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## The Category of the «Now» As the Ontological Anticipation of the Historicity<sup>1</sup>

**ABSTRACT:** The text shows aporetic tension between historicity and temporality of the «now» of the individual. The partial solution of this problem lies in the distance between strangeness/otherness and the «now». The author uses late Husserlian phenomenology of time to confront these two perspectives: the «now» and historicity. The first part of the paper is focused on meaning of the beingness as an ontological exemplification of being. The most originitive presentation of time is made to prepare ontological ground of confrontation between time and historicity. According to the author examining Heidegger's temporality, it leads to uncovering an ontological distance between temporality and the most [original] «now»/the first «now». There are also two kinds of historicity. The first one is within temporality itself, the second one, ontologically speaking between temporality and the «now». Explanation as strangeness/otherness, *Mittelpunkt*, *diastasis*, tension, and *Zwischenpunkt* are various notions of the same temporal reality that is realized between the ontologically important borders. In the second part, the author discusses with *diastasis* as a difference of two kinds of the past: "the pastness" and "the finiteness". According to the author, the sense of *diastasis* is the transformation of the centre of gravity from the anchored in the flow of consciousness «now» to the «now» understood as the actuality of the remembered. Finally, the author inscribes the category of strangeness/otherness into the consciousness of the between.

**KEY WORDS:** *diastasis* • historicity • the now • temporality • time • Derrida J. • Heidegger M. • Husserl E. • Waldenfels B.

### I. The Separation of Time and Being—A Polemic of Jacques Derrida with the «Now» And Against Martin Heidegger

According to Heidegger, the beingness exists in order to understand what a being is<sup>2</sup>. Accordingly, some necessary comment about the origin of

<sup>1</sup> The author's studies on historicity and during publication of the paper, have been published his book entitled *The Notion of lebendige Gegenwart As Compliance with the Temporality of the "Now"*, Frankfurt am Main—Berlin—Bern—Bruxelles—New York—Oxford—Wien 2011 (cf. pp. 87–100). The author's reference to this text is obvious. Nevertheless, notice that the context of considerations about the "now", about the temporal within the social of the historicity and the historicity in the context of the Others are new.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Niemeyer Halle—Saale, Halle 1927 [the author's translation].

time as a horizon of the understanding of the “being” based on temporality as the being of beingness understanding the being should be added. Heidegger seems to be sceptical when he refers to the possibility of the ontological insight into the “now”. There is aporiae in his thought; the ontological orientation on something that is constantly present causes a problem for the continuity of time.

A range of time should be inscribed into the borders of the range. Heidegger depicts an ecstasy of temporalization in the width of temporality as distance between its borders. There is the beginning and the end, the original and non-retentional also non-potential perspective of the first “now”, and the end of time as the last «now» (is it possible?) which are measured by the distance in its presentness. Heidegger shows his theory in the poetic language because he goes into time on the level of the “now” of presentness. He tries to depict the constancy of time in its “now” but his pre-predicative considerations cannot be expressed in a language of the ordinary time.

According to Heidegger, “time, as present and therewith external of the spirit, has no power over the concept; rather the concept is the power of time”<sup>3</sup>. In other words, the meaning of the power of time consists in its distance. Strangeness/otherness of what is original is what should be considered. All efforts to explain this phenomenon are in vain, as they do not examine the original beginning but instead they bring the beginning back to itself. According to Heidegger, time considered as acting present and as constancy in a double sense of the present open a temporal reality as leading to the Truth. The beginning is the most important thing because its importance absolutely overcomes the way to the truth. Time depicted as the truth of being and time itself is not important in the perspective of the beginning. Heidegger’s analysis is not concerned with the present or presentness even though the consideration about the beginning and the truth has to conduct to the presentness as the core of the truth and not only as the core of primal temporality (cf. Heidegger). According to Heidegger, what was the most important in Husserl’s considerations has been conceptualized in ecstasies. He loses the perspective of time because he rejects the ontological coincidence of the presentness and the present. The reality of being goes to death (cf. Heidegger) moreover it becomes death. The seeming awareness of the being is shown in its internality. What should be open to the reality of time (the present/the presentness) is inscribed in internality and it internally fixes temporal conditions. The opposite ontological direction in the

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*, [quoted after:] H. Trivers, *The Rhythm of Being: A Study of Temporality*, New York 1985, p. 164.

