

Denis Sdvizhkov

**THE INTELLIGENTSIA:
FROM A GLOBAL PHENOMENON TO A PERIPHERAL ONE,
AND VICE VERSA**

The fruitful nineteenth century almost simultaneously created the concepts of 'history', in its contemporary understanding, and of 'intelligentsia'. Setting national history as the frame of reference, the intelligentsia put itself in the centre of its attention. With variations, its central position had remained unchanged for more than a century. Definitely, social history as well as sociology, of Marxist and non-Marxist models alike, treated intelligentsia as a universal concept. However, it hardly provided a basis for real comparisons or empirically applied transnational approach in research. And abandoning the framework of national history, the intelligentsia started to fade away like a rare flower, immediately losing its colour and scent, becoming pale and dry. There was nothing left but some abstract schemes, such as Karl Mannheim's *freischwebende Intelligenz*.¹

The empirical basis for comparisons has become more visible with the general shift of historical science firstly to the human being, and then, since the 1980s and 1990s, to the *space*. Undoubtedly, the success of the concept *Mittelosteuropa*, former 'Central Europe', influenced the discourse of the Polish 'intelligentsia'. Along with the whole historiography, the Polish well-educated stratum started to be more and more often considered in the regional terms. One of the fundamental elements of the *Mittelosteuropa* concept was the dialectics of the particular region: within Europe, but at its periphery.²

¹ See Tibor Huszár, *Abriss der Geschichte der Intelligenz* (Budapest, 1988). A more successful example characteristic of the *Annales* school, which was the first one to justify the necessity for comparative history: Jacques Le Goff and Béla Köpeczi (eds.), *Intellectuels français, intellectuels hongrois: XIIIe–XXe siècles* (Paris and Budapest, 1985).

² See Ivan T. Berend, *Central and Eastern Europe 1944–1993: Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery* (Cambridge, 1996).

The phenomenon of ‘peripherism’ that in one way or another had been present in the Polish national tradition for a long time (for this purpose it was sufficient to re-interpret the relationship between Rome and *antemurale* within the space of *Christianitas*) served as a tool for overcoming the complex known as the Polish ‘special path’, and created a good basis for comparisons. Polish intelligentsia, together with other phenomena, initially became a subject of typology and comparisons within the region (primarily in the Czech and Hungarian context). Then, the old parallelism with Russia fitted in well. And finally, the idea was spread to non-European provinces of the West – Latin America, Asia and post-colonial countries.³

Constructive dynamics, which was connected with the ‘regionalisation’ of Polish national history, is especially evident if we compare the situation with that in Russia, where problems of spatial reference to the place, and the lack of a regional identity are obvious. It is also evident that the ‘intelligentsia’ is still the cornerstone of the national consciousness of the ‘other Russia’ or the *cultural nation*, as an alternative to the *political nation*. Therefore, according to national myths, many like to ascribe ‘intelligence’ to themselves and perceive it as a phenomenon *specific* only to them.⁴ However, the regionalisation of national history is of dual nature: it may either correspond with the evaluative models, normative models and models indicating the lack of development at the periphery, or it may even consolidate them.

Hence, how to contextualise ‘intelligentsia’? The article is a collection of thoughts and a proposal of an investigation rather than research itself. It contains a kind of manifesto, which justifies the inevitable rough generalisations in a short text. First, I will present ‘intelligentsia’ as a global phenomenon in the light of the processes

³ ‘Wherever later in the world similar circumstances appeared [as in Poland – D.S.], there usually appeared the social stratum ... called “intelligentsia”’, see Jerzy Jedlicki, ‘Przedmowa’, in Maciej Janowski, Jerzy Jedlicki and Magdalena Micińska, *Dzieje inteligencji polskiej do roku 1918*, 3 vols. (Warsaw, 2008), here: i: Maciej Janowski, *Narodziny inteligencji 1750–1831*, p. 11.

⁴ Dmitrii S. Likhachev, *Ob intelligentsii* (Saint Petersburg, 1997); Boris A. Uspenskiĭ, ‘Russkaya intelligentsiya kak spetsificheskii fenomen russkoĭ kultury’, in *idem* (ed.), *Russkaya intelligentsiya i zapadnyĭ intellektualizm: istoriya i tipologiya. Materialy mezhdunarodnoĭ konferentsii, Neapol’, maĭ 1997*, *Russia*, N.S., 2 (10) (Moscow etc., 1999).

that shaped Europe from the eighteenth century to the twentieth century. Then, slightly reducing the degree of abstraction, I will descend to the level of history of concepts and discuss the mutual relations between the notion of 'intelligentsia' and the spatial hierarchy of 'center' – 'periphery'.

