

Zbigniew Wójcik

FROM THE PEACE OF OLIWA TO THE TRUCE OF BAKHCHISARAI

International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1660–1681

In the latter half of the 17th century Eastern Europe, or more precisely speaking—the east-central part of it, lived through one of the most turbulent periods in its history. The great Ukrainian insurrection led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky convulsed not only the entire Polish-Lithuanian State but it indeed jolted the political balance of forces in this part of the European continent. Close on the heels of the Cossack revolt came the Polish-Russian war (1654–1667), a second Northern War (1655–1660), the wars between Poland and Turkey (1672–1676) and Russia and Turkey (1677–1681), crowned by long-drawn out (1683–1699) hostilities between a coalition of Christian states which, in 1684, assumed the name of the Holy League, and the Ottoman Empire.

The chronological brackets of the period in question are the outbreak of the anti-Polish insurrection in the Ukraine in 1648 and the peace of Karlowitz, 1699, whereby the war between the Holy League and Turkey was brought to an end.¹ There is no doubt that the intervening fifty years shaped a new balance of forces in the area, a balance which, one is tempted to say, survived until the

¹ Russia, from 1686 onwards also a member of the Holy League, ended its war with Turkey a little later, concluding a separate armistice agreement in Istanbul on 13th July, 1700.

outbreak of World War I. The important new element was that the Polish-Lithuanian State, Sweden, Turkey, and *eo ipso* also the Tartar Khanate of Crimea, had as a result lost their previous big-power positions to three states of East-Central Europe, which were thenceforth to become full-fledged European powers, their sway reaching far beyond the east-central area where they belonged. Those states were Russia, Brandenburg-Prussia and Austria.²

Having spent nearly thirty years studying the political history of Eastern Europe the author of the present article is deeply convinced that the really decisive cause of such a radical about-turn on the political arena of Eastern Europe was Polish-Russian rivalry and its outcome: the victory gained by Russia over Poland. That victory was tantamount to Russia winning hegemony among the Slavonic nations, or more simply winning hegemony in this part of the continent.³ Such a presentation of the issue does nothing to underestimate or overlook other aspects of the international situation in 17th century Eastern Europe, such as the Polish-Turkish, Turko-Russian, Swedish-Russian, and periodically also Swedish-Polish controversies.

The subject-matter defined by the title of the present article has a vast literature. Nonetheless, many aspects are as yet insufficiently examined and the interpretation of others is highly controversial if not outright erroneous. Historians regard the years between the peace of Oliwa (1660) and the truce of Bakhchisarai (1681), i.e. from the end of the second Northern War to the end of the first round of the Russo-Turkish wars, as especially momen-

² Cf. Z. Wójcik, *Zmiana w układzie sił politycznych w Europie środkowowschodniej w drugiej połowie XVII wieku* [A Change in the Political Balance of Forces in East-Central Europe in the Latter Half of the 17th Cent.], "Kwartalnik Historyczny," 1960, No. 1, p. 54.

³ Z. Wójcik, *Znaczenie wieku XVII w historii stosunków polsko-rosyjskich* [The Significance of the 17th Century in the History of Polish-Russian Relations], in: *Z polskich studiów slawistycznych*, seria 2, Historia, Prace na V Międzynarodowy Kongres Slawistów w Sofii 1963, p. 93. Also by the same author, *Międzynarodowe położenie Rzeczypospolitej* [International Position of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth], in: *Polska XVII wieku. Państwo-społeczeństwo-kultura*, a volume edited by J. Tazbir, 2nd ed., Warszawa 1974, p. 37. This view is neither new nor isolated. Cf. A. Gurowski, *La Vérité sur la Russie et sur la révolte des provinces polonaises*, Paris 1834, pp. 2-3, and also references to, and approval of, Gurowski's views by W. Leitsch, *Russo-Polish Confrontation*, in: *Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution*, New Brunswick, New Jersey 1974, p. 131.

tous in international political developments in the territory bordered by the Elbe and the Urals, the Scandinavian peninsula and the Black Sea.

The outcome of the second Northern War left Brandenburg as winner on all counts. The international peace treaty, signed on 3rd May, 1660, at the Cistercian Abbey in Oliwa near Gdańsk, effectively put the sanction of law on all gains and advantages won by that state during the past war. The Brandenburg Kurfürst had already reached his principal objective when in 1657, by virtue of the Welawa-Bydgoszcz treaties, he severed the bonds of East Prussia's fealty formerly sworn to the Polish Kings. An expert in what contemporaries called *Fuchspolitik*, he gained many other diplomatic successes, a remarkable one being the pact concluded with the Russians at the walls of Riga (1656) which opened, as a German historian correctly pointed out, "*die Traditionen der preussisch-russischen Freundschaft*."⁴ Last not least, the war, and especially the three-day battle of Warsaw from the 28th to 30th July, 1656, proved the mettle and fighting quality of the Brandenburgian army.⁵

The Polish-Lithuanian State emerged from the war in political and economic disarray. The extent of war destruction was considerable, casualties in some areas reached the exorbitant proportion of 61 per cent of total population and caused that large tracts of the land lay fallow,⁶ there was a consequent disastrous drop in grain production,⁷ followed by inflation which also plagued other European countries at the time. True, in terms of territory the Polish-Lithuanian State managed to hold its own, but the treaties of Welawa and Bydgoszcz meant that Brandenburg was now

⁴ K. Feustreutter, *Preussen und Russland von den Anfängen des Deutschen Ordens bis zum Peter dem Grossen*, Göttingen 1955, pp. 159-162.

⁵ See above all A. Riese, *Dreitätige Schlacht bei Warschau 28, 29, 30 Juli 1656 Jahre. Die Wiege preussischer Kraft und preussischer Siege*, Breslau 1870.

⁶ W. Rusiński, *Uwagi o zniszczeniach po wojnach z połowy XVII wieku* [Notes on the Extent of Destruction Following Wars in mid-17th Cent.], in: *Polska w okresie drugiej wojny północnej 1655-1660*, vol. II, Warszawa 1957, pp. 428-429.

⁷ Prior to 1648 Poland exported around 100,000 lasts (1 last = 30 bushels) of grain annually. By 1653 that figure dropped to 34,000, by 1656 to 11,000, and by 1659 to 541 lasts! Source: J. Rutkowski, *Historia gospodarcza Polski* [An Economic History of Poland], 3rd ed., vol. I, Poznań 1947, p. 167, 251.

deeply entrenched on the Baltic—an ill omen for the future of Poland. When we add that Russia's territorial conquests, and above all the capture of the left-bank Ukraine, which contemporary Poles regarded as only transient losses, proved to be permanent, the picture is produced of a difficult situation in which Poland found itself in the 1660s.

For Sweden, the outcome of the second Northern War turned out to the disadvantage, despite feeble appearances to the contrary. Certain territorial gains at the cost of Denmark and a preservation of *status quo ante bellum* in other cases did not alter the hard fact that the Swedes failed in their grand design of putting together a Baltic empire, that their *Östersjövälde*t dream came to nothing, and that Sweden's offensive power was effectively crushed. Hence the outcome of the Northern War, when compared to that of the Thirty Years' War, must be regarded as Sweden's retreat on the international arena.