Heidegger's school of thought regarding time consists in an impregnation of the individual time of being into eternity. What is the function of the internal time impregnated into eternity? Eternity is a kind of black hole that remains unchanged and passively allows all individual temporalizations to orient in comparison to it.

According to Lévinas, an aware being has a feature of transitoriness being not a flow of time that is integrally connected with the consciousness of death. Being and time, life and time afraid of time because time is open to eternity, as they are open to freedom. The sense of time is given in freedom but at the same moment, freedom is a feature of reality that an individual is extremely scared of. Time is "not yet" but it is not a moment before death. Time lies between the borders of the beginning and the end.

A phenomenological image and the representation of Plato's notion *metaxý* are present as well in the works of Husserl as in works of Heidegger, Lévinas, Derrida, and Waldenfels. *Mittelpunkt*, *diastasis*, tension, and *Zwischenpunkt* are various notions of the same temporal reality that is realized between the ontologically important borders. All the philosophers mentioned above have spent their lives searching for the *metaxý*, all of them have tried to overcome the aporiae of temporal incompatibility of the presentness and the present, the «now», and what is given in time. Time is a means of temporalization. First, it is a means of what can possible is an ontological tool. Both the first and the second meaning do not resist anything because its time is completely incompatible with the eternity of death.

According to Lévinas as well as to Waldenfels, there is some *Zwischenpunkt* that could be connected with itself, with the beginning; it would fix the sense of time and what is definitely closed. To be in time means to be against the end; to be in time means to respond to the challenge of the existence in which the extremity is postponed due to the distance of the "I" from it.

Lévinas—despite of the awareness of finiteness of time in being—puts a big stress on time's infinity because time added to being creates what has never been in time. Pre-Husserlian philosophy of time does not allow any movement into time. In his theories, one can only find traditional ontological categories and the temporality based on Greek *nýn* according to which time cannot be free but it is constantly given in *nýn*. According to Derrida, while we are talking about time as the «now», it stops to exist (if we talk about time as a *periechon* of eventing of being). He tries to execute the falsification of the phenomenology of Husserl by stating that the Husserlian presence is not questioned. According to Derrida, Husserl is in the same line of descent as Parmenides and Plato. It seems that the most accurate presentation of this depiction of time is Heidegger's comment given in *Sein und Zeit*. Heidegger

describes the sense of being as given in an ontological and temporal term as presentness. In other words, it is understood in a perspective of *modus* of time, which is the present. It is one of the numerous Heidegger's cases of the treatment of time as a statically given pall of eternity despite of his searching for the original beginning of time. There are very interesting findings in Kojève's study that can be compared to Plato's depiction of time in the context of Hegel's theory. According to Kojève, the entire notion as such exists in the eternal time but it is essentially different from time. When we use a line as a representation of a temporal being, the notion of an individual should be represented as a dot on this line.

Plato's notion refers to something different from itself. Eternity—as a fulfilment of time—is outside the time. Every dot of time is outside the eternity and outside the time as well. Sophism, empiricism, and psychologism are the most common errors made within the time reference to the “now” and to the temporal dots to time<sup>4</sup>. According to Plato, the “now” is not an independent being—“before” and “after” were derivatives in comparison with the “now”. Both *modi* of time were in the self-real relation to the “now”. The absence was always taken in a form of presence or as a “modalization of the presence”. It can be realized that the past and the future are described as the past present and the future present (cf. Derrida).

According to Derrida, the phenomenology of time given by Husserl is only a prelude that starts to overcome the Greek and traditional understanding of the idea of time. It is the “levelling of original time” that should be replaced by the proposition of philosophy of time that does not depict time as originating from being. Heidegger's philosophy is no better than Kant's (cf. Derrida) is. The meaning consist in the most strict sources of temporality of the “now”—*nȳn* at the moment—as initial emancipation point of ontology. In other words, Derrida criticizes Heidegger that, similar to Husserl, he does not go out of internal temporality of the “now” which is the essence of everyday existence—*Lebenswelt*. Divisibility of the traditional time has caused that time appears as unreal or as an “unmodifiable core of the temporal modification”<sup>5</sup>. What is interesting is Derrida's claim that only a being can exclude an influence of time but it cannot become the past or the future. Heidegger whose considerations of temporal ecstasies are similar to the Husserlian considerations of the “now” still does not stress time influence exclusion enough. According to Heidegger, every temporal ecstasy temporalizes itself completely and the existence obtains momentality in a complete

