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URBAN GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS IN AUTONOMOUS TERRITORIES OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY: THE CASES OF CROATIA-SLAVONIA AND AUSTRIAN GALICIA (1867-1918)

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Abstract

There is still no consensus on the definition of urban governance, which can be attributed to gaps in its empirical foundation across both time and space. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1867-1918), with its complex state structure, serves as an ideal historical and geographical subject for unveiling aspects related to the birth of modern urban governance within a Central European context. To conduct comparative research, this study examines selected cities from two territorial autonomies of the empire: Zagreb, Osijek, Varaždin, and Zemun from Croatia-Slavonia, and Lviv and Cracow (Krakow) from Galicia. Urban governance within territorial autonomy, particularly from a historical standpoint, is a unique subject that lacks a substantial presence in the literature of urban studies and territorial autonomy. In this paper, an analytical framework was developed based on the key components of the transformation thesis of urban governance and metagovernance theory. The findings of the study indicate that the process of designating territorial autonomies and the various political factors behind them significantly shaped the formation of urban governance systems.

Key words

urban governance • territorial autonomy • metagovernance • historical geography • Croatia-Slavonia • Habsburg Galicia • Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

Introduction

The research outlined in this paper serves multiple purposes: uncovering uncharted territories within various theories and amalgamating results to establish new scientific perspectives. The two primary focal points

of this study – urban governance theory and the historical-geographical exploration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy – both exhibit noticeable gaps within their respective scientific literature. Urban governance, a relatively new scientific field, struggles with an unclear definition due to its limited historical and

geographical scope in scientific findings. While its case studies predominantly encompass North America and Western Europe, a notable gap exists in the historical dimension of the theory's literature, as highlighted in Alan DiGaetano's study titled *"The Birth of Modern Urban Governance"* (DiGaetano, 2009).

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy lies outside the primary geographical focus of urban studies. However, it stands as an excellent subject for research, offering valuable insights into several gaps within urban governance theory. Surprisingly, there have been relatively few comparative studies from a historical-geographical perspective regarding the two halves of the empire, which can be attributed mainly to historical-national causes. Even the interpretation of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 and the legal nature of the empire varied among Austrian and Hungarian politicians during that era (Hilbert, 2016, 2021). Since the empire's downfall, historiographical narratives have indicated distinct perspectives within both the Austrian (e.g., Bibl, 1924; Hantsch, 1968; Kann, 1974) and Hungarian scientific communities (e.g., Cieger, 2004; Somogyi, 2004). Consequently, scholarly works have primarily focused separately on Austria and Hungary. Hence, any comparative study exploring the two halves of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy holds immense potential to uncover new information and offer fresh perspectives.

This paper aims to shed light on a distinctive factor often overlooked in urban governance literature that holds the potential for conducting a comparative study within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as well: territorial autonomy. Both Croatia-Slavonia from the Hungarian part and Galicia from the Austrian part of the empire were territorial autonomies, albeit of very different natures. *How might subnational territorial autonomies have influenced the fundamental aspects of urban governance during the initial stages of urban democratization?* The present study endeavors to address this question by employing a comprehensive analytical

framework derived from a broader range of theories on urban governance.

Literature review: Urban governance, metagovernance, and territorial autonomy

Urban governance theories and their undiscovered areas

The theoretical roots of the relatively novel concept of urban governance emerged in the second half of the 20th century, particularly during the 1970s. The economic changes triggered by the oil crisis required a restructuring of urban policies' basic principles in the Western world. Cities, influenced by macroeconomic and fiscal reorganizations, shifted their urban policies from a managerial approach to an entrepreneurial one (Harvey, 1989). This transformation involved a shift from a predominantly top-down, hierarchical urban administrative system – where local government was the primary stakeholder – to a more decentralized, less hierarchical, pluralistic system that engaged multiple actors in the decision-making process. The former type of urban policy is often termed *"urban government"* and the latter one *"urban governance"*, and the transition between them is a subject extensively explored in the scientific literature (Harvey, 1989; Stone, 1989; Rhodes, 1997; Pierre, 1999; Stoker, 1998; Jessop, 2002a; Brenner, 2004; Eckardt & Elander, 2009; Slack & Côté, 2014; Van den Dool, 2015; Cruz et al., 2018). David Osborne and Ted Gaebler labeled this philosophical shift as *"re-inventing government"*, marking a clear evolution in the path of urban governance (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Simultaneous to the policy shift in the 1970s, there was a reconfiguration of power among different geographic levels: urban and supranational levels gained prominence at the expense of the state level (Brenner, 2004), a phenomenon Erik Swyngedouw termed as *"rescaling"* (Swyngedouw, 2000). However, a consensus on the definition of urban governance remains elusive.

Nonetheless, there are foundational aspects to its analytical framework: at its core, it aims to explore the network and diversity of institutions and stakeholders involved in urban politics and the interactions among them (Pierre, 2005).

Recent studies are increasingly critical of research focusing on the shift from urban government to governance, often referred to as the “*transformation thesis*” (Lo, 2017). At the core of these critiques is the notion that these studies imply urban government as something belonging to the past while presenting urban governance as a (brand) new urban philosophy. However, according to certain British studies, this depiction is not entirely accurate: British towns in the 19th century exhibited a decentralized, fragmented administrative structure that bore similarities to the characteristics of urban governance (Andrew & Goldsmith, 1998; Goldsmith & Garrand, 2000). The urban challenges of the 19th century, including pandemics, overpopulation, and rising crime rates, necessitated an efficient urban institutional system, leading to the dispersion of decision-making power among urban and other subnational bodies. In contrast, processes in other countries, such as France, tended to centralize power within urban municipalities. Some cities in the USA and Canada also shared a parallel trajectory with the decentralized structure observed in English towns (Goldsmith & Garrand, 2000; Morris, 2000).