The Northern War ended, for the time being at least, with little success for Russia, too. It did not take part in the peace of Oliwa, and concluded a peace with Sweden only the following year (1661) at Kardis. The Kardis treaty signified Russia's temporary resignation from its long-cherished goal, i.e. winning access to the Baltic Sea. Given that state of affairs, Russia all the more energetically turned to implement two other foreign policy goals: incorporation of Polish-held Ruthenian (i.e. Ukrainian and Byelorussian) territories to the state of Muscovy, and fighting Turks and Tartars in order to win access to the Black Sea.

The Thirteen Years' War with Poland, a war in which probably more ink than blood was shed (diplomatic negotiations were on and off for nearly ten years), ended with Moscow winning favourable terms in the truce of Andrusovo in Byelorussia on 30th January, 1667.⁸ The treaty of Andrusovo was an outward expression of what has already been mentioned in this essay, i.e. of Moscow winning a preponderant position over Poland.

⁸ More on Russo-Polish relations in that period and on behind-the-scenes aspects of the truce agreement, see Z. Wójcik, *Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza* [The Treaty of Andrusovo of 1667 and Its Origins], Warszawa 1959, and I. V. Galaktionov, *Iz istorii russko-pol'skogo sblizenija v 50-60 godah XVII veka (Andrusovskoe peremire 1667 goda)*, Saratov 1960.

Remarkably, the significance of the Thirteen Years' War between Poland and Moscow and the possible weight of its outcome was realized even by contemporaries. None other but the great mind of the period, the German philosopher Gottfried von Leibniz, saw it clearly. As a young man of 20, writing under an assumed name, he published in 1669 a political treatise designed to win Polish gentry to the cause of the Prince of Neuburg, Philip William then offering his candidacy to the Polish Crown following the abdication of King John Casimir (1648–1668). Leibniz stressed in his work some essential contradictions between the interests of Poland and Moscow. The rapprochement, evident between the two powers after the treaty of Andrusovo, worried him because he quite correctly saw in it a dislocation of the balance of forces in Europe to the advantage of what he described as “the barbaric East.” Leibniz saw an ill omen for Poland in the victory and ascendancy of Russia. He foresaw that the Polish territory will at some future date become a battle-field on which predatory neighbours will compete against one another for hegemony and sway over Poland, and the Polish people will be reduced to little more than “an obstruction for the warring parties, spoils for the victors and a grave for neighbours.”⁹

Historians of a later date sometimes repeated Leibniz's prophetic verdict though they certainly were not familiar with his treatise.¹⁰ However, whether historians' judgement of the significance of the Andrusovo truce of 30th January, 1667, are objective

⁹ Georgius Ulicovius Lithuanus (Leibniz's pen name), *Specimen demonstrationum politicarum pro eligendo rege Polnorum*, Vilnae (it was really published in Gdańsk) 1669. Quoted after S. Kot, *Rzeczpospolita Polska w literaturze politycznej Zachodu [Poland in the Political Literature of the West]*, Kraków 1919, p. 151.

¹⁰ A. A. Volkov, *Rossija i Pol'sa v XVII v. in: Tčtenija v Obščestve Istorii i Drevnostej Rossijskich*, 1865, No. 2; P. Golovacev, *Značenie Andrušovskogo peremirja dla meždunarodnyh otnošenij Vostočnoj Evropy*, “*Russkaja Starina*,” vol. XXXIV, 1903, No. 7, pp. 159 ff. Also cf. Z. Wójcik, *Znaczenie wieku XVII...*, passim, and idem, *Między traktatem andruszowskim a wojną turecką. Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie 1667–1672 [Between the Treaty of Andrusovo and the Turkish War, Polish-Russian Relations, 1667–1672]*, Warszawa 1968, p. 9; and idem, *Traktat andruszowski...*, p. 257. Also cf. I. V. Galaktionov, *op. cit.*, p. 104, and idem, *Rossija i Pol'sa nakanune peregovorov v Andrušove*, “*Učenyje Zapiski Instituta Slavjanovedenija AN SSSR*,” 1959, vol. XVIII; S. M. Solovev, *Istorija Rossii s drevnejših vreměn*, vol. XI/XII, No. 6, Moskva 1961, pp. 187–188.

and not a little exaggerated (and that includes the judgement of this author too) is really irrelevant. Be it as it may, the importance of that diplomatic act, which crowned many years of military and diplomatic strife between Poland and Moscow, can under no circumstances be neglected, not only from the point of view of the two parties to the agreement, i.e. Poland and Russia, but from the point of view of entire Eastern Europe. I shall not hesitate to affirm that a calming down of the Russo-Polish frontier exerted a not so inconsiderable impact also on the political situation in Western Europe.¹¹

A radical about-turn in Russo-Polish relations, marking the beginning of an extremely bumpy and thorny road towards mutual rapprochement and understanding, evoked the strongest repercussions in the south-east of Europe, above all in the Ukraine, the Crimea and Turkey.

The Ukraine was then already past its political prime. From one of many provinces within the Polish-Lithuanian State, which the Ukraine had been until 1648, a succession of fantastic Cossack victories in the initial period of hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky's rule catapulted that land to a status of *de facto* independence. Independence was, however, short-lived for the Ukraine, and even when Cossack successes were at their peak the constant presence of a perplexing ally—the Crimean Tartars—limited to a greater or lesser degree the freedom of movement of hetman Khmelnytsky and his Cossack atamans. The sovereignty of the Ukraine ended in 1654, after the Pereyaslav agreement, and was lost irrevocably with the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1657. Attempts to return to a union with Poland, albeit on different, more respectful conditions of a third, relatively independent partner to the Polish-Lithuanian State—the Duchy of Ruthenia—came to no avail. The idea of a Ruthenian Duchy, was from the point of view of the Polish *raison d'état* undoubtedly a rational and correct proposition in the long term; alas, it came much too late. Following the great cruel war in the Ukraine it was now unacceptable to the Polish

¹¹ Even Golovacev, *op. cit.*, *passim*, correctly pointed out that the significance of the Treaty of Andrusovo could not be restricted to the sphere of Polish-Russian relations alone.

gentry and to an overwhelming majority of the Cossacks. Above all, it was abhorrent to the peasant masses in the Ukraine.

Towards the close of the 1650s that land entered what later generations were yet to call "the ruinous period," perhaps the most tragic in its history. The Ukraine then became the scene of a fierce confrontation between Poland, Russia, the Crimean Tartars, and shortly thereafter Turkey which stood behind the last-named.¹² Each tried to capture the whole Ukraine as its own exclusive possession, while warring factions of the Cossack elders oriented themselves to one or another neighbouring power. Yet, remarkably, in the general chaos and degeneration of political life in the Ukraine, the idea of an independent Ukrainian state never quite disappeared. In the early 1660s that cause was championed by two Cossack colonels, Somko and Zolotarenko, representatives of the interests of rich Cossack superior officers and rich nobility.¹³ The year 1663 brought a *de facto* partition of the country into two lands: right and left bank, the former under Polish rule with growing Tartar ascendancy, the latter subdued by the iron heel of Moscow.