<sup>4</sup> Cf. A. Kojève, *Wstęp do wykładów o Heglu*, Warsaw 1999, pp. 361, 371.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. E. Husserl and M. Heidegger, J. Derrida, M. Merleau-Ponty.

temporalized temporality and in the visible unity of the structure of care. It seems that the statement is in opposition to Husserl one. According to him, every “now” contains the potentiality of temporality, which continues until the pre-primordially. The contents of the “now” correspond to the origin of the temporal field of every “point”. The intentionality of retention and protention intentionally connected with the present “now” does fulfil the sense of the “now”. In other words, intentions are directed to the connections in time and they are fulfilled through the creating the fulfilled relations until the present “now”. This is a manner of the connection the “now” with intentions and with a sign of an object in its duration. Heidegger does not revoke Husserl’s theory but he shifts the accents of his theory of time. In other words, a mono- and inter-subjective dimension of beingness empties itself in the notion of care, which is one of fundamental Heidegger’s notions. Temporality in its ontological sense of the care is directed to the openness in the ontologically constituted world. Heidegger aims at the future using the Husserlian schema and equips it only with the action of the “I”. Husserlian phenomenology does not allow for it. Connecting of certainty with peremptoriness of cognition assumes the priority of the retentive “now”. Heidegger’s efforts to direct the care towards the horizon of the future aim at solving this difficulty.

“What is seemingly simpler than the characteristics of the existential connection between birth and death?” asks Heidegger when he criticizes the traditional temporality of the ancient thinkers. In the eyes of the classic philosophy of time, what is real is proper only in the present “now”. The entire non-presence reality is existentially unreal. According to Husserl Derrida, the continuous presentation of time is the sense of the constituting consciousness. A temporal horizon is a sense of the Heidegger’s ecstasies. This horizon includes all ecstasies without any existential excluding. The constitution is done not *post factum* and it is not put against the time and reality but it contains them. A reference to the truth is given in the constituted world of consciousness. The “now” is not given but it gives the openness of a closed horizon of the objective world. According to Heidegger, the reference to the truth is identified with the openness. However, this reference is dependent on the essence of humanity and consciousness being the core of humanity<sup>6</sup>. The Heidegger’s aporiae within temporality consists in the connecting of the contrasts of what “was” what “not yet” is which it realizes its present experi-

<sup>6</sup> Cf. E. Casey, *Derrida’s Deconstruction of Heidegger’s Views on Temporality: The Language of Space and Time*, [in:] A. Schuwer (intr.), *Phenomenology of Temporality: Time & Language, The Third Annual Symposium of the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center*, Pittsburgh 1987, p. 93–94.

ence of the ecstasy, which is mediated in the rememberingly expecting the objectifying of the world. The constituted “now” is not the momental “now”.

If so, one can ask, how Heidegger recovered a proper temporal place of the individual consciousness. Does the originally presented temporalization connect with the temporality of the other? In other words, can the horizon of the “I” and the horizon of the Other cross their paths? These questions are not concerned with an exact model of the connection but the question is is Heidegger’s horizon an empty notion. The essence of Heidegger’s *èkstatikón* is the temporalization of the unity, which is simultaneously outside<sup>7</sup>. The *Zeitigung* of temporality in different modifications that are never a pre-impresional “now” or—an absolute point of flow of primordial originality—consists in the reduction of the future. The most important phenomenon in reference to the original and proper temporality is its future<sup>8</sup>. According to Heidegger, the most proper conclusion on the limitations of beingness which at the “moment” of non-being is also the beingness does not influence the flowing stream of time. If so, one can ask what time has been flowing since this “moment” and what the temporal meaning of *periechon* is. Is the temporality of a container or rather the temporality of pure descriptiveness of the temporal horizon responsible for not being perceivable<sup>9</sup>? Dispersiveness depicts social character of temporality more efficiently, also *periechon* points out at the past as a self-presence of the “I” as the “I” plays the main role in it<sup>10</sup>.

