial losses to Poland and German nationalism. According to the Russian (Pavlov) record, when Lange said that American public opinion was worried whether the loss of German territory might not provoke a development of German nationalism, Stalin answered that Roosevelt had proposed the division of Germany into five states, also proposing that Americans occupy the ports, including Hamburg. Churchill hesitated but Stalin sided with Roosevelt. Lange observed that the division of Germany was only possible if there was no conflict between the United States, England, and Russia. Stalin mentioned three possible versions of a peace settlement. (Here Pavlov omitted the word “not” and failed to note that the first mentioned — the “halfway peace” — was version number one, A.C.). “Com. Stalin says that regarding Germany, it would be necessary [not] to go for a halfway peace like Versailles. Versailles resulted in a half-peace because they began to make concessions to Germany. Such a peace would not only contribute to the birth of thoughts about revenge, but would also create possibilities for this revenge. One could also go for another peace, leaving Germany her territories and returning the Sudeten region to Czechoslovakia and Alsace-Lorraine to France. But that is a very dangerous combination. The third possibility is to render Germany helpless — take away her industry, disarm her army and so disable Germany for 50 years. He, Com. Stalin, believes this combination should be accepted”.

After recalling that Germany had attacked France in 1870 and 1914, and unleashed war again in 1939, Stalin said he believed that a halfway decision regarding Germany would mean a new war in fifteen years’ time.

When Lange said again that a helpless Germany was only possible if there was agreement between England, America and Russia, Stalin answered that while Russia’s partners might have other ideas, he doubted whether either England or America would break the agreement. Those two powers, he said, had an interest in destroying German and Japanese industry, pointing out that Japanese labor was much cheaper than American labor. He said this was also convenient for Russia; so they were, all three, in the same camp. He concluded by saying: “This is my bolshevik view of this question”⁶⁵.

Of course, most of the conversation concerned the future of Poland. In the Russian record, the subject first appeared in a discussion of Polish soldiers’ wishes, as reported by Lange. He said they all wanted a new democratic Poland, and no one wanted a return to prewar Poland. They wanted agrarian reform, but with the preservation of private property, not collectivization. Stalin observed there was no basis for the latter in Poland.

⁶⁵ *Zapis*, pp. 64 (12)–65 (13).

Lange also said the soldiers spoke of nationalizing heavy industry and banks. Stalin observed: "That's not bad" (*Eto ne plokho*). When Lange said that the soldiers were more radical than some members of the ZPP, Stalin said: "That's possible. We are restraining them from radicalism". (In his own record, Lange noted him saying: "That's because we bawled them out").⁶⁶ Clearly, Stalin did not want to alienate either Polish opinion, or provoke his western allies.

There followed a long discussion on the question of forming a new Polish government. Stalin said there should be a provisional government or committee, which would be recognized by the English and Americans. Lange commented this would be possible if there was a split in the London [Polish] government, but he did not think the English would do it⁶⁷. (He did not mention that British Ambassador Clark-Kerr had told him on May 14, that the solution to the problem was to provoke a cabinet crisis in London in order to form a coalition government including Mikołajczyk and the Union of Polish Patriots)⁶⁸. Molotov, who was silent for most of the time, commented that the English were uniting (*splachivaiut*) the Poles in London. (The meaning of this remark is not clear, A.C.). Stalin then said some English circles were doing everything to prevent a solution of the Russo-Polish conflict and wanted a fight (*draka*) between the Russians and the Poles, to which Lange said the American government's attitude was different. The Professor then asked if Stalin thought it possible to approach Mikołajczyk as a private person (*chestnoe litso*). Pavlov noted Stalin's reaction as follows: "Com. Stalin answers that he is not against it, but we should know what Mikołajczyk represents. It is evident that he is a weak willed person. Sosnkowski plays the main role. He has an intelligence service in Polish embassies and in Poland. Sosnkowski is a man of character, but he is not looking our way. Mikołajczyk is in his hands. The members of the Polish government are compromised in Poland".

When Lange commented that they believed they had influence in Poland, we read: "Comrade Stalin declares that Soviet power exists here for 26 years; nevertheless, he com. Stalin, cannot say that 90% of the Soviet people is for them. How do the London Poles know that the whole population of Poland is for them? This is very difficult to know, since the German

⁶⁶ *Zapis*, pp. 54 (2) — 55 (3); cf. Lange Notes, *Conference, Stalin*, p. 1.

⁶⁷ *Zapis*, p. 56 (4).

⁶⁸ In his notes of May 14, "Dinner with Sir Archibald [Clark] Kerr", Lange reported: "He thought that the solution of the Polish Problem should consist in provoking a cabinet crisis in London, with the purpose of forming a new coalition government of Mikołajczyk with the Union of Polish Patriots. He was very pleased to hear that I had made a similar proposal in an article published in a Polish paper in Wisconsin last October". (Presumably this was the "Gwiazda Polarna", A.C.).

vampires are all over Poland. Sikorski was stronger than Mikołajczyk. It was easier to deal with him" (*S nim było luchsze delo*).

Lange commented that there were no people with authority among the Poles, to which he received the following riposte: "Com. Stalin says that they will yet appear. Sosnkowski and others are people of the past. They don't believe in an alliance between Russia and Poland. They think today's Russia is like Tsarist Russia, that it is trying to eat Poland, e.g. by sovietizing it"⁶⁹.

After this, Stalin went on to say that the Soviets waited with collectivization for fourteen years, always testing peasant attitudes, and that kolkhozes should grow by themselves (*sic!*). He went on to explain the basics of a socialist economy in postwar Poland. (Perhaps this was meant for Roosevelt's benefit rather than Lange's, A.C.). He said that the government's control of a land fund and some large enterprises, i.e. those belonging to persons who had served the Germans, would give it strength. He also thought it would be good for the government to own part of the railway system. Lange commented there had never been private railways in Poland, except for some small branch lines. In his report, Lange only mentioned that Polish soldiers told him of their support for nationalization of big industries and banks, while the Union of Patriots held back on this point⁷⁰.

At this moment, according to the Russian record, Stalin turned again to the question of establishing a new Polish government. He said the Poles in the USSR wanted to establish a National Committee; they had even proposed a resolution to this effect. However, "We stopped this decision, taking into consideration Lange's telegram". (This was surely a reference to Lange's letter of January 7, 1944, A.C.). He said it was necessary to try and establish one government made up of Poles living in England, America, and Russia. The USSR wanted a strong Poland with a large army, so that it (the USSR) would not again have to bear the brunt of resisting an aggressor. He mentioned that [British Ambassador Clark] Kerr had said Mikołajczyk might head such a government, and went on to say: "But this won't happen. The Americans and ourselves will not want to do this" (*No eto nie vyidiet. Amerikantsy i my ne zakhotim etogo*)⁷¹.

Lange denigrated the London Poles, but said that "if it were possible to invite some of them into a new Polish government, this would facilitate the

⁶⁹ *Zapis*, pp. 56 (4) — 57 (5). General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, was a former Piłsudski follower with a total distrust of the USSR, suspecting Stalin of planning to make Poland the 17th Soviet republic. At this time, he was Commander-in-Chief of Polish armed forces, including the Home Army (*Armia Krajowa* — A.K), whose commander reported to him.

⁷⁰ *Zapis*, p. 57 (5); cf. Lange Notes *Conference, Stalin*, p. 2.