The Russo-Polish truce at Andrusovo jolted the Ukraine and prepared the ground for a further aggravation of the already tense situation in that tragic land. Quite evidently, the ending of the long-drawn-out Polish-Russian hostilities and the agreement of 30th January, 1667, were reached mainly at the cost of the Ukraine¹⁴ which was now to remain for more than a century divided right across its middle between the two powers. The tragedy of the partition dawned immediately on the entire Ukrainian community, from the landed gentry and well-to-do Cossack elders to the poor disowned Ukrainian peasants. An air of hostility towards

¹² More on that in Z. Wójcik, *Rywalizacja polsko-tatarska o Ukrainę na przełomie lat 1661/1662* [*Polish-Tartar Rivalry in the Ukraine in 1661-1662*], published in "Przegląd Historyczny," vol. XLV, 1954, No. 4; also, by idem, *Traktat andruszowski...*, pp. 42 ff.

¹³ Z. Wójcik, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

¹⁴ On the significance of the Treaty of Andrusovo for the Ukraine, see O. M. Apanovyč, *Zaporiz'ka Sič u borot'bi proty turec'ko-tatarskoj ahresii, 50-70 roki XVII st.*, Kyjiv 1961, pp. 207 ff; Ch. B. O'Brien, *Muscovy and the Ukraine from the Pereiaslavl Agreement to the Truce of Andrusovo, 1654-1667*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1963, pp. 130-131; Z. Wójcik, *Między traktatem...*, pp. 12-13; from earlier historiography, see above all Solovev, *op. cit.*, p. 188, and V. V. Volk-Karatčevskij, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

both the signatories of the Andrusovo agreement swept the entire Ukrainian people, and as a logical outcome the pro-Turkish and pro-Tartar orientation became immensely popular. In the post-Andrusovo situation the Cossacks started regarding a protectorate by the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire as possibly the best political solution for their country.¹⁵ And not without reason. Peter Doroshenko, the successor to Hetman Tetera and certainly one of the most colourful albeit controversial figures in the troubled history of the Ukraine, put his political bets on ties with Turkey. He saw the future of the Ukraine along principles similar to the status of Moldavia and Valachia, both protectorates of the Sublime Porte but both enjoying a very large extent of autonomy and sovereignty in political and even more religious aspects.¹⁶ The pro-Turkish orientation was also represented by Yuryi Khmelnytsky, the great hetman's son, though no match to Bohdan's personality and political acumen. His career in the Turkish pay was brief, bloody and grim.

Meanwhile, Poland quite desperately went about salvaging whatever was left of its former sway along the Dnieper. The left bank Ukraine, including Kiev, was now lost: formally ceded to Russia only temporarily, it was to remain in foreign hands forever. But even the right bank of the Dnieper, where neither Moscow nor anyone else formally questioned the sovereign rights of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was to all intents and purposes ungovernable. More precisely, it was governed by Doroshenko, seconded by the Crimean Tartars and Turkey that loomed behind them.

The 1660s saw a distinct revival in the Ottoman Empire's foreign policy following a fairly long period of inactivity brought on by a thoroughgoing internal crisis. Much has been written in historiography about the nature of that crisis.

Beginning with 1656, the new Ottoman government head, Grand Vizier Ahmed Köprülü, and his successors shifted the emphasis from internal onto external politics. The viziers and the Sultan Mehmed, who was but a helpless tool in their hands, re-

¹⁵ Cf. O. M. Apanovyč, *op. cit.*, p. 209, and also Z. Wójcik, *Międzynarodowe położenie Rzeczypospolitej...*, p. 34.

¹⁶ Cf. Z. Wójcik, *Między traktatem...*, p. 251; also E. Eickhoff with collaboration of T. Eickhoff, *Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen. Umbruch in Südosteuropa 1645-1700*, München 1970, p. 279.

garded war as the best and perhaps the only instrument whereby internal tensions could be eased, enormous spoils could be captured and the Sultan's coffers, whose bottoms had been scraped bare, could at long last be replenished. They saw war as panacea for all internal ills.

It seems that many historians underestimate or completely overlook ideological causes of the wars waged by Köprülü's Turkey in the latter half of the 17th century. The ideal of *jihad*, i.e. the holy war against infidels, had been worn thin. After all, Turks had proven they could coexist in an almost exemplary fashion with infidels within their own empire and could even be held up as examples of religious tolerance as early as the 16th century when stakes were ablaze throughout most of Europe, then living through the convulsion of bloody religious strife. The Turks were equally adept at coexisting with infidel neighbours and entering into close alliances with infidel European monarchs. Now, Köprülü's offensive designs, aimed against the Aegean, more particularly Crete, and against Turkey's neighbours to the north—Poland, Russia and the Roman-German Empire—all of which belonged to the Christian world—called for a revival of the idea of *jihad*.

Nor, in this author's opinion, was religion the most important element in the ideological sphere which prodded Köprülü's Turkey on to the warpath. A motive from the area of lay ideology is grossly overlooked by historians and oriental scholars, to which the author of the present article attributes special significance. It is generally known, and accordingly described in many history books,¹⁷ that as soon as Constantinople fell to the Turks the sultans started regarding themselves to be true successors to Byzantine emperors. A Polish Oriental scholar and historian writes that many specialists hear with surprise and disbelief the well-documented fact that Ottoman rulers were addressed by their subjects as, among other names, *kaiser-i-Rum*.¹⁸ The case is substantiated

¹⁷ J. Reychman, *Historia Turcji [A History of Turkey]*, Wrocław 1973, p. 54.

¹⁸ Z. Abrahamowicz, *Sultan osmański jako cesarz rzymski [The Ottoman Sultan as the Emperor of Rome—kaiser-i-Rum]*, "Sprawozdania z posiedzeń Komisji Naukowych Oddziału PAN w Krakowie", *Komisja Orientalistyczna*, vol. XV, 1971, No. 2. It seems that Abrahamowicz's findings are extremely interesting and largely correct. They no doubt require a more

by many 16th and 17th-century documents, the sultans' correspondence, and other narrative sources. Interestingly, Sulaimān the Magnificent and his successors obstinately refused to address the House of Hapsburg by their imperial title, calling them merely "Viennese kings." That practice ended with the treaty of Zsitvatörök in 1606.¹⁹

From our point of view it is important that during the Köprülü Renaissance in Turkey the issue of the Roman imperial titulature was for the Sultans as timely as ever. This is confirmed by Evliya Chelebi, the author of popular travel books in 1665, as well as by Mehmed Giray, the author of a history of Turkey and the Crimea, in his description of events preceding the Turkish expedition against Vienna in 1683. Abrahamowicz recalls that the controversy around the title of Roman emperor explains, if only partially, the cause of the persistent conflict between the Sultan and the Emperor. He then adds that "on the part of the Ottoman Empire it was probably a premeditated act disguising the Sultan's desire to reunite the Roman empire in the hands of one ruler: the Ottoman ruler."²⁰ This assumption is very probable although, let us repeat once again, the entire fascinating affair requires much further study.

Renewed Turkish expansion began in the eastern Mediterranean where, after a war of fifteen years, Ottoman forces eventually captured Crete in 1669. Even while that war was still on, the Turks were manoeuvred into a war in Transylvania which was later to develop into an all-out war with the Hapsburgs.

The war in Transylvania was significant for the further course of events in Central and Eastern Europe in that it produced clear evidence of discord between the Turks and Tartars. Khan Mehmed

extensive documentation and a more exhaustive treatment. It goes without saying that the matter of the heritage of the Roman Empire as a motive in Turkish expansion in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries cannot be neglected and treated *per non est*.