An initial remark – I am far from claiming that the concepts of 'center' and 'periphery' are unfamiliar to history. They undoubtedly are not. Any effort to treat schemes of this type as relative is useful – plenty of new materials, new issues and methodological approaches appear. However, an important question arises: to what extent it destroys the existing hierarchy. For it seems that the assertion of relativity and the nuances may strengthen the existing general scheme rather than destroy it. There are many examples of this mechanism in the main discussion on the 'center' and 'periphery' – on Euro- (West-) centrism in postcolonial studies.

Another reservation is that the 'intelligentsia' is not a global phenomenon in the present sense of the word. In a distinct, semantically marked form it is characteristic even not for all Europe, but rather its continental part. Definitely, the Anglo-Saxon cultural space certainly cannot be excluded, but it is rather a specific case.⁵ The 'intelligentsia' is a transient and discontinuous phenomenon, following the rhythm of rises and falls. It is characteristic for the long, or perhaps even 'king size' nineteenth century (if one includes the thriving of the Enlightenment from the 1750s and 1760s onward). Moreover, it is a phenomenon that during this period often changes both its social profile and the reflection of this profile in historical semantics.

Taking into consideration the above reservations, it is remarkable, however, that from the eighteenth century to the twentieth century the social reality and the language used to make sense of this reality always returned to the idea of 'people of knowledge', and this constancy cannot be accidental.⁶ Secondly, the term 'intelligentsia' actually serves as a link rather than a marker of separation. And finally, it rather points to the relativity of the notion of 'periphery' than confirms it.

⁵ Stefan Collini, *Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850–1930* (Oxford, 1993); *et al.*

⁶ Jacques Verger, *Les gens de savoir dans l'Europe de la fin du Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1997).

From the perspective of social history, the description of a national 'intelligentsia' is problematic, mainly because it operates as a network rather than a group within a closed society. Models of social behaviour, the *modus vivendi* with unified standards of living, with continuous mobility, written forms of communication, etc. – create structures which are ultimately generated by the new power of new knowledge, where the network character is realised. I agree with the authors of *Dzieje inteligencji polskiej do roku 1918* [The History of the Polish Intelligentsia until 1918] on the point that the form of the social existence of the 'intelligentsia' was milieu. However, it was an open milieu, making in aggregate a supranational community in a nation-oriented century.⁷

The main social mission of intelligentsia is to describe the 'society' and 'nation', but to do it in terms of boundaries, defining the limits (*society* – between the *state* and *people*, and *nation* with regard to *the Other*). 'People of knowledge' find themselves as external creators of the system. In other words, those who wanted to turn *peasants into Frenchmen* (Russians or Poles – you choose), in fact lived themselves by different rules.

While the 'mental maps' of the intellectuals created the idea of an enclosed space, the time models relied basically on the collective identity, on a sense of unity of time, of the common nineteenth century, which brought an existential solid basis for this network.

The concepts of intelligentsia, including the notions of national identity and exclusiveness, are based on mutual borrowings and translations. Basic historical concepts, which are formulated by the intelligentsia and constitute the framework of the national literary language, are penetrated by these parallelisms. Such language – called to confirm specificity – is potentially clear and translatable, and its best patterns form the general canon for understanding the learned people from beyond the borders.

Moreover, 'periphery' usually also implies the recognition of the phenomenon of the intelligentsia as a symptom of a social development crisis, as opposed to 'normality'. I once again to some extent agree that intelligentsia is a child of a crisis, however, of a global crisis, or at least a European one.

⁷ We do not take into consideration any exotic forms, such as secret organisations. However, they also may very well function as a network, just like Masonic lodges do.

Modern European ideas about the society were being developed since the sixteenth century under the influence of a deep shock. The monotheistic Christian consciousness required unity. However, Christianity was now being divided not only in the metaphysical reality, but also in the worldly one. The desire to overcome this feeling gave rise to many phenomena: the baroque aesthetics marked by crisis, the doctrine of mechanism in the seventeenth-century science, as well as the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophical systems.

Simultaneously, there is also another path: from a passive object that may be divided and united, the 'society' gradually acquires the features of a thinking organism, in which the question of unity is abandoned and overcome. In the eighteenth century, at the very beginning of the process, the *philosophers* played the role of puppeteers and tried to direct the 'public opinion'. In the nineteenth century the intelligentsia starts to hold a central position *within* the nation as an internal and integral part of the self-conscious organism.