## II. Phenomenology of Time of Bernhardt Waldenfels and His Notion Called Diastase

According to Waldenfels, the strangeness/otherness can be compared with the former which can only be found [*fundieren*] in its results or in the remembrance. E. Casey presents a different point of view. According to him,

‘Pastness’ names that quality of what is remembered which places its origin and provenance, it could not be remembered in the first place:

<sup>7</sup> Cf. M. Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth, On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus*, New York 2002, p. 86.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *ibidem*. p. 462.

<sup>9</sup> It refers to the Casey’s terms: *dispersive* and *collective*. According to him, dispersiveness is a grouping of temporal events in regular one-dimensional sequences [E. Casey, *Remembering, A Phenomenological Study*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington–Indianapolis 1987, p. 181].

<sup>10</sup> Cf. E. Casey, *Derrida’s Deconstruction...*, pp. 41–42, cf. Also E. Casey, *Origin(s) in (of) Heidegger/Derrida*; „The Journal of Philosophy”, Vol. 81, No. 10 (Oct., 1984).

we cannot remember the present *qua* living present or the future *qua* yet-to-come future. [...] Memory involves the specific factor of ‘finiteness.’ What we recall is finished to the point of possessing a certain minimal coherence or intelligibility; otherwise, it is not identifiable as a memory, a memory of something in particular that *has* happened<sup>11</sup>.

It seems that the most important issue in Waldenfels’ phenomenology is the transformation of the centre of gravity from the anchored in the flow of consciousness «now» (the Husserlian unity of the remembered) to the “now” understood as the actuality of the remembered<sup>12</sup>. It would be a very fruitful operation except that the strangeness/otherness is everywhere and in every consciousness.

The otherness of the other will be forever derived from the own. The other appears as an *alter ego* of the other, i.e., strictly as a second me. However, as soon as we adopt the standpoint of the body and proceed from a bodily self who is ‘not master in its own house’, the other arises as co-original with me and to some extent as earlier than me<sup>13</sup>.

According to Waldenfels, intersubjectivity is changing into *i n t e r c o r p o r e i t y*. The main manner of it is an experience in which the events are something that cannot be depicted by any reflection. An objective and subjective unity is created from the live connection in a non-reflective depiction of the consciousness. Time is the basic form creating the meaning in this connection. According to Husserl, the “now” is identical with different subjects remaining in the reciprocal agreement of the bodily present. They can have neither the same *hic* (or the same intersubjective space of presentness) nor the same events. The present of every consciousness is a pre-reflective individual cocoon of the vivid presence which can be depicted after-consciously. The main feature of the common phenomenological situation is impermeably different simultaneously given to the consciousness bodies as well. Two bodies can be objectively connected in one object or “fused” but this fusion does not create one corps in the same stream of time and the same flow of consciousness or one *hic* or one “phenomenological space” oriented itself or an identity of the events surrounding the world of these two objects. According to Waldenfels, “we may infer that self-reference was nothing more than a lack of reference to things, just as our body appears

<sup>11</sup> E. Casey, *Remembering...*, pp. 40–41.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *ibidem*.

<sup>13</sup> B. Waldenfels, *Bodily Experience between Selfhood and Otherness*, “Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences” 3 (3), Dordrecht 2004, p. 244.

as a ‘strangely imperfectly constituted thing’ when compared to ordinary things”<sup>14</sup>.

The events and the features of the two subjects cannot stay optically identical to two eyes. Different subjects are perceived therefore the objects in the subjective time of the consciousness are essentially displaced and do not have the same features of the essence. Two or more consciousnesses can participate in the same things but the events understood as objects in their individual modus of givenness are different. Two or more streams of time are the basis of the relation of interchange; according to them, the same object which was given to the consciousness in a kind of *modus* of appearing, in stream of intersubjective time can be given to the consciousness of the Other in completely the same *modus* and *vice versa*.<sup>15</sup> In such situation, we can refer to the universal system of forming individual temporality. This reference is one of the most influential causes of any relation of conscious motivation.

The strangeness of the experience of the Other is also described in a threefold way and, according to Waldenfels, it is universal in the nature of the dialogue between different types of consciousness. (1) The context of consciousnesses consists of the same reference to the being in *modus* of a temporal flow of the “nows”. The “I” or the sameness communicate with the Other in being, also the Other can be for the “I” as the only bodily feature that fulfils the space perceived by the “I”. (2) It consists in a reference to the Other—or more so—in a reference to the otherness in the meaning given by Waldenfels<sup>16</sup>. The “I” can see the Other and the otherness as something which is beyond–bodily as the Other or as the Other among the Others. (3) It refers to a reference to the “I” as a constitutive feature of the dialogical creation of the meaning; the “I” distorts own existence for its and in its<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 240.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Zweites Buch: *Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, Den Haag 1952.

