

Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences

Preprints

TRANSITION TO ADVANCED MARKET ECONOMIES



Abstracts

of papers prepared for the IFORS Specialized Conference

June 22-25, 1992, Warsaw, Poland

Edited by

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SESSION 12

CONFLICTS, GAMES AND SHARING

Part 12B

**A NOTE ON MONOTONIC CORE ALLOCATION
PRINCIPLES**

Luo Xiao and Li Mi'an

**THE ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES WITH A VARIABLE
POPULATION**

Luo Xiao and Li Mi'an

**AN APPROACH TO SUM-FUZZY RATIONAL CHOICE BASED
ON THE NEURAL THEORY**

Luo Xiao, Wang Hongweij and Li Mi'an

MODELS OF CONFLICTS IN MULTINATIONAL STATES

Miroslav Manas

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Conflicts in multinational states may be studied by using the apparatus of the game theory, particularly using the description of coalition conflicts in the characteristic function form. The results should provide an answer to the question under which conditions a multinational state has a chance to survive as a unitary state and when the state has a tendency to be decomposed into the set of independent national states. The modelling procedure consists in the following steps: (1) Specify which nationalities are potentially able to create an independent state. (2) Specify whether there are some other groups (army, regions, etc.) having interests in unitarism or separatism. (3) Code the motivation of the nationalities and groups into the values of the characteristic function. (4) Study whether the conflict described by the characteristic function has a (nonempty) core.

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