The forms of conceptual and social manifestation of the new power of knowledge constitute the basis of intelligentsia's global role. I agree with the authors of 'The History of the Polish Intelligentsia' that 'intelligentsia' is created not by utilitarian knowledge, but rather by explanatory and saving one.⁸ Yet again, I perceive the concept in a global context. The power of knowledge in the European society of the modern period is established in opposition to the power of money. Despite the obvious, real and multiple relations with capitalism, the history of intellectuals appears – from the contrafactual perspective – to be an alternative to the triumphant history of the bourgeoisie.⁹

Knowledge with its symbolic capital (Pierre Bourdieu), constantly capitalised throughout the nineteenth century, started to compete with the economic capital. Ideal visions of the social order were generally created by the intelligentsia as new alternatives to the social order based on the participation in economic relations. Seeking the criteria for the legitimisation and representation of power, with the fall of the 'divine sanction', the *Bildung* and *Besitz* [education and property] became a competitive pair. According to the intelligentsia's view, they both may be conceptualised together as the basis of the declared

⁸ Jedlicki, 'Przedmowa', 11.

⁹ This thesis is outlined in Fritz K. Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge: French Academic Culture in Comparative Perspective, 1890–1920* (Cambridge and Paris, 1992).

unity of the third estate/middle class/bourgeoisie. They might also be opposed to each other – and indeed they were. And this opposition is equally characteristic not only for the ‘peripheral’ Poland or Russia, but also for the central and bourgeois France or Germany.¹⁰

The question of representation – central to the modern political language¹¹ – served as the immediate motive to create the concept of ‘intelligentsia’ in the social sense, with reference to a particular group. First, publicists since the 1820s, and then parliamentarians in 1848, were arguing whether only the combination of *Bildung* and *Besitz* gives the right to a political representation and power, or might *Bildung* act there independently.¹² This dynamic is diametrically opposed to one of the main arguments why the Polish or Russian intelligentsia is at the ‘periphery’. The argument concerns the fact that the educated elite in the West joined the middle class ranks, whereas in the East that did not happen because of the weakness and cultural unattractiveness of the bourgeoisie. As a matter of fact, the concept of ‘intelligentsia’, on the contrary, was a product of collapse, or in other words, the nineteenth-century challenge for the idea of a uniform ‘third estate’ as one of the main projects of the eighteenth century.

The intelligentsia had a difficult relation not only with the *bourgeoisie*, but also with the state. The idealist vision of the ‘people of knowledge’ reflected in one way or another the Plato’s dream of a state of ‘wise men’. Various attempts to evade the bureaucratic state using different forces – community, religion, proletariat, bohemian, and not uncommonly also quite anarchist groups – were not accidental in the actual social strategy. The main way was to shift the state out of politics by the concept of the nation in which intelligentsia was an obvious leader.¹³ Another way, not so principal, was the revolutionary

¹⁰ Let us take only Gustave Flaubert with his ‘hatred of bourgeois is the beginning of all virtue’ (to George Sand, 1867). A complete general analysis provides César Graña, ‘Social Optimism and Literary Depression’, in *idem, Fact and Symbol: Essays in the Sociology of Art and Literature* (New York, 1971), 4–64. See also Alan Raitt, *Gustavus Flaubertus Bourgeoisophobus: Flaubert and the Bourgeois Mentality* (Bern, 2005).

¹¹ Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics*, iii: *Hobbes and Civil Science* (Cambridge, 2002), 179.

¹² Otto Müller, *Intelligencija. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte eines politischen Schlagwortes* (Frankfurt a.M., 1971).

¹³ For Russia: Andreas Renner, *Russischer Nationalismus und Öffentlichkeit im Zarenreich 1855–1875* (Cologne, 2000).

radicalism of the intelligentsia being tempted to carry out its schemes using the masses – the peasantry and the proletariat. The problem of the contradiction between the intelligentsia's liberal progressivism and its radicalism (often considered to be characteristic for the eastern periphery, or at least Russia¹⁴), as well as the fixation of the Polish historiography with the pair of 'irredentism' – 'positivism' in this light also gain a global context.¹⁵ As the reverse perspective of 1917, 1918 and 1989 disappear, it ceases to define the meaning of the history of 'peripheral' intelligentsia exactly as the year 1933 ceased to define the history of the German *Bildungsbürgertum*.