<sup>16</sup> According to Waldenfels, “the reciprocity of perspectives, according to Alfred Schütz; the reversibility of standpoints, according to Jean Piaget: these insure that proper and foreign voices, proper and foreign look, forfeit their foreignness within dialectic of sameness and otherness” (the author is not able to render Waldenfels’ references of this quotation).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. B. Waldenfels, *Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs, Sozialphilosophische Untersuchungen in Anschluss an Edmund Husserl*, The Haag 1971, pp. 120–121, 134. I have written about the role of a motivation in Husserl’s phenomenology of time in the first part of my book. Now, I would like to refer to the marriage of phenomenology and *Gestaltpsychologie* which has taken place during the interwar period of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and to the comments given by Derrida (J. Derrida, *Pismo i różnica*, Warsaw 2004, p. 285) and by Gurwitsch (A. Gurwitsch, *The Field of Consciousness*, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh 1964). There are a lot of very interesting suggestions regarding the compatibility of different kinds



Let us consider a universal reference of formulating the temporality which is the basis of all relations regarding motivation. The problem of the unity of the world and the „I” resolves itself in a question about a temporal sense of life that connects in itself in the triple dimension of the dialogical representation.

As opposed to this, diachrony means that between foreign demand and proper response, between foreign and proper speech there is a gaping hiatus that interrupts the common flux of speech. The dash, which separates demand and response from one another, may not be turned into a hyphen. The foreign demand signifies an *original going-before* that is not to be anticipated from the present, whereas the proper response appears with an equally *original belated* quality not to be overcome within the present.<sup>18</sup> [and] This strange kind of otherness may be illustrated by the same examples we have already drawn upon in respect to my own alienness. The other’s gaze, to which I am exposed, consists in the fact that I feel myself being seen before seeing the other as somebody who sees things, including myself. The fact that I feel myself seen reaches its extreme in the paranoiac delusion of observation (*Beobachtungswahn*). It cannot be reduced to the simple effect, admitted by system theorists, that I see what you do not see and that you see what I do not see. The ‘blind spot’, inherent in the experience of the other, exceeds the mere limits of capacity attributed to self-referential systems which are unable to include their own functioning<sup>19</sup>.

Radical and universal reflection shows that the acting unification of three elements is always late. The “I” considers the past, the present, and the future as something what constitutes itself in an active reference to “diastase” (Waldenfels’ notion). A reflection is not a reflection due to uncover life of the “I” as a different modification of life. Temporality is not temporality which uses the «now» but the kind that loses its perspective. This new ontological temporality is not a domain of an active synthesis but a domain which is passive and continuous. Waldenfels looks for the sense of temporality and

of the perception given at the same time by different “nows” commented by *Gestaltpsychologie*. Cf. A. Gurwitsch, *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology*, Evanston—Illinois 1966, pp. 210, 244, 277n., 371; and A. Gurwitsch, *Perceptual Coherence As the Foundation of the Judgment of Predication*, [in:] Kersten F., Zaner R., *Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism. Essays in Memory of Dorion Cairns*, The Hague 1973, pp. 67–77; and first of all R. J. Walton *On the Manifold Senses of Horizonedness. The Theories of E. Husserl and A. Gurwitsch*, “Husserl Studies”, 19 [2003], pp. 2, 20.

<sup>18</sup> The author is not able to render Waldenfels’ references of this quotation.

<sup>19</sup> B. Waldenfels, *Bodily...*, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

its authorization in a threefold dialogue about the origin of the beginning of time in the «now» that should represent an absolute order<sup>20</sup>.