⁷¹ *Zapis*, p. 58 (6).

resolution of the whole Polish problem". He thought it might be possible if the English government told Mikołajczyk about it, but he (Lange) doubted they would do so. Molotov commented there were no signs of this so far. Stalin then said that if the Soviet, English and American governments were to order the Poles about, this would create an unpleasant situation. He continued: "The best thing would be to establish in the region of Poland some sort of provisional government, which would force England and America to recognize it". Lange commented this was his own idea. He also thought this provisional government should declare in its first manifesto that it represented a provisional organ of power. Therefore, to become a representative one, it should invite other Poles to participate in it. To this, Stalin said the national committee should declare that at this time there were no conditions for establishing a Polish government, but when it was joined by people working in Poland, it could invite other Poles to join it. As for Mikołajczyk, Stalin said that he could not be Premier because he represented the Polish peasants and had ties with them (*sic!*), but such a man would, of course, be useful for the government. Stańczyk was also being suggested. He then asked whom else Lange could name. The Professor named Banaczyk, but said he was only a copy of Mikołajczyk. He then said he did not know what impression [Tadeusz] Romer made (Foreign Minister, Polish ambassador to USSR 1942–43). Stalin said Romer had made quite a good impression on him (*na nego Romer proizvel ne plokhoe vpechatlenie*). Lange then mentioned General [Lucjan] Żeligowski, on whom Stalin commented that he "was leading the fight in the National Council"⁷². When Lange said Żeligowski had a name but was an old man, Stalin answered: "a democratic Poland can even use an old man against the Germans". Lange said he hoped that some Poles from Poland would enter the National Committee, e.g. [Wincenty] Witos, but he (Lange) did not know what his position would be. Stalin observed that Witos had apparently been arrested by the Germans, to which Lange observed they could kill him. Stalin then said Witos should be freed and the partisans could do this⁷³.

Stalin then said that the Red Army had met a "Sosnkowski division" in Poland. They had shot at these soldiers because they wore German uniforms (*sic!*). But when they signalled they were not German, their commanders,

⁷² *Zapis*, pp. 58 (6) — 59 (7). The National Council (*Rada Narodowa*) was a consultative body with the character of a surrogate parliament, attached to the Polish government in London, and made up of representatives of leading Polish political parties. General Żeligowski, who had led Polish troops into Wilno (*Vilnius*) in October 1920 and headed the short-lived Central Lithuanian Republic, proclaimed pan-Slavic ideas in the National Council, and sent his memoranda to the Soviet Embassy there.

⁷³ Witos had been arrested by the Germans in 1939 and again in 1940, but had been released.

who had come over from the other side of the Bug river (i.e. west of it, A.C.), came to talk with the Soviet commanders. The latter told them they could cooperate, but under Red Army command. The Polish commanders then returned to their side of the Bug. Recently, said Stalin, these Sosnkowski divisions had begun to disintegrate for many of their people had come over to the side of the Red Army and some were now in the Berling army. Now there were no Sosnkowski divisions left⁷⁴. The Polish people, continued Stalin, had a good attitude toward the Red Army and the Ukrainian Partisans. They asked when the Russians would come and liberate them from the Germans, so Mikołajczyk was mistaken in affirming that 90% of the Polish people were for the Polish government in London⁷⁵.

He then said the Soviets needed a national committee for purely military reasons as well. They would not act in Poland as the AMGOT [Allied Military Government] did in Italy. There must be some Polish organ of power. The ZPP was a cultural, educational and military organization, so it could not carry out administrative functions in Poland; nor would the Soviets burden the Polish army with this task. Therefore, said Stalin: "It is absolutely necessary to have an organ of power which would talk with the Polish peasants, the intelligentsia and the workers". Lange commented that this "organ of power" should immediately carry out land reform, but the nationalization of heavy industry could be set aside until the establishment of a constitutional government. Stalin then gave a little lecture on how the Polish government should "create a material basis for itself". He explained how the Soviet government's control of trade allowed it to control prices, so that

⁷⁴ *Zapis*, p. 8. (60). A Polish Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*) division had cooperated with the Red Army in late March near Włodzimierz Wołyński (Ukr: *Volodymyr Volyn'skij*) and a local Polish-Soviet agreement was concluded in which the Poles accepted provisional Soviet command, while the latter recognized they were acting under the supreme command of General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski and of the Polish government in London. However, the units of the 27th A.K. division, which had been cooperating with Soviet cavalry, were surrounded by the Germans and lost their commander when the Soviets were thrown back east of the Turya river by the German SS Viking division. After the 27th division managed to break out, its new commander met elsewhere in the region with the command of a Soviet partisan division and an NKVD adviser, who refused to acknowledge the March agreement, demanding the 27th become part of the Berling army. The Polish commander, who had also heard reports of the Soviets disarming and executing smaller A.K. units, decided to cross the Bug and proceed West, see: Andrzej Albert (Wojciech Roszkowski) *Najnowsza Historia Polski, 1914–1993 (The Recent History of Poland, 1914–1993)*, Kielce 1994 (illustrated edition), p. 221, also: *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach (The Home Army in Documents, 1939–1945)*, 1939–1945, vol. III, nos. 590, 595, 611, 627. This is what Stalin must have had in mind. The division was later disarmed by the Soviets. For NKVD repression of the Home Army and underground administration loyal to the Polish government in London, see: Keith Sword, *Deportation and Exile*, chap. 6; for Russian documents, see: Albina F. Noskova et al., eds., *NKVD i pol'skoe podpol'e 1944–1945. (Po "osobym papkam" Stalina) (The NKVD and the Polish Underground 1944–1945. According to Stalin's "special files")*, Moscow 1994; extracts from the instructions given to Nikolai A. Bulganin, see: *ibid.*, p. 12.

⁷⁵ *Zapis*, *ibid.*

by raising them kopeck by kopeck it could obtain great resources, such as another government could obtain from taxes. Lange's reaction to this was not noted by Pavlov⁷⁶. It is possible that Stalin wanted to elicit Lange's comments — after all, the professor had developed a socialist economic model — but it is also likely he wanted to see how Roosevelt would react to these ideas.

At this point, the Russian record shows that Stalin suddenly asked whether Lange might go to London. The professor answered he did not expect to do so, and asked what would be the goal of such a trip? Stalin then suggested that Lange could, as a private person, talk to Mikołajczyk and other Poles in London. He could tell them what he had seen in the Soviet Union. He thought Lange could go from the USSR to the United States and then to London. When Lange asked whether he could tell them he had talked with Stalin, the Russian record notes the following: "Comrade Stalin answers that Lange can tell the Poles in London that he, Com. Stalin, told him a new Polish government must be formed, which would include people from England. Up to now, when the Soviet government wished to find (*uznat'*) someone from the Polish government, Churchill or Eden appeared as mediators. It would be fine (*khorocho*) to talk directly with someone from among the Poles. He, Com. Stalin, does not think at all that Sosnkowski can't change. He, Com. Stalin, though with the known reservations, considers Sosnkowski and other London Poles to be Polish patriots. Lange could tell the Poles in London that we do not have a fixed view that it is impossible to talk with them. But we wish to talk with live Poles, not with Churchill and Eden. Lange can explain to them that we do not want to fight them (*voevat' s nimi*). We are ready, on the known conditions, to reach an agreement with them (*dogovorit'sia*), assuming (*s tem*) that they would not be against us together with Hitler"⁷⁷.