Yet, we possess limited knowledge about the origins and developmental stages of what we now refer to as “modern” urban governance in the 19th century (DiGaetano, 2009). In addition to the lack of a historical perspective, the restricted geographic scope of its case studies poses another obstacle to comprehending and defining urban governance. The majority of research findings related to this theory stem from the case studies of North American and British cities (Pierre, 2005; Dear & Dahmann, 2008; Macleod, 2011). Case studies beyond these regions are sporadic, particularly those exploring urban governance through a historical lens (Some examples: Marcus, 1980; Fairbanks, 1999;

Hanley, 2012). Critiques extend to the scientific methods employed in studies addressing the transformation thesis: the absence of comparative studies – encompassing a wide range of research subjects across different countries – hampers the ability to observe the phenomenon’s processes on a broader geographical scale (DiGaetano & Klemanski, 1999; Sellers, 2002; Pierre, 2005; DiGaetano, 2009; Slack & Côté, 2014; Lucas, 2017). These criticisms regarding gaps in time, space, and methodology within urban governance literature may underscore the challenges associated with defining it.

The connection point between urban governance and territorial autonomy: the theory of metagovernance

This paper aims to explore urban systems within autonomous territories, necessitating an examination of the theoretical intersections between the theories of urban governance and territorial autonomy. However, neither the urban governance theory incorporates the perspective of autonomous areas, nor does the primary literature on territorial autonomy seem to address the aspect of city administration within autonomous territories. Within urban governance literature, the topic that bears the closest relation to territorial autonomies (or administrative hierarchy and its levels) is the theory of “rescaling” power among geographical scales. However, “rescaling” primarily revolves around the “reterritorialization” of capital, wherein supranational political formations and cities emerge as pivotal centers for capital investments, causing a continual decline in the power of the state level (Harvey, 1989; Swyngedouw, 2000; Brenner, 2004). More conventional studies on urban government and scales, which also link to capitalism and the economy, mostly focus solely on the urban and state levels (Braudel, 1984).

Similar to urban governance, the definition of territorial autonomy also lacks consensus. The term “*autonomy*” derives from the Greek words “*auto*” (self) and “*nomos*” (law, rule),

signifying the right to adopt laws independently (Miklósné, 2010). In legal and political spheres, territorial autonomy is linked to concepts such as sovereignty, self-determination (Bernhardt, 1981), self-government (Dinstein, 1981; Sohn, 1981), and control over specific issues within a defined geographical or administrative area (Ghai, 2000). Heinrich Oberreuter's definition offers a precise interpretation of territorial autonomy: *"the possibility of free self-determination under an existing legal order"* (Oberreuter, 1985, 490-491). Studies on territorial autonomy closely align with the rights of various minorities to self-determination. Territorial autonomy is seen as a form of decentralization or power-sharing for geographically concentrated minorities; however, it lacks a concrete institutional structure like federalism, and the extent of local authority can vary significantly from case to case (Rothchild & Hartzell, 1999). Territorial autonomy can be classified into two main types based on its legal character: *"de jure"* and *"de facto"*. The former is based on laws and tightly controlled politically, while the latter primarily exhibits autonomy in practice and is often not codified (Barter, 2017). The literature on territorial autonomy predominantly focuses on the effectiveness of conflict management through power-sharing mechanisms (Safran, 1999; Stewart, 2001; Suso, 2010; Cederman et al., 2015; Kössler, 2018; Juon & Bochsler, 2023). An intriguing aspect concerns the relationship between minorities within the autonomy and its impact on the administrative system's organization. Typically, territorial autonomies are politically centralized by the dominant minority, known as the *"first-order minority"*, often exerting control over other minorities with smaller population proportions, referred to as *"second-order minorities"* (Barter, 2017). While conflict management's influence on the urban level could be intriguing, these studies seem to overlook this aspect.

Metagovernance, an emerging approach within urban governance theory, could potentially serve as a bridge between territorial autonomy and urban governance. It consti-

tutes a central concept within the *"second generation"* of urban governance literature, distancing itself from the foundational principles of the transformation thesis (Lo, 2017). However, it remains a relatively nascent theory (Gjaltema et al., 2019). At its core, metagovernance involves *"...the governance of governance networks"* (Berg-Nordlie, 2018: 51.), encompassing a diverse range of conceptual branches. This paper primarily aligns with the state-theoretical approach (Jessop, 2002b), which views metagovernance *"...as a new way that the State can exercise power in the context of interactive governance."* (Torfing et al., 2012: 127.). Furthermore, it *"(...).helps us in understanding (...) the attempts of national government to support and direct local governments"* (Torfing et al., 2012: 143.). The state-theoretical approach aims to elucidate how state governments shape the fundamental rules and norms of decentralized networks to effectively steer them (Bailey, 2017). In this context, the *"metagovernor"* (state government), as *"the privileged site of political authority"*, possesses crucial resources to continuously impact the fundamental rules and circumstances governing a subject's governance (Bailey, 2017: 3.). Metagovernance operates through both *"hands-off"* (network design and framing) and *"hands-on"* tools (network management and participation). The former is associated with the fundamental structure of a network (legal framework, stakeholder composition, scope, fiscal conditions, etc.), while the latter concerns its operation and influence (conflict resolution, diverse policy outputs, etc.) (Sørensen & Torfing, 2016).

Research methodology, analytical framework, and objects of the study

The geographical scope of this paper encompasses Austria-Hungary and its two autonomous territories, namely Croatia-Slavonia and Galicia. However, due to limitations, it's not feasible to examine all cities within these autonomies. Therefore, this research focuses

on specific cities from both administrative units that were directly under the control of the autonomous government in 1914. This selection includes four Croatian cities – Zagreb, Osijek, Varaždin, and Zemun – and two Galician cities with statutes, namely Lviv and Cracow. The study period precisely aligns with the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy from 1867 to 1918.