Waldenfels searches for this beginning in a connection to a dialogue constituting itself within an individual experience for which the original synthesis of time has a definitive significance. The core of a dialogue is asking questions and answering them. The dialogue is not a unity but it is something that creates common sense. This relation uncovers the essence of communication which serves as an open horizon of the community of a dialogue. According to Waldenfels, “reciprocal certitude of social actions consists also in passiveness in its twofold meaning of passiveness and as-sets. While as passive connection is considered on the both levels, we reach outlook especially describing situation of dialogue”<sup>21</sup>. Temporality plays a secondary role in creating symbols; what also fulfils the external towards is unity which is conditioned by diastasis (Waldenfels) or disparity (Derrida)<sup>22</sup>. There is not only the otherness but also an experience of strangeness/otherness. The Husserlian reflection, which is present in Waldenfels’ considerations, does not consider this sort of the inner experience. Self-reference in the transcendental reflection is understood because of a differentiation of a being into its levels. The consciousness is not aware of the contents of the reflection, the consciousness is not concerned with the reference to the contents, but the presence of the “now” is given as *lebendige Gegenwart*. In other words, the «now» is the basis of a continuous stream of time constituted in the consciousness. The «now» is the only original reference of the self-oriented consciousness to the external world. Every other reference to the external world has secondary significance. According to Waldenfels, “the birth of sense out of pathos, mentioned above, finds its complement in the birth of myself out of pathos”<sup>23</sup>. The main function of the ecstasy is mastery on a different level of beings’ being. The levelling of the being and the “I” and the Others are two different things. The ontological level and the social world do not refer to the difference in the same manner.

<sup>20</sup> According to Waldenfels, it is necessary to start with the beginning of the thinking as a differentiation between the demands of the recovery of the first beginning and the other beginning which should be expanded. This necessity needs to be taken into consideration in the shrewdest manner. Discovering the beginning of time is the most important task facing philosophers (Heidegger). Cf. B. Waldenfels, *Das Zwischenreich...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 120–121.

<sup>21</sup> „Die Wechselbestimmtheit des sozialen Verhaltens deutet darauf hin, daß auch dieses im Zeichen einer *Passivität* steht, und zwar zwiefach, im Sinne einer Passivität in und vor der Aktivität. Indem wie dem passiven Zusammenhang auf beiden Stufen nachgehen, gewinnen wir die Sicht auf das eigentümliche Zwischen reich des Dialogs”. *Ibidem*, pp. 148–149.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. also Derridean analysis of uncontinuous temporality of Freud (J. Derrida, *Pismo i różnica*, *op. cit.* pp. 392–393).

<sup>23</sup> B. Waldenfels, *Bodily...*, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

We perambulate from the core phenomenon of the “now” which is contained in it and which is referring to the past and the future and to the depiction of time in which the three modi of time differ from each other. The notion of the differentiation is very similar to the Cassirer’s one<sup>24</sup>. It seems that the analysis of time has been dominated by a concept of a permanent presentness. The “now” also lies in the core of this temporality; notice that all drifting theories of time always limit themselves to the “now”. According to Heidegger, this process has started in the Aristotle’s time because during the Plato’s time it had a different interpretation—it is a form of *méthexis*—the participation in the unity and in “the truth of being”. The past and the future are only begot incorporations of a being<sup>25</sup>. Plato was not interested in the dichotomization of the “now” i.e. the past *versus* the future and the physical time versus the time of the consciousness—but in the original source of the “now”. If there is *metaxý*, it means that it is a tie.<sup>26</sup> *Metaxý* considered in this context *állá pē dynatōn* connects, not divides.

There is no question about animals, live organisms, or life as such.<sup>27</sup> However, the main question is about the self-consciousness. The «now» in not *nunc stans* but *nunc distans*. What happens is not inscribed in *modus* of possibility and it is not given *a priori*. *Lebenswelt* of the “I” is a twofold reality of the “I” which is extended by time and it extends time.

Notice that it is impossible to understand the otherness without an original experience. The strangeness/otherness also consists in a unacquaintance in the context of a category of distance. The “now” in not *nunc stans* but *nunc distans*. According to Waldenfels, what befalls on a subject is impossible, as it is something that slips a subject. The main statement of phenomenology is that what does appear should not disperse from the manner of appearing. The ontological contents and a manner of the access are barely connected in an experience. It is difficult to realize that the Other is apprehended in the otherness. The strangeness of this otherness is given in an empirical reality that is accessible to the “I”<sup>28</sup>. Does exist any *tópos* of

<sup>24</sup> Cf. E. Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, Volume Three: *The Phenomenology of Knowledge*, New Haven—London 1972, p. 169. Heidegger finds the concept of the threefoldness of time false. He claims that Aristotle does not answer sufficiently the question of the essence of time. Cf. M. Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Frankfurt am Main 1973, pp. 268–269.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Plato, *Timaeus*, [X] 38 A.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. M. Heidegger, *The Essence...*, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

<sup>27</sup> A. Schütz, *Collected Papers*, vol. 1: *The Problem of Social Reality*, The Hague 1962, p. 8.