Stalin also suggested that Lange see Stańczyk in America before he returned to England; then Stańczyk could invite Lange to come to London. He rejected Lange's proposal that a member of the ZPP meet with members of the Polish government in Sweden for talks⁷⁸. Evidently, Stalin wished to signal Roosevelt that if the London Poles accepted his conditions, then even Sosnkowski would be welcome. Stalin, of course, knew that Roosevelt agreed with his principal condition for talks with any London Poles, i.e. recognition of the Curzon Line as the Polish–Soviet frontier. He also knew that Roosevelt's primary goal was the establishment of a new Polish

⁷⁶ *Zapis*, pp. 8(60)–9(61).

⁷⁷ *Zapis*, p. 10 (62).

⁷⁸ *Zapis*, p. 11 (63).

government acceptable to Polish–Americans. Therefore, Stalin was telling Roosevelt, through Lange, that he would accept into such a Polish government those London Poles who recognized the Curzon Line as the Polish–Soviet frontier. Indeed, according to Lange’s own record, Stalin said: “The door to an understanding with the Polish government in London is never closed”⁷⁹.

The Russian record next details a discussion on the possible consequences of Poland receiving German territory, i.e. that it might provoke German nationalism. (This was also touched on earlier in the conversation, A.C.). Stalin stressed Soviet security needs. As for the Germans living in the territories to be acquired by Poland, he thought some of them could be used to work in the USSR and some could be sent to South America. (Lange’s record is more specific on this point, A.C.)⁸⁰. After some discussion about the possibility of establishing a Socialist Germany — which Stalin did not expect to materialize soon — Lange asked tentatively whether Stalin thought it possible to make any changes in the Curzon Line. (*Lange sprashivaet, schitaet li I.V. Stalin vozmeneniie linii Kerzona?*) Here Pavlov noted: “Com. Stalin says he thinks this is possible within the limit of 3–4 kilometers either way”. (*Tov. Stalin govorit, chto on schitaet eto vozmozhnym v predelakh 3–4 kilometrov v tu i druguiu storonu*). When Lange said that many Polish soldiers accepted the Curzon Line, provided Wilno and Lwów stayed with Poland, and that most stressed Lwów, Pavlov noted: “Com. Stalin answers that the Ukrainians have become terrible nationalists. They are very suspicious. We would have to fight the Ukrainians for Lvov”. (*Tov. Stalin otvechaet, chto Ukraintsy stali strashnymi natsionalistami. Oni ochen’ mmitelny. Nam prishlos’by iz–za Lvova s Ukraintsami voevat’*). Lange answered by citing Prof. [Bohdan] Zawadzki (the psychologist, A.C.) as believing that the loss of Lwów would be greater for the Poles than for the Ukrainians, and that leaving Lwów to the latter might be a cause of anti–Soviet intrigues in Poland. Here Pavlov noted: “Com. Stalin answers that this is a very complicated problem and should be studied. The thing is that 1 million Ukrainians are fighting very bravely in our army”. (*Tov. Stalin otvechaet, chto eto ochen’ slozhnaia problema i nado ee izuchit’. Delo v tom, chto 1 milion Ukraintsev ochen’ khorosho derut’sia v nashei armii*)⁸¹.

⁷⁹ Lange Notes Conference, Stalin, p. 4. Lange reported the same to British Ambassador Clark–Kerr, see latter’s telegram to Eden, May 18, 1944, A. P o l o n s k y , *Great Powers*, no. 96; he also gave the British Ambassador a long report of his conversation with Stalin, see Clark–Kerr to Eden, May 19, 1944, *ibid.*, no. 97.

⁸⁰ *Zapis*, p. 13 (65). According to Lange, Stalin said the Germans should be deported. “About 3,000,000 might find room in Siberia, some would return to Germany which has suffered a great loss of man–power in the war, and as for the rest, Stalin added, maybe there will be room in South America or somewhere else for them”. see: Lange Notes Conference, Stalin, p. 3.

Lange then said the Poles felt uncertain about their western frontiers, Stalin answered that on this point there was no difference of opinion between him, Roosevelt, and Churchill at Teheran. Lange commented this was not known in America. At this point, Pavlov noted a historical question by Lange and Stalin's answer: "Lange asks whether Stalin thinks that Beck's government (*pravitel'stvo Beka*) cooperated with the Germans with the goal of beginning war together with them against Russia. Com. Stalin answers that we do not have materials showing that Beck cooperated with the Germans on the question of beginning a common attack on the Soviet Union".

He went on to say, however, that "Beck's government" had pushed the Germans against the Soviet Union and that the Poles had plans of expanding to the Dnieper. Stalin said they expected to do so in case of a fight (*draka*) between the Russians on the one hand and the Americans and English on the other (*sic!*). He then said Sosnkowski and others also thought like this, but this was an illusion. "They don't understand that this alliance (i.e. Russia, Gt. Britain, United States, A.C.) is not the result of a passing state of affairs (*koniunktura*), but is a long-term one". Of course, Stalin's assertions about the prewar Polish government's plans of expansion eastward, and his view that it planned to use a quarrel between America (*sic!*), England, and Russia to do so, indicated Stalin's own interpretation of prewar Polish policy, also that his mind was fixed on the present⁸².

After a long discussion about France's chances of becoming a great power again (Stalin thought this unlikely for at least a generation), the conversation turned to what Lange was to say at a press conference with foreign correspondents. Here the professor said he would state that if the Soviet government intended to sovietize Poland, it would be necessary to raise another Polish army. Pavlov noted Lange as saying: "In his, Lange's opinion, this [army] serves as the best evidence of the sincerity of the Soviet government's intentions. This shows that the formation of the Polish army in the Soviet Union is not some sort of maneuver. He, Lange, could also say that in the opinion of Soviet leaders Poland should play an important role in the postwar world. On this Stalin observed that "Poland should play an

⁸¹ *Zapis*, pp. 66 (14) — 15 (67). In Lange's account, besides Polish soldiers' wishes for Lwów (*Lv'iv*), he also mentioned "that all Polish refugees in New York who are most sympathetic with the Union of Polish Patriots asked me to raise this question of Lwów with the Soviet government". He then expressed his own view on the question — which in the Russian account, he ascribed to Prof. Zawadzki. Lange also reported Stalin saying: "This problem must be studied further". He also cited Stalin as saying that once Poland's western frontiers were settled, the discussion on the eastern ones would be much easier, see: Lange *Notes Conference, Stalin*, pp. 4–5.

⁸² *Zapis*, p. 67 (15). For an excellent survey of Polish-Soviet relations in the interwar period, see: Wojciech M a t e r s k i, *Tarcza Europy. Stosunki polsko-sowieckie 1918–1939 (Europe's Shield. Polish-Soviet Relations 1918–1939)*, Warszawa 1994.

important role not only after the war, but also during the war”⁸³. In Lange’s own report, the concluding paragraph reads: “At the very end, Stalin asked me whether I believed in the sincerity of the Soviet government’s assurances that they do not want to encroach upon Poland’s sovereignty and independence. I replied that I might or might not believe in his statements; that they might be political maneuvers. But the fact that he is arming the Polish army, which intends to win and protect Poland’s independence, is the real proof of his intentions. I accept that proof”⁸⁴. Lange’s belief that a large Polish army was proof of Soviet benevolent intentions shows that he had no idea of what Stalinist methods of repression could be, but in this he was not alone.