¹⁹ Z. Abrahamowicz, *op. cit.*

²⁰ *Ibidem*. From source materials published by Z. Abrahamowicz it follows quite definitely that the Turks were not after Vienna alone but that they set their sights on the capture of Rome. See *Kara Mustafa pod Wiedniem. Źródła muzułmańskie do dziejów wyprawy wiedeńskiej 1683. Z tureckiego przełożył i opracował Z. Abrahamowicz [Kara Moustapha at Vienna. Muslim Sources on the History of the Vienna Invasion in 1683. Translated from Turkish and Edited by Z. Abrahamowicz]*, Kraków 1974.

IV's independent policies carried with them important implications for international relations in Eastern Europe because the Crimean ruler looked to Poland and even to Moscow for a backing to his resistance against the Sultan. It was in Moscow that he eventually found refuge, among sworn enemies of the Crimean Tartars—the Kalmucks, following his fall from power.²¹ The Empire could no longer tolerate Mehmed's independent policies as it gathered forces to strike north of its frontiers. The Khan was therefore toppled in March 1666 and replaced by a servile Adil Giray.

That was an important preliminary for an attack against Poland with the ultimate objective of capturing the right-bank Ukraine. According to the information gleaned by Polish diplomacy, the decision to strike in that direction was reached by a special council in Istanbul,²² called by the Sultan, on a motion from Hussein Pasha, who was later to become the unfortunate adversary of John Sobieski who routed the Turks in the battle of Chotin (1673). Turkey now only waited for Crete to fall, because Turkish states were forever loath of waging war on two fronts at once.

That Turkish expansion towards the close of the 1660s suddenly turned to the north was not only caused by Köprülü's theoretical and practical conceptions in external politics. The ending of the Russo-Polish war had for Turkey very disgruntling overtones: the Andrusovo truce of 30th January, 1667, smacked of an anti-Mohammedan collusion and created a genuine menace not only to the Turkish far-flung aggressive northern plans but indeed to the very security of the Ottoman empire and above all to the security of the Crimea. The persistent threat of an anti-Turkish Holy League, which would comprise the House of Hapsburg, the Pope, and Venice, was now being compounded by a possible new alliance north of the Black Sea, one that was potentially also directed against the Ottoman Empire. Naturally, Turkey could not remain indifferent to that new development. It was probably then that the idea was born of a new war against Poland and Russia to be waged, separately of course.

There were other overtones of the truce of Andrusovo, also of

²¹ More on this in Z. Wójcik, *Traktat andruszowski...*, pp. 226–227; and *idem*, *Między traktatem...*, p. 95.

²² Z. Wójcik, *Traktat andruszowski...*, p. 201.

paramount significance for the international situation in Eastern Europe and beyond. Indeed, the impact of that truce extended beyond the Polish-Lithuanian State, Russia, the Ukraine, the Crimea and Turkey. It also affected Sweden quite seriously.

Among the principal goals of 17th-century Russia's foreign policy was gaining a foothold on the Baltic Sea, a fact amply confirmed by former Russian historians and modern Soviet historians as well. Access to the Baltic Sea was seen as indispensable for the political and even more economic development of Russia.²³ A Soviet historian is probably correct in claiming that around the middle of the 17th century Russia had reached an economic development level at which she began to need sorely its own avenues of seaborne trade to Western Europe and could no longer make do with occasional business transacted with foreign merchants frequenting Livonian harbours and certain Russian market towns.²⁴

Russia's strivings quite obviously collided with Sweden's vested interests. No doubt, the agreement of Andrusovo, by liquidating the state of war between the Polish-Lithuanian State and Muscovy, gave the latter a position conducive to dealing firmly with Sweden and working for a favourable resolution of the Baltic issue. Ordin-Nashchokin, the main Russian architect of the agreement of Andrusovo and the most influential personality in Muscovy at the time, represented the policy of conciliation with Poland with the aim of turning Russia's military effort towards the Baltic, which meant against Sweden. He desired not merely political but

²³ Source materials on this subject were published quite recently by the Soviet Estonian historian H. Piirimäe. He cited a wealth of statistical material to substantiate the thesis on the significance of Russian trade passing through the port of Narva in the latter half of the 17th century. See H. Piirimäe, *Sostav, ob'jom i raspredelenie russkogo vyvoza v 1661-1700 gg. čerez šedskije vladenija v Pribaltike na primere torgovli g. Narvi*, "Skandinavskij Sbornik," vol. V, 1962, pp. 34-94; also. *Kaubauduse küsimused Vene-Rootsi suhetes 1661-1700*, "Učenyje Zapiski Tartuskogo Gosud. Universiteta," vol. VII, p. 113, Tartu 1966 (summaries in Russian and German). For some relevant remarks, see also A. Soom, *Die Politik Schwedens bezüglich des russischen Transithandels über die estnische Städte in den Jahren 1636-1656*, Tartu 1940. A complete review of Soviet studies of Russia's Baltic trade in the 17th century was given by L. Čerepnin, *Russian 17th Century Baltic Trade in Soviet Historiography*, "The Slavonic and East European Review," vol. XLIII, 1964, No. 100.

²⁴ I. P. Saskol'skij, *Važnaja predposylka bor'by Rossii za Baltiku v XVII i načale XVIII v.*, in: *Feodal'naja Rossija vo vseмирnom, istoričeskom processe*, Moskva 1972, p. 373.

also economic cooperation with Poland, both to be employed against Sweden. He regarded the Swedish-Muscovite treaties concluded at Kardis (1661) and on the River Plusa (1666) as unfavourable in the extreme.²⁵

For Nashchokin's Baltic policy the treaty of Andrusovo was also important in that it eliminated the danger of a possible Polish-Swedish alliance which, if not posing direct military peril, would at the very least play against Moscow's interests. Such an alliance was indeed contemplated by Sweden in the summer of 1666 when Lilliehöök, the envoy of Charles XI in Poland, suggested to Poles the setting up of an anti-Russian pact. But at that date Poland was already determined to go through with a truce with its neighbour to the east and was not going to take risks. After all, only two years before the Swedes baited Poland with a mirage of a very similar pact of which eventually nothing came because the Scandinavians at the last moment changed their mind.²⁶

Thus it happened that increasing tension between Russia and Swedes beginning with 1667²⁷ was accompanied by a definite cooling off of Polish-Swedish relations which had at any rate been lukewarm at best. Sweden started quite evidently interfering with Poland's internal affairs, establishing diplomatic contacts, mainly with France and also with Brandenburg and Prince Philip William

²⁵ For more information on Nashchokin's foreign policy see E. V. Čis-tjakova, *Social'no-ekonomičeskie vzgljady A. L. Ordina Naščokina, XVII vek*, "Trudy Voronežskogo Gosud. Universiteta," vol. XX, Sbornik rabot po istorii; T. Koprejeva, *Starania Rosji o sojuz ekonomičny z Polską w walce z władztwem szwedzkim na Bałtyku (projekt zwołania konferencji w Kurlandii w 1668 r.)* [*Russia's Strivings to Set up an Economic Alliance with Poland in the Combat against Swedish Domination of the Baltic Sea (the Proposal for Calling a Conference in Kurland in 1668)*], "Kwartalnik Historyczny," vol. LXVI, 1959, No. 1; B. Fahlborg, *Sveriges yttre politik 1668-1672*, vol. I, Stockholm 1949, pp. 25 ff; G. Forsten, *Snošenija Svecii i Rossii vo vtoroj polovine XVII veka, 1648-1700*, "Žurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosvěćenija," vol. VI, 1899, p. 278.