Due to the historical focus and limited source availability, this paper primarily approaches the topic from a legal geographical perspective, emphasizing the examination of legal documents. Additionally, political and historiographical literature was used to supplement and contextualize the conclusions drawn from these legal documents. The necessary historical legal texts can be accessed through online databases. Acts passed by the Austrian state parliament and the Galician provincial parliament between 1850 and 1918 are accessible via one of the databases of the Austrian National Library [Österreichische Staatsbibliothek (ÖNB) ALEX Historische Rechts- und Gesetzestexte]. Similarly, laws enacted by the Hungarian parliament during the period of Dualism are available in an online database (*net.jogtar.hu*). However, Croatian laws from the researched era, written in Hungarian, are exclusively available in printed books within the Library of the Hungarian Parliament's foreign parliamentary collections.

Based on the state-theoretical approach and its “hands-off” and “hands-on” tools, this paper focuses on examining the legal designation processes of urban governance systems and identifying the key legal-political factors influencing them. Due to the absence of an analytical framework that adequately studies the link between urban governance and territorial autonomy, an individual analytical framework was developed for this study, drawing upon Jon Pierre's recommendations on comparative studies¹ (Pierre,

2005). The constructed analytical framework comprises three layers (Fig. 1). The innermost layer, rooted in the transformation theses and considering available sources, aims to reconstruct the legal “design” of urban governance systems. Factors like institutional fragmentation, representation of local voters, and municipal autonomy are pivotal elements within the transformation thesis. To emphasize territorial autonomy's role, a comparative analysis involving other cities from Austria and Hungary was conducted, drawing significant insights from the author's Ph.D. dissertation (Hilbert, 2023). This layer focuses on highlighting differences between the outcomes in cities within autonomous territories and those outside. The outcomes of the innermost layer are integrated into two additional layers, termed “metagovernors”. According to the state-theoretical approach of metagovernance theory, the governments of territorial autonomies can be viewed as “direct metagovernors” as they, in this paper's context, held legislative power to shape their area's administrative structure. Concurrently, the jurisdiction of territorial autonomies was influenced by the central governments of Austria and Hungary, along with the emperor, functioning as “indirect metagovernors” in this process. Thus, presenting the designation process of both the entire empire and its territorial autonomies is essential to identify the key elements influencing the designation process of urban governance systems in the selected cities.

The indirect metagovernors: The emperor and the state governments

The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 established a state structure founded on a real union between Austria and Hungary, creating what were known as common affairs – military affairs, foreign affairs, and both their financial affairs. The Compromise prescribed common state organs, including ministeriums for each of the common affairs, Austrian and Hungarian delegations elected from the plenum of each parliament, and

¹ Pierre suggests that a study dealing with a large number of objects requires a precisely defined, simpler analytical framework to eliminate “contextual noise” from the research, thereby enhancing its effectiveness (Pierre, 2005: 447).




Figure 1. The analytical framework of the research, derived from key points in theories on urban governance, metagovernance, and territorial autonomy

a common council of ministers led by the common emperor. Besides these three common affairs, several other issues required joint management by the Austrian and Hungarian governments, such as the monetary system, regulation of interest rates, water and rail transport, and postal and telegraphic matters, among others. The jurisdiction of these common organs was outlined in a “negative form” in the constitutions of Austria and Hungary, specifying that these bodies could not intervene or exert influence over the internal affairs of either part of the empire. Nevertheless, there were instances when the internal affairs of Austria or Hungary were deliberated and decisions were made within these common organs. In these cases, the common bodies acted as the common parliament

and government of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Somogyi, 1996). As a result, the state structure of the empire was positioned somewhere between a federal state and a confederation: operating within a single customs area, two administrative systems coexisted, and their state governments were involved in numerous shared matters. Within this customs area, labor, services, goods, and companies could freely move, and a unified official state currency was in circulation (Szente, 2011; Katus, 2012).

Apart from the historical traditions of both Austria and Hungary concerning their state structures, the pivotal role of the common emperor significantly influenced the administrative framework of the empire, particularly in the distribution of power across different

administrative levels. In 1867, Franz Joseph relinquished some of his absolutist powers but he still wielded near-absolutist authority in the legislative process in both halves of the empire. In Austria, the emperor could assume power at will anytime, governing the state through emergency decrees without requiring consent from the Austrian parliament (Reichsrat). This situation facilitated a scenario in the federal Austrian administrative system where, due to the removal of potential concerns regarding a political formation in the Reichsrat that might undermine the system of Dualism, the crownlands, and municipalities could exercise a broad range of authority. Conversely, the legislative process in the Hungarian part of the Monarchy operated smoothly when the emperor, with his power of pre-Royal assent, reached a unanimous agreement with the Hungarian Parliament (Országgyűlés) and the Hungarian government regarding bills he could sanctify. Any disruption to this agreement resulted in a complete impasse of the entire state apparatus, necessitating a restoration of consensus. This circumstance led to a thorough centralization of the Hungarian administrative system, preventing internal opposition from weakening the Hungarian government's position in the common governance with the emperor². The primary motive guiding decisions on the administrative system in both halves of the Monarchy was to maintain the status quo of Dualism (Sarlós, 1976).

The legal regulation and interpretation of urban municipalities differed fundamentally between Austria and Hungary. The Austrian Act on Municipalities of 1862 (GS, 1862) didn't legally distinguish cities from other settlement types based on their jurisdiction. As a federal law, it established basic regulations for Austrian municipalities, while each provincial parliament had the liberty to tailor and adopt its provincial law. Municipalities with larger populations could obtain statutes

from the provincial parliaments, granting expanded jurisdiction over institutional (such as creating specific organs) and financial matters (like taxation or taking a loan) to better manage their municipal tasks. Among the 33 Austrian municipalities with statutes, only two were in Galicia: Lviv and Cracow (Fig. 2). These statutes varied significantly, shaped by different principles and interests adopted separately by provincial parliaments. In Hungary (excluding Croatia-Slavonia), urban municipalities were categorized into four types according to Hungarian administrative laws (SF, 1872; LA, 1872; LA, 1886a; LA, 1886b). By 1918, there were 25 Municipal Towns (with county rights) and 112 towns with settled councils (under county supervision), while Budapest and Fiume (Rijeka in Croatian) had their own statutes. In the Croatian administrative system in 1914, there were two primary city types: towns with county rights (Zagreb, Osijek, Varaždin, and Zemun) and towns with district rights (13 smaller cities) similar to Hungarian cities in the same administrative tier. A significant distinction between Hungarian and Croatian legislation on urban municipalities existed: Croatian cities were governed by a distinct law on urban municipalities (ACR, 1881), whereas Hungarian cities (excluding Budapest and Fiume) were regulated in conjunction with counties and other municipalities.