Let us now get down to the history of concepts. Despite its discontinuity and inconsistency, despite the fact that 'la terminologie du monde de la pensée a toujours été vague',¹⁶ the *intelligentsia* discovers its universal nature in the semantics of the social role of knowledge, and naturally, primarily in the history of words.¹⁷ The history of the intelligentsia is verbalised and described in terms that it invented itself. For the intelligentsia – beginning with Le Goff's medieval

¹⁴ See the comparison between the radicalism of the Polish and the Russian intelligentsia in James Billington, *Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith* (8th edn, New Jersey, 2009). Other evergreens: Franco Venturi, *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia* (2nd edn, New York, 1966); Abbott Gleason, *Young Russia: The Genesis of Russian Radicalism in the 1860s* (New York, 1980). A new series of research brought about the recent interest in the problem of terrorism, see Anke Hillbrenner and Frithjof B. Schenk [eds.], *Modern Times? Terrorism in Late Imperial Russia, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, lviii, 2 (2010).

¹⁵ Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 2009), chapter about 'Revolutions'.

¹⁶ Jacques Le Goff, *Les intellectuels au Moyen Âge* (2nd edn, Paris, 1985), 3.

¹⁷ The following authors dealt with the history of concepts within our area of interest: Ulrich Engelhardt, "Bildungsbürgertum": *Begriffs- und Dogmengeschichte eines Etiketts* (Stuttgart, 1986); Müller, *Intelligencija*; Zdzisław Wójcik, *Rozwój pojęcia inteligencji* (Wrocław, 1962); Hans U. Gumbrecht and Rolf Reichardt, 'Philosophe, philosophie', *Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680–1820*, 3 (1985); Suse Foerstner, *Intelligence: Untersuchungen über ein europäisches Wort im französischen Wortschatz*, Diss. Phil. (Tübingen, 1965). Compare also for Poland the reflections of Jerzy Jedlicki, 'Kłopoty pojęciowe historyka', in Ewa Chmielecka, Jerzy Jedlicki and Andrzej Rychardek (eds.), *Idealy nauki i konflikty wartości. Studia złożone w darze Profesorowi Stefanowi Amsterdamskiemu* (Warsaw, 2005), 265–71, and Maciej Janowski, 'Rozpacz oświeconych? Przemiana polskiego języka politycznego a reakcje na upadek Rzeczypospolitej', *Wiek Oświecenia*, 25 (2009), 29–60.

venditores verborum and finishing with Sartre, who said ‘Si je disais: moi, cela signifiait: moi, qui écris’¹⁸ – the social reality is perceived and defined through the virtual world of words. It differs from the devotion of bourgeois epoch to real values: Adam Smith’s ‘common product’, worldwide exhibitions, physically exposed wealth, political rituals, the requirement of direct participation, etc.¹⁹

The universal space which is created by means of knowledge exists in this realm of words. As any kingdom, the kingdom of knowledge has its own hierarchy. The eighteenth-century *philosophes* defined the hierarchy of the center and periphery with the metaphor of Enlightenment, in terms of *civilisation* vs. *barbarism*. In the nineteenth century various derivative forms of the Latin *intellego* are used for denoting the educated class as a social group, as well as in the sense of the whole new driving force of knowledge/culture which defined the modern times. In this century there is an inclination to use movement metaphors, the new concept of ‘history’, as well as the notions of ‘progress’ vs. ‘stagnation’ or ‘backwardness’.

The core element of the identity of the Parisian *philosophes* is the concept of *civilisation* understood as the progress of the human spirit. With it, the former *res publica doctorum* gains imperial inclinations. The symbol of this *intellectual mastery* (Larry Wolff)²⁰ becomes initially – as one knows – the concept of ‘Eastern Europe’, which is equated with ‘periphery’. The *barbarie* of the Enlightenment, contrasted with *civilisation*, is, however, not yet the absolute evil, but an excusable deficit of a young nation, and possibly even its ‘privilege’ (Manfred Hildermeier).²¹

The unenlightened may become enlightened, and this is what makes periphery relative. The unbelievable dynamics of the eighteenth century, underpinned this optimistic mental mapping and mental ‘timing’.

¹⁸ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Les mots* (Paris, 1964), 127.

¹⁹ Jörg Baberowski, ‘Vertrauen durch Anwesenheit. Vormoderne Herrschaft im späten Zarenreich’, in *idem*, David Feest and Christoph Gumb (eds.), *Imperiale Herrschaft in der Provinz. Repräsentationen politischer Macht im späten Zarenreich* (Frankfurt a.M., 2008), 17–37.

²⁰ Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, 1994), 15.

²¹ Manfred Hildermeier, ‘Das Privileg der Rückständigkeit. Anmerkungen zum Wandel einer Interpretationsfigur der neueren russischen Geschichte’, *Historische Zeitschrift*, ccxlv, 3 (1987), 557–603.