²⁶ Z. Wójcik, *Traktat andruszowski...*, pp. 191-192; also, *Między traktatem...*, p. 22; B. Fahlborg, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-55, 525-528; W. Koonopczyński, *Polska i Szwecja od pokoju oliwskiego do upadku Rzeczypospolitej 1660-1795* [*Poland and Sweden from the Peace of Oliwa to the Demise of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 1660-1795*], Warszawa 1924, p. 8; A. Darowski, *Umowy w Andruszowie* [*Agreements in Andrusovo*], in: *Szkice Historyczne*, series 2, St. Petersburg 1891, p. 447.

²⁷ An aspect stressed explicitly by K. Zernack, *Studien zu den schwedisch-russischen Beziehungen in der 2 Hälfte des 17 Jahrhunderts, Teil I: Die diplomatische Beziehungen zwischen Schweden und Moskau von 1675 bis 1689*, Giessen 1958, p. 48.

of Neuburg, with a view to rigging the election of a new Polish king, on rumours of the intended abdication of King John Casimir. The most flagrant example of Swedish interference was the treaty concluded by that country with Brandenburg on (22nd June) 2nd July, new style (1667), in which both parties pledged themselves, in view of the forthcoming election, to give solid backing to the old political order in Poland, i.e. supporting the system of noblemen's anarchy and counteracting attempts at introducing any political reforms.²⁶ Next years were to alter the pattern of relations in the Swedish-Polish-Muscovite triangle.

But let's return to the impact of Andrusovo on the political situation in Western Europe. While the Russo-Polish border calmed down the western part of the continent was beginning to see a series of wars which were to keep rocking it for nearly half a century. The series was inaugurated by a new war between the constant rivals: the Netherlands and England (1665-1667). In 1667 Louis XIV began the so-called war of devolution against Spain, with the objective of capturing the Spanish Netherlands. A few years later, when his effort had been crowned with success, he re-directed his military machine against the Netherlands proper. The new war swiftly mobilized an entire European coalition against Louis XIV's France: the House of Hapsburg, the Netherlands, Brandenburg, Spain, Lorraine, Denmark, and many German duchies.

In those circumstances Turkey became a desired partner for France which calculated that the Austrian Hapsburgs, if brought under a pressure from the east, would soon become more amenable on the western European war theatre. French diplomatic reports reflect a rapid improvement in the relations between France and Turkey as early as 1667.²⁹ At the same time, Louis XIV

²⁶ B. Fahlborg, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 146 ff., 162-165; W. Konopczyński, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11; K. Piwarski, *Oslabienie znaczenia międzynarodowego Rzeczypospolitej w drugiej połowie XVII wieku [A Wane in the International Importance of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Latter Half of the 17th Cent.]*, "Roczniki Historyczne," vol. XXIII, 1957, p. 241.

²⁹ Cf. the report from Constantinople, dated 30th March, 1667, by de la Haye Vantelet, AAÉ, *Turquie*, 8, f. 226 ff. France's most eminent expert on 17th-century history, Victor L. Tapié, commits a serious error when he says that among the greatest blunders of Louis XIV was that he did not, like

reverted to the long-established policy of a close alliance with Sweden, a policy which was abruptly, albeit briefly, interrupted by the tripartite treaty concluded by England, Holland and Sweden in The Hague on 29th January, 1668 and aimed against the aggressive designs of the Sun-King.³⁰ And indeed, a full-time alliance was reestablished in the 1670s.

Thus French diplomacy succeeded in a high degree in rebuilding the Istanbul-Stockholm "axis" which was to serve as a counterweight to the Hapsburgs in Eastern Europe. French policy towards Poland formed part of the same grand strategy design. In accordance with old and more recent traditions of the Bourbons' foreign policy, particularly those formulated under Mazarin, he sought reestablishment of peaceful relations along the line from Stockholm, to Warsaw and to Istanbul. Relations between Sweden and Poland at the time were not fraught with the danger of another war breaking out, but relations between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire were a completely different matter.

Aggravated Polish-Turkish relations went counter to French interests while playing into Austria's and the German Reich's hands: obviously, as long as the Sultan was preparing for war on the northern front, the House of Hapsburg and the Reich had nothing to fear from Turkey. This view was fully confirmed by political events during the next 15 years after the truce of Andrusovo. The Emperor and the princes of Reich were not in danger as long as the Sultan was bogged down in the war against Poland (1672–1676) and later against Russia (1677–1681).

Therefore Emperor Leopold I, while keeping only a token force in the east, notably to keep Hungarian rebels in check, was able to move the vast majority of its forces against the French Army. There is no exaggeration in saying that exactly such a pattern of

Sobieski, go to the succour of Vienna against the Turks. See V. L. Tapié, *Nec pluribus impar*, in: *La France au temps de Louis XIV. Collection dirigée par Jacques Geimard*, Paris 1966, p. 266. Also see Z. Wójcik, *Z najnowszej literatury o Ludwiku XIV* [*Samples of the Latest Literature on Louis XIV*], "Studia Historyczne," vol. XV, 1972, No. 2, p. 267.

³⁰ For a detailed study of that period in Swedish foreign policy, see B. Fahlborg, *op. cit.*, pp. 190 ff.

forces was due to the new situation which had developed in Eastern Europe as a result of the Russo-Polish truce of 1667.³¹

France tried hard as long as it could to prevent Turkey from turning against Poland, and did whatever it could to complicate the situation on the Hapsburgs' eastern flank by aiding Hungarian rebels. A consistent French policy *vis à vis* Poland, and, more precisely speaking, towards the new King, John III Sobieski, bore some fruit within a relatively short time. Interestingly, in the event, the Hapsburg element played an insignificant part, as Louis XIV and John III Sobieski suddenly found common ground when faced by a common enemy : Brandenburg. The mission of winning the Polish King to the idea of a united front with France against the Kurfürst Frederick William was given to the French ambassador to Warsaw, the bishop of Marseilles, Mgr. Forbin-Janson, who was vigorously seconded by his Swedish colleague in Warsaw, Liliehöök.

John III accepted the Franco-Swedish initiative because it coincided quite neatly with his own policy designs and dynastic plans. His cherished dream was to secure for himself or his son East Prussia as a hereditary rule. Thus King Sobieski embarked on a new policy which has since gone down in historiography as his Baltic policy.³²

Its outward expression was to be the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth setting up a close alliance with France and Sweden

³¹ V. von Rauch, *Moskau und die europäische Mächte des 17 Jahrhunderts*, "Historische Zeitschrift," vol. CLXXVIII, 1954, No. 1, p. 39; Z. Wójcik, *Zmiana w układzie sil...*, p. 43; also by idem, *Między traktatem...*, pp. 24-25.