The direct metagovernors: Territorial autonomies of Croatia- Slavonia and Galicia

The “de jure” autonomy of Croatia- Slavonia

The Kingdom of Croatia shared a long history with Hungary, becoming part of the Hungarian Kingdom in the 11th century through a personal union. Over centuries, Croatia developed a constitutional identity through institutions like the Sabor (Croatian Diet) and the Ban (later serving as the viceroy and prime minister of Croatia-Slavonia) (Čepulo, 2002). The period between the 1848 Revolution's

² An important factor of centralization was the elimination of the possible opposition coming from ethnic minorities as well.




Figure 2. The administrative positions of Croatia-Slavonia and Galicia within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, along with their cities possessing statutes/county rights, compared to other cities at the same administrative level in the empire (1914)

Legend: 1 - Administrative units of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; A - Countries of the Hungarian Crown, A1 - Hungary and its county system, A2 - Croatia-Slavonia and its county system, B - Crownlands of Austria, B1 - Crownlands with their own parliaments and governments, B2 - The “de facto” autonomy of the Crownland of Galicia; 2 - Municipalities with statutes in Austria, and municipalities with county rights in the countries of the Hungarian Crown and their positions in the administrative structure of each territory (3A-D); 3A - Administrative structure of Austria, R - Reichsrat (Austrian Parliament), M - Municipalities without statute, MS - Municipalities with statute; 3B - Administrative structure of the Crownland of Galicia, M - Municipalities without statute, 30M - 30 municipalities with a common regulation adopted in 1889, 128M - 128 municipalities with a common regulation adopted in 1896, MS - Municipalities with statute (Lviv and Cracow); 3C - Administrative structure of the Hungarian Kingdom, O - Országgyűlés (Hungarian Parliament), C - Counties, MT - Municipal Towns (Towns with county rights), F - City of Fiume, BP - Budapest; 3D - Administrative structure of Croatia-Slavonia, S - Sabor (Croatian Parliament), C - Counties, T w.c.r - Towns with county rights (Zagreb, Osijek, Varaždin, Zemun), Distr. - Districts, Towns w.d.r. - Towns with district rights

* Districts in most of the Austrian crownlands primarily handled administrative tasks. However, the parliaments of each crownland had the authority to grant them additional power, as occurred in examples such as Galicia, Bohemia, and Styria. (Klabouch, 1968).

Source: Author’s elaboration based on the information of the following sources: ACR, 1881; ACR, 1886; ACR, 1895; Brauneder 1994; Mezey 2003.

fall and the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 was crucial for shaping Croatian-Slavonian autonomy. Following the suppression of the 1848 revolution, Croatia-Slavonia was detached from the Hungarian Kingdom and placed under direct rule by the Viennese government. While Hungary's public administration operated under military regulations, Croatia-Slavonia functioning as a "de facto" crownland of Austria, acquired a public administration system in 1861 similar to other Austrian crownlands. After the Habsburgs' defeat at Königgrätz in 1866, the weakened Habsburg government relinquished control of Croatia to Hungary. However, Emperor Franz Joseph imposed a condition: Croatia-Slavonia had to be granted autonomy, delegating certain powers to the Sabor regarding internal matters, judicature, education, and religion (Sokcsevits, 2011).

The Croatian-Hungarian Settlement, known as Nagodba in Croatia, was adopted in 1868, granting Croatia-Slavonia the right to send 40 representatives to the Hungarian parliament, four of whom were elected to the Hungarian part of the common delegations of the empire. The Ban, head of the Croatian government, was appointed by the emperor upon the proposition of the Hungarian prime minister. The legislative process of the Sabor was significantly influenced by the Hungarian government; bills passed by the Sabor required approval from the Hungarian parliament before receiving the emperor's assent (Jelavich, 1983; Čepulo, 2010). Matters such as taxation, development, and economic-financial affairs of Croatia-Slavonia were also under the purview of the Hungarian parliament (Miller, 1995). In essence, due to these limitations on self-government, Croatia-Slavonia could be regarded primarily as a cultural autonomy.

The Hungarian influence on internal affairs in Croatia-Slavonia grew increasingly evident through transformations in the Croatian administrative system. After the Settlement of 1868, Croatia's organization largely adhered to the Austrian administrative principles inherited from the absolutistic era

(Čepulo, 2010). During the prime ministerial reign of Kálmán Tisza in Hungary (1875-1890), Croatia-Slavonia faced significant waves of "Hungarianization", reaching its peak under Károly Khuen-Héderváry's pro-Hungarian administration as Croatian Ban from 1883 to 1903. Khuen-Héderváry implemented the centralization policy of the Hungarian government in Croatia (Matković, 2010). In 1886, Croatian public administration underwent radical centralization in line with Hungarian modifications that year. Numerous conflicts, including disputes over Fiume, the imposition of the Hungarian language within the Croatian administration, and the delay in essential economic and infrastructural developments, exacerbated tensions between Croatia and Hungary (Krišto, 2005; Marušić, 2020).