Here it is worth noting that Stalin’s remarks to Lange about the possibility of talks with the Polish government, followed on the heels of a Soviet agreement in April to British suggestions that confidential talks could take place. It seems that Lange’s visit moved the process forward. Thus, Stanisław Grabski, then chairman of the National Council (*Rada Narodowa*), met with Victor Lebedev, Soviet ambassador to all the emigre governments in London, on May 23, 1944. According to Grabski’s memoirs, he told Lebedev of the Polish government’s instructions to the Home Army to cooperate with the Red Army. When Lebedev asked what the Polish government could do to remove the obstacle to normal Polish–Soviet relations, i.e. its behavior on Katyń, Grabski explained the circumstances of the Polish government’s request for an investigation by the International Red Cross. He even said that now the Soviet government had announced the results of its own investigation, the Polish government could declare its satisfaction on the final clarification of this tragic affair, “which unmasked the libelous German perfidy”⁸⁵. It seems unlikely that Mikołajczyk had sanctioned this particular statement, for if it became known, he would face a stormy reaction from his Cabinet as well as from the Polish communities in Britain and the United States and, of course, public opinion in Poland.

⁸³ *Zapis*, p. 70 (18).

⁸⁴ Lange Notes *Conference, Stalin*, p. 6. It is worth noting that Lange’s account of his conversation with Stalin of May 17, 1944, was transmitted to the Polish government, see *DOPSR* II, no. 132. A copy was also sent to Churchill.

⁸⁵ Stanisław Grabski, *Pamiętniki (Memoirs)*, ed. Witold Stankiewicz, vol. 2, Warszawa 1989, pp. 463–64. Grabski mentions Mikołajczyk informed him in April that the Soviet government had agreed to confidential talks with the Polish government on restoring diplomatic relations, *ibid.*, p. 463. On these talks, see also the memoirs of Stanisław Kirkor, *Urywek Wspomnień. O rozmowach z amb. Lebediewem w Londynie w maju i czerwcu 1944 r. (Fragments of Reminiscences. On the Talks with Amb. Lebedev in London, May and June 1944)*, “Zeszyty Historyczne”, 18, Paris, 1970, pp. 99–107. The Russian investigation (Special Commission) that Grabski referred to was the one headed by Academician N. N. Burdenko, which carried out its work in January 1944., see: T. Zawodny, *op. cit.*, p. 55 and p. 56, note 3.

Grabski had three more meetings with Lebedev in May, after each of which he always made a written report to Mikołajczyk⁸⁶. At the fourth meeting, Lebedev said that if an agreement was reached, the Soviet government would gladly conclude with the Polish government a treaty like the one it had with the Czechoslovak government, i.e. on handing over the administration of the territories liberated by the Red Army to authorities established by the Polish government. He also welcomed Grabski's suggestion that Mikołajczyk visit Moscow to talk personally with Stalin. However, regarding frontiers Lebedev said "The Curzon Line is our point of departure for negotiations, what is the point departure for the Polish government?" Grabski also wrote in his memoirs that earlier Lebedev had stated that Raczkiewicz must be removed as President and Sosnkowski as Commander-in-Chief. When Grabski told him this was impossible, Lebedev had let the matter drop. However, at the fourth meeting, he asked Grabski to think about this again⁸⁷.

Stalin evidently wished to see what Mikołajczyk would say, for he used President Beneš to transmit to the Polish Premier Moscow's expression of "full confidence" in him. Furthermore, Beneš passed on moderately formulated Soviet demands on personnel changes in the government, along with assurances that problems of administration and military cooperation should be settled immediately, and the frontier question later. Finally, Beneš also passed on that: "The Union of Polish Patriots and the Polish Communists would present no obstacle". We should also note that according to information given to the British government, Grabski had put forward to Lebedev on May 31 Mikołajczyk's conditions for a resumption of Polish-Soviet relations⁸⁸. The Foreign Office kept the State Department informed of the talks.

⁸⁶ Kirkor says he saw how Grabski wrote for Mikołajczyk detailed reports of each conversation with Lebedev, see S. Kirkor, *op. cit.*, p. 103. These reports were probably destroyed, for no trace of them has survived.

⁸⁷ S. Grabski, *op. cit.*, pp. 564-465.

⁸⁸ See: Eden to Clark-Kerr, London, July 8, 1944, Telegram, A. Polonsky, *op. cit.*, doc. N° 99, p. 204. While Grabski does not list Mikołajczyk's conditions, he does say Lebedev told him: "Komuniści polscy nic nas nie obchodzą" (Polish Communists are no concern of ours), S. Grabski, *op. cit.*, p. 465; this confirms Beneš's message on the same point. According to Eden's telegram, Mikołajczyk's conditions were: 1. He would make a broadcast reaffirming the readiness of the "Polish Secret Army" (a Soviet term, A.C.) to cooperate with the Red Army, and a declaration that Soviet responsibility for Katyń was German propaganda; 2. Stalin would issue an order stating he was entering Polish territory to fight with the Polish nation against the Germans; 3. A special delegation headed by Mikołajczyk would travel to Moscow to conclude a treaty supplementing the agreement of July 1941 and settling the question of cooperation between the underground, the "Secret Army", and Soviet armies. The delegation would also discuss postwar relations and the question of territories and population (presumably resettlement, A.C.); 4. Diplomatic relations would be restored with the conclusion of this treaty.

Either at the end of May (Grabski) or on June 2 (Eden to Clark–Kerr, July 8), Mikołajczyk met with Lebedev and Grabski. According to the latter’s memoirs, the Premier explained that the Polish government was constitutionally unable to make decisions on Poland’s frontiers, but that it was possible to discuss a demarcation line between Polish and Soviet administrations. Grabski pointed out that the demarcation line really prejudged the frontier, but that the parliament (*Sejm*) of independent Poland should not be deprived of the right of ceding the territory to the USSR. This was to be discussed at the next meeting with Mikołajczyk, but the latter could not attend because he had to fly to the United States to meet with President Roosevelt⁸⁹.

III. Oskar Lange as an Intermediary between Roosevelt and Stalin, June–November 1944

Now let us return to Lange. We will not include here his account of the talks he had with Polish soldiers, also with Clark–Kerr on May 18 (when the Ambassador welcomed the idea of Lange’s visit to England), and his second conversation with Molotov on May 20, which are cited elsewhere⁹⁰. As mentioned earlier, he arrived in Alaska on June 1, and in Chicago on June 7, i.e. at the beginning of Mikołajczyk’s visit to the United States. It may well be that Roosevelt invited the Polish Prime Minister to come at this time not just to calm his Polish–American constituency — as mentioned earlier, the newly founded Polish–American Congress had vociferously condemned the Lange–Orlemański venture — but also to have him meet with Lange. Indeed, Mikołajczyk was pressured by the State Department to see the Professor.

When the two men met at Blair House on June 13, Lange summarized his conversation with Stalin and his talks with Polish soldiers, after which he answered questions put by Mikołajczyk on the above, also on the ZPP. Lange also spoke about the Home National Council (*KRN*), whose delegates had arrived in Moscow while he was there. Mikołajczyk’s only comment — as recorded by Ambassador Jan Ciechanowski to whom the Premier dictated his account of the conversation — was on the Berling Army. When Lange said Stalin had promised to supply arms for a million Poles, that the Berling army would be the first to arrive and Poland, and thus bring its influence to bear on Poland’s life, Mikołajczyk said Lange seemed to forget that the Home Army was already there and would liberate some territories in an uprising. He asked Lange what Berling would do then? He also asked

⁸⁹ S. Grabski, *op. cit.*, pp. 465–466.