³² For more on this policy, see above all K. Piwarski, *Polityka bałtycka Jana III w latach 1675-1679* [The Baltic Policy of John III, 1675-1679], in : *Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Wacława Sobieskiego*, vol. I, Kraków 1932; also J. Woliński, *Sprawa pruska 1673-1675 i traktat jaworowski* [The Prussian Issue, 1673-1675, and the Treaty of Jaworów], 2nd ed., in : *Z dziejów wojny i polityki w dobie Jana Sobieskiego*, Warszawa 1960; also, K. F. Birnbaum, *Johan Sobieskis svenska förbindelser 1674-1677*, in : *Karolinska Förbundets Arsbok*, 1950; also, R. Hoffsted, *Sveriges utrikespolitik under krigsåren 1675-1679*, Uppsala 1943, *passim*; also, K. Zernack, *Studien zu den schwedisch-russischen Beziehungen in der 2 Hälfte des 17 Jahrds, Teil 1—Die diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Schweden und Moskau von 1675 bis 1689*, Giessen 1958, pp. 81-89; also, A. Kamińska-Linderska, *Między Polską a Brandenburgią. Sprawa lenna łęborsko-bytowskiego w drugiej połowie XVII wieku* [Between Poland and Brandenburg. The Issue of the Łębork-Bytów Fiefdom in the Latter Half of the 17th Cent.], Wrocław 1966, pp. 120-176.

against the common enemy of the three: Brandenburg. The Sun-King had assigned to Poland and Sweden the role of diversionary forces which were to attack the Kurfürst's domains from the eastern flank—beginning with Ducal Prussia (later East Prussia).

From our point of view at this juncture it is important that for Sobieski's Baltic policy to succeed it was first necessary to wind up the Turkish war and reach a *modus vivendi* with the Ottoman Empire. At any rate, it was a condition put to the Polish King by the French monarch and his diplomats. Louis XIV knew only too well that, unless peace with Turkey was reached, the Poles had precious little chance of taking an offensive action against the Kurfürst in Prussia and against the Hapsburgs in Hungary. Thus Louis XIV made promised subsidies for the Brandenburg war conditional on ending the war with Turkey. In the event the Polish-French alliance was concluded even before a Polish-Turkish armistice agreement was signed.

On 11th June, 1675, a secret Polish-French treaty, its cutting edge directed against Brandenburg, was signed at Jaworów in the Red Ruthenia province, Louis XIV promised financial aid to John III in the latter's contemplated action against Ducal Prussia. What was more, and therein lay the main benefit for Poland, Louis XIV promised that in a future treaty with the hostile coalition of Austria-Brandenburg-Holland he would give proper play to the Polish King's claim to Prussia.³³

On 17th October, 1676, John III signed at Żurawno preliminaries to a peace treaty with Turkey, and on 4th August, 1677, a secret treaty with Sweden in Gdańsk.³⁴ Jaworów, Żurawno, Gdańsk were symbolic for the turn in Poland's foreign policy, so characteristic of Sobieski's early period. However, his attempts at capturing East Prussia, be it for the Crown or for his own offspring, came to grief shortly thereafter, owing above all to the

³³ K. Waliszewski, *Archiwum Spraw Zagranicznych francuskie do dziejów Jana III* [The French Archive des Affaires Étrangères As Source to the History of John III's Period], vol. I, in: *Acta Historica Res Gestas Poloniae Illustrantia*, vol. III, Kraków 1879, pp. 210–212. For a discussion thereof, see J. Woliński, *op. cit.*, pp. 54–55.

³⁴ The definite date of the treaty was found by J. Woliński following a study of the original text of the treaty and an annex thereto which had not hitherto been known. Cf. J. Woliński, *Traktat gdański 1677 r.* [The Treaty of Gdańsk, 1677], in: *Teki Archiwalne*, No. 5, 1957.

inaptness of the late allies—Swedes—whose diversionary action in Ducal Prussia came too late and ended in complete failure.³⁵

There was another, and perhaps even more important, reason behind the misfiring of Sobieski's Baltic plans. A powerful and very influential internal opposition wing, with the wealthy magnate families of Pac, Leszczyński and Trzebicki, adeptly exploited and abetted by Brandenburg and Austrian agents, stood in his way. In fact, Sobieski's Baltic designs³⁶ had to come to grief because the King had acted in nearly complete isolation and secrecy (both the Jaworów and Gdańsk treaties were secret), in the face of a common opposition of the gentry and magnate families who regarded the monarch's pro-French and pro-Swedish leanings as revolting. Evidence of the solid opposition was the Diet (Sejm) of 1677 which imposed on John III a *renovatio pactorum* with the Kurfürst and the Emperor,³⁷ contrary to Sobieski's deepest intentions and exactly at a time when his anti-Brandenburg and anti-Austrian policy was at peak intensity. The opposition went so far as to imply that the King might be dethroned if he went ahead with his programme.³⁸

On the other hand, one should realize that even in the best circumstances and assuming considerable Swedish military successes in Prussia, Sobieski's Baltic policy could never succeed. The key to the success was in Paris, held firmly by the French monarch; this monarch in 1679 radically changed his inimical position towards the Kurfürst who, following the pact of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, became one of the most trusted allies of Louis XIV. The latter immediately lost all interest in seconding the anti-Brandenburg designs of the Polish King. Wanting French support, the Baltic policy of John III stood no chance of success.

The question might be asked: now that we know it had from the outset been doomed to failure, what significance did Sobieski's

³⁵ For more on that, see K. Piwarski, *Polityka bałtycka Jana III...*, pp. 252 ff. For details concerning the misfiring of the Swedish offensive in East Prussia, see T. Hirsch, *Der Winterfeldzug in Preussen 1678-1679*, Berlin 1897.

³⁶ See K. Piwarski, *op. cit.*, pp. 240 ff.

³⁷ K. Piwarski, *op. cit.*, p. 218; also by the same, *Oslabienie znaczenia międzynarodowego Rzeczypospolitej...*, pp. 242-244.

³⁸ K. Piwarski, *Oslabienie znaczenia międzynarodowego Rzeczypospolitej...*, p. 244.

policy really have ; did it make any impact on the international position of Poland ?

Let us start with the second question. Sobieski's early policy up to 1679 reflected his broad political vision, created fine future prospects not only for the House of Sobieski but indeed for the Polish-Lithuanian State, by hammering out a union with the Franco-Swedish bloc it reinforced Poland's position *vis à vis* Brandenburg, Austria and even Russia, it made the Polish-Lithuanian State a looming and very real threat for the aggressive Kurfürst, and consequently built up the importance of this country as a European power.

From the point of view of European politics at large the policy of the Polish King between 1675 and 1679 was also significant in that it effectively paralyzed Brandenburg's military effort in its war against Sweden and France. The Polish historian Kazimierz Piwarski has thus described the importance of Sobieski's early plans :

"While John III clearly failed to put into life his Baltic programme and did not succeed in securing East Prussia for Poland or his own son in view of insurmountable obstacles, nonetheless his policies between 1675 and 1679 were instrumental in depriving Frederick William of the fruit of his victories over Sweden and effectively in postponing by yet another half century the moment when the House of Hohenzollern captured the Odra River estuary."³⁹

Prominently figuring among those insurmountable obstacles was the matter of relations with Turkey. The intense efforts of French diplomacy and the peaceful intentions of the Polish monarch notwithstanding, the Żurawno armistice agreement was not translated into the letter and spirit of a permanent peace between Warsaw and the Empire. The treaty, signed in Istanbul in 1678 by the Polish envoy Jan Gniński, and based on articles of the Żurawno armistice agreement, not only spelled out conditions that were highly disadvantageous for the Polish side, but was purpose-

³⁹ K. Piwarski, *Polityka bałtycka...*, p. 265.

ly turned into a humiliating ceremony.⁴⁰ Lasting peace between the two powers could quite certainly be ruled out.