The "de facto" autonomy of Galicia

The Crownland of Galicia was established in 1773 following the first partition of Poland, ultimately becoming the largest and least affluent crownland within the Habsburg Empire (Purchla, 2007). After the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Galicia received concessions from the Viennese Royal Court, including the establishment of a provincial assembly with limited jurisdiction, serving as a foundation for Galician "*Sonderstellung*" or special status policy (Tefner, 2007; Wolff, 2010; Kos et al., 2015). Alongside Galicia, the Congress of Vienna also created the Free City of Cracow, which existed from 1815 to 1846. Its substantial independence and minimal customs duties led to an economic and cultural boom, acting as a transmitter of Polish culture (Kovács, 1981). Following various conflicts and uprisings, Cracow was annexed by the Habsburg Empire, becoming part of Galicia³ (Davies, 2006). The political advocacy for

³ By that time, Lviv had become the undisputed administrative capital of the crownland, a status that remained unchanged even after the annexation of Cracow. However, Cracow continued to serve as a symbolic city for transmitting Polish culture. Therefore, Lviv and Cracow held distinctive roles in the life of Galicia (Purchla, 2007).

“Sonderstellung” saw fruition as the Habsburg Empire weakened internationally after 1848. The new constitution of 1867 solidified the federal structure of the Austrian half of the Monarchy, providing each crownland with its legislative body. In Galicia, the elected provincial parliament (Sejm Krajowy) had jurisdiction comparable to other crownlands, somewhat broader than that of the Sabor in Croatia-Slavonia. Alongside the administration, the provincial government wielded limited control over financial matters, including taxation, borrowing, and asset management (GS, 1861). Galicia, represented by its Polish contingent in the Austrian parliament, known as “*The Polish Club*”, played a pivotal role in passing the laws of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise in the Austrian parliament and in maintaining the status quo thereafter (Pajakowski, 1993).

Unlike the Croatian-Hungarian Settlement, which was formalized in legal documents, the Galician “*mini-Ausgleich*” (mini-compromise) (Frank, 2007: 14) was based on concessions granted by the Viennese government to Polish political leaders within the constitutional framework of Galicia’s government (Kuzmany, 2016). Essentially, the Viennese government permitted the “*polonization*” of Galicia (Haid, 2017). In 1871, a ministry for Galician affairs was established within the Viennese government, a unique feature for an individual Austrian crownland. Despite its political significance in Austria, Galicia’s autonomy was not threatened by the Austrian government; however, it grappled with a severe internal conflict between the first-order (Polish) and second-order minority (Ruthenian) groups, significantly shaping the crownland’s political landscape. The voting system in the crownland was designed to favor the Polish aristocracy and significantly disadvantaged the Ruthenian peasantry (Ciuciura, 1985). Even with the implementation of universal male suffrage in 1907 for the Austrian parliament elections, Galicia had specific regulations allowing the Polish representatives to maintain their dominance in the provincial elections (Tefner, 2007). There

was some semblance of resolution regarding the ethnic conflict just before the outbreak of the First World War. However, the onset of the war prevented any significant settlement between the Polish and Ruthenian elites (Kuzmany, 2016).

Analysis of urban governance systems in Croatia-Slavonia and Galicia⁴

As observed, the legal, socio-political circumstances shaping the designation processes of urban governance, governed by “indirect” and “direct metagovernors”, exhibited notable distinctions between Croatia-Slavonia and Galicia. The subsequent section aims to delve into the urban governance systems of Croatian and Galician cities through the three key factors outlined within the study’s analytical framework (Fig. 1). Incorporating the Austrian and Hungarian urban administrative contexts alongside the Croatian and Galician ones within these factors will effectively highlight the essence of the metagovernors’ influence.

Institutional fragmentation

The analysis of institutional structures during the era of Dualism revealed common elements among the selected cities. The Croatian cities showed heightened fragmentation in their municipal structures from 1881 to 1895 (Fig. 3). The Act on urban municipalities (ACR, 1881) initially organized municipalities following the Austrian model, maintaining the existing status quo. However, in the same year when modifications were made to the Acts governing Hungarian municipalities (LA, 1886a, LA, 1886b; excluding Budapest and Fiume), a similar adjustment was made to the Croatian Act (ACR, 1886). These modifications introduced several new bodies: the position of the Lord-lieutenant (Lord Mayor

⁴ The analysis based entirely on the following pieces of law: Croatian laws: ACR, 1881; ACR, 1886; ACR, 1895; Galician laws: GS, 1866; GS, 1870; GS, 1901

in Zagreb), the Administrative Board, and the Appointment Committee (except in Zagreb). These changes reflected the Hungarian government's centralization ambitions, as the new organs primarily held oversight over the municipal council's authority. Following the 1895 amendment law (ACR, 1895), the institutional structure of Osijek, Varaždin, and Zemun mirrored that of the Hungarian Municipal Towns, while Zagreb remained somewhat unique due to the absence of the appointment committee.

In Galicia, Lviv and Cracow had distinct institutional structures governed by different statutes, enabling the creation of unique organs and measures. While the fundamental institutions – such as the decision-making body, the executive organ, and the position of the mayor – were common in every Austrian city, they were often named differently. Some cities had district-level authorities with decision-making or executive powers, and others incorporated advisory or decision-making/executive support bodies. Lviv and Cracow each possessed specific bodies (Accountancy, Special Committee), with Cracow's organ holding decision-making authority (Fig. 3). However, an uncommon institutional element was present in Galicia: the division of municipal council mandates based on religious grounds (Christian and Jewish representatives). These groups voted separately only on matters concerning local religious affairs, such as churches and religious schools. Lviv's 1870 municipal statute specified a minimum of 80 Christian representatives out of 100. If fewer Christian representatives were elected due to voter diversity, the so-called "Christian Administration Council" needed to be established. The President (city mayor) then organized an election to fill the required number of Christian representatives. These council members voted on religious matters alongside other Christian council members. In contrast, Cracow's municipal statute fixed the number of Jewish representatives, lacking similar regulations as in Lviv. This election system favored Jewish representation more in Cracow, whereas Lviv, as the epicenter of the

Polish-Ruthenian conflicts, posed a more challenging landscape for Jewish politicians (Kuzmany, 2015).