From this perspective, anything seems possible and quickly achievable actually even just *before*, and not only *with* the French Revolution. Another revolution, the transformation of Russia by Peter I, already provided a reason for optimism – this way, the ‘north’ would catch up with the ‘south’. ‘Peter the Great ... has grasped quite a number of centuries’²² – and thus the passing of time was not an unstoppable power. Even time was manageable in this age of ‘gute Policye’.

From the 1820s, in France and in the German states, the romantic *intelligence/Intelligenz* abandons the philosophy of the Enlightenment.²³ Just like with the *philosophes*, the individual intellectual ability is attributed to the social group. As opposed to the *philosophes*, there is, however, never a clear division between the social and the ideal substance of the concept of *intelligence/Intelligenz*, as it was coined by the idealist philosophy. *Intelligence* is thus simultaneously individual and group-specific tailored, and refers to both the quality and the person(s) who represent(s) it. Hence, the concept is flexible, but also extremely unclear in the social sense.

Instead of individual historical worlds, where the younger and the older nations lived together, history is now understood as a single stream of time – whoever swims not with it, drowns, and remains outside of history. Such history gives unequivocal assessments: either *progressive* or *backward*. Center and periphery are rather understood in

²² ‘Petr v obkhvat zakhvatil neskol’ko stoletii’ – N. I. Turgenev to S. I. Turgenev, Berlin, 12[24] Sept. [1816], in *Dekabrist N. I. Turgenev. Pis'ma k bratu S. I. Turgenevu* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1936), 199–200.

²³ The first mention of the ‘intelligentsia’ in the social context in Russian was now moved to 1836. The romantic poet Vasilii Zhukovskii writes about ‘the finest Petersburger noble, who represents the whole Russian European intelligentsia here’, in Vasilii A. Zhukovskii, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i pisem*, xiv: *Dnevnik (1834-1847)* (Moscow, 2004), 40 (diary note of 2 Feb. 1836). Here, as well as in Mickiewicz in 1842, both languages rather refer to the French ‘intelligence’ than to the German ‘Intelligenz’: ‘Tout ce qu’il y avait d’hommes intelligents dans le pays cherchait à conserver la vieille Pologne. On pourrait dire que l’intelligence polonaise était restée dans le pays ... Mais ... l’âme de la Pologne dès ce moment se trouve dans les pays étrangers’, see *Les Slaves. Cours professé au Collège de France par Adam Mickiewicz* (1842), iii: *La Pologne et le messianisme. Histoire, littérature et philosophie* (Paris 1849), 183. In both cases, Zhukovskii and Mickiewicz, of great importance was the influence of François Guizot, among others (cf. my article on this topic ‘Ot obshchestva k ‘intelligentsii: istoriya kluchevykh ponyatii kak istoriya samosoznaniya’, in Alexei Miller, Denis Sdvižkov and Ingrid Schierle (eds.), *Ponyatiya o Rossii: K istoricheskoi semantike imperskogo perioda* (in print).

the temporal sense – the closer to the time stream, the more central it is perceived. In this context, the understanding of center and periphery is newly expressed and subordinated to the seemingly relentless historical laws, thus gaining the character of a predestination.

The concept of ‘intelligence’ is coined by the temporal models: ‘Eh bien, le siècle de l’Intelligence est venu. Elle sort de ruines du monde, cette souveraine de l’avenir’.²⁴ ‘Die “Intelligenz” aber, ein Ausdruck, der vorzugsweise in Verbindung mit dem andern, Zeitalter der “Intelligenz” gebraucht wird...’.²⁵ What this precisely means is that the age of rationality, and basically continuation of the previous *siècle de la Raison/des Lumières* is at the same time the age of nationality: ‘Wir leben im Zeitalter der Intelligenz, der Anerkennung der Nationalität’.²⁶

The image of the *intelligence humaine universelle* as a phenomenon of an elitist pan-European culture, a unity of a transnational network – the continuation of the eighteenth-century *république des lettres* – is still shaped by the conservative, educated aristocrats.²⁷

The motto of the epoch is, however, the *intelligence* as an element of the liberal program: it is rational and progressive. ‘We’ is no longer capitalised and related to the person of the monarch, the statement ‘we *also* have intelligence’ is equated with ‘we belong to the world history’. This is the social interpretation of *cogito ergo sum* – the nation is only possible as an ‘intelligent’ nation. And the reverse – a true intelligentsia may only be a national one.²⁸

²⁴ Alfred de Musset to George Sand [1834], in Alfred de Musset, *Correspondance (1827–1857) recueillie et annotée*, ed. Léon Séché (Paris, 1907, ND Genève, Slatkine Reprints, 1977), 93.