The matter of relations with Moscow was closely related to the Turkish problem. At the cornerstone of the Russo-Polish truce concluded at Andrusovo in 1667 there was the constant menace posed by Turkey and the Crimea in the period of the Köprülü family ruling the Ottoman Empire through a succession of viziers. The menace, though very real and affecting both countries equally, was not so strong as to override the conflict of interests between Warsaw and Moscow. The conflict was especially aggravated by the controversy over territories captured by Moscow in the course of the Russo-Polish war of 1654–1667.

The idea of an anti-Turkish military pact with Muscovy, so much alive in Poland from the time of the first treaty of Andrusovo and even more from the Moscow treaty concluded towards the end of 1667, had not materialized by 1672, when the Sultan's armies invaded Poland, and remained pure abstraction in 1677 when a new Turkish avalanche embroiled Chigirin.⁴¹

Andrzej Trzebicki, the bishop of Cracow, wrote in 1675 in a letter to Hetman Michał Pac: "May the Lord give us this alliance as soon as possible [...] because the King looks to that Muscovite

⁴⁰ The main source material on Gniński's mission: *Źródła do poselstwa Jana Gnińskiego, wojewody chełmińskiego do Turcji w latach 1677–1678...* [Sources on the Mission by Jan Gniński, Voivode of Chelmno, to Turkey in 1677–1678...], published by Franciszek Pułaski, Warszawa 1907. See also the most recent study on the subject: Z. Wójcik, *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji 1674–1679. Studium z dziejów polskiej polityki zagranicznej* [The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth vis à vis Turkey and Russia, 1674–1679. A Study in the History of Polish Foreign Policy], Wrocław 1975. Very interesting first-hand information on the vicissitudes and final outcome of the mission is given by M. de la Croix, secretary of the French Embassy in Constantinople, in a work entitled *Guerres de Turcs avec la Pologne, la Muscovie et la Hongrie*, The Hague 1689, pp. 74 ff. In it, we read among other things (p. 79): "Enfin il [i.e. Gniński] fut obligé de recevoir des capitulations telles qu'il plut au visir de les lui accorder et dont les formes et les façons de parler ressemblerent plutot à des loix qu'un Empereur importe à son vassal qu'à un traité d'alliance entre deux souverains [...]" A negative assessment of the results of the Gniński mission was also given by the English ambassador to Constantinople Sir John Finch (*Under the Turk in Constantinople. A Record of Sir John Finch's Embassy 1674–1681* by C. F. Abbott..., London 1920, pp. 253–254).

⁴¹ Z. Wójcik, *Znaczenie wieku XVII w historii stosunków polsko-rosyjskich...*, p. 90; also idem, *Między traktatem...*, p. 307; also W. Leitsch, *op. cit.* p. 150.

conjunction for a defense of the country and indeed of all the Christian world.”⁴²

But, contrary to many diplomats' desires, relations with Muscovy went from bad to worse, and therefore Poles were increasingly aware of the need to wind up the war with the Turks. This awareness did not exclude, and that is a remarkable fact, the possibility of eventually attaining a working *modus vivendi* with both neighbours to the east and south-east.

This tendency was formulated in clear-cut terms by Kazimierz Stanisław Bieniewski, the voivode of Chernigov and one of the most brilliant politicians and diplomats of his time. Voivode Bieniewski, who was the author, on Poland's side, of the famous Polish-Ukrainian union of Gadiach in 1658, conceived as a document opening a new era in Polish-Ukrainian relations, presented to King John III, shortly after the latter's coronation, an extensive and singularly interesting memorial.⁴³ In it, Bieniewski took under a deep, all-round and largely correct scrutiny the political relations between Poland and Russia, with special reference to their Turkish and Ukrainian aspects. Some of his observations are capital, for example :

“I have been warning that I see the end of the Tsar's intentions in waxing high to become the monarch of all the Russias, much as Vladimir Monomachus had been one, so that, having made himself the Autocrat of the Russians, he can, without any assist from other Christian states, alone override the Turkish might.”

Yet, despite such a critical appraisal of the intentions of Muscovy's foreign policy, Bieniewski insisted that Poland should tie its hands neither with Turkey against Russia nor with Russia against Turkey, that Poland should strive to coexist peacefully with both so that it can safely play one against the other.

The Polish-Turkish armistice caused a deterioration in the already frail Russo-Polish relations. This, combined with the out-

⁴² Bishop Trzebicki to Hetman Michał Pac, Cracow, 31st July, 1675, the National Museum in Cracow, the Czartoryski Collection, MS 429, p. 85.

⁴³ Kazimierz Bieniewski to John III, without venue or date (1675, *terminus ad ad quem*—the date of the death of the Tsar Alexey, i.e. March 1676), Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych in Warsaw, the Zamoyski Archives, No. 3031, p. 63 ff. For a detailed discussion thereof, see Z. Wójcik, *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji 1674–1679...*

break of a new war between the Ottoman Empire and Muscovy, opened a prospect, the first in many years, for a peaceful pattern of relations between Poland and Turkey and, possibly, even more: a Polish-Turkish alliance directed against Russia was not unthinkable.

As we know, however, Gniński's mission to Istanbul completely miscarried owing both to the low ebb of Poland's prestige and to Turkey's big-power chauvinism. All programmes of cooperation with the Empire, to say nothing of a possible military alliance, came down like a house of cards at the very moment when the Polish monarch, in gross disaffection towards Russia, had been giving much thought to entering into a league with Turkey.⁴⁴

And thus it happened that the Turkish menace once again had become the talk of the town in Poland, and the deep humiliation suffered by Poland in the person of its envoy Gniński, brought the minds of Poles to thoughts of retaliation. At about the same time the calming down of Western European battle-fronts made Sobieski's Baltic policy sound hollow. Consequently, the Polish King had to abandon his former plans among which a turnaround in relations with Turkey figured so prominently.

In 1678 Polish diplomats succeeded to extend, on *status quo* principles, the provisions of the truce of Andrusovo with Muscovy to last another 13 years beyond the original expiry date, i.e. until 1693. The new agreement was negotiated by a Polish mission led by Michał Czarторыcki, the voivode of Volhynia.⁴⁵ The mission was important not solely on account of the part it played in the history of Polish diplomacy and in the history of Russo-Polish relations but also on account of bringing to light certain divergencies in the positions and attitudes adopted by the Polish (Michał Czarторыcki) as opposed to the Lithuanian members of the delegation (Jan Sapieha and Hieronim Komar).⁴⁶ The mission's secretary Hieronim Komar, the judge of Orsza county, confided to Russian diplomats

⁴⁴ For more on this and other aspects of the Polish-Turkish-Russian relations, see Z. Wójcik, *op. cit.* See also J. Stoye, *The Siege of Vienna*. London 1964, pp. 39-46.

⁴⁵ For more about that mission, see above all Z. Wójcik, *op. cit.*, and from early literature E. E. Zamylovskij, *Snošenija Rossii s Polšej v carstvovanie Fiodora Alekseviča*, in: *Zurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosvěščenija*, 1888, Part 225.

⁴⁶ About this, see Zamylovskij, *op. cit.*

during a private conversation that the Lithuanian Senate took a different view of relations between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia than the Crown (Polish) Senate did, because Lithuania was striving to establish the best possible relations with Muscovy.