⁹⁰ See R. Szymczak, *Oskar Lange*, I, pp. 19–22.

if Stalin knew about the contacts established by the Home Army with the Red Army in Volhynia, and of the execution of those who had refused to join Berling? Lange said Stalin had only told him about contacts between some units and the Red Army, also the latter's conditions for cooperation, to which, according to Stalin, the Poles made no reply; he also said some Polish soldiers had gone over to the Soviets. Lange then repeated Stalin's opinion about the *Sanacja*'s domination over the Home Army, and that the Polish government was misinformed about the strength of the Polish Workers' Party (*PPR*) in Poland. He also repeated Stalin's doubt that Mikołajczyk really had the support of 90% of the Polish population⁹¹.

There is no record of what Mikołajczyk thought of Lange's report and the latter's answers to his questions. It is possible he shared Ambassador Ciechanowski's view that Stalin's statements to Lange were meant to support Roosevelt in the election. (Presumably, Roosevelt might cite Stalin's declarations on a strong, independent, and sovereign Poland? A.C.) Whatever the case might be, the Premier must have agreed with the ambassador when the latter reported advice from "friendly American circles" that the Polish government should do everything to reach an agreement with the Soviets before they approached the center of Poland⁹². Indeed, while Roosevelt told Mikołajczyk he had not agreed to the Curzon Line, he pressed the Polish leader to go to Moscow to talk with Stalin and the Poles there. The President seems to have promised that he would try to get Lwów (Ukr. *Lv'iv*), Tarnopol (Ukr. *Tarnopil*) and Drohobycz (Ukr. *Drohobyc*) for Poland⁹³. At the same time, the President assured Stalin that he continued to

⁹¹ See: Ciechanowski's note on the Mikołajczyk — Lange conversation, Blair House, Washington, D.C., June 13, 1944, *DOPSR*, II, doc. no. 143. *Sanacja* was the pejorative term used by opposition politicians to mean the Polish governments that followed Piłsudski's Coup of May 1926. It referred to Piłsudski's goal of cleansing and healing the political process; the word itself was derived from the French: *assainir*.

⁹² See: Ciechanowski report to Mikołajczyk, cited in: Edward J. Rozek, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy. A Pattern in Poland*, Chicago 1958, reprint, Boulder, Co. 1989, p. 225.

⁹³ A good account of Mikołajczyk's talks with President Roosevelt and high U.S. officials in the State Department is to be found in R.C. Lukas, *op. cit.*, pp. 57–58; see also relevant chapter in the memoirs of Ambassador Jan Ciechanowski, *Defeat in Victory*, Garden City, N.Y. 1947. For the official American record, see: *FRUS 1944*, v. III, pp. 1272–73, 1274–76, 1277–78, 1280–82, and a summary in: Secretary of State to Harriman, Washington, June 17, 1944, *ibid.*, pp. 1285–1289. The only hint of Roosevelt's offer to get Lwów, Tarnopol and Drohobycz for Poland is a sentence reading: "The President apparently intimated to Mikołajczyk that he might be able to be of further assistance later on", *ibid.*, p. 1288 (par. 2). According to Mikołajczyk's Memorandum on his conversations with President Roosevelt. Mr. Stettinius and other representatives of the American administration, submitted to the State Department and dated June 12, 1944, "The President said that at the Tehran Conference (*sic!*) he had made it clear that he held the view that the Polish-Soviet conflict should not be settled on the basis of the Curzon Line and he assured the Prime Minister that at the appropriate time he would help Poland to retain Lwów, Drohobycz and Tarnopol, and to obtain East Prussia, including Königsberg, and Silesia", see *DOPSR* II, doc. no. 141, p. 251.

“consider all matters between us in the atmosphere of Teheran”. He also inquired timidly about Lwów⁹⁴. Since he had then acquiesced privately to the Polish–Soviet frontier along the Curzon Line, the meaning was clear.

Lange himself was pessimistic. On June 16, he told Charles E. Bohlen, Chief of the East European division in the State Department and his deputy, Elbridge R. Durbrow, that he saw no possibility of a Polish–Soviet agreement. Even if Mikołajczyk were willing, it was doubtful whether he could bring the government and the Poles abroad with him. Therefore, he thought that if, as he expected, nothing could be worked out between Mikołajczyk and the Soviet government, the Soviets would deal with the Polish National Council (*KRN*), or some similar body inside Poland. He also thought this body would consider itself to be some sort of provisional government, and would probably invite Mikołajczyk, as well as some other members of the Polish government, to join it in Poland⁹⁵.

Lange was either remarkably prescient, or repeated what he had heard from the Soviet leader. Whatever the case may be, Mikołajczyk’s three meetings with Lebedev on June 20, 22, and 23, failed to achieve any progress. At the last meeting, the Soviet ambassador put the standard Soviet demands to Mikołajczyk on “a take it or leave it basis”. When the Premier explained he could not accept them, the talks ended⁹⁶. Stalin surely intended to see if he could split the Polish government by persuading Mikołajczyk to resign and, taking his supporters with him, join either a Polish National Committee, or a new government under the auspices of Moscow. On June 22, the day before the last Lebedev–Mikołajczyk meeting, Stalin recognized the Home National Council (*KRN*) as representing the Polish people. Two

⁹⁴ On June 12, 1944, Harriman reported to the President: “I told Stalin last night that you were continuing to consider all matters between us in the atmosphere of Teheran”. The Ambassador also said that “you were puzzled over the future of Lwów and hoped he would give sympathetic study to the matter in his dealings with the Poles. I told him that this and the other boundary questions could best be worked out between him and the Poles if they were dealt with in an understanding manner”. See: *FRUS 1944*, vol. III, p. 1282. On June 17, Secretary Hull sent Harriman a message from Roosevelt to Stalin, stating the President’s favorable impression of Mikołajczyk, and saying the latter was ready to go to Moscow for talks on Polish–Soviet relations, *ibid.*, p. 1284.

⁹⁵ Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, June 16, 1944, Subject: Polish–Soviet Relations. Participants: Dr. Oscar Lange, University of Chicago; Mr. Bohlen, Chief. EE; and Mr. Durbrow, Assistant Chief, EE., p. 4., National Archives, OSS–FNB, Poland, Decimal File, 1940–44, Box 21.

⁹⁶ See: Eden to Clark–Kerr, July 8, 1944, Telegram, A. P o l o n s k y, *op. cit.*, doc. no. 99, pp. 205–206. Eden wrote: “Foregoing is based upon a full account furnished to me in strictest confidence by the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs and is for your own information only. Story is known only to Polish Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and it is important that Soviet Government should receive no hint that the Poles have taken us into their confidence”. *ibid.*, point 8, p. 206. Eden might not have known that Grabski was also present at the conversation, see S. G r a b s k i, *op. cit.*, v. II, p. 468. The Polish Foreign Minister at this time was Tadeusz Romer.

days later, the *ZPP* confirmed this, saying the *KRN* created the possibility of establishing a Provisional National Government in Poland⁹⁷.