²⁵ From the antiliberal work by Johann Michael Häusle, *Darf die Wiener Hochschule paritätisch werden?* (Vienna, 1865), 54–5.

²⁶ *Erzählungen und Skizzen von Adelbert [H.] Graf Baudissin*, i (Hannover, 1863), 62–3.

²⁷ The creator of the famous triad of the Russian semi-official nationalism, Graf Sergeï Uvarov (‘la religion nationale – l’autocratie – la nationalité’ – as this is exactly how he formulated it in French), in the same year (1829) greets Alexander von Humboldt in the St Petersburg Academy of Sciences with the words: ‘les dieux de l’intelligence sont partout, les sciences sont essentiellement cosmopolites’, cf. *Séance extraordinaire ... du 16 novembre 1829* (Saint Petersburg, 1829), 7. Uvarov holds nationalism as an ideology for the masses, as opposed to the cosmopolitanism of the intellectuals, which he sees as the *modus vivendi* of the elites.

²⁸ ‘C’est en se rapprochant de la nation en tombant des régions élevées et froides de l’intelligence dans le sein du peuple polonais, qu’il [le philosophe – D.S.]

About the middle of the nineteenth century, a new vision of the social community as the main actor in history reigns throughout Europe. And this self-aware organism needs its *social sensorium* (Herbert Spencer). Interestingly, to such image now not only a nation or nations (such as ‘the Slavs’ or ‘Germanic peoples’) adapt itself/themselves, but also the states (Prussia as the ‘Staat der Intelligenz’ in Hegel) and even empires. For the secret police in Russia under Nicholas I, the educated *classe moyenne* counts as the ‘soul [one could also easily say, ‘the intelligentsia’ – D.S.] of the empire’.²⁹

‘Die Intelligenz ist daher ein wesentliches Kennzeichen zur Entwicklung bestimmten Völker’ – sums up Lorenz von Stein (1856).³⁰ The association: nation/people – intelligentsia – progress (in general meaning, as an immanent development) closely binds in Poland and Russia the concepts of progress with the intelligentsia in the expression ‘a progressive intelligentsia’ (*inteligencja postępową, progressivnaya intelligentsiya*).³¹

As late as in the 1870s the term ‘intelligence’ undergoes drastic changes, comparable to the ‘Great Schism’.³² In Poland and in Russia, the intelligentsia becomes a crystallisation point of the ‘cultural nation’, in many ways being in opposition to the state. The statement ‘we *also* have intelligence’ becomes now ‘*only* we have intelligence’. Following the logic of national development, the *social sensorium* from the ‘nation’s organ of thinking’ becomes its treasure and object of sacrum.³³

retrouvera pour la première fois la vérité’, see Mickiewicz, *La Pologne et le messianisme*, 332.

²⁹ [Maksim Ya. von Fock, 1827 and 1828], *Rossiya pod nadzorom. Otchety III Otdeleniya 1827–1869* (Moscow, 2006), 20, 41.

³⁰ Lorenz von Stein, *Die Gesellschaftslehre, Erste Abteilung: Der Begriff der Gesellschaft und die Lehre von den Gesellschaftsklassen* (Stuttgart, 1856), 242–3.

³¹ Moreover, the concept of ‘progress’ is changing from a radical to an evolutionary one: in 1834 Maurycy Mochnecki by ‘the progress of time’ understands nothing else than a universal social revolution, see *Maurycego Mochneckiego pisma rozmaite. Oddział porewolucyjny*, ed. Aleksander Jełowicki (Paris, 1836), 464.

³² This cluster of parallel terms was initially used rather broadly in Europe to designate educated and ‘progressive’ individuals, but the various Western European analogues gradually fell out of use, see Michael D. Gordin and Karl Hall, ‘Intelligentsia Science Inside and Outside Russia’, in Michael D. Gordin, Karl Hall and Alexei Kojevnikov (eds.), *Intelligentsia Science: The Russian Century, 1860–1960, Osiris*, xxiii, 1 (2008), 1–19, here: 4.

³³ For further information on ‘people of knowledge’'s awareness of the cultural canon as the major component of cultural memory, see Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle*

Both languages, Polish and Russian, distinguish these spheres: the word 'intelligentsia' designates solely a particular social group, whereas for referring to a particular individual, other terms are mainly used, such as *rozum*, *umysł*, *um* [*mind*].³⁴ On the other hand, in the west of the continent, in France and German countries, the term *intelligence/Intelligenz* becomes as if de-socialised. Why is that so?