<sup>28</sup> The difference between empirical reality and the essential one and Kant’s transcendental factors cf. Casey [E. Casey, *Imagination: Imagining and the Image*, „Philosophy and Phenomenological Research”, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Jun., 1971), p. 477]. Also is very fruitful to recognize notions of indifference and neutrality [*ibidem*].

thinking? Can its heterotopy be cancelled in the context of the universal presence? *Tópos* of experience resolves itself to the different dimension of temporality. The “now” is not yet retentional ↔ protentional «now»—this model is too inefficient to describe the state of the consciousness. Pre-displacement of time in not even an original shift of time—as we would see it in Waldenfels works when he describes diastasis [*Spalt*] in the “now”. However, the “now” is included in Plato’s cosmic pre-impostation of time as well as in the pre-appearing of time, which does not participate in what was before the pre-beginning. Plato’s model seems to be the anticipation of Husserl’s constitution of the consciousness of time verified by the strangeness/otherness. The “now” of diastasis can be an example of the context of the interpretation of the assumption of the ontological constancy of the primordial consciousness and primordially of the change-and-sequence without any time within them. That time and that temporalization are the carriers of the absolute strangeness which exist in the “I” in the connection of the “I” and the Other. The “I” can be strange for his or her self because the experience of time of an individual “I” refers to the pre-past. Looking for any state beyond the strangeness leads the “I” to the beginning of its existence until “the past which have never been present” (Merleau-Ponty). The individual beginning is an event which manifests itself in the “I” and its strangeness. As have been mentioned, the “I” is not able to answer completely to the strangeness by rooting into the “now”. In other words, the strangeness is always older than the “I”. From this moment, the “I” starts its struggle against the strangeness of itself and the otherness of the Others. This interpretation of Waldenfels’ phenomenology of the temporalization of the Other is very similar to Husserl’s statement written on May 1933:

‘I’ and the Other are not in the unity. Every ‘I’ that subject experiences as the Other in original realization has got the unity of ‘I’ and its flowing life, its immanent temporal stream of subjective temporalization, and its primordial nature. When nature is constituted as intersubjective unity, it is a unity with the Other. In other words, it does not lead to any possible continuation of my ‘I’-field or my constituted basis as non-active intentionality of my acts in relation to the other I which be treated as external continuation in the flow of time as correlate of reciprocal continuation in staying ‘I’-field<sup>29</sup>.

<sup>29</sup> [The author’s translation.] „Für mich und [für] den Andern habe ich diese Einheit nicht. Jedes Ich, das ich als anderes in originaler Vergegenwärtigung erfahre, hat s eine Einheit und sein strömendes Leben, seinen immanent-zeitlichen Strom sachlicher Zeitigung, seine primordiale Natur. Während aber die Natur in der Vergemeinschaftung sich als intersubjective Einheit konstituiert, ist sie doch Einheit aus Vergemeinschaftung mit meinem Andern. Darin liegt: Es führt keine mögliche Kontinuierung von meinem

According to Waldenfels, the strangeness cannot be overcome by the innerness of the “I”. Notice that any based on the notion of intersubjectivity model could do it. When the strangeness precede the “I”, it is impossible to start from what could be reached in what is common. Even if the Other is a reflection of the “I”, it does not have any access to its consciousness unlike it happens through the glass that is scratched by the strangeness/otherness. In other words, intersubjectivity assumes that there is something happening between the “I” and the Other by using the subjectivity of both.

The strangeness/otherness has at least two different meanings. Firstly, a social situation can be relatively strange as it is created by the carriers of the social sense (i.e. tradition) due to the bringing closer of the “I” and the Other. Secondly, a mono-subjectivity of a subject is described by the absolute strangeness. In the first case, the social situation creates a bipolar model. An artificial extracting of a sphere of the relative strangeness/otherness stays in the relation with the absolute strangeness. Extraction is what constitutes the narrowing to an accurate knowledge demanded by the functioning in a system and its instrumental knowledge<sup>30</sup>. According to Waldenfels, this knowledge is a very slim coat of existence<sup>31</sup>. According to Schütz,

the social world as it is always accepted in the attitude of the natural standpoint, whether in everyday life or in sociological observation<sup>32</sup>.  
[and]  
self-consciousness can only be experienced *modo praeterito*, in the past tense. [...] We participate in the immediate present of the Other's thought<sup>33</sup>.