The representation of local voters in the governance systems: The municipal election system

Two interpretations can be drawn from analyzing the election systems of urban governing bodies: studying the voting processes within the municipal council highlights direct representation while examining the election of the (Lord) mayor and other organs reveals indirect representation of local voters. The details of local election systems varied considerably between Austria and Hungary. Nevertheless, the chosen cities in Croatia-Slavonia and Galicia presented a notably distinct perspective in this aspect compared to their counterparts in the empire.

The electoral systems of Hungarian and Croatian cities' municipal councils displayed a fundamental difference: in Hungary, local voters were listed in an electoral register and voted through an open ballot system, while in Croatia-Slavonia, voters were categorized into three classes based on their annual tax payments and utilized a secret ballot system. This system had its origins in Austria, where these classes were termed "curiae". Voting rights in Hungary were restricted by a relatively high tax threshold (either house tax payment or a yearly land tax of at least 16 gulden), whereas in Croatia-Slavonia between 1881 and 1895, there was no minimum tax requirement, and voters were divided into three equal classes. However, the amendment law of 1895 (ACR, 1895) introduced a minimum tax threshold of 5 gulden, establishing various tax thresholds for each voter class across the four selected Croatian cities based on their population (Tab. 1). The age qualification for voting in Croatia was 24 years, similar to Austria. Yet, the most notable disparity lay in the absence of virilism in the Croatian electoral system. Virilism, a rather feudalistic suffrage tool, automatically granted mandates to municipal council members who paid




Figure 3. Schematic representation of the institutional structure of Gallician and Croatian cities and their positions within the administrative system of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1914

Legend: 1A – Actors involved in urban governance systems; A – The common emperor of Austria-Hungary, B – State body or body appointed by the common emperor and/or the state government, C – Provincial body; D – Body elected by the common emperor and the government of the crownland; E – The Appointment Committee and the municipal organs elected by this body; F – Body elected by local residents possessed voting rights or body elected by the municipal council; 1B – Official relations between the organs participating in the urban governance system, 1 – It could uphold, amend and cancel decrees and resolutions, as well as dissolve municipal councils; 2 – Elected, appointed, consented to the appointment of one or more members; 3 – It could dissolve a plenum of a body and dismiss an official from his office; 4 – It could appeal against the decree of another body; 5 – The body's permission was required for the adoption of certain or all of its decrees; its decisions concerning an appeal or complaint case were binding to the concerned urban organ; 6 – The provincial parliament adjudicated appeals by any urban organs against the decree of the provincial government.

Notes: 1 – The Provincial Governor had the authority to suspend decrees or resolutions of any municipal body regarding state tasks transferred to the municipal level. The Municipal Council could appeal against the decision to the Minister of the Interior; 2 – The Provincial Government adjudicated appeals against all city decrees and resolutions of any urban body affecting municipal tasks; 3 – The Administrative Board could suspend the decree or resolution of any urban body, which could appeal against it to the national government.

Source: Author's elaboration based on the following acts: ACR, 1881; ACR, 1886; ACR, 1895; GS, 1870; GS, 1901.

Table 1. The electoral details of the selected cities from the research, as well as other cities from Hungary and Austria (1914)

	The minimum tax census of the curiae/ voting classes (gulden)			Voting age	Virilism
	1	2	3		
Zagreb	500	100	5	24	No
Osijek	280	70	5	24	No
Varaždin	250	50	5	24	No
Zemun	150	30	5	24	No
Hungarian cities	An electoral register system was in effect. The minimum tax census was 16 gulden.			20	Yes
Lviv	An electoral register system was in effect. The minimum tax census was either 16 (income tax) or 12 (other types of tax) gulden.			24	No
Cracow	The eligible voters were divided into three curiae. The minimum tax census was either 6 (house rent tax), 5 (income tax) or 16 (other types of tax) gulden.			24	No
Austrian cities from other crownlands	30-400	10-100	0-25 (A fourth curia was introduced in many cities without tax census.)	24	No

Note: The electoral details of the Austrian cities are presented here aggregated, showing the range of the imposed tax censuses' value in these cities.

Source: Author's elaboration based on the following acts and sources: ACR, 1895; GS, 1866, GS, 1870, GS, 1901; Hilbert, 2023.

state taxes above a specified amount without requiring an election. Half of the mandates in Hungarian cities' municipal councils were reserved for these virilist representatives, with the other half elected by local voters. Virilism was implemented in nearly every Hungarian municipality (except Fiume) and some municipalities in Austria, but only in a few crownlands. Analyzing the municipal council election systems, the two Galician cities presented contrasting pictures. Interestingly, Lviv's Municipal Council electoral system bore more resemblance to the Hungarian system than the Austrian one, employing an electoral register system through an open ballot, a unique occurrence in the Austrian half of the empire⁵. Presumably,

⁵ However, in some voting districts of Chernivtsi (the capital of Bukovina), an electoral register was also introduced instead of a curial voting system.

this deviation from the curial election system aimed to ensure Polish candidates' dominance due to Lviv's more mixed population⁶. Meanwhile, the Cracowian Municipal Council adopted a curial and secret ballot voting system similar to that of most Austrian cities. However, it lacked a fourth curia without a tax threshold, a feature present in the election of municipal councils in many Austrian cities. Additionally, Lviv and Cracow had the highest minimum tax thresholds among the 33 Austrian cities where tax thresholds were introduced.

⁶ According to the Austrian census taken in 1910, about 50% of the inhabitants of Lviv possessed Catholic (who had presumably mainly Polish ethnicity), 28% Jewish, and 19% Greek-Catholic religion (who were mostly Ruthenians). These numbers in Cracow were respectively 77%, 21% and <1% (K.K. Statistische Zentralkommission, 1912).