After the 1870s, after the unification of Italy and Germany and the Franco-Prussian War, the national project in the West no longer needs 'the intelligentsia'. Its centre becomes a national state; official nationalism, instrumentalised by the authorities replaces the liberal, mid-century model. The fate of the European liberalism manifests itself in the most decisive way in the history of 'intelligentsia'.

In this respect, the once European project of the 'intelligent' nation becomes periphery. Although this periphery also refers to the so-called smaller nations of the so-called West, such as Norway or Scotland,³⁵ but altogether, the concept *Intelligenz/intelligence* no longer has its former rank and thus no longer belongs to the core vocabulary of the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*.

In Germany, the *Intelligenz* is replaced by the derivatives of *Bildung* (*Gebildete Stände/Klasse* – just as the French *Nation* is replaced by *Volk*). However, the term is still being used in the social-democratic press and journalism, continuing its influence as an 'anti-bourgeois' leftist project. In the republican France, under the rule of the radical party, the sociological understanding of the term *intelligence* is no longer of great importance. An example here may be a book by the

Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen (Munich, 1992). By the mid-20th century all was perfectly clear in Russia: 'Our Russian intelligentsia is so distinctive that it has given the foreign languages a new specific word: "intelligentsia"', see Vikentii V. Veresaev, 'O Kachalove' *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 7 (10 Feb.) (1945); and in Poland, see Waclaw Berent, *Diogenes w kontuszu. Opowieść o narodzinach literatów polskich* (Warsaw, 1937).

³⁴ However, I did not take into consideration the use of the term *intelligentsia* in Latin sources in Poland – it is obvious that here the traditions differ from the Russian ones.

³⁵ On the Scottish intellectual milieu cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Die Idee der gebildeten Öffentlichkeit', in Jürgen Oelkers (ed.), *Aufklärung, Bildung und Öffentlichkeit. Pädagogische Beiträge zur Moderne* (Weinheim and Basel, 1993), 25–44; on Norway, the insightful essay by Erik Egeberg, in Uspenskiĭ (ed.), *Russkaya intelligentsiya*, 104–9.

famous Hippolyte Taine, *On intelligence* (1870), alluding to the 'old' meaning of the term.³⁶

The history of this European concept takes a twist at the turn of the twentieth century, when in France the old term revitalises under the name of *intellectuels*. As an independent force, the intelligentsia now necessarily must distance itself and take a critical attitude towards the national state, which does take place in the case of the *intellectuels*. The origins of this concept are usually explored in the context of the French domestic politics – the Dreyfus affair and the crisis of the Third Republic. At the European level, on this basis the history of the critical *intellectuals* – as a distinctive class of the twentieth-century *people of knowledge* – is recognised. This history is autonomous and has its prehistory in the nineteenth century, with the central event of 1898 that caused waves spreading from Paris around – to repeat the metaphors of the eighteenth-century philosophers.³⁷

But to what extent do the French 'dreyfusians' borrow the 'Eastern' model of the probing outsiders – critically thinking individuals, if not professionally, then ideologically, standing outside state structures (Peter Lavrov)? There were certainly many channels for spreading the influence, both in the political (the Franco-Russian rapprochement, the frequent publications concerning the Polish question in the European press) and in the cultural sphere (through the long-awaited awakening of the 'Eastern European' culture, the reading success of the *roman russe*, as well as through the influence of the Polish *Wielka Emigracja* [Great Emigration] in Paris). Known became the impressions of Lucien Herr – the librarian of the École Normale Supérieure and the 'brain centre' of the dreyfusian-intellectuals – from his stay in Russia.³⁸ But in general, this inverse influence still awaits its researcher.

German liberals and democrats soon identify themselves with the *Intellektuellen*. In the famous polemics by the Mann brothers, reflected

³⁶ Hippolyte Taine, *De l'intelligence*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1870).

³⁷ Christophe Charle, *Les intellectuels en Europe au XIXe siècle. Essai d'histoire comparée* (Paris, 1996); Gangolf Hübinger, *Gelehrte, Politik und Öffentlichkeit. Eine Intellektuellengeschichte* (Göttingen, 2006).