If Stalin had intended Roosevelt to use some of his positive statements on Poland — as made to Lange — he was disappointed. In early July, the furore in the Polish–American community over the Moscow trip again rose to fever pitch with the publication of extracts of Lange’s notes, obtained under false pretenses from Lange’s Secretary and his Research Assistant by a colleague of the famous journalist Drew Pearson and published by the latter in the *Washington Post*, on July 2 and 3, 1944. Lange reported the whole matter to J. Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI, who in turn reported it to the President’s Military Aide, and Appointments Secretary, Major General Edwin M. (“Pa”) Watson. Hoover also sent copies to the State Department. However, there is no record of any official action against Pearson or his colleague⁹⁸.

Lange’s next intervention in Polish affairs was his letter of July 28, 1944, to Wanda Wasilewska, then Deputy Chairperson of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (*Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego* — *PKWN*) of which Edward Osóbka–Morawski was the first chairperson. This Committee had been established on July 22, ostensibly in Poland, but, in fact, in Moscow. It consisted of members of the *ZPP* and the Home National Council (*Krajowa Rada Narodowa* — *KRN*), whose delegates crossed the frontline and were in Moscow in May–July 1944⁹⁹. Mikołajczyk heard of the *PKWN* when he was already on his way to Moscow, but decided to proceed. Lange’s letter — again handwritten in English — was transmitted through his wife to Shabanov. In his cover letter to Shabanov Lange wrote: “Mr. Mikołajczyk’s visit to Moscow makes it most urgent that Wasilewska be informed of the situation. This appraisal may influence the Polish Committee’s hand”. He added that he was very busy at the University, so his wife was bringing Shabanov this letter¹⁰⁰.

⁹⁷ On June 22, 1944, Stalin told the *KRN* delegation that it was necessary to begin preparations to create a new Polish government based on the *KRN*. On June 24, the *ZPP* Executive resolved that the *KRN* was “the true representative of the Polish nation”, see: K. Kersten, *op. cit.*, pp. 61–62, and references cited there.

⁹⁸ Oscar Lange to J. Edgar Hoover, July 5, 1944; J. Edgar Hoover to Major General Edwin M. Watson, Secretary to the President, The White House, Washington, D.C., July 4, and same, July 13, also report by Lange’s Secretary, Dorothy Jaffe Sheinfeld, and Bert F. Hoselitz, his Research Assistant, July 3, newspaper cuttings, PSF File, 66, Lange–Orlemański, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. On July 25, Cordell Hull returned the whole file to General Watson, noting that the President had sent it to him (Hull), on July 13, with the request that it be sent back to Watson., *ibid.*

⁹⁹ On the creation of the *PKWN*, see K. Kersten, *op. cit.*, pp. 62–65, and references cited there.

¹⁰⁰ Lange to Shabanoff (*sic*) July 28, 1944, *AVP*, f. 06, op. 6, d. 546, pap. 42, p. 13.

In his letter to Wasilewska of July 28, Lange wrote that the establishment of the Polish Committee of National Liberation was received well by the American press and radio. Although there was a strong sentiment favoring a compromise between the Committee and the London government, the general view was that the [Polish] government's stupidity was responsible [for the creation of the *PKWN*, A.C.]. Furthermore, American opinion was so strongly impressed by the Red Army's successes, that it was not inclined to question Soviet policy on Poland. He thought that once the Committee was strongly established in Poland, the demand for compromise would subside. He also mentioned that there was a group among Polish diplomatic and information officials in New York, who were ready to collaborate with the Committee. Furthermore, while American Poles were bewildered, he thought the majority would swing over to the new Polish government, once it was recognized by the United States. He added that pressure for a compromise was much stronger in Britain than in the United States.

In these circumstances, he advised the *PKWN* to try to include Mikołajczyk and some other members of the London government. He said he had seen Mikołajczyk, who impressed him as "as a sincere man, only badly informed about [the] situation in Poland". He would even go so far as to offer Mikołajczyk the chairmanship of the Committee, which should then assume the name of the Provisional National Government. This would, he wrote, save the prestige of the American and British governments and facilitate recognition. However, the Committee should under no circumstances take over "the diplomatic and military clique", which continued its "vicious activity" and called the *PKWN* a "tool of foreign power". Furthermore, continued Lange, the Atlantic Charter was very popular in the United States, so the Committee should invoke its provision on guaranteeing the right of peoples to choose their own governments. Finally, the *PKWN* should immediately approach the American government with a request for visas for the delegation. (It is not known who suggested sending a *KRN* delegation to the United States, A.C.). The Professor said that he and Krzycki would do their best to help with the visas being granted¹⁰¹.

Mikołajczyk was in Moscow between July 30 and August 10, but his efforts to reach an agreement with the Soviet government and the *PKWN* were unsuccessful. He could not accept the Curzon Line as the Polish-Soviet frontier, nor the offer of only 20% of the seats in a new Polish government for his Peasant Party, along with the Premiership for himself. He secured

¹⁰¹ Lange to Wanda Wasilewska, Vice-Chairman, Polish Committee of National Liberation, *AVP, ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

Stalin's rather vague agreement to help the Warsaw Uprising, which broke out on August 1. At the end of the talks, he told the Soviet leader he would refer the Soviet and *PKWN* proposals to his government¹⁰². Stalin, for his part, probably calculated that a vague promise of help for Warsaw might entice Mikołajczyk to leave the Polish government in London and accept a prestige post in a new government, in which he and his allies would be outnumbered.

In any case, Stalin decided to put further pressure on Roosevelt. On August 8, i.e. two days before Mikołajczyk left Moscow — the *PKWN* drafted a telegram to President Roosevelt proposing an exchange of diplomatic representatives, with Lange as its representative in Washington, and handed it to ambassador Harriman. Furthermore, Stalin himself informed Roosevelt that the Polish Committee of National Liberation had decided to invite Lange to join it as director of Foreign Affairs. He thought this would benefit Poland and ended by saying: "I hope that you share this view and will not refuse the necessary support in this matter which is of such great importance to our common cause"¹⁰³. However, the President proved unwilling to do so, and Lange sent another letter to the *PKWN*, dated August 18, interpreting Roosevelt's negative attitude to this request. Again, the letter was written in Lange's hand and in English. He wrote that Roosevelt could not agree to the *PKWN* proposals because this would imply American recognition. If, however, Lange wrote, he joined a government which

¹⁰² For a brief, critical, account of Mikołajczyk in Moscow August 1944. see: K. K e r s t e n , *op. cit.*, pp. 78–83; in more detail, see E. R o z e k , *op. cit.*, pp. 237–247; see also: *DOPSR* II, nos. 177, 180, 186, 189. The most important conversations were, of course, with Stalin, on Aug. 3, and 9. In the Polish record of the second conversation, Mikołajczyk reminded Stalin of his promise to do everything possible to help Warsaw as soon as possible, and Stalin confirmed his promise, see *ibid.*, p. 337. This referred to a statement by Stalin on August 3. According to the Polish record of this conversation, after Mikołajczyk had asked for Stalin's help for Polish units fighting in Warsaw, Stalin said: "I will give the necessary orders", *ibid.*, no. 180, p. 311. This statement is not, however, included in the Russian record, *AVP*, f. 06, op. 6, pap. 42, d. 550, pp. 4–15. However, in the Russian record of the conversation of August 9, Stalin promised to "try to do all that is possible", see: *Voenna-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, 1993, no. 3, p. 23. For documents on Stalin's attitude toward the Warsaw Uprising, see: Antoni Przygoński, *Stalin i Powstanie Warszawskie (Stalin and Warsaw Uprising)*, Warszawa 1994. For a recent study accusing Stalin of committing a crime against Warsaw, see: Lech Dzikiewicz, *Zbrodnia Stalina na Warszawie (Stalin's Crime Against Warsaw)*, Warszawa 1994.