The electoral systems for (lord-)mayors and other city organs in Croatia and Galicia were quite similar compared to their respective halves of the empire. By the election of the mayor, the emperor possessed a key role. In Austria, a city's mayor was elected by the municipal council, requiring the emperor's assent. If the emperor withheld assent, a new vote could be called. In some documented instances, such as in the cases of Vienna and Prague, the municipal council's persistence led to the dysfunction of the city and local tension, compelling the emperor to ultimately assent to the elected mayor (Klabouch, 1968). Other members of municipal organs in Austria were also elected solely by the municipal council. Yet, Cracow and Lviv had a unique situation compared to other Austrian cities, where religious factors played a role in the election of the President and vice presidents. In case the mayor and first vice president were both of Jewish faith, Christian members of the council had to elect a Christian vice president from among themselves. In Hungary, the lord mayor was directly appointed by the emperor through the nomination of the minister of the interior, excluding the municipal council from the election process. The mayor's election occurred via an appointment committee comprising an equal number of representatives elected by the municipal council and appointed by the lord mayor, who led the committee. With the lord mayor's voting rights, those members trusted by the lord mayor (indirectly by the state government and the emperor) constituted the majority of the committee. Three nominees for mayor were appointed by this committee, and the council voted to select one. The election process for other municipal organs followed a similar pattern. The Croatian amendment law on urban municipalities (ACR, 1886) adopted a similar procedure to the election of these positions/organs, except in Zagreb (and Fiume in Hungary) where the appointment committee was not introduced. Notably, Croatian cities underwent a distinct shift in their election procedures in 1886,

transitioning from Austrian models to Hungarian examples.

Municipal autonomy: Local authority and financial independence

The nature of state or provincial control over city governments varied significantly between the two halves of the Monarchy. In Austria, the state, through the governor of the crownland, oversaw the implementation of state tasks at the municipal level, while the government of the crownland supervised local municipal tasks (Fig. 3). These two entities primarily monitored the city councils' by-law-making processes. Although the provincial government lacked direct intervention capabilities in city affairs, it held considerable indirect authority. For instance, the city council had to seek the crownland's consent in certain matters like taxation. Moreover, if there were complaints or appeals against municipal by-laws, the provincial government had the authority to annul them or propose modifications to the municipal council. In cases where the council contested the provincial government's decision, the final say rested with the provincial parliament. The crownland's governor had greater authority to intervene directly in city governance, especially in cases of adopting an illegitimate by-law or mishandling the city's assets. In such cases, the governor could halt the legislative process of by-laws, initiate renegotiations within the city council, or nullify them. Additionally, when urban tasks remained unfulfilled, the governor could assume control over any municipal body or create a temporary body for task provision. The municipal council could appeal the governor's orders to the Minister of Interior.

In Hungary and Croatia (after 1886), the state control over the cities was much more complex and stringent. Three categories of controlling bodies monitored city operations. Both the state government and the Minister of Interior exercised control over every Hungarian and Croatian town with county rights. In Hungary, the state government held such

Table 2. The maximum possible amount of some budgetary items that could be adopted by the municipal council without the consent of a higher administrative entity (1914)

	Croatian cities	Hungarian cities	Galician cities	Austrian cities from other crownlands
Municipal surtax (%)	20	0	Lviv: 30 Cracow: 25	25-500
Marketable municipal properties (thousand gulden)	10	Budapest: 25 Other cities: 0	Lviv: 10 Cracow: 150	0-150 (Cracow's value is the highest)
The amount of borrowable loan (thousand gulden)	Not more than the sum of the yearly budgetary income with the deduction of all debts.	Budapest: 25 Other cities: 0	Lviv: Not more than the average sum of the previous six years' budgetary incomes. Cracow: Not more than 1/4 part of the average of the previous three years' budgetary incomes	Variable figures. A few examples: Vienna: 2000 Linz: 100 Klagenfurt and Brno: 50 Graz: 25 Innsbruck and Salzburg: Not more than the total yearly budgetary income. Prague: Not more than the sum of the yearly budgetary income with the deduction of all debts.

Notes: 1. The data of the Austrian cities are presented here aggregated, showing the range of the values of the municipal surtax and the marketable properties. 2. Due to the population-based regulations in Croatia-Slavonia, Varaždin's and Zemun's municipal councils were initially limited to selling properties valued at six thousand gulden until 1910. After reaching a population threshold, they became eligible to sell properties valued at 10 thousand gulden.

Source: Author's elaboration based on the following acts and sources: ACR, 1895; GS, 1866; GS, 1870; GS, 1901; Hilbert, 2023.

strict authority over cities that it could nullify municipal laws and replace them. The mayor executed these statutes. In Croatia, while the state government did not have the same kind of direct power, all municipal by-laws required submission for approval. The Administrative Board, introduced in 1876 in Hungary and 1886 in Croatia, also wielded control over cities. Board members were partly elected by the municipal council and partly appointed by the state, with the town's representatives being the majority in Budapest and Croatian cities, while in Hungary's Municipal Towns, the situation was reversed. Lastly, through the position of the lord-lieutenant (the lord mayor in Budapest and Zagreb), state control directly impacted Hungarian and Croatian city administration systems. The lord-lieutenant/lord mayor held extensive powers over the city government.

Under the 1886 amendment laws on municipalities (LA, 1886a; ACR, 1886), the lord-lieutenant/lord mayor practically could attain full control over city organs with state government approval, governing with personal decrees.

Five major points of municipal authority were chosen from the Croatian and Galician pieces of law to evaluate the extent of municipal autonomy (Fig. 1). Apart from amendments to urban statutes, every Austrian city with statutes (except for Trieste) exercised all the listed rights within their own jurisdiction. Lviv and Cracow mirrored the scenario of any other Austrian city, except for a significant detail in Cracow's 1866 statute (GS, 1866): the Municipal Council could initiate precise modifications to its municipal statute and administrative boundaries to the Galician Provincial Parliament. The adoption of Cracow's new statute in 1901 somewhat limited

this right (GS, 1901): the Municipal Council could request a review against the modification bill of the municipal statute submitted to the provincial parliament.