³⁸ Christophe Charle, *Naissance des "intellectuels", 1880–1900* (Paris, 1990), 88 f. Lucien Herr visited Russia, was familiar with the theory of the 'critically-thinking individuals' by the Russian *narodnik* Peter Lavrov, and wrote his unpublished work about the 'socialist, revolutionary and opposition groups in the Russian Empire'.

in Thomas Mann's *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* (1918), a leftist *Intellektuelle* is contrasted with an autochthonous – and russophile – *Bildungsbürger*. Shaped in the interwar period, the reincarnation of the 'intellectuals' from the liberal 'intelligentsia' of the nineteenth century reaches its peak importance in the west of Europe by 1968. The discourse of the *intellectuals* was established as the – western – alternative to the eastern *intelligentsia*.³⁹

Only after 1968 came the French intellectuals under great criticism, especially after the publishing of *The Gulag Archipelago* by Solzhenitsyn (1974), for their archaic claims to the leadership of the cultural nation.⁴⁰ Similarly to the global term *intelligentsia*, the global concept of *intellectuels* also gradually dies out. Its place is taken by the Anglo-Saxon *intellectuals*, *white collars*, *professionals*, *experts*.

In Germany the debates mainly considered the relationship between the *Bildungsbürgertum* and the *Sonderweg*. The effect was that the *Bildungsbürgertum*, which before counted as a national phenomenon,⁴¹ now advanced to the universal model of the efficient, loyal *professionals* – perhaps too model-like – as we may see in the first two volumes of 'The History of the Polish Intelligentsia'.⁴²

Meanwhile, throughout the twentieth century the term 'intelligentsia' has been orientalised and at the same time peripheralised. The situation becomes fixed – the term *intelligentsia* emphasises both its Slavic character and its Anglo-Saxon origin. The 'intelligentsia' is generally 'over there, on the continent'. In the nineteenth-century Anglo-Saxon press they are mainly Germans,⁴³ but in the twentieth century – primarily Poles and Russians.

³⁹ For a typology of this division, see Aleksander Gella (ed.), *The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuals: Theory, Method and Case Study* (London, 1976); Uspenskii (ed.), *Russkaya intelligentsiya*.

⁴⁰ Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956* (Berkeley, 1992).

⁴¹ Classical example: Fritz K. Ringer, *The decline of the German Mandarins. The German Academic Community, 1890–1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).

⁴² Janowski, *Narodziny inteligencji*, 236. Characteristic for the typology of Jürgen Osterhammel's *Bildungsbürgertum*, as a regional phenomenon in Central Europe, just as for the remaining non-European periphery, is an opposition to the orthodoxy and the radical intelligentsia, see *idem*, *Verwandlung der Welt*, chapter 'Hierarchien, Moderne und Politik', pp. 1095–8. A clear tendency to assign degrees and hierarchy to the periphery is visible here.

⁴³ In the American and English press in the second half of the 19th century 'intelligentsia' was the term initially used to describe, e.g., also the socio-democratic

Analogically to the concept of *Osteuropa*, this narrowing finally finds the entry into the modes of thinking of the 'locals' themselves. This phenomenologisation and nationalisation of the 'intelligentsia' logically leads to the final stage in the history of this conceptual field – when the intelligentsia becomes degraded from being the symbol of progress and national pride to the object of public flagellation. As an alternative reference figure one finds also *professionals* and *experts*.

In the process of 'globalisation' of history, of the past following the process of 'globalisation of the present', attention will inevitably be drawn to the 'global' scale of the 'intelligentsia'. The statement is true not only for Russia: 'history of the Russian intelligentsia must be told in pan-European (if not global) terms'.⁴⁴ However, this should not remain a look at the – although global, but still – periphery.

In my opinion, the history of intelligentsia serves as an excellent example for a very fashionable *casus* nowadays: a global history that has been written and shaped within a national framework. The future approach to the history of the intelligentsia is in analysing its 'network' character at various levels and milieus of functioning – multinational families and clans, centres of different type, from informal clubs to institutionalised organisations, etc. This history illustrates the functioning of the European *public sphere*,⁴⁵ also in the classical epoch of nationalism, and offers the chance to leave the provincialism and the periphery, which, to borrow Kant's expression of his famous *What is Enlightenment* represents a 'self-imposed immaturity'.

trans. Aleksandra Biela-Wołończiej

fraction of the German Reichstag. Strangely enough, this Marxist-universalist use of the concept 'intelligentsia'/'Intelligenz' also contributed to the fact that later the 'intelligentsia' is ultimately associated with the 'Marxist' East.

⁴⁴ Gordin and Hall, 'Intelligentsia Science', 11.

⁴⁵ Jörg Requate and Martin Schulze Wessel (eds.), *Europäische Öffentlichkeit. Transnationale Kommunikation seit dem 18. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt a.M., 2002).