¹⁰³ Letter from the Polish Committee of National Liberation to President Roosevelt; the letter is typed in Russian. There is a handwritten note after the text, that it was sent to Com. [Dmitri Z.] Manuilsky (1883–1959, chairman of the Council of Ministers and a Deputy Foreign Minister), on Aug. 8, 1944, and received by Shapirova (presumably his Secretary); another copy went to [Bolesław] Bierut (1892–1956, then President of the *KRN*, which acted as a pseudo parliament attached to the *PKWN*), *AVP*, f. 06, op. 6, d. 546, pap. 42, pp. 77–78. The *PKWN* gave its letter to Ambassador Harriman, see: *Zapis besedy narodnogo komissara inostrannykh del SSSR a poslom SShA v SSSR, 11 avgusta 1944*, in: *Sovetsko-amerikanskii otnosheniia*, t. 2, p. 173; cf. Harriman to Secretary of State, Aug. 11, 1944, see: *FRUS* 1944, III, pp. 1311–13. For Stalin to Roosevelt, Aug. 9, 1944 (paraphrase), see: *ibid.*, pp. 1307–08.

included Mikołajczyk, Roosevelt would give his official support because such a government would be recognized by the United States. Lange went on to say that Roosevelt's actions were determined by the forthcoming elections. After more remarks in this vein, Lange concluded by saying he would go to Washington to try and find out how his joining the *PKWN* would be accepted by Roosevelt and the State Department. This might take some time, but he also thought he might be able to influence the position of the U.S. government¹⁰⁴.

Indeed, on August 30, Lange reported in a letter to Edward (Osóbka) Morawski (Chair *PKWN*) and Wanda Wasilewska (Deputy Chair), that he had succeeded in learning Roosevelt's position. Lange could have seen the President, who was in town when Lange was there on August 29, and left for the Labor Day weekend the next day. While no record of such a meeting survived, Lange saw Charles E. Bohlen in the State Department, on August 29th. Bohlen noted the Professor said that "he had no particular business but merely wished to give me his views on recent developments in the Polish-Soviet situation". He was depressed by the Soviet refusal of aid to the Warsaw insurgents, which he saw "a great blunder from the point of view of Polish psychology". He also felt this development would make any agreement between Mikołajczyk and the Polish Committee virtually impossible. He thought that if Mikołajczyk did not participate in a new Polish government, it would be two years before Polish-American opinion accepted it, "and then only after it had been established as a working government in Poland"¹⁰⁵.

If Bohlen transmitted Roosevelt's views to Lange, there is no trace of what he said. Perhaps he was, therefore, not a party to what Lange was told, either by the President or by some trusted official. Whatever the case may be, in Lange's letter to Morawski and Wasilewska of August 30, 1944, we read: "After thorough exploration in Washington I find that President Roosevelt would support my joining Committee of Liberation or Polish government only when he will be ready to give official diplomatic recognition. At present such recognition depends on coalition with Mikołajczyk. Unfortunately, prestige of Committee of Liberation has suffered greatly by crisis over aid to Warsaw uprising. I urge that you do your utmost in helping Warsaw fighters and postpone for later discussion of responsibility". He went on to say that the question of his participation should be postponed. If this issue were an obstacle to negotiations with Mikołajczyk, the Committee

¹⁰⁴ Oscar Lange to Polish Committee of National Liberation, August 18, 1944, *AVP, ibid.*, p. 18.

¹⁰⁵ Memorandum by Charles E. Bohlen, August 29, 1944, National Archives, OSS-FNB, Poland, Decimal files. Box. 21.

should not consider itself under any obligation to him. However, if his participation were considered helpful, they should ask Mikołajczyk to express such a view in a message to Roosevelt. Finally, he advised the *PKWN* to put in an aid request to UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Association) which, he wrote, was impatiently waiting for such a request. Furthermore, it was desirable for the *PKWN* to ask Mikołajczyk to put in a similar request¹⁰⁶.

In fact, as Lange had told Bohlen, the task of establishing a new Polish government met with a severe setback, because of the Soviet refusal to help the Warsaw Uprising, which provoked outrage in both Britain and the United States. In another message, typed in English, addressed to Edward [Osóbka] Morawski and Wanda Wasilewska, Polish Committee of National Liberation (undated, but presumably sent in September), Lange appealed to the *PKWN* and the *ZPP*. He wrote that Americans of Polish descent were deeply disturbed by press reports from Lublin on the attitude of *PKWN* spokesmen toward the uprising. Whatever the original, political motives of the uprising might be, wrote Lange, it was now the cause of the whole Polish nation and of all the United Nations. Therefore, he wrote: "Your friends in [the] United States expect you to secure fullest moral and material support to Warsaw fighters"¹⁰⁷.

As we know, the Warsaw Uprising ended in defeat on October 2.

Mikołajczyk travelled again to Moscow in October, but could not accept the Stalin–*PKWN* conditions, i.e. the immediate acceptance of the Curzon Line as the Polish–Soviet frontier and only four out of twenty Cabinet seats for the Peasant Party, with himself as Prime Minister. In early November, the Polish Cabinet in London rejected the Soviet demand for its recognition of the Curzon Line as the Polish–Soviet frontier¹⁰⁸. Indeed, if the Polish government wanted to keep the allegiance of the vast majority of Poles at home and abroad, it could not go beyond its memorandum for the British government of August 29, i.e. to have the Polish–Soviet frontier settled by a freely elected Polish parliament (*Sejm*) on the basis of self-deter-

¹⁰⁶ Typed letter, dated August 30, 1944, signed by Lange, *AVP, ibid.*, p. 19. This was presumably sent as a telegram via the Soviet Embassy in Washington, or the Consulate in New York.

¹⁰⁷ Unsigned, undated, typed note. In the top left hand corner, there is something that looks like a sender's code: "0015 Petrowa NY, SRW 3187 New York 85 31". Slightly below, on the right hand side is the address: "NLT Polish Committee National Liberation c/o Union Polish Patriots Moscow" (*sic*). Typed at the end are the words: "Oscar Lange", *AVP, ibid.*, p. 72.

¹⁰⁸ For Mikołajczyk's Moscow talks in October 1944, see: E. J. Rozeck, *op. cit.*, pp. 267–296, also *DOPSR II* doc. nos. 237–246. The Russian records of these conversations were not on the Molotov Secretariat files made available to this researcher in the *AVP* in summer 1994. For the text of the Polish government's resolution of Nov. 3, 1944, rejecting the Soviet terms, see: *DOPSR II*, doc. no. 259.

mination¹⁰⁹ This implied the cession of most of former eastern Poland, but not preponderantly Polish-speaking areas, especially Lwów (*Lv'iv*) and Wilno (*Vilnius*). However, Stalin refused to consider such a compromise.