The “I” stays in a social bipolarity of the relative strangeness and the absolute one. The social character of the “I” consists also in the overcoming of the closeness and the strangeness/otherness. In other words, it is understood as a frame of life—*Lebenswelt*—and not as a domain of the “I”'s activity. If one refers to the social “I” in such a *modi*, one has to restrain from the finite and ontological defining.

Ichpol bzw. von meinem kontinuierlichen Untergrund der inaktiven Intentionalität und meinen Akten (deren äussere Kontinuität im Zeitstrom als Korrelat die Gegenkontinuität des in Identitätsgemeinschaft mit sich selbst stehenden Ichpols hat) zum ‚anderen‘ Ichpol”. E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Texte aus dem Nachlass*, Dritter Teil: 1929–1935, The Hague 1973, pp. 576–577.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. B. Waldenfels, *Das Zwischenreich...*, *op. cit.*, p. 175, 179.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *Idem*, *Das sokratische Fragen, Aporie, Elenchos, Anamnesis*, Meisenheim am Glan 1961, p. 78.

<sup>32</sup> A. Schütz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, Evanston 1967, p. 97.


<sup>33</sup> *Idem*, *Collected Papers*, vol. 1..., *op. cit.*, p. 173.

As would be mentioned, the “I” is not in the “now” as an acting subject but with the «now» of the consciousness it becomes strange or home-ness. According to Husserl, the «now» takes a role of the ontological and epistemological stabilization. It is as varied as its surrounding reality. It depends on the rules of the strangeness and home-ness. Additionally, hitherto existing of the retentional ↔ protentional “now” it is blind in the context of the bipolar community of relativity and absoluteness. It does not mean that the “I” does not have an ontological qualification in a social community of the “new” “now”. In this context, the strangeness and home-ness are the only notions describing the determination of the “I” being-in-the-world. It is one of the Husserlian references to time as the past.

It is a new kind of anthropology of time based on the co-influence of the two poles and two different perspectives. This kind of anthropology is expressed in a specific structure of time with the “now” in the centre. However, it is not the centre of the social awareness. This new kind of central notion is connected with the verification of the strangeness/otherness passing in the past.

## Conclusions

The absolute strangeness lies in its mono-subjectivity levels of both—the bipolarity of the relative and absolute strangeness. According to Husserl, every consciousness has its own place and historical configuration of senses from which the objects are visible. Thus, every consciousness has its own events and apperceptions. An actual remembrance and depiction are different for every consciousness. It seems that the sense of intersubjectivity is individual on the different level of awareness. We communicate with the Others and we usually give our existence an objective sense of a spatial and temporal reality as being for us. This is the sense of the stock of the knowledge at hand<sup>34</sup>.

Finally, the category of strangeness/otherness is multileveled. A relation of “here” to the spatial strangeness is something different from a relation of the “now” to the temporal strangeness/otherness. The “here” of the “I” is the “here” or the “there” of the Other. The “I” and the Other refer to the “same” intersubjective location of space. They refer to the constituted, not to the constituting. If the “I” refers to the “now”, it means that the “I” reduces itself to the frozen consciousness in the context of its constitution of time and its constitution of objects<sup>35</sup>. 

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, p. 5.

<sup>35</sup> We are not talking about the notion of the frozen consciousness of the Other—this is a domain of, e. g. philosophy of A. Schütz in his phenomenological interpretative

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philosophy of social being when the “I” stays with the Others in We–relationship. The “I” has the consciousness of the experience of the Other thought, an experience of the Other’s apperceptions in the consciousness of the Other which is changing in a social real time. Cf. also A. Schütz, *Collected Papers, vol. 1...*, pp. 215–216, 243 and M. D. Barber, *Social Typifications and the Eleusive Other. The Place of Sociology of Knowledge in Alfred Schütz’s Phenomenology*, Lewisburg 1988, pp. 55–60, who, like Schütz, makes a mistake in the generalization of time and space as spatial–temporal and homogeneous conditions of apperception.