The episode should not be overplayed, yet the more general aspect it signalled has cardinal importance. Without going into details, the following general observation can be made: the latter half of the 17th century, having seen a succession of defeats and ill luck in the Russo-Polish wars waged almost without a pause between 1654 and 1667, caused the rise of separatist tendencies in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. These tendencies were reflected in, among other things, the desire to hammer out a peace treaty with Muscovy at almost any cost and contrary to Polish standpoint. This pro-Muscovite part in Lithuania was led by the wealthy family of Pac, represented by the family senior member, the Grand Hetman of Lithuania Michał Pac.⁴⁷ In the event, a crisis situation and an open rift were avoided.

By 1679, the conviction that a new war with Turkey was inevitable and that the Polish-Lithuanian State could ill-afford to wage such a war alone gained popular currency in Poland. Thus the idea of an anti-Turkish league was born, and the Muscovite state was to be Poland's main partner in such a league. Therefore an alliance with Muscovy again became the principal objective of Poland's foreign policy.

In that year a new big Polish mission arrived in Moscow, led by the consummate diplomat and expert on Russian affairs, Lithuanian referendary Cyprian Paweł Brzostowski. On that occasion one could hear for the last time of Afanasiy Ordin-Nashchokin, now the monk Anthony, the great Russian statesman, who had to be summoned especially for the negotiations to Moscow from a remote monastery where he had been locked up for several years in exile. The mission ended in complete failure. Despite a war being waged against Turkey the Russians declined to give Poland

⁴⁷ Cf. Z. Wójcik, *Pacowie wobec kandydatury moskiewskiej na tron Polski w latach 1668–1669. Misja Polkowa na Litwie, 1668 [The Pac Family and the Moscow Candidacy to the Polish Throne in 1668–1669. The Polkov Mission in Lithuania, 1668]*, "Przegląd Historyczny," vol. LX, 1969, No. 1.

any assistance against that selfsame Turkey.⁴⁸ They would not be sold on the impressive Polish project of wiping out the Crimea by a joint military effort, a project drawn up personally by the Polish monarch and handed over in Moscow by envoy Brzostowski.⁴⁹ One reason for the flat rejection of the Polish offers was, as it had been in Istanbul, the dissipated state of the Polish armed forces; another was Muscovy's dogged determination to bring the war with Turkey to a swift conclusion.

Having suffered a defeat in the second Chigirin campaign (1678) the Russians apparently became more pliable to look for a *modus vivendi* with the Ottoman Empire. The Russian envoys Vasil Daudov and Fedor Starkov went to Istanbul while the Moscow government also negotiated an exchange of prisoners of war with the Crimea.⁵⁰ Then, on instructions from the Sublime Empire, George Duca, the hospodar of Moldavia, offered his good offices to act as mediator between Turkey and Russia.⁵¹

The failure of Brzostowski's mission was a painful blow to Poland and personally to King John III as it crossed all plans of building an anti-Turkish league of the Christian nations, a league which, despite facts of life, was conceived by Polish politicians as forming the cornerstone of the state's international security. Once again the truth was brought home that Muscovy was a difficult and tough negotiator. The Russian government did not intend to have their hands bound by an offensive-defensive alliance with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, much less return to it the annexed territories. Indeed, Moscow quite definitely set its sights on the task of subordinating to its rule the whole of the Ukraine.⁵²

Bad news signalled by Polish diplomats in Moscow and the obvious fiasco of the whole initiative which had been so painstakingly prepared aroused serious alarm in Warsaw. When only a short time before the inevitability of another war with Turkey seemed apparent to everyone, now, in the autumn of 1679, as it

⁴⁸ Z. Wójcik, *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji...*

⁴⁹ The royal memorial dated Grodno, 18th April, 1679, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych in Warsaw, Nabytki 102 b.

⁵⁰ More on this in N. A. Smirnov, *Rossija i Turcija v XVI, XVII vv.*, vol. II, Moskva 1946, pp. 162-163.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 164.

⁵² Z. Wójcik, *op. cit.*

was some years ago, voices were heard calling for a conciliation with the Sublime Porte.⁵³

The Poles tried yet once again to secure Russia's military assistance against the Turks and Tartars. The mission was given to Konstanty Tomicki who arrived in Moscow in 1680. His mission ended in failure too.⁵⁴

In the meantime the Russo-Turkish war seemed to be bogging down despite the Turkish success at Czehryń in 1678. Moscow used the respite for military as well as diplomatic purposes. Missions were now sent out not only to Poland but also to Austria. A large group of Russian diplomats, headed by Ivan Buturlin and Ivan Chaadayev went to Vienna via Warsaw. In Vienna, Russian suggestions for a tripartite Polish-Austrian-Russian coalition against the Ottoman Empire went unheeded. Austria's Hapsburgs were preoccupied with the affairs of Western Europe and preparations for another round of fighting with Louis XIV. Emperor Leopold I could not in such circumstances engage in a war against the Turks. And in any way, Austria had from the time of the truce of Andrusovo in 1667 considered Turkey an innocuous party, compelled to concentrate its military effort against Russia and Poland. Austrian statesmen were shortly to be proven wrong.

Moscow found itself in a tight spot following the failure of talks with Austria and Poland. To continue waging the war on Turkey all alone was beyond its military and economic capacity. Peace had to be concluded with the Turks before new military successes could even be thought of.

The Russian diplomats Tyapkin and Zotov went on a peace mission to the Crimea at the close of the summer of 1680. Several months of extremely tough negotiations followed, crowned in January 1681 by the conclusion of a truce with the Khan of the Crimea. The pact was ratified by Sultan Mehmed IV in March of the following year, thereby effectively ending the state of war between Russia, on the one hand, and Turkey and the Crimea, on the other. The truce agreement was concluded for twenty years, with the river Dnieper recognized as the frontier line, with the

⁵³ *Ibidem.*

⁵⁴ Warsaw University Library, MS 73.

exception of Kiev and its area which was to remain in Russian possession, albeit situated on the western bank of the river. The Ukrainian territory between the Dnieper and the Boh (Jużnyj Bug) to remain an unsettled desert for military considerations. Zaporożhe was handed over to the Turks.

The treaty of Bakhchisarai brought to a close the first round of Russo-Turkish wars. It meant that Russia successfully withstood the Turkish onslaught, even though the Russian armed forces showed considerable flaws in their standards of preparedness. In that sense, the Bakhchisarai treaty differed quite fundamentally from those of Buczacz and Żurawno: it spelled out conditions more favourable for Moscow than the two former pacts gave to Poland. It also showed that the provision of the Moscow treaty of 1667, whereby Poland was to act in collaboration with Russia and against the Tartars and Turks, was largely meaningless.

The truce negotiated in Bakhchisarai freed Turkey's hands to turn with redoubled energy against Austria.

And so, despite a new situation which arose in effect of the January 1681 treaty, a clash between Turkey and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was inevitable. Poland had to look for allies other than Russia, which had so far been completely unreliable. The allies were found in the Austrian House of Hapsburg with whom Poland concluded an anti-Turkish pact shortly thereafter. Thus the Polish-Lithuanian State eventually established working contacts neither with Turkey against Russia nor with Russia against Turkey but with Austria and the Holy League against the Ottoman Empire.

The Turks' aggressive endeavours in Central Europe and the desirability of winning Russia over to the cause of an anti-Turkish league of nations eventually had to bring Poland and Russia to terms with each other. A first step in that direction was the "eternal peace" treaty concluded between the two states in 1686.

(Translated by Jerzy Jastrzębowski)