Lange's last intervention on the question of the Polish government in 1944 was a long letter to Molotov, typed in Russian and dated November 10. In it he urged the inclusion of Mikołajczyk in the *PKWN*, and that Lwów be left to Poland. Molotov answered curtly on November 18, saying he disagreed with Lange's evaluation of Mikołajczyk. The latter, claimed Molotov, had no authority in Poland and no perspectives for the future. Furthermore, wrote Molotov, Lange was far from Poland and the *PKWN*, and had completely incorrect information on the real situation in Poland. As for Lvov, wrote Molotov, he thought it was unnecessary to repeat the Soviet Union's negative answer given long ago. Molotov sent both letters to Nikolai A. Bulganin (1895–1975), the Soviet representative to the *PKWN*, with the request that he give copies to [Bolesław] Bierut (President, *KRN*) and Osóbka Morawski (Chair, *PKWN*)¹¹⁰.

IV. Concluding Remarks

Lange's correspondence with the *ZPP* and then the *PKWN*, also the Russian records of his conversations with Stalin and Molotov in May 1944, indicate that he was in touch with American officials and that, at least from May 1944 onward, he spoke for President Roosevelt. Indeed, it is clear that in May Stalin treated the Professor as an intermediary between the President and himself. Lange's memoranda, letters and notes to the *ZPP* and *PKWN* were — except for the typed Russian memorandum of February 14 — written in English, although the addressees were Polish, which indicates that English-speaking readers read this correspondence. We know that Lange was in touch with the Foreign Nationalities Branch (FNB) of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) since 1942, while in August 1944 — if not earlier — he was also in direct contact with high officials in the State Department, and perhaps with Roosevelt himself. We know the President was most anxious for the Polish question to be settled in a manner acceptable to Polish-Americans, whose votes he needed to win the November election. He saw the inclusion of Mikołajczyk in such a government as the key condition for such acceptance. This is reflected in the stress on the inclusion of Mikołajczyk in the *PKN*, or the *PKWN*, or in a new Polish government, which was present in Lange's correspondence from the very beginning.

¹⁰⁹ See: *DOPSR* II, doc. no. 214.

¹¹⁰ *AVP, ibid.*, pp. 80–84. Lange's letter to Molotov was obviously a translation from English; it began: *Dorogoi Syr.*, i.e. Dear Sir.

Finally, on August 30, Lange clearly stated Roosevelt's view on his joining the *PKWN*, i.e. only if the President could recognize it officially, which was conditioned on the inclusion of Mikołajczyk.

While it is, of course, possible to assume that, in 1943–44, Lange's articles in the American and Polish–American press, as well as some of his public speeches, were, at least in part, “inspired” from Moscow, it is this writer's opinion that the Professor was neither a Kremlin agent nor Stalin's puppet. He seems to have played the role of intermediary between Washington and Moscow in accordance with his personal goal, i.e. the establishment of a socialist, democratic Poland allied with the USSR. Furthermore, his comments and suggestions were far more in line with Roosevelt's ideas than with Stalin's. Thus, Lange's political views and his personal friendship with Wanda Wasilewska predisposed him for the role of intermediary between Roosevelt and Stalin. As it happened, Roosevelt did not get a Polish government including Mikołajczyk, which would be acceptable to Polish–Americans, in time for the election. However, he promised them what they wanted: a strong, independent, democratic Poland. Given this promise, as well as the fact that most of them supported his New Deal policies, they voted for him in November 1944. Stalin, for his part, did not get Mikołajczyk to join the *PKWN* in 1944, but the latter constituted itself as the Polish Provisional Government on December 31, 1944, and he recognized it as such a few days later — despite the pleas of Roosevelt and Churchill that he wait with his decision until the forthcoming Yalta conference. There, they accepted Stalin's suggestions on enlarging the Provisional Government — though Churchill tried hard to make it more representative¹¹¹.

Mikołajczyk, who had resigned from the Polish government in late November 1944, accepted the Yalta decisions on Poland and travelled to Moscow June 1945 to negotiate his access to a new Polish government. Tragically, these negotiations took place as the same time as the rigged trial of sixteen Polish underground leaders kidnapped and imprisoned by the *NKVD*¹¹². The verdicts were delivered on June 21, the day on which agreement was reached on the membership of the new government, including Mikołajczyk as a Deputy Premier, and the trial was, of course, a means

¹¹¹ See A. M. Cienciąła, *Britain and Polonia Before and After Yalta (1943–1945)*. A. Reassessment, “Polish Review” vol. XL, 3, 1995, pp. 281–313.

¹¹² See: Andrzej Chmielarz and Andrzej K. Kunert, eds., *Proces Szesnastu. Dokumenty NKWD (Trial of Sixteen. NKWD Documents)*, Warszawa 1995 (Polish translation of *NKWD documents*, A.C.). On Mikołajczyk's negotiations in Moscow to enter the new Provisional Polish Government and the agreement reached, see: K. Kersten, *op. cit.*, pp. 156–157, and E.J. Rózek, *op. cit.*, pp. 394–396. For more detail, see: A. Paczkowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 132–137.

of Soviet pressure on the Polish statesman. He, like most Poles, pinned his hopes on the free elections which the new government was obligated to hold as soon as possible. The official establishment of the new government on June 28, 1944, opened the way to western recognition of it as the Provisional Government of National Unity (*Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej* — *TRJN*) on July 5, 1945. However, the free elections were never held and Poland, like most of Eastern Europe, was destined to live under a Communist system and Soviet domination for the next forty-four years. Few contemporaries could have foreseen such a long period of time, though in 1943 President Roosevelt seemed to envisage Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, along with Communists governments, for at least twenty years¹¹³. The Lange papers in Moscow, combined with American sources, show that Roosevelt helped lay the foundations for the beginning of this process in 1944, through Oskar Lange¹¹⁴.

¹¹³ According to the notes of Archbishop Francis Spellman of New York (later Cardinal), President Roosevelt told him on September 4, 1943, that the world would be divided into spheres of influence: "China gets the Far East; the U.S. the Pacific; Britain and Russia, Europe and Africa. But as Britain had predominantly colonial interests it might be assumed that Russia will predominate in Europe". Roosevelt thought that: "The European people will simply have to endure the Russian domination, in the hope that in ten or twenty years they will be able to live well with the Russians". He probably meant Eastern Europe, for he also said Stalin would get Finland, the Baltic States, eastern Poland and Bessarabia. Furthermore, he told Spellman that he expected to see Communist governments in Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Croatia, though he thought the Communists might accept a Popular Front government in France. See: Robert J. Gannon, S.J., *The Cardinal Spellman Story*, Garden City, N.Y., pp. 222–224. American military projections in August–September 1943 also envisaged Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, see: Mark Stoler, *The Politics of the Second Front. American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941–1943*, Westport, Ct., 1977, chap. 8. By 1944, Roosevelt certainly believed that Poland, along with the rest of Central and South–Eastern Europe, would fall under Soviet domination.

¹¹⁴ Lange was the first postwar Polish ambassador to the United States from fall 1945 to early 1947; from March 1946, he was also the Polish representative in the U.N. Security Council. After his return to Poland he supported the "Polish Path to Socialism", and was active in the *PPS*, but had to renounce both in late 1948, and joined the United Polish Workers' Party (*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*), a forced amalgamation of part of the *PPS* with the *PPR*. He was active mainly in academic affairs until October 1956, when the return to power of Władysław Gomułka revived his political career. From 1957 to his death he was the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, though he devoted much time to writing books on economics. He died in London in October 1964 and was buried with official honors in the sector for distinguished soldiers and civilians at the Powązki cemetery, Warsaw, see: T. Kowalik in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, v. XVI, pp. 493–495, and T. Siemicki, *op. cit.*, pp. 183–281.