Contrary to the Galician towns, Croatian cities had significant differences from their Hungarian counterparts concerning the mentioned five authorities. However, major changes arose after 1886. Before the amendment law of 1886, Croatian cities possessed every right except for modifying urban statutes and urban institutional structure. After 1886, the administrative board gained authority over modifying the municipal budget and issuing building permits, albeit the board was dominated by municipal representatives against state-elected members. Moreover, the city gained “provisionary” control over the local police, though the statute allowed the state to assume control at the city’s expense if deemed necessary, serving as a safeguard against local unrest. However, the amendment law of 1886 didn’t alter a crucial aspect of local autonomy: a limited scope of financial autonomy that was completely nullified in Hungarian towns. Despite the Hungarian capital’s jurisdiction over financial assets, compared to Zagreb (which had over ten times less population in 1910), the Croatian cities demonstrated relatively broader financial autonomy (Tab. 2).

Lviv and Cracow held relatively “average” positions among the Austrian cities in the discussed aspects. Cracow stood out due to its high value of marketable properties, the highest among Austrian cities, but its borrowable loan amount was relatively unfavorable. Lviv presented the opposite scenario concerning these two budgetary assets. Both Galician cities had relatively unfavorable circumstances compared to other Austrian cities regarding the maximum imposable municipal surtax. Despite Lviv’s provincial capital status which garnered large state investments for urban infrastructure and representative buildings (Hrytsak, 2000), Cracow’s budget showed significantly higher dynamics of revenue growth which was mainly due to its rapidly growing administrative borders (Hołuj, 2013).

In conclusion, Austrian and Hungarian cities significantly diverged concerning financial autonomy, while Croatian and Galician cities exhibited more similarities.

Summary

This research demonstrated how the historical background and the formation process of territorial autonomies, along with various socio-political forces, significantly influenced the establishment of urban governance systems. The establishment of both autonomies held historical significance: Croatia-Slavonia, formerly an independent kingdom, maintained a distinct status within the Hungarian Kingdom for centuries, while Galicia, a comparatively newer administrative entity, also had its legacy of self-governance. After the Revolution of 1848, both regions came under the control of the Viennese Royal government, which introduced provisional acts governing their administrative structures and municipalities. The circumstances and driving forces behind the designation of these autonomous territories played a crucial role in shaping urban governance systems.

The autonomous status of Croatia-Slavonia resulted from political pressure by Franz Joseph, leading to a “*de jure*” autonomy that, nonetheless, remained under the control of the Hungarian government. This autonomy lacked substantial political power to entirely exclude Hungarian intervention in Croatia’s internal affairs. Initially, the legal framework established during the Austrian era remained largely unchanged, but subsequent waves of “Hungarianization” led to pronounced centralization at every administrative level, mirroring the Hungarian model. This involved the creation of new municipal organs, such as the lord mayor/lord-lieutenant, administrative board, and appointment committee. These changes narrowed municipal jurisdiction and raised tax-censuses, all aligning with the objectives of centralization. Nonetheless, the complete transformation of the Croatian administration system did not materialize. Elements like the curial voting system (rooted

in Austrian legal traditions), the absence of virilism in the electoral system, local financial autonomy, and Zagreb's distinct status persisted due to Croatia-Slavonia's autonomous status. These aspects seemingly coexisted with centralization efforts, preserving the status quo to avert larger political conflicts. *The territorial autonomy in Croatia-Slavonia served as both a weakening shield against Hungarian centralization during the time of Dualism and a preserver of the legal framework inherited from the Austrian era. As a result, Croatian cities displayed a hybrid type of urban governance model, incorporating distinct elements from both the Austrian and Hungarian systems.*

Different political circumstances led to the establishment of Galicia's "de facto" autonomy: as a reward for the continual political support of the crownland's (Polish) representatives in the Austrian parliament, the Austrian government conferred a special status upon the region. Austria's federal state structure afforded crownlands considerable jurisdiction, providing Galicia's government with somewhat broader autonomy compared to the Croatian Sabor. Due to the consistent political landscape in Austria over the decades, Galicia's autonomy was not subject to pressure from the central Austrian government. The legislative processes of the autonomous territory were significantly influenced by the crownland's internal affairs, particularly those related to religion and ethnicity. The division of the mandates within the municipal councils directly responded to religious circumstances, while the relatively high tax-censuses catered to both ethnic and religious dynamics. Due to Lviv's more diverse population in terms of ethnicity and religion compared to Cracow, its urban governance system displayed more unique features. The precise allocation of municipal council seats based on religion carried different implications for the two Galician cities. However, the objective remained consistent in both cases: to ensure the dominance of the Polish elite (as the first-order minority) in the cities' governance. Cracow's extensive jurisdiction

could be attributed to its special status as a city-state in the past, the predominance of Polish influence in Galicia's provincial parliament, and its symbolic role as a transmitter of Polish culture. *The territorial autonomy in Galicia provided the crownland's government with a relatively broad scope of self-governance which remained intact to the end of Dualism. This autonomy allowed Polish elites to adjust the urban governance systems of Lviv and Cracow in response to local ethnic and religious dynamics, leading to the development of distinctive urban structures and solutions.*

Interpreting the findings through the lens of the transformation thesis, the results of this paper align with British case studies referenced in the theoretical framework, highlighting that elements of both urban government and urban governance can be noticed in historical case studies. Croatian-Slavonian cities, with their controlled and hierarchical administrative structures, echoed more elements of urban government, while Galician cities, boasting broader jurisdiction and fragmented institutional frameworks, reflected urban governance. Additionally, the social factors that generated the need for democratizing urban governance may be the same in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as in Western Europe or the USA but – as this paper demonstrated – the legal-political circumstances were also crucial. Beyond acknowledging historical perspectives and employing comparative methodologies across wider geographical scales in urban governance case studies, this research underscores the necessity of considering the designation process not only for urban governance systems but also for their broader administrative contexts. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, characterized by its complex state structure and socio-political nature, provides an excellent geographical context to explore these facets comprehensively. Similarly, examining other countries and historical state formations offers comparable potential, enriching the empirical foundation of urban governance theory with new elements and perspectives.

Editors' note:

Unless otherwise stated, the sources of tables and figures are the author's, on the basis of their own research.

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